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OUTLINES 



OF 



IMPERFECT AND DISORDERED 



MENTAL ACTION. 



BY 

THOMAS C. UPHAM, 

PROFESSOR OP MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN 
BOWDOIN CPLLEGE. 



)WDOIN Cpi 



NEW-YORK: 

HARPER & BROTHERS, 82 CLIFF- STREET. 
18 4 0. 






Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1840, by 

Harper & Brothers, 

In the Clerk's Office of the Southern District of New- York. 



Ortftfrom 
MiM Attorn H. 

Jam 6,XS82 




MAR2 1944 




PREFACE 



In undertaking to prepare the present volume^ 
I was strongly infiaenced by a conviction of the 
practical importance of the subject. It is perhaps 
true, that the public mind is but little informed, cer- 
tainly much less than it should be, in relation to the 
true doctrines of regular or normal mental action ; 
but it is, undoubtedly, much more ignorant of the 
philosophy of defective and disordered mental ac- 
tion. Nor is it surprising that this should be the 
case, when we consider that but very few writers, 
even of those who have professedly devoted them- 
selves to mental inquiries, have particularly investi- 
gated this portion of the Philosophy of Mind. It 
has, in fact, been almost totally neglected, except by 
a few learned and philosophical writers of the med- 
ical profession, who, in the discharge of their pro- 
fessional duties, could not Well avoid giving some 
attention to this subject. But the books of these 
writers, of great value as they undoubtedly are, 
are for the most part taken up with the consider- 
ation of disordered mental action as it is connect- 
ed particularly with the physical system, and with 
various practical directions having relation to the 
treatment of insane persons. These works were 
not designed for popular circulation ; nor, as a 
matter of fact, has this been the case. 

Under these circumstances, it naturally suggested 
A 



IV PREFACR. 

itself to the proprietors of the Family Library that 
something might be prepared on this subject which 
would be both interesting and useful. In underta- 
king this task, although I had for some time direct- 
ed my attention to inquiries of this nature, I deeply 
felt my inability to do justice to a subject hitherto 
considered so doubtful in its principles, and univer- 
sally acknowledged to be exceedingly complicated 
in its relations. Believing, however, that such a 
work might be practically useful, and that, in fact, 
it was much needed, I was willing to do what I 
could in the somewhat narrow limits which the 
plan of the Family Library allowed me. I have 
therefore laid down the outlines of this great sub- 
ject in the manner which facts and nature seemed 
to me to dictate, and with a sincere regard to what 
seemed to me to be the truth. As the work is de- 
signed for popular reading as much and even more 
than for men of science, I have endeavoured to be 
simple and natural in the plan of inquiry as well 
as in style. I commit it to the reader in the hope 
that he will accept whatever merit the work has, 
and regard it leniently in whatever it may fall 
short of his reasonable expectations. 

Thomas C. Upham. 

Bowdoin College, Oct,^ 1839. 



CONTENTS 



INTRODUCTION. 

CHAP. I. — OUTLINES OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Section Page 

1. Extent and importance of the subject to be examined 17 

2. Necessity of some preliminary or introductory State- 

ments 19 

3. The idea of Insanity of Mind predicated on that of 

Sanity 20 

4. Outhnes of the Constitution of the Mind . . .21 

5. Further considerations on the same subject . . 23 

6. Of the Intellect, particularly the External Intellect . 24 

7. Of the Conceptive Power and Conceptions . . 25 

8. Of the External Intellect in connexion with peculiari- 

ties of character 26 

9. Of the Internal Intellect, or the Intellect as it is brought 

into action, independently of the direct agency of 
the Senses 27 

10. Of the Nature of Original Suggestion . . .29 

11. Consciousness another form of Internal mental action 30 

12. Of Relative Suggestion or Judgment . . . .32 

13. Of the Nature of the Reasoning Power . . .33 

14. Remarks on the Imagination 35 

15. Of other important Intellectual Principles . . .36 

16. Of the SensibiUties in Distinction from the Intellect . 37 

17. Other and more Subordinate Divisions of the Sensibil- 

ities .38 

18. Of the Will, and its Relation to the other Powers . 40 

CHAP. II. — CONNEXION BETWEEN THE MIND AND BODY. 

%9. The Origin of many mental disorders to be found in 

the Connexion between the mind and the body . 42 

20. The Mind constituted on the Principle of a Connexion 

with the Body 44 

21. Illustration of the subject from the effects of old age . 45 

22. The Connexion of the body and mind farther shown 

from the effects of diseases 46 

23. Shown also from the effects of stimulating drugs and 

gases . . . 47 



yi CONTJENTS. 

Section Fage 

24. Influence on the Body of Excited Imagination and Pas- 

sion . . . ... . . . .49 

25. Connexion of the Mental Action with the Brain . 51 

26. Of the Brain, considered as a part of one great Senso- 

rial Organ 53 

27. Relation of these Views to the General Subject . . 54 

CHAP. JJI. — GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OP THE SUBJECT. 

,28. The Classification of Insane mental action should be 

predicated on that of Sound mental action . . 56 

29. Defects in early Classifications, and Improvements of 

them . . . 57 

30. The Inquiry naturally begins with the External Intel- 

lect . . . . . . . . . .59 

31. Proceeds from the External to the Internal Intellect . 61 

32. Is continued in the Sensibilities and the Will . .62 

33. Of popular adaptation, combined with philosophical 

precision . . . . . . . . .63 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE EXTERNAL JN- 
TPLLECT. 

CHAPTER I. 



NATURE OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION 

34. Remarks on the Nature of Sensation . 

35. All Sensation is properly and truly in the mind 

36. Of the Actual Process in cases of Sensation 

37. Of the Meaning and Nature of Perception 



67 
68 
69 
70 



38. Of the Connexion between Sensation and Perception 71 

CHAPTER II. 

BISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

(l.) THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. 

39. Circumstances attending Disordered Sensations . 72 

40. Disordered Perceptions consequent on Disordered Sen- 

sations 74 

41. Of Disordered Sensations and Perceptions, connected 

with the Organ of Smell 75 

42. Statements Illustrative of the Preceding Section . 77 

43. Of Disordered Sensations and Perceptions connected 

with the Sense of Taste 79 

44. Illustrations of the foregoing Views in connexion with 

Disordered Taste 82 



CONTENTS. • Vll 

CHAPTER III. 
DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. . 

(ll.) THE SENSE OF HEARING. 
Section F^ 

45. Of Disordered Sensations and Perceptions in connex- 

ion with the Hearing 84 

46. Facts illustrative of Disordered Auditory Sensations 

and Perceptions 85 

47. Of the Brain in connexion with Diseased Auditory 

states of Mind 86 

48. Third Cause of Disordered Auditory Sensations and 

Perceptions 89 

49. The Disordered auditory Sensations of the poet Cow- 

per 91 

CHAPTER IV. 

DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
(III.) THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 

60. Disordered Sensations and Perceptions connected with 

the Sense of Touch 93 

51. Facts illustrative of Tactual Disorders . . .94 

52. Other cases illustrative of Disordered Sensations and 

Perceptions 97 

53. Application of these views to the Witchcraft Delusion 

in New -England 98 

CHAPTER V. 

DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION, 

(IV.) THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 

54. Of the Outward or Physical Organ of the Sensations 

and Perceptions of Sight 100 

55. Disordered Visual Sensations and Perceptions . . 101 

56. The Preceding Views confirmed by the analogy of the 

other Senses 102 

57. Illustrations of the Subject from the use of Opium . 104 

58. Disordered Action may exist in connexion with more 

than one Sense at the same time .... 105 

59. Of Disordered Perceptions in connexion with excited 

Religious Feehng . 106 

60. Concluding Remarks on Disordered Sensation and Per- 

ception 108 



VIU CONTENTS, 



CHAPTER VI. 

EXCITED OR DISORDERED CONCEPTIONS. 

Section Page 

61. On the General Psychological Nature of Conceptions 109 
|62. There may be Disordered Conceptions connected with 

the Action of all the Senses 110 

(53. Of the less permanent Excited Conceptions of Sight .111 
(64. The Conceptive Power may be placed in a wrong po- 
sition by habit . . . . . . . . 113 

65. Of Permanently Disordered Conceptions . . . 115 

66. Of disordered Conceptions, combined with a disor- 

dered State of the outward Organs . . . .117 

67. Of the original Causes of inordinately excited Concep- 

tions . . . . . . . , . .118 

68. Instance illustrative of this Subject .... 120 



CHAPTER Vn. 

SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 

69. Of the General Nature of Spectral Illusions or Appa- 

' ritions . . 123 

70. First Cause of the States of Mind termed Apparitions. ' 

—Neglect of Periodical Bloodletting . . . 124 

71. Methods of Relief adopted in this case . . .128 

72. Second Cause of Spectral Illusions or Apparitions. — 

Attacks of Fever . . . . . . . 129 

73. Third Cause of Apparitions. — Inflammation of the Brain 131 

74. Facts having relation to the third Cause of Apparitions 133 

75. Fourth Cause of Spectral Illusions or Apparitions. — 

Hysteria . . . . .... . 134 

76. Of Ghosts and other Spectral Appearances . . 135 

77. Other Circumstances characteristic of their recurrence 136 

78. Farther Illustrations and Remarks on the same Sub- 

ject . . . . . . . . . .138 

79. Remarks of Walter Scott on the subject of Ghost- 

stories ... . . . . . .139 

CHAPTER VIII. 

DISORDERED STATE OF THE POWER OP ABSTRACTION. 

80. Remarks on the general Nature of this Power . . 142 

81. Farther considerations on the Nature of this Power . 143 

82. Of Natural Defect in the Power of Abstraction . . 144 

83. Illustrations of natural Defect in this Power . ' .146 



CONTENTS. IX 

I 
Section Page 

84. Of excessive facility and Profoundness in the Abstract- 

ing Power 147 

85. Further Illustrations of this Topic . . . .149 

86. Illustration from Bruyere's Manners of the Age . 152 

87. Other instances illustrative of excessive Abstraction . 154 

CHAPTER IX. 

DISORDERED ATTENTION. 

88. Of the general nature of Attention .... 157 

89. Of differences in the Degree of Attention . . .159 

90. Of Absence of Mind, or inability to fix the Attention . 160 

91. Illustration of inordinately weak or disordered Atten- 

tion 161 

92. Cases of sudden failure of the Attention . . . 163 

93. Additional illustration of this disordered Action . . 166 

94. Of the course to be taken to restore the power of At- 

tention 166 

CHAPTER X. 

ON DREAMING. 

95. General statement in regard to Dreams . , . 169 

96. Connexion of Dreams with our waking Thoughts . 170 

97. Dreams are often caused by our Sensations . . 171 

98. Explanation of thp incoherency of Dreams . . . 172 

99. Apparent reality of Dreams. (1st cause.) . . . 173 

100. Apparent reality of Dreams. (2d cause.) . . . 175 

101. Of our estimate of time in Dreaming .... 176 
i02. Dreams sometimes lay the foundation of a permanent- 
ly disordered state of Mind 177 

X03. Mental disorder sometimes developes itself in connex- 
ion with Dreams . , 178 

104. Case of destruction of life arising from a Dream . 180 

CHAPTER XI. 

SOMNAMBULISM. 

105. General view of Somnambulism . . . • . 181 

106. Singular instance of Somnambulism .... 182 

107. Of the senses falling to sleep in succession . . 183 

108. Similar views applicable to the muscles . . .185 

109. Of the connexion of Somnambulism with Dreaming . 185 

110. Further illustrations of Somnambulism . . .188 

111. Reference to the case of Jane Rider . . . .189 



CONTENTS. 



DISORDERED ACTION OF THE INTERNAL INTEL- 
LECT. 

CHAPTER I. 

DISORDERED SUGGESTION. 
Section Page 

112. Of the Internal in distinction from the External Intel- 

lect 193 

113. Original suggestion to be regarded as a distinct power 

of the Mind 194 

114. Insanity in connexion with the conviction of personal 

Identity 196 

115. Disordered mental action in connexion with the idea 

of Space . . . 198 

116. Disordered mental action in connexion with Time . 200 

117. Further illustrations of disordered Time . . . 203 

118. Varieties or peculiarities in disordered ideas of Thne . 204 

CHAPTER II. 

DISORDERED CONSCIOtJSNESS. 

119. Of the meaning of the term Consciousness . . .206 

120. Two forms of disordered Consciousness , . . 207 

121. Illustrations of suspended Consciousness . . . 208 

122. Illustrations of divided or intermittent Consciousness 210 



CHAPTER III. 

DISORDERED ACTION OF RELATIVE SUGGESTION OR JUDGMENT. . 

123. Relative Suggestion or Judgment a distinct Power . 214 

124. Of the views which have sometimes been taken of this 

Power 215 

125. Weak or disordered Judgment arising from natural ob- 

tuseness of Mind 216 

126. Disordered Judgment as connected with incapacity of 

Attention 218 

127. Of disordered Judgment in connexion with facility of 

Belief 220 

128. Of disordered judgment in connexion with obstinacy 

of Belief 222 

129. Of mere unsoundness in distinction from insanity of 

Judgment 223 



CONTENTS. XI 



CHAPTER IV. 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OP ASSOCIATION. 
Section Page 

130. General remarks on the nature of Association . . 225 

131. Of sluggish and ineffective Association . . .228 

132. Of mental defect in consequence of too quick and rapid 

Association 229 

133. Instances illustrative of the preceding section . . 231 

134. Remarks on fickleness of Character .... 232 

135. Of temporary excitement of the associating Principle 233 

136. Additional instance of this view of the subject . . 234 

CHAPTER V. 

DISORDERED ACTION OP THE MEMORY. 

137. General nature of the Memory 237 

138. Cases involving a general prostration of the Memory . 238 

139. Of loss of Memory in relation to particular Subjects . 241 

140. Impaired Memory in connexion with Names . . 242 

141. Of loss of Memory during particular periods of Time . 244 

142. Of other modifications of disordered Memory . . 245 

CHAPTER VI. 

IMPERFECT AND DISORDERED ACTION OF THE REASONING 

POWER. 

143. Of the nature of the Reasoning Power . . . 246 

144. Of failure of Reasoning from the want of Ideas . . 249 

145. Ofmere weakness or imbecility of the Reasoning Power 249 

146. Of disordered Reasoning in relation to particular sub- 

jects 250 

147. Instance of the foregoing form of perverted Reasoning 252 

148. Of disordered Reasoning arising from a disordered state 

of the other powers of the Mind . . . .253 

149. Of readiness of Reasoning in the partially Insane . 254 

CHAPTER VII. 



DISORDERED ACTION OF THE IMAGINATION. 

150. General Remarks on the nature of Imagination . 

151. Great Imagination does not necessarily imply a disor 

dered or insane action of the Mmd . 

152. Of cases of marked deficiency of Imagination 

153. Disorder of the Imagination as connected with Asso 
ciation and excited Conceptions .... 



256 

257 
259 

260 



XU CONTENTS. 

Section Fa^ 

154. Disorder of the Imagination as connected with the 

Sensibilities 262 

155. Other illustrations of the same subject . . . 263 

156. Of inordinate Imagination, the opposite of misanthrop- 

ical 265 

CHAPTER VIII. 

NATURE AND CAUSES OP IDIOCV. 

157. Idiocy generally implies a defective action of the whole 

Mind 267 

158. Of the degree of intellectual power possessed in Idiocy 268 

159. Of the natural and moral sensibilities in Idiocy . . 269 

160. Of certain marked or peculiar aspects of Idiocy . . 270 

161. Of the Origin and causes of Idiocy . . . .272 

162. Idiocy to be ascribed sometimes to the effects of age . 273 

163. Illustrations of the causes of Idiocy . . . . 275 

164. Of restoration from a state of Idiocy .... 276 

165. Of the beneficial results connected with Idiocy . , 277 



DERANGEMENT OF THE SENSIBILITIES. 
CHAPTER I. 

DISORDERED ACTION OP THE APPETITES. 

166. Classification and method of inquiry .... 281 

167. Of the distinction between mere disorder and Insanity 

of the Sensibilities 282 

168. Of the disordered and aUenated action of the Appetites 283 

169. Facts illustrative of the preceding statements . . 285 

170. Further notices on the disorder of the Appetites . 286 

CHAPTER II. 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE PROPENSITIES, 
(l.) PROPENSITY OF SELP-PRESERVATION. 

171. General remarks on the Propensities .... 288 

172. Disordered action of the principle of Self-preservation 289 

173. Other disordered forms of the Self-preservative princi- 

ple 291 

174. Explanation of the above-mentioned cases . . . 292 

175. Further remarks on this subject . . , . . 294 



CONTENTS. xm 



CHAPTER III. 
DISORDERED ACTION OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

(ll.) PROPENSITY TO ACQUIRE OR ACQUISITIVENESS. 
Section Pa?e 

176. The propensity to acquire an original or implanted one 296 

177. Instances of the first kind or form of disordered action 

of the Possessory Principle 297 

178. Instances illustrative of the subject from Dr. Gall . 299 

179. Second form of the alienated action of the Possessory 

Principle 300 

180. Reference to the singular case of Sir Harvey Elwes . 301 

181. Reference to the case of Jeremiah Hallet . . .• 303 

CHAPTER IV. 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

(ill.) AMBITION, OR THE DESIRE OF POWER. 

182. The desire of Power an original or implanted principle 304 

183. This propension, like others, susceptible of derange- 

ment 305 

184. Results of a disappointed love of Power . . . 307 

185. Additional illustrations of this subject . . . 308 

186. Of this form of Insanity in connexion with particular 

periods of society . * 309 

CHAPTER V. 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

(IV.) IMITATIVENESS, OR THE PROPENSITY TO IMITATION. 

187. Evidence of the existence of this principle . .311 

188. Explanations in relation to sympathetic Imitation . 312 

189. Familiar instances of sympathetic Imitation . . 313 

190. Of Sympathetic Imitation in large multitudes . . 315 

191. Of the Animal Magnetism of M. Mesner in connexion 

with this subject 316 

192. Instances of Sympathetic Imitation at the poorhouse of 

Haerlem . . . . . . . , .318 

193. Other instances of this species of Imitation . . . 320 

194. Additional and striking facts on this subject . . 321 

195. Application of these views to the Witchcraft Delusion 

in New-England 323 

196. Practical results connected with the foregoing views . 325 

197. Application of these views to Legislative and other As- 

sembhes 326 



XIV CONTENTS* 

CHAPTER VI; 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE PROPENSITIES.' 

(v). THE DESIRE OP ESTEEM. 
Section Pa^^e 

198. The desire of Esteem susceptible of a disordered action 328 

199. Further explanatory remarks on this subject . . 329 

200. Incidents illustrative of this form of Alienation . . 330 

201. Other instances still further illustrative of the subject 331 

CHAPTER VII. 
DISORDERED ACTION OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

(VI.) SOCIALITY, OR THE DESIRE OP SOCIETY. 

202. Origin of the propensive principle of Sociality . . 332 

203. True idea of Alienation, or Insanity of the Sensibilities 333 

204. The irregular action of the Social principle exists in 

two forms 334 

205. Further remarks on the disordered action of the Social 

propensity 336' 

206. Of the disease founded on the Social propensity 

termed Nostalgia 338 

207. Disordered action of the principle of Veracity . . 339' 

CHAPTER VIII. 

DISORDERED ACTION OP THE AFFEiCTIONS. 

208. Of the states of mind denominated Presentiments . 341, 

209. Of sudden and strong impulses of Mind . . .343 

210. Insanity of the Affections or Passions . . . 345 

211. Of the mental disease termed Hypochondriasis . . 346 

212. Of other forms of Hypochondriasis . . . . 347 

213. Of intermissions of Hypochondriasis, and of its reme- 

dies . 349 

214. Further remarks on the remedies of Hypochondriasis 350 

215. Disordered action of the passion of Fear . . . 351 

216. Other illustrations of the disordered actioii of this pas- 

sion 353 

217. Perversions of the Benevolent Affection . . . 354 

218. Other cases of perverted Benevolent Affections . . 355 

CHAPTER IX. 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE MORAL SENSIBILITIES. 

219. Nature of voluntary Moral Derangement . . . 356 

220. Of Accountability in connexion with this form of Dis- 

ordered Conscience 358 



CONTENTS. Xy 

Section Pa^ 

221. Of natural or congenital Moral Derangement . .359 

222. Further illustrations of congenital Moral Derangement 360 

223. Facts in relation to an individual in the Lunatic Asy- 

lum in Dublm 362 

224. Of Moral Accountability in cases of natural or con- 

genital Moral Derangement 363 

CHAPTER X. 

CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS IN CONNEXION WITH THE SENSIBILI- 
TIES. 

225. Frequency of Casual Association, and some instances 

of them 365 

226. Of Association in connexion with the Appetites . . 366 

227. Of Casual Associations in connexion with the Propen- 

sities . . . 367 

228. Other instances of Casual Association in connexion 

with the Propensities 368 

229. Inordinate fear from Casual Associations . . . 369 

230. Casual Associations in respect to persons . . .371 

231. Casual Association in connexion with objects and 

places 372 

232. Of Casual Association in connexion with particular 

days 373 

233. Antipathies to Animals 375 



DISORDERED ACTION OF THE WILL. 



CHAPTER L 

NATURE OP THE WILL. 

234. On the relation of the Will to the other parts of the 

Mind 381 

235. Of the attribute of Power as existing in the Will . 382 

236. Of the degree of Power existing in the Will . . 383 

237. Of Positive in distinction from Relative disorder of the 

Will 384 

CHAPTER IL 

IMBECILITY OP THE WILL. 

238. Of natural weakness or imbecility of the Will . . 385 

239. Consideration of the foregomg statements in connexion 

with Power 386 

240. Illustration of natural imbecility of the Will . .387 

B 



XVI CONTENTS. 

Section , "Pagti 

241. Further remarks on imbecility ofWill . . .388 

242. Of alienation of the Will termed Inconstantia . 389 

243. Of superinduced weakness of Will, or that which is oc- 

casioned by wrong mental training .... 391 

CHAPTER III. 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE WILL IN CONNEXION WITH 
OTHER POWERS. 

244. The action of the Will may be perplexed through the 

medium of the other faculties 392 

245. Disordered Action of the Mind in connexion with 

Casual Associations . . . . . . . ib.' 

246. Additional illustration of the preceding view . .394 

247. Of ahenation of the Will as connected with a disor- 

dered state or alienation of Belief . . . . 395 

248. Alienation of the Will in connexion with Melancholy 396 

249. Of Accountability in connexion with Alienation or In- 

sanity of the Will . r . r . . . 398 



IMPERFECT AND DISORDERED 



MENTAL ACTION 



INTRODUCTION. 

CHAPTER I. 

OUTLINES OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY, 

§ 1. Extent and importance of the subject to be 
examined. 

The reader will notice that I have entitled this 
Treatise, Imperfect and Disordered Mental Action. 
A title designedly made thus general, in order to 
include all the varieties of imperfect and alienated 
action of which (and they are almost without num- 
ber) the human mind is the subject. Our inquiries 
are not meant to be limited to those more aggrava- 
ted forms of mental disorder which infringe upon 
moral accountability, and which are commonly had 
in view, when what is called Insanity or Madness 
comes under discussion. We propose to take a 
more extensive view of the subject; and indulge 
the hope, that, in thus extending the plan of remark, 
the Treatise may be found to be more interesting 
and useful to the common reader at least, if not to 
the philosopher. 

I can hardly consider it necessary to delay for 
B2 



18 INTRODUCTION. 

the mere purpose of attempting to illustrate the im- 
portance of the subject which it is now proposed to 
examine. It commends itself at once to every so- 
ber and reflecting mind, as intimately and seriously 
connected with the well-being of men. Every man 
ought to have some knowledge of the general struc- 
ture and action of the mind, and of its irregular as 
well as its regular action. Nor will it be enough 
that he has some general knowledge of the more 
aggravated cases of insanity, such as are character- 
ized by a total confusion of the powers of thought, 
and sometimes by ungovernable ferocity. There 
are cases of partial mental disorder, less perceptible 
to the unpractised eye, which come nearer home. 
There are mental aberrations and shades of aberra- 
tion ; there are mental imperfections and shades of 
imperfection, short of a total overthrow of the spir- 
itual fabric, which, although they have seldom had a 
place in any Treatise designed to be generally acces- 
sible, it is nevertheless important, for various rea- 
sons, to understand. A person may not be insane, 
in the ordinary sense of the term insanity, and yet 
may be the subject of various modifications of men- 
tal disorder, which have no inconsiderable bearing 
upon his usefulness and happiness. He is merely 
called by his neighbours an " odd man," a " hair- 
brained man," a " violent man," a " visionary man," 
or by some other name, indicative, in their view, of 
some peculiarity of mental structure, although, by 
no means, of insanity, in the ordinary import of that 
term. And yet such specialities of intellect and 
temper, inconsiderable as they may appear, ought 



OUTLINES OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 19 

to have their place in the philosophy of the mind's 
disordered action. 

But there are other cases, much more marked in 
their nature, and more decisively injurious in their 
consequences. We refer to those instances of 
mental disorder where the mind is not merely dis- 
composed, not merely temporarily set ajar, but in 
ruins. No sight is so afflicting, so overwhelming, 
as that of a mind fundamentally, and, perhaps, per- 
manently unsettled. What, then, can be more im- 
portant than to understand the facts and causes of 
its ruin, and the principles on which a restoration 
may be possible ! 

§ 2. JVecessity of some Preliminary or Introductory 
statements. 

Before, however, entering directly upon this im- 
portant subject, it may, for various reasons, be desi- 
rable to attempt a brief examination of some matters 
of a somewhat general nature which are closely 
connected with it. 

I. — In the first place, it seems to me just and rea- 
sonable to say, that we cannot have a correct knowl- 
edge of insanity or unsoundness of mental action, 
without some knowledge of the laws and principles, 
which are involved in a sane or sound action. It is 
necessary, therefore, as a preliminary matter, to give 
a concise view of the Outlines of the Philosophy of 
the Mind. 

II. — In the second place, it is well known that 
there is a close connexion between the body and the 
mind, especially between the brain and the mind. 



20 INTRODUCTION. 

And such are the various influences and results of 
this connexion, that it is impossible to explain fully 
the aberrations to which the mind is subject without 
some reference to it. Here, then, although frequent 
references will be subsequently made to it from time 
to time, is obviously another preliminary topic. 

III.— In the third place, it seems proper, before 
we go into the facts and details of the Work, to lay 
down the basis, at least, of a philosophical Classifi- 
cation. In the early history of any department of 
science, when the facts in relation to it have not 
been collected in sufficient number, or have not 
been subjected to a sufficiently careful examination, 
this course would perhaps be premature. But the 
facts, or what might properly be termed the Statis-- 
tics of Insanity, have been so greatly multiplied, 
and that, too, under the supervision of men eminently 
fitted for the task, that this cannot properly be said 
in the present case. 

§ 3. The jdm of Insanity of Mind predicated on 
that of Sanity. 
The three distinct topics which have now been 
mentioned will be introduced and examined as Pre- 
liminary views ; and, consequently, will not occupy 
a place in the body of the work, except incidentally 
and concisely. In accordance with these intima- 
tions, I shall now, in the present chapter, proceed to 
give the Outlines or general principles, on which the 
mind appears to be constituted. If we have a right 
understanding of things in this particular ; in other 
words, if we know what the regular action of the 



OUTLINES OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 21 

mind is, we shall be more likely to appreciate cor- 
rectly the statements, which we shall have occasion 
to make of its irregular or disordered action. The 
fact is, that every appropriate or sound action of the 
mmd (at least this is so generally the case as to ad- 
mit of no exception worthy of notice here) is sus- 
ceptible of degenerating into a defective or ahenated 
one. The philosophy of insanity, therefore (using 
the term here in the broadest sense, as including all 
the various forms both of defective and irregular 
mental action), is parallel with that of sanity ; it oc- 
cupies the same wide field ; it goes side by side. 
To know, therefore, what the mind is in its insane 
action, we must know what it is in its sane action ; 
in other words, we must know something of the gen- 
eral principles of Mental Philosophy, properly so 
called. But this knowledge, in its minuter details 
at least, and in its illustrations, must be obtained 
from other books. It cannot reasonably be expect- 
ed, in such a Treatise as the present, to furnish any- 
thing more than some general outlines, which we 
now propose to do. 

§ 4. Outlines of the Constitution of the JSlind. 
The human mind exists in the three great de- 
partments of the intellect or understanding, the sen- 
sibilities, and the will. I am aware that this view 
of the mind's constitution has not always been taken 
by writers on Mental Philosophy ; but there is great 
reason to believe that it is substantially a correct 
one. It would be pleasing, and perhaps profitable, 
to enter into a consideration of the proofs by which 



22 INTRODUCTION. 

this fundamental arrangement is sustained. But our 
limits will not permit this ; and we can only refer 
the reader, in general terms, to those works on 
Mental Philosophy, where such a discussion would 
find a more appropriate place. Nevertheless, in 
view of the multiplied sources of evidence applicable 
to the inquiry, we have no hesitation in saying that 
we consider this great distinction as sufficiently es- 
tabhshed, and as constituting the true point of de- 
parture in all investigations into the mind. 

Taking it for granted that this fundamental dis- 
tinction exists, we proceed to say that it is the office 
of the understanding (what may be called, perhaps, 
the perceptive or cognitive department of the mind) 
to give us knowledge. The product of its action is 
INTELLECTION, not PASSION. The result of the ac- 
tion of the sensibilities, on the contrary, is found in 
those states of mind which are denominated emo- 
tions and desires, and in those combinations of these 
elementary feelings, which constitute the benevolent 
and malevolent affections. The office of the will, 
which is called later into action, and seems to hold 
a higher position, is mandatory and executive. Vo- 
litions, which are the results of the will's action, have 
no perceptive power, nor are they, in themselves, im- 
pregnated with any emotive or affective element. 
They are not only subsequent in time to the states 
of mind just mentioned, but are invested, as has just 
been intimated, with the supervisory and executive 
duty of carrying them into effect. 



OUTLINES OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 23 

§ 5. Further considerations on the same subject 
The mind may be regarded as departmental (that 
is, as susceptible of leading generic distinctions), not 
only in reference to its results, but also in its law of 
movement, or, more explicitly, in its successive or- 
der of action. It is true that the mental depart- 
ments, to a certain extent, rest upon, and are impli- 
cated with, each other ; but still their connexion and 
action are always consistent with a prescribed and 
definite law of progress. The order of movement 
is that in which the departments have already been 
enumerated, viz. : the intellect, the sensibilities, and 
the will ; commencing in the intellect, continued^ 
under various forms and modifications, in the sensi- 
bilities, and terminating in what Richard Baxter 
(in a Treatise almost forgotten, but not without mer- 
it) has denominated the "vplitive" faculty. The 
intellectual developement, in distinction from the sen- 
sitive and volitive, is obviously first in the' order of 
nature. On this point we do not suppose that there 
tan possibly be any great difference of opinion. As 
a general thing, certainly, there can be no action of 
the sensibilities without a previous action of the un- 
derstanding. If we put forth any sensitive act ; if we 
exercise any desire or passion, it is, of course, in- 
volved in the very expressions, that there is and 
must be some object of desire or of passion, which 
is the subject of our knowledge ; in other words^ 
upon which the intellect, in its perceptive or cogni^ 
tive action, has been employed. There can be no 
question, therefore, that in a history of the mind's 
action our inquiries ought to begirt with the intellect. 



24 INTRODUCTION. 



§ 6. Of the Intellect^ particularly the External In-' 

tellect. 

In considering the intellect first, as it is proper 
we should do, we must keep in mind the great di- 
vision of the intellect, which is more or less hinted 
at by writers (and which certainly has its foundation 
in nature), viz., into the external and the internal 
intellect. 

Under the head of the external intellect we in- 
clude, especially and chiefly, those intellectual sus- 
ceptibilities which are brought into action in direct 
and immediate connexion with the external world, 
particularly sensation and external perception. With- 
out this connexion, which nature has obviously es- 
tablished, there is no reason to suppose that these 
powers would ever become operative. Intellectual 
states of external origin depend for their existence, 
therefore, upon the antecedent existence, and, with 
one exception, upon the actual presence, of external 
objects. If the mind were insulated and cut off from 
the outward and material world, or if the outward 
world had no existence, we could not taste, we 
could not touch, nor hear, nor see. All those 
mental states, which we express, when we speak of 
the diversities of touch, and smell, and taste, of 
sound and sight, are immediately dependent on the 
existence and presence of something, which is exte- 
rior to the intellect itself. And it is the intellect, so 
far as it is brought into action in this way, which we 
characterize by a convenient, though not, in all re- 
spects, a felicitous phraseology, as the external in- 



OUTLINES OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 



25 



tellect.— It is not necessary, however, as has already 
been intimated, to restrict the import of the phrase 
to these states of mind exclusively ; since there is 
at least one other state of mind which is so based 
upon antecedent sensations and perceptions as to 
become intimately and specifically, though not di- 
rectly, connected with external objects ; and which, 
therefore, may properly be arranged under the same 
general head. 

§ 7. Of the Conceptive Power and Conceptions. 

In accordance with the intimation at the close of 
the last section, we proceed to say that under this 
general head, viz., of the external intellect, we may 
properly include the conceptive power, or that power, 
not by which we originate things or discover them 
absolutely for the first time, but by which we recall 
or revive to the mind those impressions which we 
have previously received through the medium of the 
senses. Conceptions, therefore, which are the re- 
suits of the exercise of this power, is the name of 
re-existing sensations and perceptions, when the out- 
ward causes and objects of such sensations and per- 
ceptions are no longer present. It is particularly in 
this respect, that conceptions differ from ordinary 
sensations and perceptions, viz., the absence of their 
outward causes and objects. When, for instance, 
the rose, the honeysuckle, or other odoriferous body 
is presented to us, the effect which follows in the 
mind is termed a sensation. When we afterward 
think of that sensation (as we sometimes express it) ; 
when the sensation is recalled, even though very 

C 



26 INTRODUCTION. 

imperfectly, without the object which originally 
caused it being present, it then becomes, by the use 
of language, a conception. 

And it is the same in any instance of perception, 
considered as distinct from mere conception. When, 
in strictness of speech, we are said to perceive any- 
thing, as a tree, a river, a building, or a mountain, 
the objects of our perceptions are in all cases be- 
fore us. But we may form conceptions of them; 
they may be recalled and exist in " the mind's eye ;" 
they may be conceptively brought near and made 
internally existent, however remote they may be in 
fact, both in time and place. Nevertheless, as this 
re-existence and restoration is, in the strict and spe- 
cific sense of the terms, based upon what had pre- 
viously been addressed to the outward senses, there 
is certainly reason for including the conceptive power 
and its results under the general head of the exter- 
nal intellect. 

§ 8. Of the External Intellect in connexion with 
peculiarities of character* 

It may be proper to remark here, that the view of 
the mind which separates the external from the in- 
ternal intellect, furnishes some assistance in forming 
a correct estimation of those varieties of intellectual 
character, which frequently present themselves to our 
notice. There are some men who have great pow- 
ers of external perception ; who readily perceive 
and appreciate all the varieties and peculiarities of 
extension, form, colour, and magnitude ; who, in a 
word, can accurately and promptly estimate what- 



OUTLINES OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 27 

ever has tangibility and visibility ; but in whom the 
powers of comparison, judgment, and reasoning, and, 
in general terms, all those capacities, which are inter- 
nal and reflective, are greatly deficient. It is un- 
doubtedly the case, that these men often give the 
impression, at first sight, of great ability ; nor is it 
true that they are wanting in ability of a certain kind. 
But it is rather practical than philosophical ability ; 
ability suited rather to the appreciation of the exte- 
rior and the visible manifestations of things than of 
what may be called their subjectivity, or the more 
remote and intimate principles ; ability better adapt- 
ed to the every-day business of common life than to 
the speculations of the closet and the intricacies of 
science. This peculiarity of mental structure has 
frequently been noticed ; and no system of Mental 
Philosophy, which derives its doctrines from a care- 
ful observation of nature, will be likely to deny its 
existence. 

§ 9. O/* the Internal Intellect, or the Intellect as it 
is brought into action, independently of the direct 
agency of the Senses. 

The mind is first brought into action through the 
mediation and assistance of the senses. It is by 
means of the senses that we become acquainted with 
outward things, with whatever is visible and tangi- 
ble, and has outline and form. Accordingly, the 
first great theatre of mental movement is the exter- 
nal world. This is the source from which the mind 
may be considered as drawing its earliest nutriment, 



28 INTRODUCTION. 

and from which, in the first instance, it takes its 
character. 

But the development of the external intellect is 
followed, particularly where there are opportunities 
of mental cultivation, by a new movement, which is 
strictly internal. In other words, the soul, when 
once called into action by means of its connexion 
with external things, finds sources of knowledge in 
itself, entirely distinct from the outward sources of 
hearing, touch, and the like. There are inward 
powers of perception, constituting, as it were, hidden 
fountains of knowledge, which open themselves and 
flow up in the mind's remote and secret places. 
There is, therefore, philosophically considered, an 
internal as well as an external intellect ; a percep- 
tive power, which reaches to invisible and intangible 
existences and relations, as well as a perceptivity, 
which is merely occupied with what is presented to 
touch and sight, and the other senses. 

I am aware that some mental philosophers, who 
have enjoyed more or less note in the literary world, 
have objected to this doctrine, particularly Hobbes, 
Condillac, and Helvetius ; but it is supported by 
others certainly of not inferior weight; by Reid, 
Stewart, and Brown, and the Scotch school gener- 
ally ; by Cousin, and all the writers of the Platonic 
and Kantian school ; by the leading phrenological 
writers ; and, as it seems to me, by Mr. Locke. 
The authority of the more recent writers, those who 
have had the best opportunities to form a correct 
opinion, is decidedly in favour of it. And if it could 
be said that philosophy, as it exists in books, does 



OUTLINES OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 29 

not favour it, still, have we not indubitable grounds 
for saying that philosophy, as it exists in nature, 
does ? And what shall we say of that philosophy, 
which is at variance with nature ? 

§ 10. Of the JVature of Original Suggestion, 

Under the head of the Internal Intellect are prop- 
erly included, as leading powers (or perhaps we 
should more properly say, as leading sources of 
knowledge), Original Suggestion, Consciousness, 
Relative Suggestion or Judgment, and Reasoning. 

I. — By means of Original Suggestion we become 
possessed of various ideas, which we cannot ascribe 
directly to the senses on the one hand, nor to an 
act of the judgment or of the reasoning power on 
the other ; ideas which, in the language of Dr. Reid, 
are not gotten by comparison, " and perceiving 
agreements and disagreements, but immediately in- 
spired by our constitution." Mr. Stewart also rec- 
ognises the existence of this mental power. In 
his Philosophical Essays he speaks of certain men- 
tal phenomena as attendant upon the objects of our 
consciousness, and as suggested by them. The 
notions of time, number, motion, memory, same- 
ness, PERSONAL IDENTITV, PRESENT EXISTENCE, 

&c.,he ascribes neither to the external world on the 
one hand, nor to the internal mental operations, of 
which we are conscious, on the other, except so far 
as they are the occasions on which the mind brings 
them out or suggests from its own inherent ener- 
gy. Of the notion of duration, for instance, he 
would say, I do not see it, or hear it, or feel it, nor 

C2 



30 INTRODUCTION. 

become acquainted with it by means of any other of 
the senses ; nor am I conscious of it, as I am of 
believing, of reasoning, of imagining, and of other 
mental exercises ; but it is suggested by the mind 
itself; it is an intimation absolutely essential to the 
mind's nature and action. That is to say, it is an 
intimation, or conception rather, which the mind, 
constituted as it is, cannot fail to originate. 

§ IL Consciousness another form of Internal men^ 
ial action, 

IL— The term Consciousness expresses another 
of the forms of internal mental action. By the 
common usage of the language, the term conscious- 
ness is appropriated to express the way or method, 
in which we obtain the knowledge of those objects 
which belong to the mind itself, and which do not, 
and cannot, exist independently of some mind. The 
words remembering, imagining, and reasoning, are 
terms expressive of real objects of thought ; but evi- 
dently the objects for which they stand cannot be 
supposed to exist independently of some mind, which 
remembers, imagines, and reasons. Of these, there- 
fore, he may properly be said to be conscious. And 
in all other cases where we apply the term under 
consideration, consciousness is Hmited, in the testi- 
mony which it gives, to mere mental action and the 
modifications of action ; and does not properly ex- 
tend to anything which has existence, extraneous to 
the conscious subject or soul itself. 

Consciousness seems to sustain the same relation 
to the attributes of mind which sensation does to 



OUTLINES OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 31 

those of matter. In both cases we have direct 
knowledge ; that is to say, knowledge without the 
necessary intervention of other facts. In the case 
of Sensation, whenever an object is presented to us, 
we have a new state of mind at once, and necessa- 
rily. So in Consciousness, whenever a new state 
of mind exists, we recognise its existence at once, 
without any accessory aid. We cannot help do- 
ing it. 

Consciousness is a gi'ound or law of belief. 
And the belief attendant on the exercise of it, like 
that which accompanies the exercise of Original 
Suggestion, is of the highest kind. It appears to 
be utterly out of our power to avoid believing, be- 
yond a doubt, that the mind experiences certain sen- 
sations, or has certain thoughts, or puts forth partic- 
ular intellectual operations, whenever, in point of fact, 
that is the case. We may be asked for the reason 
of this belief, but we have none to give, except that 
it is the result of an ultimate and controlling princi- 
ple of our nature ; and hence, that nothing can ever 
prevent the convictions resulting from this source, 
and nothing can divest us of them. 

In the course of this Work we shall have occasion 
to bring forward some instances where the power of 
consciousness (whether we call it the power, or, as 
some would prefer, the mere fact of consciousness, 
is not, perhaps, in the present discussions, very es- 
sential) appears to be disordered. The examination 
of Insanity, as it presents itself under this particular 
head, will furnish some cases, which are interesting 
in a high degree. 



32 INTRODUCTION. 

§ 12. Of Relative Suggestion or Judgment, 
III. — Another of those powers, coming under the 
general head of the Internal Intellect, is Relative 
Suggestion. It is well known that the mind has the 
power, as we commonly express it, of bringing its 
thoughts together, of placing them side by side, of 
comparing them. These expressions, although they 
are for the most part of material origin, indicate nev- 
ertheless an important fact in the mental action. 
When it is said that our thoughts are brought to- 
gether, that they are placed side by side, and the 
like, the meaning undoubtedly is, that they are im- 
mediately successive to each other. And when it 
is further said that we compare them, the meaning 
is, that we perceive or feel their relation to each other 
in certain respects. 

The mind, therefore, has an original susceptibility 
or power corresponding to this result ; in other 
words, by which this result is brought about ; which 
is sometimes known as its power of relative sug- 
gestion, and at other times the same thing is ex- 
pressed by the term judgment, although the latter 
term is sometimes employed with other shades of 
meaning. " With the susceptibiHty of relative sug- 
gestion" (says Dr. Brown, Lect. 51), "the faculty of 
judgment, as that term is commonly employed, may 
be considered as nearly synonymous ; and I have 
accordingly used it as synonymous in treating of the 
different relations that have come under our review." 
Degerando,in his Treatise on the Origin of Human 



OUTLINES OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 33 

Knowledge (pt. ii., chap, ii.), has a remark nearly 
to the same effect. 

We arrive here, therefore, at an ultimate fact in 
our mental nature ; in other words, we reach a prin- 
ciple so thoroughly elementary that it cannot be re- 
solved into any other. The human intellect is so 
made, so constituted, that, when it perceives differ- 
ent objects together, it immediately and necessarily 
has a knowledge of some of the mutual relations of 
those objects. It considers them as equal or un- 
equal, like or unlike, as being the same or different 
in respect to place and time, as having the same or 
different causes and ends, and in various other re- 
spects. 

§ 13. Of the Nature of the Reasoning Power, 

IV. — Another of the internal powers is Reason- 
ing. An expression by which we are to understand 
the mental process or operation, by means of which 
we deduce conclusions from two or more propositions 
premised. For our knowledge of the operations of 
the reasoning power we are indebted to conscious- 
ness, which gives us our direct knowledge, not only 
of this, but of all other mental processes. It is 
hardly necessary, therefore, to add, that reasoning is 
not identical with, or involved in, consciousness. If 
consciousness gives us a knowledge of the act of 
reasoning, the reasoning power, operating within its 
own limits and in its own right, gives us a knowl- 
edge of other things. It is a source of perceptions 
and knowledge, which we probably could not possess 
in any other way. 



94 INTRODUCTION. 

Considered as sources of knowledge, none of the 
forms of intellectual action which have been men- 
tioned are identical with each other. Each occu- 
pies its appropriate sphere, and has its specific and 
appropriate results. Without the aid of Original 
Suggestion, it does not appear how we could have 
a knowledge of our existence ; without Conscious- 
ness we should not have a knowledge of our mental 
operations ; without Relative Suggestion or Judg- 
ment, which is also a distinct source of knowledge, 
there would be no Reasoning ; and, unassisted by 
Reasoning, we could have no knowledge of the rela- 
tions of those things which cannot be compared 
without the aid of intermediate propositions. The 
reasoning power, accordingly, is to be regarded as 
a new and distinct fountain of thought, which, as 
compared with the other sources of knowledge just 
mentioned, opens itself still farther in the recesses 
of the internal intellect ; and as it is later in its de- 
velopement, so it comes forth with proportionally 
greater efficiency. It not only discloses to us those 
separate relations, which are so complicated and re- 
mote, that relative suggestion, or judgment in its 
elementary form, cannot reach them ; but sustains 
the higher office of bringing to light the great prin- 
ciples and hidden truths of nature ; reveahng to the 
inquisitive and delighted mind a multitude of fruit- 
ful and comprehensive views, which could not other- 
wise be obtained. 

This power too, pre-eminent and important as it 
is acknowledged to be, is not exempt from an im- 
pairment and alienation of its action. Indeed, Cul- 



OUTLINES OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 35 

len and Locke, and we know not how many other 
Jeading writers, seem to have regarded it as the 
great seat of mental disorder. 

§ 14. Remarks on the Imagination. 

V. — Another leading power which, when we ac- 
curately consider its nature, seems properly to be 
arranged under the general head of the Intellect, is 
the Imagination. We shall have occasion hereaf- 
ter to recur again to the nature and intellectual pro- 
cess of imaginative action, when it comes in place 
to consider the disorders to which this important 
faculty is subject. All we propose to do here is 
briefly to point out the relation existing between the 
imagination and the reasoning power. D'Alembert 
somewhere intimates very distinctly, that this rela- 
tion is a very close one ; and suggests farther, in 
illustration of his views, that Archimedes, the geom- 
etrician, of all the great men of antiquity, is best 
entitled to be placed by the side of Homer. If such 
a relation exists, it furnishes one reason at least in 
support of the classification, which arranges the ima- 
gination, in connexion with the reasoning power, 
under the general head of the Intellect. 

Some of the particulars, in which the imaginative 
and deductive powers are closely related, are these. 
They both imply the antecedent exercise of the pow- 
er of abstraction ; they are both employed in framing 
new combinations of thought from the elements al- 
ready in possession ; they both put in requisition, 
and in precisely the same way, the powers of asso- 
ciation and relative suggestion. Nevertheless, they 



36 INTRODUCTION. 

are separated from each other, and characterized by 
the two circumstances, that they operate in part on 
different materials, and that their objects are differ- 
ent. Reasoning, as it aims to give us a knowledge 
of the truth, deals exclusively with facts more or less 
probable. Imagination, as it aims chiefly to give 
pleasure, is at liberty to transcend the limits of the 
world of reality, and, consequently, often deals with 
the mere conceptions of the mind, whether they cor- 
respond to reahty or not. Accordingly, the one as- 
certains what is true, the other what is possible ; the 
office of the one is to inquire, of the other to create. 

§ 15. Of other important Intellectual Principles. 

In addition to the intellectual susceptibilities which 
have been mentioned, there are others which, in a 
full account of the mental powers, would be entitled 
to an important place ; such as Association, Mem- 
ory, and Abstraction. The power of Abstraction, 
in consequence of the applicability of its exercise 
either to external or internal objects, might be ar- 
ranged under either of the two great divisions of the 
intellect. Association and memory, as they have a 
very intimate relation to the reasoning and imagina- 
tive powers, would, with a high degree of propriety, 
present themselves for consideration in immediate 
connexion with those powers ; and, accordingly, be 
arranged under the head of the Internal Intellect 
rather than of the External. These important pow- 
ers of the mind our limits will not permit us partic- 
ularly to notice. 

It is not to be inferred, however, from the cir- 



OUTLINES OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 37 

cumstance of their not being considered here, that 
they will not hereafter receive their appropriate place 
and their full share of notice. Whatever may be 
true in respect to the power of abstraction, certain 
it is that no view of insanity would be adequate 
which should fail to point out the phenomena pre- 
sented by a disordered condition of association and 
memory. 

§16. Of the Sensihilities in Distinction from the 
Intellect. 

The second great division of the mind is that of 
the Sensibilities. The action of the sensibilities is 
subsequent in time to that of the intellective nature^ 
As a general thing, there is and can be no move- 
ment of the sensibilities ; no such thing as an emo- 
tion, desire, or feeling of moral obligation, without 
an antecedent action of the intellect. If we are 
pleased or displeased, there is necessarily before the 
mind some object of pleasure or displeasure ; if we 
exercise the feeling of desire, there must necessarily 
be some object desired, which is made known to us 
by an action of the intellect. So that if there were 
no intellect, or if the intellectual powers were en- 
tirely dormant and inactive, there would be no action 
of the emotive part of our nature and of the pas- 
sions. 

The department of the sensibilities is itself sus- 
ceptible of being resolved into some subordinate 
yet important divisions ; particularly the natural and 
moral sensibilities. The department of the natural 
sensibilities considers objects chiefly as they have a 

D 



38 INTRODUCTION. 

relation to ourselves. The department of the moral 
sensibilities, taking a wider range, contemplates ob- 
jects as they relate to all possible existences. The 
one looks at things in the aspect of their desirable- 
ness, the other fixes its eye on the sublime feature 
of their rectitude. The one asks what is good, 
the other what is right. 

It will, perhaps, throw light upon the distinction 
which we suppose to exist in the sensibilities, if 
we call to mind that the natural (or pathematic 
sensibilities, as they are sometimes called) exist 
in brute animals the same as in man. Brute ani- 
mals are susceptible of various emotions ; they 
have their instincts, appetites, propensities, and af- 
fections, the same as human beings have, and per- 
haps even in a higher degree. They are pleased 
and displeased ; they have their prepossessions and 
aversions ; they love and hate, with as much ve- 
hemence at least as commonly characterizes hu- 
man passion. 

But if we look in the lower animals for the other 
and more elevated portion of the sensibilities, it is 
not there. And here, we apprehend, is the great 
ground of distinction between men and brutes. The 
latter, as well as human beings, appear to understand 
what is good, considered as addressed simply to the 
natural affections ; but man has the higher knowl- 
edge of moral as well as of natural good. 

§ 17. Other and more Subordinate Divisions of the 
Sensibilities. 
The natural or pathematic sensibilities resolve 



OUTLINES OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 39 

themselves again into the yet more subordinate di- 
vision of the Emotions and Desires. These two 
classes of mental states follow each other in the or- 
der in which they have been named ; the emotions 
first, which are exceedingly numerous and various ; 
and then the desires. The desires are, in their 
own nature, essentially fixed and uniform, and are 
chiefly modified in their combination with emotions. 
The various modifications which the desires assume, 
appear in the distinct shape of Instincts, Appetites, 
Propensities, and Affections. And it is here that we 
find a very interesting and important department of 
the mind, especially in connexion with insanity. 

The moral sensibilities divide themselves in a 
manner analogous to the classification which exists 
in the natural. The first class of mental states 
which presents itself to notice under this general 
head, is that of Moral Emotions ; corresponding in 
the place which they occupy in relation to the intel- 
lect, as well as in some other respects, to the natu- 
ral emotions. The moral emotions are followed by 
another class of moral feelings, which may be des- 
ignated as obligatory feelings, or feelings of moral 
obligation ; which hold the same relation to the 
moral emotions, which the desires do to the natural 
emotions. If we had not moral emotions (that is to 
say, feelings of moral approval and disapproval), it 
would not be possible for us to feel under moral 
obligation in any case whatever, the latter state of 
the mind being obviously dependent on the former. 



40 INTRODUCTION, 



§ 18, Of the Will, and its Relation to the other 
Powers, 

Of the three leading divisions of the mind, which 
are supposed to enibrace the whole mental structure, 
that of the Will naturally comes last. The natural 
jcourse of investigation in Mental Philosophy obvi- 
ously commences in the understanding, and is pros- 
ecuted through the sensibilities upward to the will. 
We shall not undertake here to go into a philosophi- 
cal explanation of the nature of this power, but 
merely indicate in a few words the relation which it 
sustains to the other departments. 

The will may be considered as occupying, in 
some important sense, a higher and more authori- 
tative position. In other words, as we have already 
had occasion to intimate, it sustains, as compared 
with the other great mental departments, the part of 
the controlling and executive power of the mind. 
Action, in some form or other, was undoubtedly the 
great object which was had in view in the creation 
of the mind ; and although it cannot be denied that 
the preparatives of action (we mean now, action 
which has an object exterior to the mind) exist in 
the intellect and in the sensibilities, the presiding 
element of action, its effective or consummating 
power, is unquestionably lodged in the will. What- 
ever other powers he might possess, if man were 
destitute of the power of exercising volitions, and 
could not realize the results involved in such an ex- 
ercise, he would, in the present state of existence at 
least, be an inefficient and useless being. 



OUTLINES OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 41 

We admit that the intellect and the sensibilities, 
in their various forms of action, constitute the ante- 
cedents to voUtion. They are to be regarded as 
the established prerequisites of the internal volun- 
tary movement, as furnishing the basis of motives, 
on which the subsequent operations of the will de- 
pend. But, without the will to carry into effect the 
antecedent suggestions of the intellect, and to arbi- 
trate among the conflicting elements of the sensibil- 
ities, the mind would present an appearance but 
little better than that of a complete chaos, It is 
the will which, in the executive sense of the terms 
at least, if not in the advisory and consultative, sits 
the witness and arbitress over all the rest. It is es- 
sential alike to the action and accountability, the 
freedom and order of the other parts of the mind. 
They seem to revolve around it as a common cen- 
tre ; kept in their place by its power, and controlled 
by its ascendency. 

In closing this sketch of the Outlines of the Mind, 
it may be proper to remark, that the doctrines of this 
chapter are essentially those which are given in the 
Elements of Mental Philosophy, published a number 
of years since by the author of this treatise. In 
some of the statements, almost as a matter of ne- 
cessity, the same expressions are employed. The 
analysis which has been given has necessarily been 
concise ; and, consequently, makes no pretensions 
to completeness and perfection. For a more full 
and explicit account of the writer's views of the 
leading doctrines of Mental Philosophy, the reader 
is referred to the work just mentioned. 

D2 



4? INTRODUCTION. 



CHAPTER II. 

CONNEXION BETWEEN THE MIND AND BODY. 

§19. The Origin of many mental disorders to be 
found in the Connexion between the mind and the 
body^ 

We proceed now to another general topic, which 
may properly be embraced in this Introduction. It 
is undoubtedly true, that, in a great majority of cases, 
the human mjncj conforms in its action to the pre- 
dominant principles of its own nature. In other 
words, it acts, in all ordinary instances, as its Crea- 
tor designed it to act. But, unhappily, this is not 
^Iways the case. The fact that there may be dis- 
prjder or insanity of mind, imphes that the mind 
sometimes suffers a disastrous deviation from the 
laws which commonly regulate it. Undoubtedly, 
the causes of these deviations are very various, an4 
will repeatedly present themselves to our notice, and 
receive more or less of comment in the course of 
the present work. In connexion with this topic, 
however, viz., the causes of disordered mental ac- 
tion, we take this opportunity to say, that the origin, 
as we apprehend, of no small portion of mental dis- 
order (stating the matter in the most general terms) 
is to be found in the connexion existing between the 
mind and the body. This leading cause of irregu- 



CONNEXION BETWEEN THE MIND AND BODY. 43 

lar action, considered in its most general aspect, 
may properly be made a distinct subject of inquiry. 
It is in its general aspect, and not in its particulars, 
that it has a place in this Introduction. 

We do not deny, it will be noticed, that there may 
be, as there undoubtedly are, other causes of mental 
irregularity. We do not agree with some respecta- 
ble writers in considering Insanity as being, in its 
basis, exclusively a physical disorder. We have no 
hesitancy in admitting the doctrine that there may 
be other causes of mental irregularity, more remote 
from common observation, and more intimately con- 
nected with the mind's interior nature and secret 
impulses. But this view of the subject, neverthe- 
less, does not preclude a distinct and particular at- 
tention to a cause of mental disorder so obvious, 
and, by general consent, so powerful as that which 
we now particularly refer to. Whatever may be 
true of sources of disorder in the internal relations 
of the mind, there is no dispute that they may be 
abundantly found in its external relations. In other 
words, expressing the matter in few and plain terms, 
it is hardly possible for the body to be disordered, 
without the fact of physical disorder having an in- 
fluence on the mental movement. 

Accordingly, it will be the object of the remarks 
embraced in this chapter, and as introductory, in 
some degree, to the statements to be made hereaf- 
ter, to show, by some facts and illustrations, the 
connexion existing between the body and mind, and 
the influence they reciprocally exert. This topic is 
one of so much importance, that it ought to be thor- 



44 INTRODUCTION. 

oughly understood. And it seems a proper one, in 
its general form at least, to occupy a place in these 
introductory remarks. 

§ 20. The JWind constituted on the Principle of a 
Connexion with the Body. 

i[n endeavouring to illustrate the subject of the 
intimate connexion and the reciprocal influence of 
the mind and body, we naturally remark, in the first 
place, that the mind is evidently constituted on the 
principle of such a connexion. — The human mind, 
as we have already had occasion distinctly to ob- 
serve, exists in the threefold nature or threefold di- 
vision of the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will. These 
great departments of the mind, although the limits 
which separate them are distinctly marked, have, 
nevertheless, an intimate connexion with each other. 
The action of the will, for instance, depends upon 
the antecedent action of the sensibilities ; and that 
of the sensitive nature is based upon the antecedent 
action of the intellect ; so that the commencement 
of action in the other parts of the mind seems to 
depend upon the antecedent action in the purely in- 
tellectual part. 

The inquiry then arises, In what way is the Intel- 
lect first brought into action ? And, in answering 
this inquiry, we are led to remark, that the action of 
the intellect (the understanding, as Mr. Locke calls 
it) is twofold, external and internal. Accordingly, 
we not unfrequently employ the convenient phrases, 
External Intellect and Internal Intellect. By the 
phrase external intellect, as we have already had 



CONNEXION BETWEEN THE MIND AND BODY. 45 

occasion to explain, we mean the intellect, as it acts 
in immediate or nearly immediate connexion with 
the external world. And it is in this department of 
the mind that we find the beginnings, the initiation 
of all mental action. But it is well understood (so 
much so, we suppose, as not to be a matter of con- 
troversy) that the action, which takes place here, 
takes place in connexion with bodily action. The 
external intellect does not act, nor is it capable of 
acting, although the mind is so constituted that the 
movement of all the other parts depends upon move- 
ment here, without the antecedent affection of the 
outward or bodily senses. Hence the remark at 
the commencement of this section, that the mind is 
constituted on the principle of a connexion with the 
body. Hence the propriety of the remark, too, that 
the action of the mind cannot be satisfactorily ex- 
plained, neither its sane action nor its insane ac- 
tion, without a careful consideration of this con- 
nexion. 

§ 21. Illustration of the subject from the effects of 
old age. 

The existence of the connexion between the mind 
and body, and of their influence upon each other, 
appears, in the second place, from the effects which 
are witnessed in old age. The effects of old age, 
it is true, are first experienced in the bodily system. 
The outward senses become blunted and dim ; the 
eye, considered as a merely material organ, loses its 
keenness of sight ; the ear its quickness of hearing ; 
the palate its nice discriminations of taste ; and in 



46 INTRODUCTION. 

various other ways the whole bodily system shows 
the rapid diminution of its activity and power. But 
it is well known, since it is a matter of every day's 
observation, that these effects are not restricted to 
that part of the human system where they first show 
themselves. The mind, also, is unfavourably affect- 
ed at the same time, and through the influence of 
the same causes. 

These results, it is true, are not experienced, to a 
great extent, in the Internal intellect, or that division 
of the intellect which operates in the discovery of 
truth, independent, in a great measure, of the out- 
ward senses ; but they are seen and felt, in a high 
degree, in that department of the mind which we 
have proposed to designate, in consequence of its 
depending in its action on the external senses, as 
the External Intellect. This portion of the mind 
seems at once to fall with the outward organization 
and the material instrumentality upon which it rested. 

§ 22. The Connexion of the body and mind far- 
ther shown from the effects of diseases. 

In addition to what has been said, it may be re- 
marked further, in confirmation of the same generaF 
views, that violent corporeal diseases in youth and 
manhood, before any decays take place from age, 
often affect the powers of thought. Persons have 
been known, for instance, after a violent fever, or 
violent attacks of some other form of disease, to 
lose entirely the power of recollection. Thucydides, 
in his account of the plague of Athens, makes men- 
tion of some persons who had survived that disease ; 



CONNEXION BETWEEN THE MIND AND BODY. 47 

but their bodily sufferings had affected their mental 
constitutions so much, that they had forgotten their 
families and friends, and had lost all knowledge of 
their own former history. — It is a singular fact, also, 
that the result of violent disease is sometimes quite 
the reverse of what has now been stated. While in 
one case the memory is entirely prostrate, we find 
in others that, under the influence of such attacks, 
the memory is suddenly aroused, and restores the 
history of the past with a minuteness and vividness 
unknown before. But both classes of cases confirm 
what we are now attempting to show, viz., the ex- 
istence of a connexion between the mind and body, 
and a reciprocal influence between them. 

§ 23. Shown also from the effects of stimulating 
drugs and gases. 

If there be not a close connexion between the 
body and mind, and if there be not various influen- 
ces propagated from one to the other, how does it 
happen that many things of a stimulating nature, 
such as ardent spirits and opium, strongly affect the 
mind when taken into the system in considerable 
quantities ? But, without delaying upon the effects 
of drugs of this description, which, unhappily, can 
hardly fail to be noticed every day, we would in- 
stance particularly the results which are found to 
follow from the internal use of the nitrous oxyde gas. 
This gas, when it is received into the system, oper- 
ates, in the first instance, on the body. The effect 
is a physical one. In particular, it quickens the 
circulation of the blood, and also, as is commonly 



48 INTROBtJCTION. 

supposed, increases the volume of that fluid. But 
its effects, which are first felt in the body, are after- 
ward experienced in the mind, and generally in a 
high degree. When it is inhaled in a considerable 
quantity, the sensations are more acute ; the con- 
ceptions of absent objects are more vivid ; associa- 
ted trains of thought pass through the mind with 
increased rapidity ; and emotions and passions, gen- 
erally of a pleasant kind, are excited, corresponding 
in strength to the increased acuteness of sensations 
and the increased vividness of conceptions. 

There is another gas, the febrile miasma, which 
is found, on being inhaled, to affect the mind also, 
by first affecting the sanguineous fluid. But this 
gas diminishes, instead of increasing the volume of 
blood ; as is indicated by a small, contracted pulse^ 
and an increasing constriction of the capillaries. A& 
in the case of the nitrous oxyde gas^ the mental ex- 
ercises are rendered intense and vivid by the febrile 
miasma ; but the emotions which are experienced, 
instead of being pleasant, are gloomy and painful. 
The trains of thought which are at such times sug- 
gested, and the creations of the imagination, are all 
of an analogous character, strange, spectral, and 
terrifying.* — We may add as a general remark 
here, that, whenever the physical condition of the 
brain, which is a prominent organ in the process of 
sensation and external perception, is affected, wheth- 
er it be from a more than common fulness of the 
bloodvessels or from some other cause, the mind 
itself will be found to be affected also, and often- 
times in a high degree. 

* See Hibbert's Philosophy of Apparitions, pt. ii., ch. L 



CONNEXION BETWEEN THE MIND AND BODY. 49 



§ 24. Influence on the Body of Excited Iniagination 
and Passion. 

The powers of the mind are not only liable to be 
powerfully affected by certain conditions of the cor- 
poreal system, but the body also, on the other hand, 
even to the functions of the vital principle itself, is 
liable to corresponding affections, superinduced by 
certain conditions of the mind. When the passions, 
for instance, are excited, particularly that of fear, 
the body at once feels the influence ; and instances 
have occurred where, under the influence of the last- 
named passion, even death itself has followed. In 
the city of New- York, a few years since, a little 
child was left in the evening in the care of a maid- 
servant, the mother having gone out. As the child 
was disposed to be troublesome and to cry, after 
being placed at the usual time in bed in another 
room, the domestic resorted to the expedient of qui- 
eting it by making and placing before it the image 
of some frightful object. The fears of the little 
child were greatly excited; and when, in the latter 
part of the evening, the mother returned and went 
to the room, she found it dead ; its eyes being open 
and fixed with a singularly wild and maniac kind of 
stare on the frightful image, which the girl had so 
cruelly placed before it. In the time of the Ameri- 
can Revolution, as the transaction was related by an 
officer who was present, a soldier who had com- 
mitted some crime was condemned to be shot. 
He was finally pardoned, without a knowledge of 
the pardon being communicated to him, since it was 

E 



50 INTRODUCTION 

thought advisable that he should be made to suffer 
as much as possible from the fear of death. In ac- 
cordance with this plan, he was led at the appointed 
time to the place of execution ; the bandage was 
placed over his eyes ; and the soldiers were drawn 
out, but were privately ordered to fire over his head. 
At the discharge of their muskets, although nothing 
touched him, the man fell dead on the spot. 

" A criminal was once sentenced in England to be 
executed, when a college of physicians requested Ub- 
erty to make him the subject of an experiment con- 
nected with their profession. It was granted. The 
man was told that his sentence was commuted, and 
that he was to be bled to death. On the appointed 
day, several physicians went to the prison, and made 
the requisite preparations in his presence ; the lancet 
was displayed ; bowls were in readiness to receive 
the blood ; and the culprit was directed to place 
himself on his back, with his arms extended, ready 
to receive the fatal incision. When all this was 
done, his eyes were bandaged. In the mean time, 
a sufficient quantity of lukewarm water had been* 
provided ; his arm was merely touched with the 
lancet, and the water, poured slowly over it, was 
made to trickle down into the bowl below. One of 
the physicians felt his pulse, and the others frequent-- 
ly exchanged such remarks as, ' He is nearly ex- 
hausted ; cannot hold out much longer j grows very 
pale,' &c. ; and, in a short time, the criminal actu- 
ally died from the force of imagination."* 

* As the statement is given in the Work entitled Popular Su- 
perstitions. 



CONNEXION BETWEEN THE MIND AND BODY. 51 

^ 25. Comuxion of the JMental Action with the 

Brain. 

From what has been said, we suppose it has been 
made sufficiently clear, that there is a close and im- 
portant connexion existing between the mind and 
the body, and that they are reciprocally the subjects 
of various influences resulting from this connexion. 
In what hcLS been hitherto said, however, we have 
considered the subject in the most general point of 
view. In other words, we have had no other ob- 
ject than the announcement and establishment of the 
general fact. We have now to add further, that this 
doctrine is particularly true as far as the brain is 
concerned. Without admitting the doctrine that 
the mind is identical with the brain, or even that the 
mind finds in the brain a congeries of organs spe- 
cifically suited to the development of each of its 
separate faculties, we nevertheless hold it to be 
certain, not only that there is a reciprocal connexion 
and influence between the two, but that such con- 
nexion and influence exist in a remarkably high de- 
gree : so much so that it is absolutely necessary 
to advert to it in any attempt to explain the mental 
action, especially disordered mental action. 

It may be proper, therefore, to make some gen- 
eral statements in regard to the brain, although we 
are not left at liberty, by our proposed course of in- 
vestigation, to enter minutely into that subject. 

The brain, although it is susceptible of various 
subordinate divisions, such as the cerebrum and the 
cerebellum, may in general terms be described as 



52 INTRODUCTION. 

that globular mass of nervous matter, which is lodged 
in and occupies the cavity of the cranium or scull. 
It is of an irregular figure, exhibiting on its surface 
a great number of projections and depressions, cor- 
responding in some cases to irregularities in the 
scull, but which are to be ascribed in part also to 
convolutions and cavities in the brain itself. The 
more important divisions of the cerebral mass are, 
FIRST, into the cerebrum, which occupies the whole 
of the upper part of the cranium, and the little brain 
or cerebellum, which in size is about one eighth or 
ninth part of the cerebrum, and is situated under its 
posterior lobes ; and, secondly, the longitudinal 
division into two equal and symmetrical halves, 
termed hemispheres. The spinal cord, or, as it is 
frequently termed, the spinal marrow, is a cylindrical 
body of nervous matter proceeding from the lower 
part of the brain, with which it is connected through 
the medium of a medullary mass, called the medulla 
OBLONGATA. Like the brain, it is enclosed in mem- 
branes, and is of the same substance. It extends 
through, and occupies, the vertebral canal. A num- 
ber of white cords, called nerves, proceed from the 
base of the brain and from the spinal marrow to 
different parts of the system. They are composed 
of medullary matter, and are contained in membra- 
neous sheaths. Some of them communicate with, 
or, more properly, constitute^ at their termination, the 
different organs of sense. 



CONNEXION BETWEEN THE MIND AND BODY. 53 

§ 26. Of the Brain, considered as a part of one 
great Sensorial Organ. 

The nerves, the spinal cord, and the brain, con- 
nected together as they are, consisting essentially of 
the same substance, and contributing, each in its 
own way and degree, to the same results, may prop- 
erly be regarded as forming one great Sensorial 
Organ. It is by means of the assistance furnished 
by the sensorial organ (under which expression we 
include also the subordinate organs of taste, smell, 
sight, touch, and hearing) that the mind is first 
brought into action. On this organ, the sensorial, 
as thus explained, an impression, originating from 
the presence and application of some external body, 
must be made, before there can be sensation and 
external perception. Without the presence of some 
external body, and without the assistance furnished 
by the sensorial parts of the system, there is reason 
to believe that the powers of the mind would never 
be effectively called into action. It is here, in con- 
nexion with this conjunction of body and mind, that 
we discover the beginnings of mental movement. 
An impression, for instance, is made on that part of 
the sensorial organ called the auditory nerve, and a 
state of mind immediately succeeds which is vari- 
ously termed, according to the view in which it is 
contemplated, either the sensation or the perception 
of sound. An impression is made by the rays of 
light on that expansion of the optic nerve, which 
forms what is called the retina of the eye, and the 
intellectual principle is brought into that new posi- 

£2 



64 INTRODUCTION. 

tion, which is termed visual perception, or a percep-. 
tion of sight. And the same of other cases. 

It will be noticed, that we speak of the new state 
of mind, the sensation or external perception, as im- 
mediately consequent on the application of the out^ 
ward body to the external senses. But it is neces- 
sary to add, in order to have a correct view of the 
case, that the outward impression is rapidly propa- 
gated to the brain (so very rapidly that it may well 
be considered as a single act) before the mental 
3tate Jesuits. So that we may properly regard the 
brain, so far as the mere corporeal process is con^ 
cerned, as the ultimate seat of sensation. It is there 
that the bodily impression is felt last. If the im-. 
pression fails to be felt in the brain, the mental state 
fails also. Of this there is very easy and satisfac-^ 
tory proof. If, for instance, the nerve, which con- 
nects the outward sense with the brain, be divided 
or be greatly compressed, so as to cut off the com- 
munication between them, it is well known that the 
mind will not be affected by the pressure and appli- 
cation of outward objects as it would otherwise be. 
In other words, there will be no sensation. 

§ 27. Relation of these Views to the General 
Subject, 

Now we may well inquire whether this view of 
the connexion existing between the mind and the 
great sensorial organ, particularly the brain, must 
not necessarily have an intimate relation to the sub- 
ject of insanity. Is it possible that this great and 
important organ can, as a general thing, be disor- 



CONNEXION BETWEEN THE MIND AND BODY. 55 

dered, or even be disordered merely in some of its 
parts, without occasioning some degree of disturb- 
ance in the mental action 1 On the contrary, are 
we not to seek for the origin of a considerable por- 
tion of mental disorders in the fact of the disturbed 
and disordered state of this part of the physical sys- 
tem? 

We do not suppose, as we have already had oc- 
casion to intimate, that the causes of mental disorder 
are exclusively physical. There are intellectual and 
moral causes, as well as those more obvious and, 
perhaps, more common ones, which are located in 
the physical structure. Let a man indulge in the 
frequent exercise of the principle of resentment ; let 
the resentful principle grow stronger and stronger, 
as it will not fail to do by this indulgence ; and ul- 
timately it will exercise an authority inconsistent 
with the just action of the other parts of the mind ; 
and the person will bear about him, superinduced by 
mental and not by physical causes, the undoubted 
marks of insanity. At the same time, we are en- 
tirely confident that every system of Disordered 
Mental Action must be very imperfect which does 
not recognise distinctly the relation existing between 
the sensorial organ and the mind, and the important 
and unquestionable fact that the disordered condition 
of the former frequently results in a corresponding 
disordered state of the latter. 



56 INTRODUCTION. 



CHAPTER III. 

GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE SUBJECT. 

§ 28. The Classification of Insane mental action 

should be predicated on that of Sound mental 

action. 

We wish to embrace one other topic, and only 
one, in this Introduction. It will be our object ii; 
the present chapter to give a concise view of the 
general plan which we propose to pursue in the in- 
vestigation of the subject before us. The general 
outline which has been given of the Philosophy of 
the Mind, helps us very much here. In truth, it 
indicates very distinctly the course which ought to 
be taken. We have already had occasion to re- 
mark, that the Philosophy of Insanity (using the 
term in the broad sense) is parallel with that of San- 
ity ; and we mean to intimate by this, not only that 
they occupy the same wide field, and proceed side 
by side in the more general sense, but that they are 
parallel with each other, and are mutually corre^ 
gpondent in their subordinate divisions. 

In writing this Treatise on Insanity, we propose, 
therefore, to pursue the same course, to follow the 
same order of investigation, as if we were endeavour- 
ing to prepare a Treatise on the Philosophy of the 
Mind. The plan, accordingly, is clearly indicated 



GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE SUBJECT. 57 

in what has already been said in relation to the Out- 
lines of Mental Philosophy. We feel the more 
satisfaction in taking this course, because the writers 
on this subject seem, as a general thing, to have 
failed more in the matter of arrangement than they 
have in the detail of facts, or in the philosophical 
reflections to which their facts have given rise. 
Perhaps, however, we ought not to speak of their 
Works as a failure, even in this respect ; if it be true, 
as it undoubtedly is, in respect to some of them, 
that their great and leading object was, not to frame 
a system, but merely to collect facts and to ascer- 
tain the statistics of Insanity, preparatory to the la- 
bours of others, who, they anticipated, would arise in 
due time to impress order and philosophic symmetry 
upon the mass of valuable but chaotic materials. 
They laboured well in their vocation, and have mer- 
ited high praise. So true is this, that all which 
seems to be wanting at the present time is to take 
the materials, which are furnished ready at hand in 
great abundance, and arrange them according to the 
relations they sustain to the immutable principles of 
Mental Philosophy. 

§ 29. Defects in early Classifications and Im- 
provements of them. 

The plan of this work will perhaps appear to some 
as a novel one, and as wanting, more than ought to 
be the case, in the supports of authority. But, in 
point of fact, the plan, in its leading features, has al- 
ready been sanctioned to some extent by some wri- 
ters of no small name. In the time of Mr. Locke, 



68 INTRODUCTION. 

and during all antecedent periods, so far as we 
know, it was a common doctrine, that insanity is 
exclusively predicable of the perceptive or intellect- 
ual part of man, and does not exist in the affections. 
In other words, it consists in a lesion or injury of 
the intellect, and not of the heart. Pinel (an hon- 
ourable name even among those who have been 
most distinguished as the benefactors of their race) 
proposed the extension of the doctrine of insanity, 
so as to include the moral or affective part of man's 
nature as well as the intellectual. The proposition 
was regarded at first as a startling one. Nor does 
Pinel appear to have understood distinctly, and in its 
details, what may properly be included under the 
bead of the moral or affective faculties. Neverthe- 
less, he illustrated and confirmed his doctrine in its 
general form by such an array of facts, gathered 
from his widely diversified experience, that it has 
ever since been accredited by the leading writers. 
The sagacity of Pinel, sanctioned by the facts which 
came under his notice, led him to conclude that the 
doctrine of insanity ought not to be limited to the 
intellect. We may now go farther, and say that it 
ought not to be limited to anything short of the 
length and breadth, and the heighth and depth of the 
whole mind. It is a source of pleasure, therefore, 
to notice that a recent German writer. Professor 
Heinroth, has taken this ground. As it has not 
been in our power to gain access to Prof Hein- 
roth's work, we are indebted for what little we know 
of it to the recently published and very valuable 
Treatise of Dr. Pochard on Insanity. " The disor- 



GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE SUBJECT. 59 

ders of the mind, according to this writer^^ (saya 
Dr. Prichard), " are only limited in number and in 
kind by the diversities which exist in the mental fac' 
vliiesy He gives us to understand farther, that 
Prof. Heinroth divides the mental operations into 
three different departments^ viz., the Understand- 
ing, the Feehngs or Sentiments^ and the Will. Dr. 
Prichard had adopted a somewhat different arrange- 
ment before the Work of Heinroth came into his 
hands ; nor did he find sufficient reason for altering 
his arrangement in the views which were presented 
in that work. But he has the candour to saj ex- 
pressly^ that " no systematic arrangement of mental 
disorders can be contrived more complete than that 
of Professor Heinroth." And again, " His scheme 
is the most complete system that can be formed; 
and I have laid the outline of it before my readers, 
as it may tend to render more distinct their concep- 
tion of the relations of the different forms of insanity 
to each other." Dr. Prichard gives a short account 
of the minor divisions of tteinroth's classification^ 
which we do not consider it necessary to repeat, as 
it furnishes no important suggestion (although, if we 
had the original work before us, perhaps it would be 
otherwise) which we shall deem it necessary to 
adopt in what follows. 

§ 30. The Inquiry naturally begins loith the Exter- 
nal Iritellect. 

The first step to be taken will be to give an ac* 
count of insanity or unsoundness of mental action, 
as it exists intellectually ; that is to say, as it exists 



60 INTRODUCTION 

in the Intellect or Understanding. And here we 
are to keep in view the natural order of the mind's 
action. If we begin with the intellect, it does not 
follow that we may begin with any portion of it in- 
discriminately. This would evidently be inconsis- 
tent with the details at least of philosophic arrange- 
ment. We commence, therefore, with th6 External 
Intellect, or that portion which, in consequence of 
its connexion with external things, is first brought 
into action. Accordingly, it will be our object, in 
the first place, to give some account of Disordered 
Sensation and of Disordered External Perception, 
which will open at once a broad and interesting field 
of inquiry. 

In this part of the subject we shall find, for the 
most part, that the disordered mental action has its 
basis in disordered physical action, particularly in 
an irregular or abnormal condition of the nervous 
system. And here, perhaps, more than anywhere 
else, it will be necessary to keep in mind the gener- 
al principles in relation to the connexion between the 
mind and body which have been brought forward in 
the preceding chapter. 

In treating of sensation and external perception, 
it will be proper to consider the senses, which are 
the instruments of this form of mental action, sep- 
arately from each other, at least as far as it can con- 
veniently be done, and also with reference to some 
definite principle of arrangement. Under the head 
of Disordered Visual Sensations, the interesting sub- 
ject of Apparitions will appropriately have a place. 
Furthermore, there are some states and powers of 



GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE SUBJECT. 61 

the mind, which from their nature may be ranked 
either under the head of the external or the internal 
intellect, being susceptible of existing as attributes 
or manifestations of the mind in both forms. We 
refer particularly to the power which is denominated 
abstraction, and to the state of mind which some 
writers have hesitated in describing as a distinct 
mental power, but which is recognised under the 
name of Attention. We may find it convenient to 
give some account of disordered action as it is found 
to exist in connexion with these mental powers or 
states under this head. 

§ 31. Proceeds from the External to the Internal 
Intellect. 

As we advance farther in the investigation before 
us, we shall find that the intellect may be disorder- 
ed, not only in its operation 'through the senses and 
its connexion with the external world, but also in its 
internal action. Original Suggestion, Conscious- 
ness, Relative Suggestion, Reasoning, together with 
the collateral and subordinate powers of Association 
and Memory, may all, in various ways and degrees, 
be disturbed in their operation. These will all be 
considered in their proper place and order ; and al- 
though it will be our object to be as concise as pos- 
sible, many interesting facts, gathered from various 
sources, will be presented to the reader's notice. 

Under the preceding head, that of the external in- 
tellect, the causes of disturbed action, as we have 
already intimated, will be found for the most part in 
the disordered state of the physical system, particu- 

F 



62 ♦ INTRODUCTION. 



» 



larly the sensorial organ. Under the present head, 
although physical causes will not be excluded, there 
will be others more frequently occurring, which are 
more strictly of an intellectual and moral nature. It 
may be remarked here, however, in general terms, 
that the doctrine of the causation of insanity, wheth- 
er external or internal, is involved as yet, in many 
respects, in no small degree of obscurity. 

§ 32. Is continued in the Sensibilities and the Will. 

From the internal intellect we proceed, in the or- 
der which nature evidently points out, to the Sensi- 
biUties ; beginning with the natural or pathematic, 
in distinction from the moral sensibilities. The first 
great division of the natural sensibilities, as we have 
already had occasion to remark, is that of the Emo- 
tions, which is followed by the distinct class of men- 
tal states called Desires. Under the head of De- 
sires we have the distinct mental principles (com- 
plex in their nature, including both desires and 
emotions) which are known in treatises of Mental 
Philosophy under the distinct names of Appetites, 
Propensities, and Affections. It is in connexion with 
the natural sensibilities, as existing particularly un- 
der these last complex forms, that we propose to 
prosecute this investigation. It is true that emo- 
tions and desires, even in their simple and unmixed 
form, are not exempt from insanity ; but, so far as 
this is the case, nothing more will apparently be 
necessary than to remark upon the subject incident- 
ally. In their complex form — in other words, as 
they appear under the distinct and important modifi- 



GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE SUBJECT. 63 

cations of the Appetites, Propensities, and Affections, 
they will deserve and receive a more particular no- 
tice. 

This view of the subject will naturally be follow- 
ed by some statement of mental derangement, as it 
is connected with the Moral Sensibilities. And the 
whole subject will be closed by a concise view of 
the insanity of the Will. 

§ 33. Of 'popular adaptation^ combined with pliilo' 
sophical precision. 

A view of Insanity, conducted in the manner 
which has now been proposed, would seem to pre- 
sent some claims to be considered a philosophical 
view ; which would not be the case if the inquiry 
were conducted without a regard to fixed principles, 
having their foundation in nature. Such is our plan ; 
and this plan we affirm to be truly a philosophical 
one. At the same time, w^e wish to combine with 
a scientific form so much of personal and practical 
illustration, and that, too, presented in such simplicity 
of style, as shall render the work accessible and in- 
teresting to the common reader. It is generally 
conceded to be a fact, that instances of insanity are 
multiplying. Certain it is that they are frequent, if 
they are not actually increasing in number. Many 
are the families whose happiness is interrupted by 
the inroads of mental disorder; and no individual, 
whatever may be his present soundness of mind, is 
at liberty to consider himself as permanently exempt 
from its accessions. 

It is desirable, therefore, that a treatise on this 



64 INTRODUCTION. 

subject, while it takes a philosophical view, should, 
at the same time, be adapted to popular apprehen- 
sion. The public should have the means of know- 
ing something of the nature of these dreaded attacks, 
either that they may guard against their occurrence, 
or rightly estimate them when they have come. Fur- 
thermore, the philosophy of insanity, using the term 
in a general sense, is, in fact, a portion, " part and 
parcel," of the philosophy of the human mind ; al- 
though, with scarcely an exception, it has been ex- 
cluded from the leading works on Mental Philoso- 
phy. And as such, saying nothing of other consid- 
erations, it ought to have a place in every system of 
general and popular instruction ; and, consequently, 
ought to be adapted, so far as can be done consist- 
ently with philosophical precision and truth, to this 
important object. 



IMPERFECT AND DISORDERED 



MENTAL ACTION 



DIVISION FIRST. 
DISORDERED ACTION OF THE INTELLECT. 

PART I. 

DBRANGEJVTENT OF THE EXTERNAL INTELLECT. 






DISORDERED ACTION 

OF THE 

EXTERNAL INTELLECT 



CHAPTER I. 

NATURE OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

§ 34. Remarks on the JVature of Sensation. 

In accordance with the plan which has been laid 
down, we proceed to prosecute our inquiries, in the 
first place, in connexion with the external intellect, 
or that portion of the intellect which is brought into 
action in more immediate and intimate proximity 
with external objects. And under this general 
head, the first form of intellectual action which pre- 
sents itself to our notice is that of Sensation. Per- 
haps it may be proper to remark here, that the term 
sensation has a twofold application. We some- 
times use it as expressive of a mental power, and 
sometimes as expressive merely of the result of the 
power ; in other words, of the mental state or act. 
The condition, under which this slate or act exists, 
and by which chiefly it is known, is the presence of 



f 



68 NATURE OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

some external object, operating upon some organ of 
sense. In other words, a sensation is a simple state 
of mind, immediately successive to a change in some 
organ of sense, or at least to a bodily change of some 
kind, which is caused by the presence of some ex- 
ternal body. 

Accordingly, while we speak of the sensations of 
heat and cold, of hardness and softness, and the like, 
we do not ordinarily apply this term to joy and sor- 
row, hatred and love, and other emotions and pas- 
sions, which, although they are states of the mind, 
either simple or complex, originate, nevertheless, 
under different circumstances. 

§ 35. Ml Sensation is properly and tmly in the 
Mind. 

In order to understand more fully the nature of 
sensation, we may properly advert a moment to the 
common opinion, that sensation has its true position 
in the body, and actually takes place there, particu- 
larly in the organs of sense. The sensation of 
touch, as people seem to imagine, is in the hand, 
which is especially regarded as the organ of touch, 
and is not truly internal ; the smell is in the nostrils, 
and the hearing in the ear, and the vision in the eye, 
and not in the soul. But it will at once occur that 
the outward organs of smell, hearing, and vision are 
nothing more nor less than mere forms and modifi- 
cations of matter. And that matter, from its very 
nature, is not and cannot be susceptible of percep- 
tion and feeling. It would be inconsistent with all 
our notions of materiality to consider thought and 



NATURE OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 69 

feeling as attributes of it. All we can say with truth 
and on good grounds is, that the organs of sense are 
accessory to sensation and necessary to it, but the 
sensation or feeling itself is wholly in the mind. 

" A man" (says Dr. Reid) " cannot see the sat- 
ellites of Jupiter but by a telescope. Does he con- 
clude from this that it is the telescope that sees those 
stars ? By no means ; such a conclusion would be 
absurd. It is no less absurd to Conclude that it is 
the eye that sees, or the ear that hears. The tele- 
scope is an artificial organ of sight, but it sees not. 
The eye is a natural organ of sight, by which we 
see, but the natural organ sees as Uttle as the arti- 
ficial." 

But we presume it is not necessary to enter much 
at length into the consideration of this topic. We 
readily admit the general connexion existing between 
the body and the mind, and the still more intimate 
and important connexion existing between the mind 
and the sensorial organ ; but we should carefully 
guard against the admission of views which seem to 
imply, what is a very differing thing, the sameness 
or identity of the mind with any mere material modi- 
fication. 

§ 36. Of the Actual Process in cases of Sensation. 

But while we admit the existence of an intimate 
connexion between the action of the mind and the 
antecedent action of some physical organ in all cases 
of sensation, we do not deny that there is, in some 
respects, a degree of obscurity attending it. Per- 
haps all we can say with safety in the matter is this. 



70 NATURE OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

Some object capable of affecting the outward organ 
must first be applied to it in some way, in conse- 
quence of which a modification or affection of the 
organ actually takes place. Subsequently to the 
change in the organ, either at its extremity and out- 
ward development, or in the brain, with which it is 
connected, and of which it may be considered as 
making a part, a change in the mind, or a new state 
of the mind, immediately takes place. In the state- 
ment so far we are sustained by acknowledged facts. 
But when we inquire how it is, or why it is, that 
a new state of a material organ causes a new state 
of the mind ; or, in other words, that an affection of 
the mind naturally and necessarily follows an affec- 
tion of some part of the body, we touch upon one of 
those ultimate limits of intellectual action which seem 
to reject any farther analysis. All we know, and 
all we can state with confidence, is the simple fact 
that a mental affection is immediately subsequent to 
an affection or change, which is physical. It is in 
this way that we find ourselves constituted. Such 
is the appointment of the Being who has made us. 

§ 37. Of the Meaning and JVature of Perception. 

As intimately connected with the subject of Sen- 
sation, we now proceed to that of Perception. Sen- 
sation and Perception (we speak now, it will be no- 
ticed, of external, and not of internal perception) have 
much in common with each other. — Perception, 
using the term in its application to outward objects, 
differs from sensation as a whole does from a part. 
It embraces more. It may be defined, therefore, an 



NATURE OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 71 

affection or state of the mind which is immediately 
successive to an affection of some organ of sense, 
and which is referred by us to something external as 
its cause. 

It will be recollected that the term sensation, 
when applied to the mind, expresses merely the state 
of the mind without reference to anything external, 
which might be the cause of it, and that it is the 
name of a truly simple feeling. Perception, on the 
contrary, is the name of a complex mental state, in- 
cluding not merely the internal affection of the mind, 
but also a reference to the exterior cause. Sensa- 
tion is wholly within ; but Perception carries us, as 
it were, out of ourselves, and makes us acquainted 
with the world around us. If we had but sensation 
alone, there would still be form, and fragrance, and 
colour, and harmony of sound, but it would all seem 
to be wholly internal. Perception, availing itself of 
the facts of sensation, connects with them the ideas 
of causality and externality, and thus reveals to us 
the visible and tangible realities of the outward world. 

§ 38. Of the Connexion between Sensation and 
Perception, 

The mental powers. Sensation and Perception, 
are considered together in the present chapter, be- 
cause they are closely connected, and, in conse- 
quence of this connexion, throw light upon each 
other. Perception is the natural result of Sensation, 
It is that to which sensation tends, and without 
which, as its natural result, sensation would be al- 
most of no value. Although susceptible of being 



72 DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

philosophically distinguished, they are yet so closely 
implicated with each other that they are, in a great 
degree, practically one. 

It is particularly necessary to consider them to- 
gether in the examination of the subject of Insanity. 
It is true that we may philosophically make a dis- 
tinction in the aspects of the mental disorder which 
are presented in the two cases. And yet they are 
so closely connected, that the examination of them 
entirely apart from each other would lead to embar- 
rassment. The insanity of external perception in- 
volves and substantiates that of sensation. The 
one does not exist without the other ; and the former 
is the developement and indicator of the latter. These 
remarks are to be kept in view in connexion with 
the observations which are to follow. 



CHAPTER 11. 

DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION, 
(l.) THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. 

§ 39. Circumstances attending Disordered Sensa- 
tions, 

Having remarked, so far as seemed to be neces- 
sary, on the general nature of Sensation and Exter- 
nal Perception, we are now prepared to say farther, 
in the first place, that sensation, even when consid- 



(l.) THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. 73 

ered as distinct from perception, is susceptible of a 
disordered or alienated action. In the verification 
of this statement two views are to be taken. First. 
It is evidently a law of our nature, that the inward 
sensation, whenever it exists, shall correspond to the 
condition of the outward or bodily organ. Conse- 
quently, a disordered or irregular movement of the 
organ necessarily communicates itself to the inward 
or mental state. Perhaps our meaning may not be 
exactly apprehended here. What we mean to as- 
sert is simply this, viz., that the sensation, in conse- 
quence of receiving its character from the diseased 
organ, is not such a sensation as would have existed 
in a different state of the organ. The product of the 
action of a sound organ, provided there is no irregu- 
lar or abnormal affection of the mind itself, is a sen- 
sation of a well-defined and specific character. Such 
a sensation is a sound or normal one. On the other 
hand, one that exists under the opposite circumstan- 
ces, is an unsound or abnormal one. This, if we 
rightly understand the matter, is to be regarded as 
the result of the natural and permanent relation be- 
tween the organ and the mental state. 

Second. A view directly the opposite of this 
may be taken, in explanation of the same result. 
That is to say, if the organ of sense is sound, but 
the mind is in a disordered state, the sensation may 
be unsound or abnormal for this reason also, viz., of 
unsoundness of mind. The mind, being disordered 
in itself, is not in a situation to receive the natural 
or true impression, which the action of the organ 
would otherwise give. It may be either so depress- 

G 



74 DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

ed in its power of action as not to be deeply enough 
affected, or it may be so highly susceptible as to re- 
ceive a wrong impression in the other direction. It 
may be too vivid or too weak, or fail, in some other 
respects, in the natural and precise correspondence 
to the outward affection. We make these general 
statements here, and leave it to the reader himself to 
make an application of them, in connexion with the 
facts to be adduced hereafter. 

§ 40. Disordered Perceptions consequent on Disor- 
dered Sensations, 

Perception, as we have already had occasion to 
intimate, is something additional to sensation, and 
inclusive of it. Accordingly, the perception will be 
as the sensation is. If the sensation be actually 
disordered, it will be found to be the case that the 
perception will partake of the disorder, and will be 
unreal, visionary, and deceptive. Perception always 
has reference to some outward cause ; we mean 
here outward, even in reference to the organ of 
sense. And when the perceptive power is not dis- 
ordered, we perceive things, to the limits of that 
power, just as they are. But it will be recollected 
that sensation is an intermediate step, preparative to 
the result of perception. Consequently, if the sen- 
sation is disordered, the relation existing between 
the subsequent perception and the outward cause of 
perception is disturbed. And, under these circum- 
stances, the perception cannot be expected to corre- 
spond, and will not, in fact, correspond to the reality 
and truth of things. It becomes, what has just been 



I 



(l.) THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. 75 

asserted, unreal and visionary. In other words, it 
imposes upon our belief, by indicating, with such dis- 
tinctness as to secure our assent, the existence and 
presence of objects which are not present, and often 
not real. It surrounds us with a world of mere illu- 
sions. 

In accordance with these views, we find it to be 
the case that there are various kinds of diseased or 
disordered sensations and perceptions, correspond- 
ing to the particular outward organ of sense, what- 
ever it is, which happens to be disordered. These 
sensations and perceptions (for they are so closely 
connected that it is not only difficult, but, for nearly 
all practical purposes, quite unnecessary to separate 
them) we propose now to examine. And, in doing 
this, we shall find it not only the most satisfactory, 
but the most convenient method, to pursue the in- 
quiry in connexion with each of the organs of sense 
separately. Accordingly, as it is practically of but 
little consequence with which of the organs we be- 
gin, we shall commence our remarks with those 
which, from their results or some other cause, are 
generally considered the lowest in importance and 
rank, and proceed to those which, in their connex- 
ion with the operations of the mind at least, appear 
to be more important. 

§ 41* Of Disordered Sensations and Perceptions^ 
connected with the Organ of Smell. 

In accordance with the suggestion which has just 
been made, we may properly begin with the Sense 
of Smell. The medium through which we have the 



'h 



76 DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

sensations and perceptions of smell, is the organ 
which is termed the olfactory nerve, situated princi- 
pally in the nostrils, but partly in some continuous 
cavities. When any odoriferous particles, sent from 
external objects, affect this organ, there are certain 
states of mind produced which vary with the nature 
of the odoriferous bodies. The facts of the existence 
and of the nature of these states of mind are made 
known by our consciousness. And as the intima- 
tions and the leading facts of Consciousness are un- 
questionably common to all persons, we take it for 
granted that no one is ignorant either of the exist- 
ence of the sensations and perceptions of smell, or 
of their general nature. 

Among other things, it is well known that, in a 
sane or sound mind, acting in connexion with a 
sound state of the outward organ, the perceptions of 
smell, and the sensations which, as their antecedents, 
are involved in them, always have a definite and 
well-known character ; and which, in accordance 
with this character, we properly describe as sane or 
sound sensations and perceptions. But if either the 
mind, considered in itself, be disordered, or if such 
be the case with the outward organ, in connexion 
with which the mind acts, the sensations and per- 
ceptions, under such circumstances, will be found to 
vary, in a greater or less degree, from the standard 
of soundness. In other words, they will have the 
character of disorder, unsoundness, or alienation. 
That such unsound sensations and perceptions, con- 
nected in their origin with the sense of smell, some- 
times exist, is sufficiently verified by facts. 



(l.) THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. 77 

Some of these facts we shall now proceed to 
mention, although it may not be proper to delay, 
since there are other views of mental disorder of 
greater importance, in order to bring forward instan- 
ces and illustrations at great length. 

§ 42. Statements Illustrative of the Preceding 
Section. 

There is a remark in the valuable Treatise on 
Mental Derangement of Dr. Andrew Combe, which, 
not improbably, his own personal observations had 
verified to this effect, that " the senses of taste, 
hearing, sight, and smell may be perverted ; and 
then odours are felt and tastes perceived which no 
healthy organs can recognise."* Speaking of in- 
sane persons. Dr. Neville remarks, " Some are tor- 
mented wherever they go by bad smells, and may 
be seen compressing their nostrils in order to escape 
the annoyance from which they suffer.''^ Buffon, 
in his Natural History of Man, has given an account 
of a priest of Guyenne, by the name of Blanchet, 
who had experienced a violent attack of insanity, 
and who himself, after his recovery, made a state- 
ment in writing of the peculiar sensations he had 
during the continuance of his disorder. Blanchet 
states, in general terms, that his senses became so 
exceedingly quick and delicate as to subject him al- 
ternately to exquisite pleasure or the greatest suf- 
fering. The sense of smell, as well as the other 
senses, was disordered. He says expressly, " I 

* Observations on Mental Derangement, Boston ed., p. 216. 
i Neville's Insanity, London ed., p. 24. 
G2 



78 DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

seemed at times to perceive odours and delicious 
perfumes, whose exquisite savours neither nature 
nor the art of the chymist could equal. At other 
times, insupportable odours, nauseous and bitter 
tastes drove me almost to desperation. Even the 
sense of touch was affected with these extremes of 
pleasure and pain." 

The celebrated Esquirol mentions the case of a 
young female under his care in the Hospital La Sal- 
petriere, whose sense of smell was disordered. She 
would frequently request the removal of the cause of 
some disagreeable odour. At other times she spoke 
of enjoying the most fragrant perfumes, although in 
neither case was there any odoriferous body near. 
" It is a circumstance worthy of remark" (says Dr. 
Adams, who has referred to this individual in a re- 
cent valuable article on Psycho-Physiology), " that 
she had lost the sense of smell so as to be insensi- 
ble of the presence of natural odours, while the dis- 
ordered state of her brain was giving her the most 
vivid impressions of odours when none were present 
to impress the organ of smell."* 

Dr. Burrows mentions the case of a sea-captain, 
who, in consequence of being wrecked, was com- 
pelled to suffer the extremities of famine. " The lat- 
ter part of the time, when his health was almost de- 
stroyed by privation and long suffering, a thousand 
strange images affected his mind ; every particular 
sense was perverted, and produced erroneous im- 
pressions ; fragrant perfumes had a fetid odour, 
and all objects appeared of a greenish or yellow 

* American Biblical Repository, No. xxxiv. 



(l.) THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. 79 

hue."* Dr. Conolly mentions the case of a wom- 
an who experienced simultaneous illusions of sight, 
smell, and hearing. " All kinds of animals seemed 
to be scampering before her ; the smell of brim- 
stone, and the continual sound of singing voices, 
conspired to trouble her."'f 

Here, then, are cases, as we understand the sub- 
ject, of really disordered mental action ; very trifling 
ones, perhaps, in themselves considered, but still ac- 
tually existing. The mind does not, in these cases, 
correspond to the intentions and the undisturbed 
tendencies of its own nature ; it is impelled by a 
wrong bias ; and, under this unnatural impulsive in- 
fluence, is the subject of an operation which, to say 
the least, is not a sound one. 

§ 43. Of Disordered Sensations and Perceptions 
connected with the Sense of Taste, 

The mental action which takes place in connex- 
ion with the organ of Taste next proposes itself for 
consideration. It is the tongue, covered with its 
numerous papillae, which essentially forms this or- 
gan, although the papillae are found scattered in oth- 
er parts of the cavity of the mouth. The applica- 
tion of any sapid body to this organ immediately 
causes in the organ itself a change, an alteration, or 
an affection ; and this is at once followed by a men- 
tal affection or a new state of the mind. In this 
way we have the sensations and perceptions, to 
which we give the various names sweet, bitter, sour, 
acrid, &c. 

* Burrows's Commentaries on [nsanity, p. 320, 
t Conolly's Indications of Insanity, p. U4. 



80 DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

The sensations and perceptions of Taste, as well 
as those of Smell, may be disordered. 

First. If, in consequence of actual bodily dis- 
ease, an organ of sense is brought, without the pres- 
ence of an outward object, into that particular state 
into which it is ordinarily brought by the application 
of its appropriate external object, the same sensa- 
tion, attended also with its resulting perception, will 
arise in the mind in the former case as in the latter. 
In other words, the person will seem actually to 
smell, or taste, or hear, as much so as if some ob- 
ject of smell, taste, or hearing were actually present. 
The sensation will be so well defined, and the per- 
ception, of which it is the basis, so distinct, that the 
beUef will be controlled ; and he will have no doubt 
of the real existence and presence of odoriferous, 
sapid, and other external objects, corresponding to 
the inward sensations and perceptions, unless he is 
aware of the peculiar state of the outward organ, 
and is in that way kept from error. 

Second. If the disordered action which we have 
supposed to exist in the outward organ, or external 
sensorial developement, should be found to exist ex- 
clusively in that part of the great sensorial organ 
which we denominate the Brain, the effect upon the 
mind will be the same. That is to say, the person 
will have the sensation or perception precisely as if 
the object were present. The case of the woman 
in the Hospital La Salpetriere, mentioned in^the pre- 
ceding section, is an instance in point. It appears 
that, while the outward organ of smell had so lost 
its power as to render her insensible of the presence 



(l.) THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. 81 

of natural odours, and also when no odoriferous 
bodies were present to impress the organ, if it had 
been susceptible of impressions, there were, never- 
theless, distinct and very vivid impressions of odours, 
which may probably be ascribed, as is suggested by 
Dr. Adams, to a disordered action existing exclu- 
sively in the brain. 

Third. Furthermore, it will be kept in recollec- 
tion, that there is not only an action of the body upon 
the mind, but also of the mind upon the body. The 
influence in the two cases may properly be regarded 
as reciprocal, though not, perhaps, in an equal de- 
gree. Hence it is possible (and, in some instan- 
ces, is undoubtedly the fact) that a very excited and 
unnatural state of the mind may, unaided by the 
presence of an outward body, produce in some part 
of the sensorial organ the precise state or affection 
which the presence of such a body would produce. 
And the natural consequence of this state of things 
will be a reaction upon the mind itself, and the pro- 
duction of false sensations and perceptions ; that is, 
of sensations and perceptions without anything ex- 
ternal corresponding to them. 

The conceptive power, for instance, sometimes 
becomes unnaturally excited ; so much so as to 
control our belief In other words, we may have 
such distinct conceptions of smells, tastes, sounds, 
and the like, that we cannot help fully believing in 
their actual existence and presence, and that we are 
truly the subjects of them. At such a time, certain- 
ly, the mind will be likely to have an influence on 
the outward organ, and to bring it into a position 



82 DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

precisely corresponding to the internal vivid concep- 
tion. 

These explanatory views, although they are intro- 
duced in connexion with the sense of taste, are ap- 
plicable to the disordered action of all the senses. 

^ 44. Illustrations of the foregoing Views in conr 
nexion tvith Disordered Taste. 

To apply these views to the sense of Taste. It 
is well known that insane persons not unfrequently 
ascribe some peculiarity of taste to objects which 
does not belong to them, and which they would not 
ascribe to them if the sensorial organ in all its parts, 
and the mind also, were in a perfectly sound state. 
The priest of Guyenne, mentioned in a former sec- 
tion, gives us to understand, that in his case the 
sense of taste, as Vv^ell as the other senses, had its 
vicissitudes of pleasure and pain. Sometimes the 
savours were exquisite, exceeding the capabiliiies of 
nature and art. Sometimes nauseous and bitter 
tastes drove him almost to desperation. In the 
statement of Dr. Combe, introduced in the section 
illustrative of disordered smells, we are informed, in 
general terms, that the sense of taste, as well as 
the senses of smell, hearing, and sight, may be per- 
verted ; and that then tastes may be perceived which 
no healthy organs can recognise. 

Dr. Neville, in some remarks upon insane per- 
sons, makes the following statement, which involves 
some facts illustrative of the subject under consider- 
ation. " The feeling by which we are admonished 
of the necessity of taking meat and drink, is very 



(l.) THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. 83 

commonly either blunted or very much exalted. 
Many insane persons never show the slightest signs 
of feeling either hunger or thirst. They voluntarily 
pass days without food, and would sometimes per- 
ish of inanition, were they not compelled to feed ; 
others, on the contrary, seem insatiable in their ap- 
petites ; and their whole minds are, apparently, con- 
centrated on the pleasures of the table."* Dr. 
Good mentions the case of a young woman who 
was wholly destitute, or nearly so, of the power of 
discriminating either the smell or taste of objects. 
In this instance, as in most others, it is probable that 
the disorder existed primarily (although it is possible 
it might have been internal and mental) in the out- 
ward organ, and thence communicated itself to the 
internal sensations and perceptions. Whatever may 
have been the true cause, the resulting states of 
mind could not be regarded otherwise than as re- 
ally disordered. 

Instances similar in their results to those which 
have been mentioned might be multiplied from the 
writings of individuals who have had charge of in- 
stitutions for the insane, or have enjoyed other fa- 
vourable opportunities of judging. The general 
principles which have been laid down, and the facts 
which have been mentioned, will probably enable 
the intelligent reader to understand the subject, so 
far as it is connected with the lower senses of smell 
and taste, without going farther into particulars. 

*• Neville's Insanity, p. 27. 



84 DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 



CHAPTER III. 

DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION, 
(ll.) THE SENSE OF HEARING. 

$ 45. Of Disordered Sensations and Perceptions in 
connexion luiih the Hearing, 

In the prosecution of this part of our general sub- 
ject, we proceed to remark farther, that there may 
be imperfect and disordered sensations connected 
with the sense of Hearing. The causes of disor- 
dered auditory sensations and perceptions, hke those 
of other mental acts connected with the senses, are 
threefold ; distinct in their nature, but yet suscepti- 
ble (and this is, perhaps, generally the fact) of acting 
in combination. 

In the first place, disordered auditory states of 
mind may arise from a disordered condition of the 
auditory nerve. It is well known, as we have al- 
ready had occasion to intimate, that an unusually 
strong or inordinate affection of any of the organs 
of sense may be followed by actual sensations, when 
the usual outward cause of such sensations is no 
longer present. If the eye be fixed for any length 
of time upon some bright object — the sun, for in- 
stance — the optic nerve is found to be powerfully and 
unfavourably affected. And when we turn our eye 
from the bright object, we find that its image, in 
consequence of the excited state of the retina, still 



(ll.) THE SENSE OF HEARING. 85 

remains. In other words, the retina, owing to the 
great power of the first impression, continues to be 
affected in the same way as when the object was 
before it. And the mind, consequently, is in a cor- 
responding state ; that is, it seems to see the object, 
although it is no longer present. So, when the au- 
ditory nerve has been for a long time affected by a 
loud and continuous sound, the physical affection re- 
mains after the sound (that is, the outward cause of 
the sound) has ceased. The movement of the tym- 
panum, which was so powerfully affected in the first 
instance, has not ceased ; and, so long as this is the 
case, the mind is affected in the same manner as if 
the outward cause of sound existed. 

§ 46. Facts Illustrative of Disordered Auditory 
Sensations and Perceptions, 

These are cases, it is true, of merely occasional 
or temporary disorder of the physical organs ; but 
facts of this kind evidently go to show that there is 
a possibility, at least, of these organs being perma- 
nently disordered. And other classes of facts evince, 
beyond all question, that this possibility is sometimes 
realized. Accordingly, persons (probably in conse- 
quence of the organ having been unduly affected at 
some previous time, and thus thrown into an unnat- 
ural position) are sometimes troubled with a ringing 
noise, which seems to them the sound of bells. At 
another time they hear, for hours and days together, 
the rumbling of carts or the explosions of cannon. 
At other times, again, their ears are affected with 
what they imagine to be the voices and songs of 

H 



86 DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

celestial beings. There is an account given in a 
foreign Medical Journal (the Medico-Chirurgical 
Repertory of Piedmont) of a young lady who at- 
tended for the first time the music of an orchestra, 
with which she was exceedingly pleased. She con- 
tinued to hear the sounds distinctly and in their or- 
der for weeks and months afterward, till, the whole 
system becoming disordered in consequence of it, 
she died. 

In some instances there is an unpleasant feeling 
in the tympanum of the ear, as if it were greatly dis- 
tended or stretched tight, attended with an increased 
sensation of sound, so that very small sounds appear 
like thunder. A letter to Dr. Rush from one of his 
patients, whose nervous system had become much 
deranged, has these expressions : " I am, as it 
were, all nerve ; the least noise is like a shock of 
thunder ; so that for seven years I have been in the 
constant habit of stopping both ears with wax." " A 
mere catarrh" (says Dr. Conolly, Insanity, p. 238) 
" will sometimes cause one ear to convey a differ- 
ent sound from that conveyed by the other ; the 
same note, but in a different key; or the same 
words, but as if from two voices, one an octave 
higher than the other." 

§ 47. Of the Brain in connexion with Diseased 
Auditory states of Mind. 

From what has been said, it seems to be clear 
that the auditory nerve sometimes becomes morbidly 
affected to such a degree, that there is an internal 
sensation of sound without any corresponding exter- 



(ll.) THE SENSE OF HEARING. 87 

nal cause whatever. The medium of communica- 
tion which the mind employs is in fault. The ma- 
chinery of the instrument of external perception is 
disordered ; and, as a natural consequence, the mind 
loses its power of answering promptly and correctly 
to the external reality and aspect of things. 

We proceed to remark, in the second place, that 
the same results will follow if a diseased action 
should be found to exist, not in the outward organ, 
viz., the auditory nerve^ but in the part of the brain 
which is particularly connected with it. Esquirol, 
in the article Demonomanie, in the Dictionnaire des 
Sciences Medicales, gives some account of the dis- 
ordered mental action of a woollen spinster, who 
was under his care in the La Salpetriere Hospital, 
which seems to confirm this view. Among other 
things, he mentions her return from a long walk at 
a certain time. Becoming fatigued, she lay down 
upon the ground to rest. " In a short time she felt 
a motion in her head, and heard a noise like that of 
a spinning'ivheeV^* It is certainly a reasonable sup- 
position here, that the affection was in the brain 
rather than in the outward organ. The illusory 
sound like that of a spinning-wheel resulted, in all 
probability, from the circumstance of the brain's as- 
suming the same position or the same movement, 
into which it had been customarily brought by the 
real sound of the wheel when she was at her work. 

Nevertheless, the two cases are intimately con- 
nected with each other. It is generally difficult to 
decide with certainty whether the original cause of 

* Dictionnaire des Sciences Medicales, torn, viii., p. 302. 



88 DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

disordered auditory sensations exists in a diseased 
stale of the brain or of the auditory nerve. Proba- 
bly, in a majority of cases, the diseased action exists 
in both of these parts of the great sensorial organ at 
the same time. 

The facts which have already been given in the 
preceding section will serve to illustrate this cause 
of mental disorder, viz., a disordered action of the 
brain, as well as that first mentioned. And some 
other facts of a similar nature may properly be added 
here. 

Persons who are subject to disordered auditory 
sensations frequently hear their names called. "We 
are accustomed'' (says Dr. Rush, speaking of names) 
" to hear them pronounced more frequently than oth- 
er words ; and hence the part of the ear which vi- 
brates with the sound of our names moves more 
promptly, from habit, than any other part of it." 
And this, we may well suppose, is especially the 
case if the organ of hearing be disordered. Some- 
times short sentences are heard, generally having 
relation to the subject upon which the mind happens 
to be exercised at the moment. We learn from 
Washington Irving, that Christopher Columbus was 
at one time subject to deceptive auditory sensations. 
He relates that, in the midst of his gloom, when he 
had abandoned himself to despair, Columbus heard 
a voice calling to him in the following terms : " Oh, 
man of little faith ! fear nothing ; be not cast down. 
I will provide for thee. The seven years of the term 
of gold are not expired ; and in that and in all oth- 
er things I will take care of thee." It is possible, 



(ll.) THE SENSE OF HEARING. 89 

however, in the case of Columbus, that the decep- 
tive sensations may have arisen from a peculiarly 
excited state of mind, without the accessory fact of 
a disturbed organ. A view of the subject which re- 
quires, in its place, a more particular notice. 

It is here, in connexion with these facts and views, 
that we find an explanation, in part at least, of those 
singular soliloquies which are sometimes carried on 
by insane persons. Acting under the impression 
that they are actually spoken to, they utter the cor- 
responding replies ; and thus a sort of interlocutory 
conversation is carried on, a part only of which is 
audible, except to the vitiated ear of insanity. 

^ 48. Third Cause of Disordered Auditory Sensa- 
tions and Perceptions. 
We come now to a third cause of the disorder- 
ed states of mind which we are considering. The 
sensorial organ may be sound in all its parts, and 
yet the mind may, in its own nature, be so disorder- 
ed as to produce these vitiated and abnormal results. 
It is an acknowledged truth (and we hope to be ex- 
cused for repeating it), that strong affections of the 
mind may cause new modifications of the bodily 
part, as certainly and effectually as that, on the other 
hand, violent affections of the body may have their 
result in the mind. Accordingly, a person in a high 
degree of mental excitement may have such a dis- 
tinct conception of a human voice, of the sound of 
a musical instrument, or of some other sound, that 
the auditory nerve, in consequence of the sympathy 
between the mind and the body, will become affect- 

H2 



90 DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

ed precisely as if an external cause of sound exist- 
ed. And then the sound, that is, the internal sen- 
sation of sound, follows. 

Persons, for instance, sitting alone in a room, are 
sometimes interrupted by the supposed hearing of a 
voice which calls to them. But, in truth, it is only 
their own internal conception of that particular sound, 
which, in consequence of some inordinate mental 
excitement, happens, at the moment, to be so distinct 
as to cause a modification of the auditory nerve, 
such as is common in cases of actual hearing, and 
thus imposes itself on them for a reality. And this 
may be done, it will be remembered, when there is 
no actual disease of the physical organ. 

This is probably the whole mystery of what Bos- 
well has related as a singular incident in the life of 
Dr. Johnson, that, while at Oxford, he distinctly 
heard his mother call him by his given name, al- 
though she was, at the very time, in Litchfield. The 
same principle explains also what is related of Na- 
poleon. Previously to his Russian expedition, he 
was frequently discovered half reclined on a sofa, 
where he remained several hours, plunged in pro- 
found meditation. Sometimes he started up con- 
vulsively and with an ejaculation. Fancying he 
heard his name, he would exclaim, "Who calls me?" 
These are the sounds, susceptible of being heard at 
any time in the desert air, which started Robinson 
Crusoe from his sleep when there was no one in his 
solitary island but himself. 

«* The airy tongues that syllable men's names, 
On shores, in desert sands, and wildernesses." 



(ll.) THE SENSE OF HEARING. 91 

Perhaps it ought to be added, as a matter of pos- 
sihility at least (and the principle involved in the re- 
mark will apply equally well to any other organ of 
sense), that the conception of sound may at times 
be so distinct as to control a person's belief, and 
thus assume the appearance of reality, without any 
corresponding position of the auditory nerve. It is, 
unquestionably, an established principle in mental 
philosophy, that the belief may sometimes be con- 
trolled in that way. And, whenever this is the case, 
whatever is believed to be affects us in the same 
manner as if it had an actual existence. Such, 
however, is the powerful influence of the mind over 
the body, it is probable, that, in nearly all such cases 
of highly excited conception, attended with behef, 
the physical organ puts itself in harmony with the 
internal mental state. 

§ 49. The Disordered auditory Sensations of the 
poet Coioper, 

The mental hallucinations to which the poet 
Cowper was subject appeared, among other forms, 
in that of deceptive or illusive sensations of hearing. 
All the causes of this form of mental disorder seem 
to have existed in his case. It has never been 
doubted that his nervous system was very much dis- 
ordered ; and it is certainly no improbable supposi- 
tion, that the irregular and diseased action was ex- 
perienced in the brain, as well as in the outward de- 
velopements of the sensorial organ. And then his 
mind, too, was intensely conceptive and imaginative, 
to a degree that almost overstepped the limits of 



92 DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

sanity. Is it surprising, then, that he should have 
heard voices when there was nothing present which 
had the power of sound ? 

He does not himself, however, appear to have 
suspected the psychological or the physiological 
causes of the voices which he from time to time 
heard ; but regarded them as actual communications 
from invisible beings. In a letter to one of his cor- 
respondents, he says, " I awoke this morning with 
these words relating to my work loudly and distinct- 
ly spoken : 

" ' *^pply assistance in my case, indigent and we- 
cessitous.^ 

" And about three mornings since with these : 

" ' // ivill not be by common and ordinary means,^ 

" It seems better, therefore, that I should wait till 
it shall please God to set my wheels in motion, than 
make another beginning only to be obliterated like 
the two former. I have also heard these two words 
on the same subject : 

" ^ JVleantime, raise an expectation and desire of 
it among the people.^ " 

At the commencement of another letter we find 
the following remarkable statement : " My experi- 
ence since I saw you affords, on recollection, no- 
thing worthy to be sent to Olney, except the follow- 
ing notice, which I commit to writing, and commu- 
nicate as a kind of curiosity rather than for any other 
reason ; though Milton, who is at present an inter- 
esting character to us both, is undoubtedly the sub- 
ject of it. I waked the other morning with these 
words distinctly spoken to me : 



\ 



(ill.) THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 93 

" ' Charles the Second, though he was, or wished to 
be accounted a man of fine tastes and an admirer of 
the arts, never saw, or expressed a wish to see, the 
man whom he would have found alone superior to all 
the race of men,'' " 

Mr. Southey has recently published an interesting 
life of this distinguished poet, in which he relates the 
above instances, and others similar to them. 



CHAPTER IV. 

DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION, 
(in.) THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 

^ 60. Disordered Sensations and Perceptions con- 
nected with the Sense of Touch, 

The sense of Touch may properly present itself 
next in order. The principal organ of this sense is 
the hand. Nevertheless, it ought not to be consid- 
ered as limited to that part of our frame, but as dif- 
fused over the whole body. It is not surprising, 
however, that the hand should principally arrest our 
attention as the organ of this sense, since it is fur- 
nished with various articulations ; is easily moveable 
by the muscles ; and can readily adapt itself to the 
various changes of form in the objects to which it is 
applied. 

The sense of touch, like the other senses, may be 
disordered m itself and in its sensorial connexions 



94 DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

(we have reference here particularly to the brain), 
and, as a natural consequence, in its mental results. 
As various principles already laid down are applica- 
ble here, we shall proceed, without delaying upon the 
general views which the subject presents, to mention 
some incidents and facts which may tend to illustrate 
this form of alienation. It may be proper to add, 
however, that the natural results of the sense of 
touch are more various than those of the other sen- 
ses ; and that, as would naturally be expected, there 
is no less diversity in the morbid results. They re- 
late not only to form and extension, but to hardness 
and softness, heat and cold, pleasure and pain, and 
whatever else may in any way pertain to that sense. 

§ 51. Facts Illustrative of Tactual Disorders. 

Dr. Abercrombie mentions a case, originally re- 
corded in the Memoirs of the Medical Society of 
London, of a gentleman " who, after a paralytic at- 
tack, had such a morbid state of sensation that cold 
bodies felt to him as if they were intensely hot. 
When he first put on his shoes, he felt them very 
hot ; and, as they gradually acquired the temperature 
of his feet, they appeared to him to cool." He 
mentions also the case of a soldier, a very strong 
man, and able for all his duties, who had so com- 
pletely lost the feeling of his right arm and leg, that 
he allowed the parts to be cut, or red-hot irons to be 
applied to them, without complaining of any pain.* 

Mr. Southey, in his Life of Wesley (vol. ii., chap, 
xviii.), gives an interesting account of a zealous and 

* Diseases of the Brain, p. 275, 6. 



(hi.) the sense of touch. 95 

devoted itinerant preacher by the name of Haime. 
Tlie case of this man, as Mr. Southey himself inti- 
mates, is worthy of notice in a physical and psycho- 
logical, as well as in a religious point of view. At 
one time he suffered greatly from extreme religious 
depression, which brought him, to say the least, to 
the very borders of insanity. Some of the physical 
sensations which this pious man experienced at this 
time seem to me to illustrate the subject now before 
us. We give the statement in his own words. " So 
great was the displeasure of God against me, that 
he in a great measure took away the sight of my 
eyes. I could not see the sun for more than eight 
months. Even in the clearest summer day it al- 
ways appeared to me like a mass of blood. At the 
same time, I lost the use of my knees. I could 
truly say, ' Thou hast sent fire into my bones.' I 
was often as hot as if I were burning to death. 
Many times I looked to see if my clothes were not 
on fire. I have gone into a river to cool myself; 
but it was all the same ; for what could quench the 
wrath of his indignation that was let loose upon me ? 
At other times, in the midst of summer, I have been 
so cold that I knew not how to bear it. All the 
clothes I could put on had no effect ; but my flesh 
shivered, and my very bones quaked." 

Dr. Burrows, in his Commentaries on Insanity, 
narrates a remarkable case having relation to this 
subject in the following terms : " A gentleman, 
aged thirty-six, insane, with a strong hereditary pre- 
disposition to suicide, contrived, during the tempo- 
rary absence of his keeper, though his legs were 



96 DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

fastened together, to kick a hole in the fireguard 
and thrust his feet into a quick fire, which he made 
more fierce by tearing up a book and thrusting the 
leaves in. He was found a {ew minutes after, sit- 
ting very composedly in this position. His toes 
and part of one foot were severely burned ; the other 
escaped with a smart scorching. In the burned foot 
inflammation, extensive and deep eschars, and mor- 
tification, with sloughing of the muscles and tendons, 
followed. And, finally, all the bones of the toes, 
and some of the metatarsal bones, sloughed away. 
The cure of this foot occupied more than a year ; 
the scorched one soon got well. But neither du- 
ring the combustion of the toes, nor for months af- 
terward, upon removing the diseased parts or dress- 
ing the wound, was any pain expressed. But when 
the mind improved and the desire of suicide dimin- 
ished, which it did long before the wound healed, he 
complained violently of the pain he suffered from it 
or when it was dressed."* 

This case seems to show (and it is what the anal- 
ogy presented by the irregular action of the other 
senses would lead us to expect) that disordered tac- 
tual sensations do not depend exclusively upon a 
disordered condition of the bodily organ ; but also, 
and perhaps in an equal degree, upon an irregular 
or abnormal action of the mind. In many cases 
there is probably a combined sensation, the cor- 
poreal combining itself with the mental. A case 
mentioned in Dr. Brewster's Work on Natural Ma- 
gic is one of this character, presenting the results 

* Burrows's Commentaries on Insanity, Part ii., Com. ii., p. 290, 



(ill.) THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 97 

of a morbid state of the body operated upon by an 
inordinately excited state of the mind. It is the ac- 
count of a lady who was subject to spectral illu- 
sions, of whom it is expressly said that she pos- 
sesses a " naturally morbid imagination, so strongly 
affecting her corporeal impressions that the story of 
any person having suffered severe pain, by accident 
or otherwise, will occasionally produce acute twinges 
in the corresponding part of her person. An ac- 
count, for instance, of the amputation of an arm, 
will produce an instantaneous and severe sense of 
pain in her own arm." 

§ 52. Other cases illustrative of Disordered Sensa^ 
tions and Perceptions. 

There are some cases of tactual disorder still 
more striking than those which have been mention- 
ed. It is not unfrequently the fact, that persons 
have very peculiar tactual sensations existing, not in 
a particular part merely, but over the whole body. 
One, for instance, has a sensation which conveys to 
him the idea of great bodily enlargement or diminu- 
tion. Another has a sensation of lightness, as if he 
were composed of feathers. Another experiences 
a feeling of weight, as if he were made of lead. And 
others, again, have a strong and indescribable sen- 
sation, which they indicate by saying, it seems to 
them as if they were made of glass or of some 
other substance. 

Some very marked cases of insanity have a con- 
nexion with the facts which have now been alluded 
to. The organ of touch, for instance, throughout 

I 



98 DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

the physical system is so disordered as to give a 
person the distinct sensation of brittleness or of 
being made of glass. The sensation, we will sup- 
pose, is so distinct and so strong as to control this 
person's belief; and that he actually believes him- 
self to be made of glass. This, certainly, is possi- 
ble. The state of mind, it will be recollected, which 
is called belief, is not, strictly speaking, a voluntary 
one ; but has its laws, which necessarily determine 
it. And we cannot be surprised, therefore, that, 
under the circumstances supposed, he should have 
a full persuasion that he is physically in this condi- 
tion. In other words, he is, in his own view and 
practically, a man of glass, and regulates his con- 
versation and his conduct in consistency with this 
fundamental error. We have here a full and mark- 
ed case of insanity ; one which is universally ac- 
knowledged to be so ; but which, in its origin, ap- 
pears to be founded exclusively upon a disordered 
condition of the sense of touch. And the same of 
other cases. 

§ 63. Application of these views to the Witchcraft 
Delusion in JVew-England. 

The statements of this chapter will help to explain 
one of the leading features of the witchcraft delu- 
sion, which prevailed in New-England about the 
year 1690. The feature we refer to was this. The 
unfortunate subjects, as they were supposed to be, 
of diabolical arts, often complained that they were 
pricked with pins, or pierced with knives, or struck 
with blows. And all by the means and through the 



(ill.) THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 99 

agency of some invisible hand. The simple fact 
probably was, that they were merely the subjects of 
disordered or alienated sensations and perceptions 
of the touch. They felt something, undoubtedly. 
And the sensation was very much such a one as 
would have followed the prick of a pin, the wound 
from a knife, or the infliction of a blow. But there 
was, in fact, nothing more than what can be easily 
explained on natural and philosophical principles. 
There is no need to suppose the introduction of in- 
visible and external agency. Dr. Cotton Mather, 
who is the principal historian of those remarkable 
events, furnishes one fact that throws some light 
upon this point. Speaking of the bewitched per- 
sons, he says : " They often felt the hand that 
scratched them, while yet they saw it not ; but, 
when they thought they had hold of it, it would give 
them the slip. Once the fist beating the man was 
discernible, but they could not catch hold of it.'^* 

We admit, however, that the principles of this 
chapter are not sufficient to explain all the facts 
which are said to have occurred in that remarkable 
period of delusion. We shall hereafter, probably, 
have occasion, in connexion with other forms of dis- 
ordered mental action, to refer to the subject again. 

* Mather's Magnalia, book vi., ch. 7. 



100 DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 



CHAPTER V. 

DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
(iV.) THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 

§ 54. Of the Outward or Physical Organ of the 
Sensations and Perceptions of Sight. 
Following the plan of inquiry which we have 
marked out, we proceed now to the consideration of 
disordered mental action as it exists in connexion 
with the sense of sight. The organ of this sense is 
the eye. The medium on which this organ acts 
are rays of light, everywhere diffused, and always 
advancing, if they meet with no opposition, in direct 
lines. The eye, which may be regarded as a sort 
of telescope, having its distinct parts, and discover- 
ing throughout the marks of admirable wisdom, not 
only receives externally the medium on which it 
acts, but carries the rays of light into itself; and, 
on principles purely scientific, refracts and combines 
them anew. If they were to continue passing on 
precisely in the same direction, they would produce 
merely one mingled and indistinct expanse of col- 
our. In their progress, however, through the crys- 
taUine humour, they are refracted or bent from their 
former direction, and are distributed to certain focal 
points on the retina, which is a white, fibrous ex- 
pansion of the optic nerve. As soon as the rays of 
light have been distributed on their distinct portions 



(iV.) THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 101 

of the retina, and have formed an image there, they 
are immediately followed by the sensation or per- 
ception which is termed sight. 

^ 55. Dism^dered Visual Sensations and Per- 
captions . 

Whenever we seem to see things which we do 
not see ; in other words, whenever the visual per- 
ception is not in accordance with the outward re- 
ality, we naturally and properly speak of such a sen- 
sation or perception as a disordered one. The causes 
of such disordered visual results are various. 

I. The FIRST which we shall mention is one en- 
tirely analogous to the cause of disordered sensa- 
tions in other cases, viz., an unnatural and morbid 
sensibility of the retina of the eye, either the whole 
of the retina or only a part. This cause, it is true, 
is in some degree conjectural, in consequence of the 
retina being so situated as to render it difficult to 
make it a subject of observation and experiment. 
But knowing, as we do, that the nervous system 
generally is liable to be diseased, and that the dis- 
ease of a particular portion is commonly productive 
of results having relation to the object or uses of 
that portion, we may for this reason, as well as for 
what we know directly and positively of the occa- 
sionally disordered affections of the optic nerve, give 
it a place in the explanations of the subject now be- 
fore us. In these cases the optic nerve is a source 
of action to itself. It is so excitable, so morbidly 
sensitive, that it repeats its antecedent states, as it 

I 2 



102 DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

were, automatically, when the natural causes of 
those states are no longer present. 

11. The SECOND cause is the mental state itself 
acting sympathetically upon the visual organ. We 
know, when the object of sight is directly before the 
eye, that there is a new state, an affection of the op- 
tic nerve ; and it is probable, in consequence of the 
sympathy between the mind and body, that when, in 
the absence of a visible body, we merely think or 
conceive of one, there is always a very slight sym- 
pathetic affection of the retina, analogous to what 
exists when the visible object is actually present. 
In a perfectly healthy state of the body, including 
the organ of visual sense, this affection of the retina 
is of course very slight. But under the influence 
of a morbid sensibility, the mere conceptions of the 
mind, if they happen to be particularly vivid, may at 
times impart such an increased activity to the whole 
or a part of the retina as to give existence to disor- 
dered or illusory sights. 

& 66. The preceding Views confirmed by the Anal- 
ogy of the other Senses. 
It is the same in the case of visual as of auditory 
sensations. The vibrations of the morbidly sensi- 
tive nerve of the ear will cause sensations of sound 
within, wholly independent of any external cause. 
The auditory nerve may either, in the first place, be 
a source exclusively of action to itself, or may be, 
in the second place, under the influence chiefly of 
sympathy from the mind ; but in either case it acta 
irrespective of an outward sonorous cause. So in 



(IV.) THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 103 

regard to the optic nerve and the portions of the 
sensorial organ immediately connected with it. It 
may be so morbidly sensitive as to act of itself, and 
to give re-existence, from the mere force of habit, to 
the pictures that were formerly impressed upon it. 
And particularly the mere thought or conception of 
a visible object may affect it, by the power of sym- 
pathy, as really and in the same way as if such visi- 
ble object were actually present to the sight. And 
thus the individual who is the subject of these exci- 
ted or morbid affections, whether they are exclusive- 
ly physical, or physical and mental together, may be 
regarded as possessing the power in himself of ori- 
ginating and sustaining the representation or pictures 
of objects, although no such objects are present. In 
other words, as these results depend upon a morbid 
state of his physical or mental system, or of both 
combined, 'rather than upon any deliberate act of his 
will, he may properly be regarded as the subject of 
disordered visual sensations, more commonly known 
as spectral illusions. 

We will only add, in confirmation of what has 
been said in reference to the possible and actual af- 
fection of the retina, that in one of the most inter- 
esting cases of disordered visual sensations which 
have been published, the person who was the sub- 
ject of them expressly states, that, for some hours 
preceding their occurrence, she had a peculiar feel- 
ing in the eyes, which was relieved as soon as they 
had passed away.* 

* Brewster*s Natural Magic, Letter III. 



104 DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

^ 67. Illustrations of the Subject from the use of 

Opium, 

There are some articles, such as ardent spirits in 
their various forms, opium, and the febrile miasma 
gas, as we have already had occasion to remark in 
a former chapter, which, on being introduced into 
the system, and especially when taken repeatedly 
and in considerable quantities, are found powerfully 
to affect the mind. And the effect on the mind ap- 
pears to be produced by means of an intermediate 
influence, as we should naturally expect it would be, 
upon the sensorial organ. All the various sensa- 
tions and perceptions, those which originate in the 
sense of sight no less than others, may be more or 
less disordered in this way. 

It appears from the work entitled the Confessions 
of an Enghsh Opium-eater, that the auth6rof it was 
inordinately addicted to the use of opium ; so that, 
in the end, not only his health was affected, but his 
intellect was thrown into an unnatural and disorder- 
ly posture. The nerve of vision became so disor- 
dered that it at once assumed the position which 
his thoughts indicated, whatever that might be. So 
that his eye, in discordance with its natural laws of 
action, constantly peopled the surrounding vacant 
space with visions and phantasms of terror or of 
beauty. He informs us, among other things, that 
at night, when he lay in bed, vast processions pass- 
ed along in mournful pomp. But his visions do not 
appear to have been Hmited to representations of a 
mournful character. Whatever be happened to think 



(iV.) THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 105 

upon, whether it were landscapes, or palaces, or ar- 
mies in battle array ; in a word, whatever was a sub- 
ject of thought, and was capable of being visually 
represented, formed themselves into images or phan- 
tasms of the eye, and swept before him in order and 
distinctness, no less marked and imposing than if 
the real objects themselves had been present. 

§ 58. Disordered Action may exist in conneocion with 
more than one Sense at the same time. 

Sometimes (and not unfrequently) the mental dis- 
order, which exists by means of the senses, extends 
to two or more of the senses at the same time. Such 
seems to have been the fact in the case of that re- 
markable visionary, Blake, the English painter. 
" Did you ever see a fairy's funeral, madam 1" he 
once said to a lady who happened to sit by him in 
company. " Never, sir !" was the answer. " I 
have," said Blake, " but not before last night." He 
then proceeded to state as follows : 

" I was walking alone in my garden. There 
was great stillness among the branches and flowers, 
and more than common sweetness in the air. I 
heard a low and 'pleasant sound, and knew not 
whence it came. At last I saw the broad leaf of a 
flower move, and underneath I saw a procession of 
creatures of the size and colour of green and gray 
grasshoppers, bearing a body laid out on a roseleaf, 
which they buried with songs, and then disappear- 
ed."* It would seem from this statement, and from 
other things which are related of him, that this re- 
* Macnish's Philosophy of Sleep, p. 229. 



106 DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

markable person was the subject of disordered au- 
ditory as well as visual sensations. 

We might multiply instances and illustrations un- 
der this head, but perhaps it is needless. The sub- 
ject, as it presents itself to notice here, is closely 
connected with the disordered action of the concep- 
tive power ; so much so, that the farther examina- 
tion of it at present would necessarily imply the an- 
ticipation of some things which are to be said here- 
after. There remain, however, one or two inci- 
dental topics. 

§ 59. Of Disordered Perceptions in connexion loith 
excited Religious Feeling. 

As having a relation with what has been said un- 
der the general subject of alienated Sensations and 
Perceptions, it may be proper briefly to refer to some 
facts that have attracted notice in connexion with 
strongly excited religious feeling. Not unfrequent- 
ly, individuals at such times have been the subjects 
of perceptions which were unnatural and illusory. 
Nor have the illusions been hmited to one sense 
merely. 

One, for instance, has beheld angels ascending 
to heaven, or descending on the ladder of Jacob ; 
or has seen the river of the water of life, clear as 
crystal. Another has heard the voices of invisible 
beings singing the song of Moses and the Lamb. 
Another, again, has seen the Saviour in the most 
trying moments of the crucifixion ; and has no more 
doubt of having truly and visually beheld him, than 
the disciple Thomas when he thrust his hand into 
his side. 



(iV.) THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 107 

We are aware that this subject is one of a deli- 
cate nature, and on which we are greatly liable to be 
misunderstood. Accordingly, we do not hesitate 
frankly to express our conviction that there is such 
a thing as spiritual communications ; special influ- 
ences of the Holy Spirit ; joys unspeakable, flowing 
from a celestial source ; a living mental intercourse 
with heaven. At the same time, it is not the less 
true that there may be sights seen which are not 
spiritual, but corporeal, and voices heard which are 
not from above. Is it not dangerous to rest one's 
hopes and belief of possessing a truly religious char- 
acter on things of this kind? Without rudely set- 
ting at defiance any feelings and opinions which may 
happen to exist on this subject, we may still take 
the liberty to inquire whether the strong bodily sen- 
sations which have sometimes been felt, and the 
sights which have been seen, and the voices which 
have been heard, cannot very often, as in instances 
already remarked upon, be traced to some disorder 
of the physical system ? Or, admitting that the body 
is sound and under no special excitement, whether 
they may not be merely our own thoughts, strength- 
ened by reflection rendered intense by desire ? 

" Alas ! we listen to our own fond hopes, 
Even till they seem no more our fancy's children , 
We put them on a prophet's robe, endow them 
With prophet's voices, and then Heaven speaks in them, 
And that which we would have be, surely shall be." 

The salvation of the soul is too weighty a con- 
cern to be risked on such an uncertain foundation ; 
especially as we have the Word of life, which points 



108 DISORDERED SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

out the mai'ks of a truly religious state, yet without 
making mention, as far as we are able to perceive, 
of dreams, and sounds, and visions, as included 
among those marks. 

§ 60. Concluding Remarks on Disordered Sensa- 
tion and Perception. 

Such are some of the aspects and varieties of 
mental disorder, which are presented under the gen- 
eral head of Disordered Sensation and Perception. 
The facts which have been mentioned may appear 
inconsiderable in themselves, but they are important 
in their totality. A man might perhaps escape the 
imputation of insanity, in the ordinary acceptation of 
the term, who happened not to smell aright ; but if, 
in addition to that, he did not taste aright, nor touch 
aright, nor hear aright, nor see aright ; if he put 
sweet for bitter, and bitter for sweet ; if he heard 
audible voices in the midst of utter stillness ; if he 
peopled the vacant space around him with mere ima- 
ginary visibilities ; if all, or even half of this, were 
true, it does not appear, whatever might be true of 
the imputation of absolute insanity, how he could 
well lay claim to the possession of entire soundness 
of mind. 

It is true, there are forms and modifications of 
disordered mind more deeply seated and more for- 
midable than these which we have now been con- 
templating. But it cannot be denied that these, 
though nearer the surface of the mind, and more 
easily manageable than others, are yet of sufficient 
importance to require a particular notice. They 



EXCITED OR DISORDERED CONCEPTIONS. 109 

give to the whole mind an anomalous aspect ; they 
perplex the outward conduct, and diminish a per- 
son's happiness and usefulness. 



CHAPTER VI. 

EXCITED OR DISORDERED CONCEPTIONS. 

§ 61. On the General Psychological JYature of 
Conceptions. 

We proceed now to the consideration of another 
form of disordered mental action, viz., Excited or 
Disordered Conceptions. Conceptions, the states 
of mind to which our attention is now directed, are 
those ideas which we have of any absent objects of 
sensation and perception. When a sapid body or 
an odoriferous body is presented to its appropriate 
organ of taste or smell, the effect which follows in 
the mind is termed a sensation. W^hen we after- 
ward think of that sensation, as we sometimes ex- 
press it ; in other words, and more properly, when 
the sensation is recalled, even though very imper- 
fectly, without the object which originally caused it 
being present, it then becomes, by the use of lan- 
guage, a conception. 

And it is the same in any instance of perception. 
When, in strictness of speech, we are said to per- 
ceive anything, as a flower, a tree, or a building, the 

K 



110 EXCITED OR DISORDERED CONCEPTIONS. 

objects of our perceptions are in all cases before us^ 
But we may form conceptions of them ; they may 
be recalled and exist in the " mind's eye," however 
remote they may be in fact, both in time and place. 
Accordingly, these mental states are distinct from 
every other ; they have their specific or characteris- 
tic nature and traits ; and, in various points of view, 
are unquestionably deserving of especial attention. 
Nevertheless, it will not be necessary particularly to 
delay upon them in this place. In their natural or 
ordinary form they will generally be found to have 
a place in treatises on Mental Philosophy, where 
they are sufficiently explained. It will answer our 
purpose to refer to a single trait more. It is this. 
These states of mind are susceptible of variations in 
their degree of strength or vividness ; and the con- 
sequence is, that they sometimes assume modifica- 
tions which, especially in the form of inordinately 
EXCITED or DISORDERED CONCEPTIONS, vcry proper- 
ly have a place in a treatise on Disordered Mental 
Action. 

§ 62. There may be Disordered Conceptions con* 
nected ivith the Action of all the Senses* 
There may be conceptions based upon the ante- 
cedent operation of any or of all the senses. There 
may be conceptions of smell, of taste, of sounds, of 
touch, as well as of sight. The facts which we 
have already found it necessary to introduce, in con- 
nexion with the disordered action of sensation and 
perception, show this to be the case. Conceptions 
of sound may be so vivid as to affect our belief, and 



EXCITED OR DISORDERED CONCEPTIONS. Ill 

thus, without the least afTection of the auditory nerve, 
convert the mere semblance of audition into a virtual 
reality. In other cases, the conception, even when 
less excited, may call into action, in virtue of the 
sympathetic connexion between the mind and body, 
the diseased organ, and thus produce essentially the 
same result, when there is in neither case any exter- 
nal cause of sound. And the same of other cases 
of sensation and perception depending upon other 
organs. In fact, the present subject has already 
been in part, and necessarily, anticipated. And this 
being the case, we shall feel ourselves more at lib- 
erty to confine our remarks here, as we propose to 
do, to disordered conceptions of Sight. These, in 
consequence of the great importance of the visual 
organ, and the frequency of the deceptions connect- 
ed with it, claim especial attention. 

^ 63. Of the less permanent Excited Conceptions of 

Sight. 

There are conceptions of sight (disordered, per- 
haps, in the sense of being inordinately excited) 
which are not permanent, but have merely a mo- 
mentary existence. (I.) These are noticed, in the 
first place, in children, in whom the conceptive or 
imaginative power, so far as it is employed in giving 
existence to creations that have outline and form, is 
generally more active than in later life. Children, 
it is well known, are almost constantly projecting 
their inward conceptions into outward space, and 
erecting the fanciful creations of the mind amid the 
realities and forms of matter, beholding houses, men, 



112 EXCITED OR DISORDERED CONCEPTIONS. 

towers, flocks of sheep, clusters of trees, and varie- 
ties of landscape in the changing clouds, in the 
wreathed and driven snow, in the fairy work of frost, 
and in the embers and flickering flames of the hearth. 
This, at least, was the experience of the early life of 
Cowper, who has made it the subject of a fine pas- 
sage in the poem of " The Task :" 

" Me oft has fancy, ludicrous and wild, 
Soothed with a waking dream of houses, towers, 
Trees, churches, and strange visages express'd 
In the red cinders, while, with poring eye, 
I gazed, myself creating what I saw." 

Beattie too, after the termination of a winter's 
storm, places his young minstrel on the shores of 
the Atlantic, to view the heavy clouds that skirt the 
distant horizon : 

** Where, mid the changeful scenery ever new, 
Fancy a thousand wondrous forms descries. 
More wildly great than ever pencil drew. 
Rocks, torrents, gulfs, and shapes of giant size, 
And glittering cliffs on cliffs, and fiery ramparts rise." 

II. Again, excited conceptions which are not per- 
manent are frequently called into existence in con- 
nexion with some anxiety and grief of mind, or some 
other modification of mental excitement. A per- 
son, for instance, standing on the seashore, and anx- 
iously expecting the approach of his vessel, will 
sometimes see the image of it, and will be certain, 
for the moment, that he has the object of his antici- 
pations in view, although, in truth, there is no vessel 
in sight. That is to say, the conception, idea, or 
image of the vessel, which it is evidently in the pow- 
er of every one to form who has previously seen one. 



EXCITED OR DISORDERED CONCEPTIONS. 113 

is rendered so intense by feelings of anxiety as to 
be the same in effect as if the real object were pres- 
ent, and the figure of it were actually pictured on 
the retina. It is in connexion with this view that 
we may probably explain a remark in the narrative 
of Mrs. Howe's captivity, who in 1775 was taken 
prisoner, together with her seven children, by the 
St. Francois Indians. In the course of her captivi- 
ty, she was at a certain time informed by the In- 
dians that two of her children were no more ; one 
having died a natural death, and the other being 
knocked on the head. " I did not utter many 
words" (says the mother), "but my heart was sorely 
pained within me, and my mind exceedingly troubled 
with strange and awful ideas [meaning conceptions 
or images]. I often imagined, for instance, that / 
plainly saw the naked carcasses of my children hang- 
ing upon the limbs of trees, as the Indians are wont 
to hang the raw hides of those beasts which they 
take in hunting." 

^ 64. The Conceptive Power may he placed in 
a wrong position by habit. 

The conceptive power, by the aid of which we 
have the internal or mental recognition of sensible 
objects which are not present, may, like the other 
powers, be greatly strengthened. A person, for in- 
stance, who has been accustomed to drawing, re- 
tains a much more perfect notion of a building, land- 
scape, or other visible object than one who has not. 
A portrait painter, or any person who has been in 
the practice of drawing such sketches, can trace the 

K2 



114 EXCITED OR DISORDERED CONCEPTIONS. 

outlines of the human form with very great ease ; it 
requires hardly more effort from them than to write 
their names. This increase of conceptive power 
is far from always being advantageous. On the 
contrary, it may sometimes be carried so far as to 
affect the mind in other respects very unfavourably. 
The faculty may be made to possess an exaggerated 
intensity of action, resulting in its interference with 
the due exercise of other parts of the mind. " We 
read" (says Dr. Conolly), " that when Sir Joshua 
Reynolds, after being many hours occupied in paint- 
ing, walked out into the streets, the lamp-posts 
seemed to him to be trees, and the men and women 
moving shrubs." 

There are persons, who are entirely convinced of 
the folly of the popular belief of ghosts and other 
nightly apparitions, but who cannot be persuaded to 
sleep in a room alone, nor go alone into a room in 
the dark. This is owing to the fact of their having 
early formed conceptions of invisible and unearthly 
beings ; conceptions which have gradually been ren- 
dered more vivid and intense by repetition. Ac- 
cordingly, when they happen out at night, their 
minds are employed in giving existence to such 
imaginary beings ; and their ideas of them are so 
vivid as to control their belief; and, consequently, 
they are the subjects, at such times, of a considera- 
ble degree of disquiet and even terror. 

" It was my misfortune" (says Dr. Priestly) " to 
have the idea of darkness, and the ideas of invisible 
malignant spirits and apparitions, very closely con- 
nected in my infancy ; and to this day, notwithstand- 



EXCITED OR DISORDERED CONCEPTIONS. 115 

ing I believe nothing of those invisible powers, and, 
consequently, of their connexion with darkness or 
anything else, I cannot be perfectly easy in every 
kind of situation in the dark." 

In all persons this faculty may be trained to an 
increased degree of strength, by the same process 
which gives facility and strength of action to other 
mental powers, viz., by constant repetition or prac- 
tice ; in other words, by the formation of a habit. 
And this increase of energy may, by possibility at 
least, be so great as to render it proper to consider 
the power, under such circumstances, as existing in 
an unnatural or disordered state. 

^ 65. Of Permanently Disordered Conceptions, 

We thus, by the considerations which have been 
brought forward, approach, and, to some extent, ver- 
ify the doctrine which it is our object here to an-, 
nounce, viz., that the conceptive faculty may be 
truly disordered ; and that, too, not merely for a short 
time, under a temporary excitement, but permanent- 
ly. Those who are not subject to this peculiarity 
of mind have but little idea of the very high degree 
of vividness which may attach to the mental states. 
When the conceptive power is inordinately and per- 
manently excited, the forms and outlines, the hues 
and combinations of outward objects exist in the in- 
tellect like living things, in the freshness and dis- 
tinctness of reality. 

And this is not all. There is a relation, more or 
less intimate, among all the powers of the mind. 
Whenever, for instance, we have a perception of 



116 EXCITED OR DISORDERED CONCEPTIONS. 

things, our belief is controlled ; in other words, we 
naturally and necessarily have a belief in the exist- 
ence of the things which are perceived. And, in 
like manner, whenever in the vividness of concep- 
tions there is a near approach to the acknowledged 
and necessary vividness cf the perceptive states of 
the mind, there is a similar tendency to an affection 
of the belief. This tendency is realized ; in other 
words, the belief is fully controlled, if the vividness 
in the two cases is nearly the same. 

Now the mere inordinate vividness implies a dis- 
ordered state of the mind ; but, if this be combined 
with the coexistence of a belief in the actuality of the 
things conceived of, the disorder is very much in- 
creased. It is then that the subject of this unhappy 
state of things may be said, with something more 
than a mere metaphorical import of the terms, to 
live in the midst of a world of his own creating. 
The mind, exercising itself upon the materials which 
the outward world has furnished, reproduces distinct 
images of things, and, substantiating their reality by 
the authority of belief, recognises things that are not 
as in no ways different from things that are. Hence, 
there are constant mistakes. Things unreal are 
mistaken for things real. And hence, also, there is 
frequently a great perplexity of the judgment and the 
reasoning power. This is obvious, because the 
judgment and the reasoning power necessarily im- 
plicate the ultimate verification of their results with 
the certainty and reality of their premises ; and the 
source of confidence in the premises has, in a great 
degree, failed. Not to mention other incidental 



BXCITfiD OR DISORDERED CONCEPTIONS. 117 

evils, which are Ukely to connect themselves with 
this pecuhar state of mind. 

§ 66. Of disordered Conceptions^ combined with a 
disordered State of the outivm^d Organs, 

Now if we connect this state of mind, which is 
sufficiently unfavourable in itself, with a disorder- 
ed condition of the external senses, the evil will, if 
possible, be still farther increased. If, for instance, 
the conception of visible objects be very vivid, and, 
at the same time, the organ of sight be morbidly 
susceptible, the vivid conception will be likely, by 
mere sympathy, to place the optic nerve in the posi- 
tion of actual vision. And the immediate conse- 
quence is, that, to all intents and purposes, there is 
at once a visual perception ; and the conception and 
the perception become merged in each other. Un- 
der such circumstances, is it surprising that men 
should see a variety of phantasms, and find the 
world peopled with invisible beings 1 

But it is our wish here to consider this state of 
mind separate, as much as possible, from mere dis- 
ordered sensations and perceptions. It is true they 
are sometimes combined together, perhaps frequent- 
ly. At the same time, if we wish to get at the 
sources of insanity and of the modifications of in- 
sanity, it seems necessary to give them a distinct 
consideration. They not unfrequently combine to- 
gether in producing the same results ; but there is 
no doubt that they may produce essentially the same 
results separately ; and they have their distinct laws 



118 EXCITED OR DISORDERED CONCEPTIONS. 

of action. Hence the necessity of treating of them 
under distinct heads. 

§ 67. Of the original Causes of inordinately excited 
Conceptions, 

It becomes here an interesting inquiry, upon what 
causes disordered conceptions depend ? One of the 
causes of them is probably to be found, in the fixsi 
place, in the mind itself; that is to say, in some 
other part of the mind disconnected from the con- 
ceptions themselves, A disordered state of the 
propensities and passions may, for instance, pro- 
duce a disordered state of the conceptions. Take 
an individual who is of a very sanguine tempera- 
ment (in whom that state of mind which is denom- 
inated Hope is predoniinant), and it will be found, I 
suppose, that his conceptions of those prospective 
objects at which he aims are much more distinct 
and vivid than those of another person in whom 
hope is deficient. We do not undertake to explain 
how the vividness of one state of mind communi- 
cates itself, as in this case, to another; but there 
will probably be no diversity of opinion as to the 
fact. 

Take, again, an individual in whom the passion 
of fear exists in an inordinate degree. It is notori- 
ous that such a person will magnify difficulties and 
dangers. His agitated mind will give outline, and 
prominence, anci distinctness to objects which scarce- 
ly attract the notice of another person. So intense 
are his conceptions, that his belief is, in a great de* 
gree, controlled by them ; and, against the remon- 



EXCITED OR DISORDERED CONCEPTIONS. 119 

strances of his reason, he peoples the darkness, and 
even the day itself, with imaginary conspirators 
against his person, and with thieves that lay in wait 
for his property. 

(II.) And why may we not suppose, furthermore, 
that the conceptive faculty itself, independently of its 
connexion with the other mental powers, may some- 
times be disordered ? The mind has its nature and 
its laws ; and, although it cannot be diseased or 
disordered in the same way that a material exist- 
ence may be, yet sound philosophy does not forbid 
the supposition that it may possibly be susceptible 
of derangement in such way and degree as may be 
consistent with its own nature. Take, for instance, 
the susceptibility of Belief. The state of mind 
which we call belief has its laws, and may be re- 
garded as a universal attribute of the mental nature. 
In other words, all men have this susceptibility. 
Furthermore, in the great mass of mankind it exists 
nearly in the same degree, and exhibits the same 
manifestations. And yet it is well known that in 
some individuals it discovers an extreme quickness, 
an astonishing facility; so much so, that the persons 
in whom this peculiarity exists unhesitatingly receive 
every statement which is made to them, however 
improbable and contradictory. The susceptibility 
obviously exists in an unnatural and disordered state, 
which in its action results in annulling the beneficial 
tendencies of the other parts of the fnind, and ren- 
ders the person, besides making him a common 
laughing-stock, useless, in a great degree, to socie- 
ty. This is, beyond all question, to be considered 



120 EXCITED OR DISORDERED CONCEPTIONS. 

as a disordered state of the mind ; but the disorder 
does not appear to result from the unnatural and dis- 
ordered position and influence of other parts of the 
mind, nor from anything peculiar, so far as we can 
perceive, in the sensorial organization. The viola- 
tion of nature is to be found in the mental trait itself. 
The disease (if we may be allowed to apply the term 
to mental existences) is connatural, not in the body, 
but the mind itself, and in that particular part of the 
mind. 

We introduce this statement, it will be noticed, in 
illustration of the general doctrine that a disorder 
of the mind may be connatural ; that is to say, may 
really have its foundation in the constitution and 
facts of the mental, in distinction from the physical 
nature. And if the susceptibility of belief or any 
other mental attribute may be disordered in itself, 
why may not the conceptive power be disordered in 
itself also ? We suppose it, at least, to be possible. 

§ 68. Instance Elusfrative of this Subject. 

We bring the remarks of this chapter to a close 
by introducing an instance where the Conceptive 
power seems to have been inordinately excited ; and 
where, also, the results appear to have been more 
marked than they would otherwise have been, in 
consequence of the sympathetic influence of the 
very vivid conceptions on the disordered physical 
system. "In* March, 1829" (says Dr. Macnish, in 
his Philosophy of Sleep, chap. 3cv.), "during an at- 
tack of fever, accompanied with violent action in the 
brain, I experienced illusions of a very peculiar kind. 



EXCITED OR DISORDERED CONCEPTIONS. 121 

They did not appear except when the eyes were 
shut or the room perfectly dark. And this was one 
of the most distressing things connected with my 
illness ; for it obHged me either to keep my eyes 
open, or to admit more hght into my chamber than 
they could well tolerate. I had the consciousness 
of shining and hideous faces grinning at me in the 
midst of profound darkness, from which they glared 
forth in horrid and diabolical relief. They were 
never stationary, but kept moving in the gloomy 
background. Sometimes they approached within 
an inch or two of my face ; at other times they re- 
ceded several feet or yards from it. They would 
frequently break into fragments, which, after floating 
about, would unite ; portions of one face coalescing 
with those of another, and thus forming still more 
uncouth and abominable images. The only way I 
could get rid of those phantoms was by admitting 
more light into the chamber and opening the eyes, 
when they instantly vanished ; but only to reappear 
when the room was darkened or the eyes closed. 

" One night, when the fever was at its height, I 
had a splendid vision of a theatre, in the arena of 
which Ducrow, the celebrated equestrian, was per- 
forming. On this occasion I had no consciousness 
of a dark background, like to that on which the 
monstrous images floated ; but everything was gay, 
bright, and beautiful. I was broad awake ; my eyes 
were closed, and yet I saw, with perfect distinctness, 
the whole scene going on in the theatre : Ducrow 
performing his wonders of horsemanship ; and the 
assembled multitude, among whom I recognised 

L 



122 EXCITED OR DISORDERED CONCEPTIONS. 

several intimate friends ; in short, the whole process 
of the entertainment, as clearly as if I were present 
at it. When I opened my eyes, the whole scene 
vanished like the enchanted palace of the necro- 
mancer ; when I closed them, it as instantly returned. 
" But, though I could thus dissipate the specta- 
cle, I found it impossible to get rid of the accompa- 
nying music. This was the grand march in the 
Opera of Aladdin, and was performed by the orches- 
tra with more superb and imposing effect, and with 
greater loudness, than I ever heard it before. It was 
executed, indeed, with tremendous energy. This 
air I tried every effort to dissipate, by forcibly en- 
deavouring to call other tunes to mind, but it was in 
vain. However completely the vision might be dis- 
pelled, the music remained in spite of every effort to 
banish it. During the whole of this singular state 
I was perfectly aware of the illusiveness of my feel- 
ings, and, though labouring under violent headache, 
could not help speculating upon them and endeav- 
ouring to trace them to their proper cause. This 
theatrical vision continued for about five hours ; the 
previous delusions for a couple of days." 



i 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 123 



CHAPTER VIL 

SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 

^ 69. Of the General JYature of Spectral Illusions 
or Apparitions. 

The doctrines, which have been advanced in con- 
nexion with our examination of disordered Sensa- 
tions and Perceptions, and of disordered Conceptive 
States of the Mind, appear to furnish all the requisite 
elements for a satisfactory explanation of Spectral 
Illusions or Apparitions. 

Spectral illusions or apparitions are appearances 
which seem to be real and external, but which, in 
truth, have merely an internal or subjective exist- 
ence ; occasioned sometimes by the disordered 
state of the outward organ of sense ; sometimes by 
the unnatural or disordered state of the portion of 
the brain particularly related to the outward organ ; 
sometimes by an unnatural or abnormal position of 
the conceptive power ; and probably, for the most 
part, by the combined action of all these causes. 

Apparitions are very various in their character ; 
as much so as the various objects and combinations 
of objects, which from time to time come under the 
notice of the visual organ. Accordingly, there may 
be apparitions, not only of angels and departed spir- 
its, which appear to figure more largely in the his- 



124 SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 

tory of apparitions than other objects of feight, but of 
landscapes, mountains, rivers, precipices, festivals, 
armies, funeral processions, temples ; in a word, of 
all visual perceptions which we are capable of re- 
calling. 

There are unreal and visionary intimations, which 
have their origin in other senses, and which mingle 
with, and sometimes give a marked character to, the 
illusive scenes which are visually enacted ; but ap- 
paritions, in the proper sense of the term, have espe- 
cial reference to those things, and those only, which 
can be visibly represented. It is in this sense of 
the term, in particular, that we propose to illustrate 
them ; although the subject, as in the conclusion of 
the last chapter, has already been, to some extent, 
anticipated. Furthermore, as there are some states 
of the body in connexion with which apparitions de- 
velope themselves more than at other times, we shall 
find an advantage in examining the subject in refer- 
ence tp these more marked occasions. 

^ 70. First Cause of the States of Mind termed 
Apparitions, — JVeglect of Periodical Bloodlet^ 
ting. 

One of those more marked occasions on which 
those states of mind which are called Apparitions 
will be likely to develope themselves, is the neglect 
of periodical bloodletting. There may be the ele- 
ments of these states of mind previously existing in 
the mental or bodily constitution, or in both, such as 
an unnatural tendency to excitement in the sensorial 
organ or in the conceptive power ; and yet this ten- 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 125 

dency may not result in the states of mind under 
consideration until some marked and specific occa- 
sion shall occur, such as has now been mentioned. 
The doctrine that spectral illusions or apparitions 
are likely to be attendant on a superabundance of 
blood, occasioned by the neglect of periodical blood- 
letting, seems to be illustrated and confirmed by the 
actual and recorded experience of various individu- 
als, as in the following instance. 

Nicolai, the name of the individual to whom the 
statements here given relate, was an inhabitant of 
Berlin, a celebrated bookseller. He was a man in 
whom the conceptive or imaginative power was nat- 
urally very excitable, and in a high degree inventive 
or creative. And what is a fact, which some will un- 
doubtedly esteem it important to know, he was nei- 
ther an ignorant man nor superstitious ; but, on the 
contrary, possessed of much information, and capa- 
ble of philosophical analysis. The following ac- 
count of the illusive sights or apparitions which ap- 
peared to him is given in his own words : 

"My wife and another person came into my 
apartment in the morning in order to console me, 
but I was too much agitated by a series of incidents, 
which had most powerfully affected my moral feel- 
ing, to be capable of attending to them. On a sud- 
den I perceived, at about the distance of ten steps, 
a form like that of a deceased person. I pointed 
at it, asking my wife if she did not see it. It was 
but natural that she should not see anything ; my 
question, therefore, alarmed her very much, and she 
immediately sent for a physician. The phantom 

L2 



126 SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 

continued about eight minutes. I grew at length 
more calm, and, being extremely exhausted, fell into 
a restless sleep, which lasted about half an hour. 
The physician ascribed the apparition to a violent 
mental emotion, and hoped there would be no re- 
turn ; but the violent agitation of my mind had in 
some way disordered my nerves, and produced far- 
ther consequences, which deserve a more minute 
description. 

" At four in the afternoon, the form which I had 
seen in the morning reappeared. I was by myself 
when this happened, and, being rather uneasy at the 
incident, went to my wife's apartment, but there like- 
wise I was persecuted by the apparition, which, how- 
ever, at intervals disappeared, and always presented 
itself in a standing posture. About six o'clock there 
appeared also several walking figures, which had no 
connexion with the first. After the first day the 
form of the deceased person no more appeared, but 
its place was supplied with many other phantasms, 
sometimes representing acquaintances, but mostly 
strangers ; those whom I knew were composed of 
living and deceased persons, but the number of the 
latter was comparatively small. I observed the per- 
sons with whom I daily conversed did not appear as 
phantasms, these representing chiefly persons who 
lived at some distance from me. 

" These phantasms seemed equally clear and dis- 
tinct at all times and under all circumstances, both 
when I was by myself and when I was in company, 
as well in the day as at night, and in my own house 
as well as abroad ; they were, however, less frequent 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 127 

when I was in the house of a friend, and rai'ely ap- 
peared to me in the street. When I shut my eyes 
these phantasms would sometimes vanish entirely, 
though there were instances when I beheld them 
with my eyes closed ; yet, when they disappeared on 
such occasions, they generally returned when I open- 
ed my eyes. I conversed sometimes with my phy- 
sician and my wife of the phantasms which at the 
moment surrounded me ; they appeared more fre- 
quently walking than at rest, nor were they con- 
stantly present. They frequently did not come for 
some time, but always reappeared for a longer or 
shorter period, either singly or in company; the lat- 
ter, however, being most frequently the case. I 
generally saw human forms of both sexes; but they 
usually seemed not to take the smallest notice of 
each other, moving as in a market-place, where all 
are eager to press through the crowd ; at times, 
however, they seemed to be transacting business 
with each other. I also saw several times people 
on horseback, dogs, and birds. 

" All these phantasms appeared to me in their 
natural size, and as distinct as if alive, exhibiting 
different shades of carnation in the uncovered parts, 
as well as different colours and fashions in their 
dresses, though the colours seemed somewhat paler 
than in real nature. None of the figures appeared 
particularly terrible, comical, or disgusting, most of 
them being of an indifferent shape, and some pre- 
senting a pleasing aspect. The longer these phan- 
tasms continued to visit me, the more frequently did 
they return, while, at the same time, they increased ia 



128 SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 

number about four weeks after they had first appear- 
ed. I also began to hear them talk ; these phan- 
toms sometimes conversed among themselves, but 
more frequently addressed their discourse to me; 
their speeches were commonly short, and never of 
an unpleasant turn. At different times there appear- 
ed to me both dear and sensible friends of both sex- 
es, whose addresses tended to appease my grief, 
which had not yet wholly subsided : their consola- 
tory speeches were in general addressed to me when 
I was alone. Sometimes, however, I was accosted 
by these consoling friends while I was engaged in 
company, and not unfrequently while real persons 
were speaking to me. These consolatory address- 
es consisted sometimes of abrupt phrases, and at 
other times they were regularly executed." 

§ 71. JMethods of Relief adopted in this case. 

These are the leading facts in this case, so far as 
the mere appearance of the apparitions is concerned. 
But as Nicolai, besides possessing no small amount 
of acquired knowledge, was a person of a naturally 
philosophic turn of mind, he was able to detect and 
to assign the true cause of his mental malady. He 
was, it is to be remembered, in the first place, a 
person of a very vivid fancy, and hence his mind 
was the more likely to be aflTected by any disease of 
the body. A number of years before the occurren- 
ces above related, he had been subject to a violent 
vertigo, which had been cured by means of leeches ; 
it was his custom to lose blood twice a year, but 
previously to the present attack this evacuation had 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 129 

been neglected. Supposing, therefore, that the 
mental disorder might arise from a superabundance 
of blood and some irregularity in the circulation, he 
again resorted to the application of leeches. When 
the leeches were applied, no person was with him 
besides the surgeon ; but, during the operation, his 
chamber was crowded with human phantasms of all 
descriptions. In the course of a few hours, how- 
ever, they moved around the chamber more slowly ; 
their colour began to fade, until, growing more and 
more obscure, they at last dissolved into air, and he 
ceased to be troubled with them afterward.* 

^ 72. Second Cause of Spectral Illusions or Appa- 
ritions.-^ Attacks of Fever, 

Violent fevers also, calling into action the hidden 
materials and elements of illusive sights, are found 
at times to constitute another leading occasion of 
Apparitions. The vivid conceptions which the sick 
person has, operate sympathetically upon his disor- 
dered physical system, until the mind, projecting, as 
it were, its own creations into the exterior space, 
peoples the room with living and moving phantoms. 
" Spectral illusions" (says Dr. Macnish) " are more 
frequently induced by fever than by any other cause." 

* Memoir oq the Appearance of Spectres or Phantoms occa- 
sioned by Disease, with Psychological Remarks, read by Nico- 
lai to the Royal Society of Berhn, on the 28th of February, 
1799 ; as quoted by Hibbert, pt. i., ch. i. — Walter Scott, in his 
Demonology and Witchcraft, speaks of the apparitions of Nico- 
iai as a leading case in this department of human knowledge. 
He also expresses the opinion, that many others have had the 
same experience with Nicolai, but have been deterred by vari- 
ous causes from making it public. 



130 SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 

There is a statement illustrative of this view of the 
subject in the fifteenth volume of Nicholson's Phil- 
osophical Journal, a part of which will be here re- 
peated. The fever in this instance, of which an 
account is given by the patient himself, was of a 
violent character, originating in some deep-seated 
inflammation, and at first affecting the memory, al- 
though not permanently. 

"Being perfectly awake" (says this person), "in 
full possession of memory, reason, and calmness, 
conversing with those around me, and seeing, with- 
out difficulty or impediment, every surrounding ob- 
ject, I was entertained and delighted with a succes- 
sion of faces, over which I had no control, either as 
to their appearance, continuance, or removal. 

" They appeared directly before me, one at a 
time, very suddenly, yet not so much so but that a 
second of time might be employed in the emergence 
of each, as if through a cloud or mist, to its perfect 
clearness. In this state each face continued five or 
six seconds, and then vanished, by becoming grad- 
ually fainter during about two seconds, till nothing 
was left but a dark opaque mist, in which almost 
immediately afterward appeared another face. All 
these faces were in the highest degree interesting to 
me for beauty of form, and for the variety of expres- 
sion they manifested of every great and amiable 
emotion of the human mind. Though their atten- 
tion was invariably directed to me, and none of them 
seemed to speak, yet I seemed to read the very 
soul which gave animation to their lovely and intel- 
ligent countenances. Admiration, and a sentiment 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 131 

of joy and affection when each face appeared, and 
regret upon its disappearance, kept my mind con- 
stantly riveted to the visions before it ; and this 
state was interrupted only when an intercourse with 
the persons in the room was proposed or urged," 
&c. The apparitions which this person experien- 
ced were not limited to phantasms of the human 
countenance ; he also saw phantasms of books, and 
of parchment and papers containing printed matter. 
Nor were these effects exclusively confined to ideas 
received from the sense of sight ; at one time he 
seemed to himself to hear musical sounds ; that is, 
his conceptions of sound were so exceedingly vivid, 
combined, probably, with the sympathetic concur- 
rence of a disordered auditory organ, that it was, in 
effect, the same as if he had really heard melodious 
voices and instruments. 

^ 73. Third Cause of Apparitions. — Inflammation 
of the Brain, 

In the third place, spectral illusions or apparitions 
will be likely to be called into existence by means 
of inflammations and other diseases of the brain. 
We may infer, from certain passages which are found 
in his writings, that Shakspeare had some correct 
notions of the influence of a disordered condition of 
the brain on the mental operations. We allude, 
among others, to the passage where, in explanation 
of the apparition of the dagger which appeared to 
Macbeth, he says, 

" A dagger of the mind, a false creation, 
Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain." 



132 SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 

Whether the seat, or appropriate and peculiar res- 
idence of the soul be in the brain or not, it seems 
to be certain that this part of the bodily system is 
connected in a very intimate and high degree with 
the exercises of the mind ; particularly with percep- 
tion and volition. Whenever, therefore, the brain is 
disordered, whether by a contusion or by a removal 
of part of it, by inflammation or in other ways, the 
mind will, in general, be affected in a greater or less 
degree. It may indeed be said, that the immediate 
connexion in the cases which we now have refer- 
ence to, is not between the mind and the substance 
of the brain, but between the mind and the blood 
which is thrown into that part of the system. It is, 
no doubt, something in favour of this notion, that so 
large a portion of the sanguineous fluid finds a cir- 
culation there ; it being a common idea among anat- 
omists, that at least one tenth of all the blood is im- 
mediately sent from the heart into the brain, although 
the latter is in weight only about the fortieth part of 
the whole body. It is to be considered also, that 
the effects which are wrought upon the mind by the 
nitrous oxide and the febrile miasma gas, are caused 
by an intermediate influence on the blood. On the 
other hand, it may be said that there cannot be a 
great acceleration of the blood's motion, or increase 
of its volume, without a very sensible effect on the 
cerebral substance. And, therefore, it may remain 
true that very much may be justly attributed to the 
increase of quantity and motion in the blood, and 
still the brain be the proximate cause of alterations 
in the states of the mind. 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 133 

& 74. Fads having relation to the third Came of 
Apparitions. 

But here we stand in need of facts, as in all other 
parts of this investigation. The following state- 
ment, selected from a number of others not less au- 
thenticated, can be reUed on.* A citizen of King- 
ston-on-HuU had a quarrel with a drunken soldier, 
who attempted to enter his house by force at an un- 
seasonable hour. In this struggle the soldier drew 
his bayonet, and, striking him across the temples, di- 
vided the temporal artery. He had scarcely recov- 
ered from the effects of a great loss of blood on this 
occasion, when he undertook to accompany a friend 
in his walking-match against time, in which he went 
forty-two miles in nine hours. He was elated by 
his success, and spent the whole of the following 
day in drinking, &c. 

The result of these things was an affection, prob- 
ably an inflammation, of the brain. And the conse- 
quence of this was, the existence of those vivid states 
of mind which are termed apparitions. According- 
ly, our shopkeeper (for that was the calling of this 
person) is reported to have seen articles of sale 
upon the floor, and to have beheld an armed soldier 
entering his shop when there was nothing seen by 
other persons present. In a word, he was for some 
time constantly haunted by a variety of spectres or 
imaginary appearances ; so much so that he even 
found it difficult to determine which were real cus- 

* See the Edinburgh Medical and Surgical Journal, vol. vi, 
p. 28a 

M 



134 SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 

tomers and which were mere phantasms of his own 
mind. The remedy in this case was bloodletting, » 
and some other methods of cure which are practised * 
in inflammations of the brain. The restoration of 
the mind to a less intense and more correct action 
was simultaneous with that of the physical system. 

^ 75. Fourth Cause of Spectral Illusions or Appa- 
ritions, — Hysteria, 

It is farther to be observed, that people are not 
unfrequently affected with apparitions in the parox- 
ysms of the disease known as Hysteria or hyster- 
ics. For the nature of this disease, which exists 
under a variety of forms, and is of a character so 
peculiar as to preclude any adequate description in 
the narrow limits we could properly allot to it, the 
reader is referred to such books as treat of medical 
subjects. This singular disease powerfully agitates 
the mind ; and its effects are as various as they are 
striking. When the convulsive affections come on, 
the patient is observed to laugh and cry alternately, 
and altogether without any cause of a rational or 
moral nature ; so that he has almost the appearance 
of fatuity, or of being delirious. But spectral illu- 
sions or visionary sights are among its most striking 
attendants. The subjects of it distinctly see every 
description of forms ; trees, houses, men, women, 
dogs, and other inferior animals, balls of fire, ce- 
lestial beings, &c. We can, without doubt, safely 
refer to the experience of those who have been much 
conversant with instances of this disease in confirm- 
ation of this. 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 135 

The existence of the states of mind under con- 
sideration might, without much question, be found, 
on farther examination, to connect itself with other 
forms of disease. The subject is certainly worthy, 
whether considered in relation to science or to hu- 
man happiness, of such farther developements as it 
is capable of receiving. 

§ 76. Of Ghosts and other Spectral Appearances. 

In connexion with what has been said in this and 
some of the preceding chapters, it may not be out 
of place to add something in explanation of ghosts 
and other spectral appearances, which occupy so 
conspicuous a place in popular superstitions. 
Ghosts are partly apparitions, taking that term 
as it has been illustrated, and in part mental illu- 
sions, arising from not viewing objects aright. In 
respect to all appearances of this nature, remark, I. — 
That they are seen most frequently in the dark, hard- 
ly any one pretending to have seen them in the day- 
time. And this is a circumstance altogether in fa- 
vour of the idea that they are in nearly all cases, al- 
though they cannot all be referred to one cause, 
mere deceptions practised on us, either by means of 
the senses or by means of an excited internal con- 
ception, operating in some cases, perhaps, upon a 
disordered physical system. In the dark, as we are 
exposed to a greater variety of dangers than at other 
times, our feehngs are in consequence excited in a 
greater or less degree, and, as there is a great dim- 
ness in the outlines of objects, they readily assume, 



136 SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 

when viewed under such circumstances, new, and 
various, and uncertain shapes. 

11. — Let it be observed, as another circumstance 
commonly attending their visitations, that ghosts and 
other spectres are seen most frequently among peo- 
ple of very little mental cultivation, among the ig- 
norant. Uninstructed minds are generally the most 
credulous. If there were truly any beings in nature 
of this sort, and they were anything more than ima- 
ginary appearances, persons who are well-informed 
and philosophic would stand a chance, equally good 
with others, of forming an acquaintance with them. 
From these two circumstances we seem to be justi- 
fied in the supposition, that many of these imagina- 
ry beings are the creations of a credulous and exci- 
ted mind, viewing objects at an hour when their 
outlines cannot be distinctly seen. 

§ 77. Other Circumstances characteristic of their 
recurrence, 

III. — It is to be remarked farther, that ghosts, 
whenever they present themselves, are found to 
agree very nearly with certain previous conceptions 
which persons have formed in respect to them. If, 
for instance, the ghost be the spirit of one with whom 
we have been particularly acquainted, he appears 
with the same lineaments, although a little paler, 
and the same dress, even to the button on his coat ; 
the dress in general, however, is white, correspond- 
ing to the colour of the burial habiliments ; so that 
they may be said to have a personal or individual, a 
generic, and, as some have maintained, a national 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 137 

character. " They commonly appear" (says Grose, 
who has written on this subject) *' in the same dress 
they wore while living ; although they are some- 
times clothed all in white ; but that is chiefly the 
churchyard ghosts, who have no particular business, 
but seem to appear pro bono publico, or to scare 
drunken rustics from tumbling over their graves. 
Dragging chains is not the fashion of English 
ghosts, chains and black vestments being chiefly 
the accoutrements of foreign spectres seen in arbi- 
trary governments." 

IV. — This additional circumstance remains also to 
be noticed, viz., wherever ghostly and spectral beings 
have come from the dead to the living, it has gener- 
ally been found that they were among the particular 
friends, although sometimes of the enemies, of those 
whom they came to see. This is very natural. It 
is our friends and enemies whom we think most of; 
much more than of those to svhom we are unknown, 
and towards whom our feelings are indifferent. A 
person, for instance, has lost a very near friend by 
death ; his soul is greatly distressed ; and amid the 
joys of life, which have now lost their charms, and 
amid its cares, to which he turns with a broken 
heart, he incessantly recalls the image so endeared 
to him. What wonder, then, that his imagination, 
which, in the light of the day, was able to keep be- 
fore itself the picture of the departed, should, in the 
stillness and shades of midnight, when remembran- 
ces multiply, and feelings grow deeper and deeper, 
increase that picture to the size, and give to it the 
vivid form of real life ! These circumstances justify 

M2 



138 SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 

US in ascribing, for the most part, the existence of 
that supposed class of beings called ghosts (and we 
may include in the remark all spectres whatever) to 
the two causes mentioned at the commencement of 
this topic, viz., conceptions rendered inordinately in- 
tense, and objects actually seen, but under such cir- 
cumstances as to be misrepresented to us. 

§ 78. Farther Illustrations and Remarks on the 
same Subject. 

The principles laid down in this chapter illustrate 
various incidents, hitherto considered very remarka- 
ble, which are to be found in history, both ancient and 
modern. They help to illustrate, for instance, the 
alleged appearance of Caesar's ghost to Marcus 
Junius Brutus on the plains of Philippi ; a circum- 
stance which is the foundation of a passage in the 
play of Julius Csesar. 

" How ill this taper burns ! Ha ! who comes here ? 
I think it is the weakness of mine eyes, 
That shapes this monstrous apparition. 
It comes upon me ; art thou anything ? 
Art thou some god, some angel, or some devil?" 

Brutus was not only greatly fatigued at the time 
this terrific figure appeared to him, but his mind 
was exceedingly anxious ; and we may therefore 
well suppose that the spectral apparition was merely 
an internal excited conception. 

It is also worthy of inquiry whether these views 
may not account, in part at least, for a singular 
power of the Scotch Highlanders, called the second 
sight. Especially as they live in a dark, lonely. 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 139 

and mountainous country, and their feelings, in con- 
sequence, are not only likely to be quickened and 
impetuous, like their own mountain torrents, but to 
possess a cast of melancholy. Such a state of feel- 
ing is favourable to the existence of inordinately ex- 
cited conceptions or apparitions ; and apparitions 
(that is, the seeing of things which are not present) 
is implied in the exercise of the second sight. 

^ 79, Remarks of Walter Scott on the subject of 
Ghost-stories, 

As the interest of this subject is not limited to 
novelists and the writers of romance, but is practi- 
cally and widely important, we are induced to sub- 
join here a passage from a popular author, who is, 
perhaps, better qualified than almost any other wri- 
ter to form a correct opinion on it. " There are 
many ghost-stories which we do not feel at liberty 
to challenge as impostures, because we are confi- 
dent that those who relate them on their own author- 
ity actually believe what they assert, and may have 
good reason for doing so, though there is no real 
phantom after all. We are far, therefore, from aver- 
ring that such tales are necessarily false. It is easy 
to suppose the visionary has been imposed upon by 
a lively dream, a waking re very, the excitation of a 
powerful imagination, or the misrepresentation of a 
diseased organ of sight; and, in one or other of 
these causes (to say nothing of a system of decep- 
tion, which may, in many instances, be probable), 
we apprehend a solution will be found for all cases 
of what are called real ghost-stories. 



140 SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 

" In truth, the evidence with respect to such ap- 
paritions is very seldom accurately or distinctly ques- 
tioned. A supernatural tale is, in most cases, re- 
ceived as an agreeable mode of amusing society, 
and he would be rather accounted a sturdy moralist 
than an entertaining companion who should employ 
himself in assailing its credibility. It would, indeed, 
be a solecism in manners, something like that of 
impeaching the genuine value of the antiquities ex- 
hibited by a good-natured collector for the gratifi- 
cation of his guests. This difficulty will appear 
greater, should a company have the rare good for- 
tune to meet with the person who himself witnessed 
the wonders which he tells ; a well-bred or prudent 
man will, under such circumstances, abstain from 
using the rules of cross-examination practised in a 
court of justice ; and if in any case he presumes to 
do so, he is in danger of receiving answers, even 
from the most candid and honourable persons, which 
are rather fitted to support the credit of the story 
which they stand committed to maintain, than to the 
pure service of unadorned truth. The narrator is 
asked, for example, some unimportant question with 
respect to the apparition ; he answers it on the hasty 
suggestion of his own imagination, tinged as it is 
with belief of the general fact, and, by doing so, often 
gives a feature of minute evidence which was before 
wanting, and this with perfect unconsciousness on 
his own part. It is a rare occurrence, indeed, to 
find an opportunity of dealing with an actual ghost- 
seer ; such instances, however, I have certainly my- 
self met with, and that in the case of able, wise^ 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS OR APPARITIONS. 141 

candid, and resolute persons, of whose veracity I 
had every reason to be confident. But, in such in- 
stances, shades of mental aberration have afterward 
occurred, which sufficiently accounted for the sup- 
posed apparitions, and will incline me always to feel 
alarmed in behalf of the continued health of a friend 
who should conceive himself to have witnessed such 
a visitation. 

" The nearest approximation which can be gen- 
erally made to exact evidence in this case, is the 
word of some individual who has had the story, it 
may be, from the person to whom it has happened, 
but most likely from his family or some friend of 
the family. Far more commonly, the narrator pos- 
sesses no better means of knowledge than that of 
dwelling in the country where the thing happened, 
or" being well acquainted with the outside of the 
mansion in the inside of which the ghost appeared. 

" In every point, the evidence of such a second- 
hand retailer of the mystic story must fall under the 
adjudged case in an English court. The judge 
stopped a witness who was about to give an account 
of the murder, upon trial, as it was narrated to him 
by the ghost of the murdered person. ' Hold, sir,' 
said his lordship ; ' the ghost is an excellent wit- 
ness, and his evidence the best possible ; but he 
cannot be heard by proxy in this court. Summon 
him hither, and I'll hear him in person ; but your 
communication is mere hearsay, which my office 
compels me to reject.' Yet it is upon the credit of 
one man, who pledges it upon that of three or four 
persons, who have told it successively to each other, 



142 DISORDERED STATE OF THE 

that we are often expected to believe an incident in- 
consistent with the laws of nature, however agreea- 
ble to our love of the wonderful and the horrible."* 



CHAPTER VIII. 

DISORDERED STATE OF THE POWER OF ABSTRAC- 
TION. 

§ 80. Remarks on the general JVature of this 
Power. 

The power of abstraction is not, properly speak- 
ing, an original and distinct source of knowledge ; 
but it furnishes, nevertheless, one of the most im- 
portant means, in virtue of which the knowledge 
which we have may be separated from other knowl- 
edge, and contemplated in a new aspect. It is the 
perceptive power (the external perceptivity) which 
gives the carpenter a knowledge of the log of wood, 
upon which he finds himself employed ; but it is the 
abstractive power which enables him to contemplate 
this complex object in its parts, separating the vari- 
ous traits or qualities of length, breadth, hardness, 
firmness, texture, colour, and the like, and making 
them, in their state of intellectual insulation from 
each other, the subjects of fixed and distinct exam- 
ination. It applies equally well to external and to 
* Scott's Demonology and Witchcraft, Letter X. 



POWER OF ABSTRACTION. 143 

internal objects ; it separates and holds in its grasp 
the invisible objects of mind, as well as the visible 
and tangible objects of outward sense ; and hence, 
if other things furnish no reason to the contrary, it 
may, without impropriety, be considered under the 
general head of the External Intellect as well as at 
any subsequent place. 

§ 81. Farther considerations on the JVature of this 

Power. 

In order to understand the nature of the abstrac- 
tive power more fully, we proceed to say farther, 
that in every case of abstraction there appears to be 
a number of things involved. In the first place, it 
is implied that the object in respect to which the act 
of abstraction is to take place, is complex; or, if the 
object be not complex, that there is, at least, a com- 
bination of objects or parts of objects present to the 
mind. There is implied farther, that in every case 
of abstraction there must necessarily be a determi- 
nation, a choice, an act of the will. This internal 
voluntary movement must concern the complex ob- 
ject before the mind ; or, if the object be not one, 
the combination of objects before the mind, in some 
specific and precise point of view, rather than an- 
other. So that we may truly and justly be said to 
have not only a desire, but a determination to con- 
sider or examine some part of the complex object 
or objects before us more particularly than other 
parts. When the mind is in this manner directed 
to any particular object out of many, or to any par- 
ticular part of a single complex object, we find it to 



144 DISORDERED STATE OF THE 

be the fact, that the principle of association, or what- 
ever principle it is which keeps the other objects or 
parts of objects in their state of union with it, ceases, 
in a greater or less degree, to operate and to main- 
tain that union ; the other objects rapidly fall off and 
disappear, and the particular object or part of an ob- 
ject, towards which the mind is especially directed, 
remains the sole subject of consideration. That is 
to say, it is abstracted, or becomes, as it is repre- 
sented and exists in the mind, an abstract idea. And 
if this be a correct statement of the matter, it will be 
seen that the abstractive power is not, properly 
speaking, a simple power, but implies a complex 
movement of the mental action. 

It ought, perhaps, to be added here, that the ab- 
straction or separation of the object may exist men- 
tally when it cannot take place in the object itself. 
For instance, the size, the figure, length, breadth, 
colour, &c., of a building, may each of them be 
made subjects of separate mental consideration, al- 
though there cannot be an actual or real separation 
of all, or, perhaps, any of these things in the build- 
ing itself. 

§ 82. Of Natural Defect in the Power of Ab* 
sir action. 

The power of abstraction, to a greater or less ex- 
tent, is unquestionably one of the leading attributes 
of human nature. Many discussions have arisen in 
relation to it. Whether it is or is not a power pos- 
sessed by brute animals, has been made a matter of 
inquiry ; but this is a point which it is not necessary 



POWER OF ABSTRACTION. 145 

to discuss here. Whatever may be true of brute 
animals, certain it is, at any rate, that man could not 
be what he is without it ; and that the want of it to 
any great extent, and also its disordered action, 
whatever phasis the irregularity may assume, must 
be regarded as a great misfortune. 

In some instances the abstractive power is sim- 
ply defective ; it falls below that average amount of 
energy which characterizes the great mass of man- 
kind. It may not, however, be always easy to de- 
tect this deficiency. It shows itself, as a general 
statement, in a dulness or hebetude of mind, in a 
minghng and confusion of objects, which is some- 
times mistaken for the mere want of external per- 
ception. 

But perhaps we may be a little more specific, and 
go a little more into particulars. The classification 
of objects imphes the exercise of abstraction. Its 
exercise is implied, again, in the giving of general 
names, and also in the formation and use of num- 
bers. These are its common and almost necessary 
results, saying nothing of the immense power which, 
in its higher efforts, it gives to the human mind. 
Hence the man, in whom this power is naturally de- 
ficient, fails very much in distinguishing one class of 
objects from another, even if there is no marked de- 
fect in the external perceptive powers. He mistakes 
and confounds the names of objects, as well as the 
objects themselves. Incapable of separating the at- 
tributes of things, by which they are distinguished 
one from another, he seems to behold them in a 
dilated and unformed mass, as objects are seen in a 

N 



146 DISORDERED STATE OF THE 

mist. In respect to the uses, powers, and relations 
of numbers, and to all the truths and processes in- 
volved in mathematical formularies, he is utterly 
at a loss ; he stands aghast, and feels very much as 
does the sailor, in the midst of a boundless ocean, 
without chart or compass. 

§ 83. Illustrations of natural Defect in this Power, 

How often such instances of deficient abstractive 
power occur, we are not able to say. Undoubtedly 
the weakness of some inefficient minds is to be con- 
sidered as located here, which, as it is presented to 
the unpractised eye of common observation, would 
be ascribed to some other part of the mind ; perhaps 
to the perceptive powers, to memory, or to reason- 
ing. If such is the case, the instances of defective 
abstractiveness, if such an expression may be allow- 
able, are more frequent than is commonly supposied. 

We have just had occasion to intimate that the 
power of abstraction is called into exercise in the 
formation, understanding, and application of num- 
bers. Something farther may properly be said here. 
Before we can consider objects as forming a multi- 
tude, or are able to number them, it seems necessa- 
ry to be able to apply to them a common name. 
This we cannot do until we have reduced them to a 
genus or species ; and the slighest reflection will 
sufficiently show that the formation of genera and 
species necessarily implies the exercise of the ab- 
stractive power. If the formation and the use of 
numbers, and the knowledge of mathematical truths 
and relations generally, rest upon the exercise of 



POWER OF ABSTRACTION. 147 

Ae abstractive power, then we may, perhaps, find in 
truths of this nature the readiest and most decisive 
test of the original weakness or strength of that 
power. Where there is a great natural deficiency 
of the power in question, the mind recedes from the 
presence of diagrams and numerical processes as 
instinctively as the sensitive plant falls back from 
the roughest touch. The records of literary institu- 
tions too often show that such cases, though not al- 
ways in the highest degree, have an existence. Ex- 
treme cases, however, sometimes occur. 

Dr. Gall mentions a citizen of Paris, not alto- 
gether wanting in intelligence in other respects, who, 
to use his own language, " is so destitute of the 
talent of combining numbers, that it has always been 
impossible to make him comprehend that two and 
two make four, or that two and one make three."* 
What a difference (it would require no feeble calcu- 
lus to estimate it) between the abstractive power of 
such a man, and that of Leibnitz and Newton ! 

§ 84. Of excessive Facility and Profoundness in 
the Jlbstraciing Power. 

Abstraction (although this is not all that is involv- 
ed in the term) implies the direction of the attention 
to the particular abstracted objects before the mind, 
exclusive of other objects. This state of mind is, 
perhaps, in no case a perfect one. Other objects 
will, from time to time, slightly obtrude themselves 
on the mind's notice ; disturbing, though not essen- 
tially interrupting, the chain of thought. And this 
* Gall's Works, Boston ed., vol. v., p. 93. 



148 DISORDERED STATE OF THE 

seems to be the intention of nature, viz., that, even 
in profound abstraction, there should be something 
conservative, and that an individual, in thinking of 
the subject before him, should not absolutely forget 
what belongs to himself as a man. Accordingly, 
this faculty (for such we call it, although there are a 
number of things involved in it, making it a complex 
rather than a simple power) may undoubtedly be dis- 
ordered by too great facility and profoundness. In 
such cases, as in all others, it is altogether probable 
that the abstractive power operates, in the first in- 
stance, under the direction of the will. The mind 
is directed towards a particular subject, and con- 
templates it in its own and in its relative abstract- 
ness, because the individual chooses or wills to do 
it. But the abstraction speedily becomes so intense, 
that the energy of the will seems, under these new 
circumstances, unequal to the control of the mental 
action. The restorative power seems to be quite in 
abeyance. The man remains profoundly adhesive, 
if we may be allowed the expressions, in the mud 
of his own contemplations ; apparently unable to get 
out himself, and insensible, to a most remarkable 
degree, to any suggestions and appliances which 
may come from any other source. For the time 
being, he is a lost man ; not only lost to the exter- 
nalities of common decency and propriety, but lost 
to himself; and ignorant, in another sense than that 
of the Apostle Paul, whether he is in the body or out 
of the body. 

Such persons sometimes have the reputation of 
profound men. Profound men they undoubtedly 



POWER OF ABSTRACTION. 149 

are ; but it is generally much less evident that they • 
are men of good common sense, or that they are 
practically useful. Their abstractiveness (a conve- 
nient single term to express the faculty in question) 
is out of proportion to the other powers of the mind, 
so that the other powers seem to be absorbed in 
thi^. In the language of Dr. Good, " all the ex- 
ternal senses remain in a state of torpor ; so that the 
eyes do not see, nor the ears hear, nor the flesh feel ; 
and the miser may be spoken to, or conversation 
may take place around him, or he may even be 
struck upon the shoulders, without any knowledge of 
what is occurring." 

§ 85. Further Illustrations of this Topic, 

It is true that a man of a perfectly sound mind 
may, under some accidental circumstances (perhaps 
under the influence of some uncommon feelings of 
curiosity, or of joy, or of sorrow), be absorbed to 
that degree of intensity which has now been descri- 
bed. But when this is frequently the case ; when 
a man is liable, at any time and place, to be carried 
out of the reach of all ordinary facts and relations 
into the region of pure and unmitigated ideality, the 
description of a perfectly sound mind will not apply 
with perfect propriety. We do not mean to inti- 
mate that he is what, in common parlance, is termed 
a crazy man, and that he is, generally speaking, a 
proper subject of those precautions which craziness 
implies, but simply to say that the description of 
perfect soundness is inappropriate. The true bal- 
ance of the mind is lost. He is what the people, 

N2 



150 DISORDERED STATE OF THE 

with a significant whisper, sometimes call an odd 
man, perhaps a very odd man. 

We know but little of the personal and private 
history of Archimedes, the justly celebrated geom- 
etrician of Syracuse. But, so far as we have a 
knowledge of him, he might, perhaps, be justly con- 
sidered as at least a partial illustration of the views 
which have been given. He was occupied with 
some geometrical demonstration at the very time 
when the Roman army took Syracuse, and so in- 
tently engaged in it that he was wholly insensible to 
the scenes of confusion and suffering which ensued, 
and to the shouts and outcries which everywhere re- 
sounded. He was even calmly drawing the lines of 
a diagram, when a soldier suddenly entered his room 
and placed a sword to his throat. " Hold, friend" 
(said Archimedes), " one moment, and my demon- 
stration will be finished." 

At any rate, whatever may have been true of the 
Syracusan geometrician, such instances are un- 
doubtedly to be found. It is unquestionably the 
case, that there are men who have the power of vol- 
untarily abstracting their minds from every other 
subject, and fixing it intensely upon the subject be- 
fore them, without possessing an equal power of 
promptly recalling their attention to other objects 
which may happen in the mean while to present a 
reasonable claim upon their notice. Sir Walter 
Scott, in the Romance of St. Ronan's Well, has 
given, with his usual descriptive accuracy, a deline- 
ation of one of this class, in the following terms : 
" Bewildered amid abstruse researches, metaphysi- 



POWER OP ABSTRACTION. 151 

cal and historical, Mr. Cargill, living only for him- 
self and his books, acquited many ludicrous habits, 
which exposed the secluded student to the ridicule of 
the world, and which tinged, though they did not al- 
together obscure, the natural civility of an amiable 
disposition, as well as the acquired habits of polite- 
ness which he had learned in the good society that 
frequented Lord Bidmore's mansion. He not only 
indulged in neglect of dress and appearance, and all 
those ungainly tricks which men are apt to acquire 
by living very much alone ; but besides, and espe- 
cially, he became probably the most abstracted and 
absent man of a profession peculiarly liable to cher- 
ish such habits. No man fell so regularly into the 
habit of mistaking, or, in Scottish phrase, misken- 
ning the person he spoke to, or more frequently in- 
quired at an old maid after her husband, at a child- 
less wife after her young people, at the distressed 
widower after the wife at whose funeral he himself 
had assisted but a fortnight before ; and none was 
ever more familiar with strangers whom he had nev- 
er seen, or seemed more estranged from those who 
had a title to think themselves known to him. The 
worthy man perpetually confounded sex, age, and 
calling ; and when a blind beggar extended his hand 
for charity, he has been known to return the civility 
by taking off* his hat, making a low bow, and hoping 
his worship was well."* 

♦ St, Ronan's Well, chap, xvi. 



152 DISORDERED STATE OF THE 

§ 86. Elustration from Bimyere^s JWanners of the 

Age. 

Bruyere sketches a character, under the name of 
Menalcas, which, in some of its points at least, cor- 
responds to the views which have now been present- 
ed. " Menalcas (the character is supposed to have 
been drawn from life, viz., the Count de Brancas) 
gOQS down stairs, opens the door to go out, shuts it. 
He perceives that his nightcap is still on ; and, ex- 
amining himself a little better, finds but one half of 
his face shaved, his sword on his right side, his 
stockings hanging over his heels, and his shirt out 
of his breeches. If he walks into the street, he feels 
something strike on the face or stomach. He can't 
imagine what it is, till waking and opening his eyes, 
he sees himself by a cartwheel, or under a joiner's 
penthouse, with the coffins about his ears. One 
time you might have seen him run against a blind 
man, push him backward, and afterward fall over 
him. Sometimes he happens to come up, forehead 
to forehead, with a prince, and obstructs his passage. 
With much ado he recollects himself, and has but 
just time to squeeze himself close to a wall to make 
room for him. He seeks quarrels and brawls, puts 
himself into a heat, calls to his servants, and tells 
them, one after another, everything is lost or out of 
the way, and demands his gloves, which he has on 
his hands ; like the woman, who asked for her mask 
when she had it on her face. He enters an apart- 
ment, passes under a sconce, on which his periwig 
hitches, and is left hanging. The courtiers look on 



POWER OF ABSTRACTION. 153 

him and laugh. Menalcas laughs too, louder than 
any of them, and turns his eyes round the company 
to see the man who shows his ears and has lost his 
wig. He says yes, commonly, instead of no. 
And when he says no, you must suppose he would 
say YES. When he answers you, perhaps his eyes 
are fixed on yours, but it does not follow that he 
sees you, nor any one else, nor anything in the 
world. All that you can draw from him, when he 
is most sociable, are some such words as these : 
Yes, indeed, His true, good, all the better, sincerely, I 
believe so, certainly, ah, oh, heaven, and some other 
monosyllables, which are not spoken in the right 
place neither. He never is among those whom he 
appears to be with. He calls his footman very se- 
riously, Sir, and his friend, Robin, He says your 
Reverence to a prince of the blood, and your High- 
ness to a Jesuit. When he is at mass, if the priest 
sneezes, he cries out, ' God bless you.'* He is in 
company with a judge, grave by his character, and 
venerable by his age and dignity, who asks him if 
such a thing is so. Menalcas replies, ' Yes, madam,'* 
As he came up once from the country, his footmen 
attempted to rob him and succeeded. They jump- 
ed down from behind the coach, presented the end 
of a flambeau to his throat, demanded his purse, and 
he delivered it to them. Being come home, he told 
the adventure to his friends, who asked him the cir- 
cumstances, and he referred them to his servants. 
* Inquire of my men,' said he, ' they were there.' " 



154 DISORDERED STATE OF THE 

^ 87. Other instances illustrative of excessive Ab- 
straction. 

We may, perhaps, in this connexion, although it 
IS not without some degree of hesitation that we do 
it, refer to the case of Sir Isaac Newton, as a per- 
son in whom the abstractive power, sometimes at 
least, seems to have showed itself in excess. His 
mind, in the exercise of this power, seized the sub- 
ject before it, insulated it, removed everything else 
to an unseen distance, and held it in its inextricable 
grasp firmly and alone ; but, in doing this, the ab- 
stractive power seems to have absorbed all the other 
mental powers ; and while the subject of his exam- 
ination was so thoroughly brought within its control 
as to be in some sense lost in the mind, it might be 
said, with almost equal truth, that the philosopher 
was lost in the subject. His biographers assure us 
(and the facts which they detail sufficiently confirm 
their statements), that his thoughts at such times, as 
he sat for hours on his bedside without dressing him- 
self, or in some other position equally indicative of 
their intensity, appeared to preserve no connexion 
with the ordinary affairs of life. 

Still more striking was this singular trait in Dr. 
Robert Hamilton, the author of a celebrated " Es- 
say on the National Debt," and esteemed a pro- 
found and clear-headed philosopher. A writer in 
the New Monthly Magazine, after speaking of the 
profound science, beautiful arrangement, and clear 
expression, characteristic of Dr. Hamilton's wri- 
tings, goes on to say : " Yet, in public, the man was 



POWER OF ABSTRACTION. 155 

a shadow ; pulled off his hat to his own wife in the 
streets, and apologized for not having the pleasure 
of her acquaintance ; went to his classes in the col- 
lege on the dark mornings, with one of her white 
stockings on one leg, and one of his own black 
ones on the other ; often spent the whole time of 
the meeting in moving from the table the hats of the 
students, which they as constantly returned; some- 
times invited them to call on him, and then fined 
them for coming to insult him. He would run 
against a cow in the road, turn round, beg her par- 
don, ' Madam,' and hope she was not hurt. At 
other times he would run against posts, and chide 
them for not getting out of his way ; and yet his 
conversation at the same time, if anybody happen- 
ed to be with him, was perfect logic and perfect 
music." 

The case of the Rev. Dr. George Harvest, one 
of the ministers of Thames Ditton, and said to have 
been a man of uncommon abilities and an excel- 
lent scholar, is very similar. " He was once" (so 
say the accounts of the peculiarities which distin- 
guished him) " on the eve of being married to the 
bishop's daughter, when, having gone a gudgeon 
fishing, he forgot the circumstance, and overstayed 
the canonical hour, which so offended the lady that 
she indignantly broke off the match. If a beggar 
happened to take off his hat to him in the streets, in 
hopes of receiving alms, he would make him a bow, 
tell him he was his most humble servant, and walk 
on. He has been known on Sundays to forget 
the days on which he was to officiate, and would 



156 DISORDERED STATE, ETC. 

walk into church with his gun under his arm, to as* 
certain what the people wanted there. Once, when 
)ie was playing at backgammon, he poured out a 
glass of wine, and it being his turn to throw, having 
the box in one hand and the glass in the other, and 
being extremely dry, he swallowed down both the 
dice, and discharged the wine upon the dice-board. 

"His notorious heedlessness was so apparent 
that no one would lend him a horse, as he frequent- 
ly lost his beast from under him, or, at least, from 
out of his hands, it being his frequent practice to 
dismount and lead the horse, putting the bridle un- 
der his arm, which the horse sometimes shook off, 
or the intervention of a post occasioned it to fall. 
Sometimes it was taken off by the boys, when the 
parson was seen drawing his bridle after him ; and 
if any one asked him after the animal, he could not 
give the least account of it, or how he had lost it."* 

Instances of this kind might be easily multiplied. 
It will be noticed, that in cases such as have been 
enumerated, the leading trait is not mere weakness 
of the mind, not that specific characteristic which is 
known in writers on Insanity under the name of im- 
becility, not mere helplessness and wandering of the 
attention ; but an excessive facility and profound- 
ness of abstraction, which results in excluding all 
notice of everything, whether of greater or less im- 
portance, excepting the particular subject which at 
the moment happens to occupy the mind. No mat- 
ter what the nature of the subject is. It may be of 
great moment or of very trivial moment ; the crea- 

* Macnish's Philosophy of Sleep, ch. xviL 



DISORDERED ATTENTION. 157 

tion of a world or the birth of an insect. It is all 
the same to Menalcas. Relatively to him, there is 
nothing which, for the time being, comes at all into 
comparison. The proprieties of time and place ; the 
conventional decencies and civilities of society ; the 
claims of age, talents, and station ; the common 
practical duties of life ; everything, in a word, is dis- 
regarded, forgotten, involuntarily thrown out of ac- 
count. 



CHAPTER IX. 

DISORDERED ATTENTION. 

§ 88. Of the general nature of attention. 

The mere fact of Attention or mental Concen- 
tration is, unquestionably, a different thing from 
Concentrativeness, or that elementary power (if 
such there be, and whatever may be its nature) by 
means of which we give attention. Our inquiries, 
in the first place, have relation to the fact of atten- 
tion rather than the power. Probably we come near 
the common view of the matter by saying, in general 
terms, that attention expresses the state of the mind 
when it is steadily and strongly directed to the ob- 
ject, whatever it is, which happens to be before it. 
As the mind, in the exercise of Attention, generally 
directs itself to a particular object, exclusive of other 





158 DISORDERED ATTENTION. 

objects, it is not surprising that attention should 
sometimes be confounded with Abstraction. Atten- 
tion, however, does not make it a chief or leading 
object, as Abstraction does, to consider things apart, 
and in a state of isolation from each other, but par- 
ticularly to consider them fixedly and closely, wheth- 
er they present themselves to the mind alone or in 
connexion with other objects. In other words, the 
grasp which the perceptive power fixes upon the ob- 
ject of its contemplations, whether considered as one 
or many, abstractly or complexly, is essentially an 
undivided, an unbroken one. 

In what way the perceptive or intellective power 
is able to do this, it may not be an easy matter to 
determine with entire certainty. But the probability 
is, that it is owing to a distinct and specific act of 
the will, directing, condensing, and confining to a 
particular point, the movement of the percipient na- 
ture. So that in all cases of attention the act of the 
mind may be regarded as a complex one, involving 
not only the mere perceptions, or series of percep- 
tions, but also an act of the will, founded on some 
feeling of desire or sentiment of duty. It is the act 
of the will, prompted, in general, by the feeling of 
desire or interest, which keeps the mind intense and 
fixed in its position. Nevertheless, as we gener- 
ally have reference, when we speak of this subject, 
to the intellectual movement rather than to the voli- 
tive or voluntary energy which may be supposed to 
lay back of it, it is not without reason that we pro- 
pose to consider it under the head of the intellect 
rather than under any subsequent division. And, as 



DISORDERED ATTENTION. 159 

Attention, like Abstraction, is as predicable of the 
External Intellect as of the Internal, it may as well 
be considered under the former subordinate division 
as under the latter. 

§ 89. Of differences in the Degree of Attention. 
It is worthy of notice, that we often speak of At- 
tention as great or small, as existing in a very high 
or a* very slight degree. When the view of the 
mind is only momentary, and is unaccompanied, as 
it generally is at such times, with any force of emo- 
tion or energy of volitive action, then the attention 
is said to be slight. When, on the contrary, the 
mind directs itself to an object or series of objects 
with earnestness, and for a considerable length of 
time, and refuses to attend to anything else, then the 
attention is said to be intense. 

Some persons possess a command of attention in 
a very high degree. There have been mathemati- 
cians who were able to investigate the most abstruse 
and complicated problems amid every variety and 
character of disturbance. It is said of Julius Caesar, 
that, while writing a despatch, he could at the same 
time dictate four others to his secretaries ; and, if 
he did not write himself, could dictate seven letters 
at once. The same thing is asserted also of the 
Emperor Napoleon, who had a wonderful capability 
of directing his whole mental energy to whatever 
came before him.* — Many other striking instances 
of this kind, illustrating the immense energy of at- 
tention which is characteristic of some individuals, 
might be introduced here if it were necessary. 
* Elements of Mental Philosophy, vol. ii., ^ 153, 3d ed. 



160 DISORDERED ATTENTION. 



§ 90. Of Absence of Mind, or inability to fix the 
Attention. 

But this view of the subject, viz., great strength 
or energy of attention, is of less consequence to us, 
in our present inquiries, than the opposite. In some 
men there seems to be an utter inabiUty to detain 
the intellect, for any length of time, upon a given 
topic. Every new object which presents ftself, 
every new idea which arises in the mind, claims the 
attention, slight as it is, which had just before been 
given to some other object or some other thought. 
The mind may be considered as in a state of con- 
stant transition from object to object, almost without 
motive and without purpose. 

Such a state of the mind is, in the highest degree, 
unfortunate. It is fatal to the acquisition of knowl- 
edge. If the eye of the student, who is the subject 
of it, is fixed upon his book, it is probable that his 
thoughts are altogether removed from any connex- 
ion with the thoughts and reasonings of his author. 
To all practical purposes, the faculties of a person 
in this situation are obliterated and lost. Of what 
use are perceptive powers, and judgment, and pow- 
ers of reasoning, if, in consequence of weakness of 
the will, or for any other cause, it is impossible to 
direct them, for any length of time, to any definite 
and practicable purpose ? Such a person is unable 
to make any favourable impression on the commu- 
nity ; he is even unable to manage the concerns of 
his own family ; and is likely to be a source of great 
anxiety and trouble to all with whom he is immedi- 
ately connected. 



DISORDERED ATTENTION. 161 

§91. Illustraiion of inordinately weak or disordered 
Attention, 
An interesting case, illustrative of this mental dis- 
order, is to be found in the writings of Sir Alexander 
Crichton. The case is repeated in Dr. Good's 
Study of Medicine (vol. iv., class iv., ord. i.); and 
it is in the words of this last-mentioned and highly- 
valuable writer that we give it here. Of the indi- 
vidual whose character he is describing, he says : 
" In his disposition he was gentle and calm, but 
somewhat unsociable. His absence of mind was 
extreme, and he would sometimes willingly sit for a 
whole day without moving. Yet he had nothing of 
melancholy belonging to him ; and it was easy to 
discover by his countenance that a multiplicity of 
thoughts were constantly succeeding each other in 
his imagination, many of which were gay and cheer- 
ful ; for he would heartily laugh at times, not with 
an unmeaning countenance, but evidently from men- 
tal merriment. He was occasionally so strangely 
inattentive, that, when pushed by some want which 
he wished to express, if he had begun a sentence, 
he would suddenly stop short after getting half way 
through it, as though he had forgotten what else to 
say. Yet, when his attention was roused, and he 
was induced to speak, he always expressed himself 
in good language, and with much propriety ; and if 
a question were proposed to him which required the 
exercise of judgment, and he could be made to at- 
tend to it, he judged correctly. 

" It was with difficulty he could be made to take 
02 



162 DISORDERED ATTENTION. 

any exercise ; but was at length prevailed upon to 
drive his curricle, in which Sir Alexander at times 
accompanied him. He at first could not be pre- 
vailed upon to go beyond half a mile ; but in suc- 
ceeding attempts he consented to go further. He 
drove steadily, and, when about to pass a carriage, 
took pains to avoid it ; but when at last he became 
familiarized with this exercise, he would often re- 
lapse into thought, and allow the reins to hang loose 
in his hands. His ideas seemed to be for ever va- 
rying. When any one came across his mind which 
excited anger, his horses suffered for it ; but the 
spirit they exhibited at such an unusual and unkind 
treatment made him soon desist, and re-excited his 
attention to his own safety. As soon as they were 
quieted, he would relapse into thought ; if his ideas 
were melancholy, the horses were allowed to walk 
slow ; if they were gay and cheerful, they were gen- 
erally encouraged to go fast. 

" Something may in this case, perhaps, be owing, 
as supposed by Sir A. Crichton, to an error in the 
mode of education ; but the chief defect seems to 
have been in the attentive faculty itself, and its la- 
bouring under a natural imbecility which no mode 
of education could entirely have removed." 

In connexion with the remark just made. Dr. 
Good, from whom we take this statement, goes on 
to assert the important doctrine which we have re- 
peatedly had occasion to advance, that the various 
powers of the mind may be weak and diseased in 
themselves. In other words, they may be diseased 
originally and in their own nature, and independent- 



DISORDERED ATTENTION. 163 

ly of other causes. At least, it is thus that we un- 
derstand him. 

§ 92. Cases of sudden failure of the Attention, 

It is sometimes the case, that the power of Atten- 
tion fails suddenly, in minds where it had existed 
with a considerable degree of energy up to the very 
time of its failure. Previous to this period, the in- 
dividual was capable of directing his attention, with 
at least the ordinary degree of quickness and effect, 
to any subjects which might present themselves. 
But from that time the power vanishes ; the mind 
wanders abroad, independent of all control; but 
perhaps the evil is only temporary. — A striking in- 
stance and illustration of what has just been said is 
to be found in the Psychological Magazine. The 
individual was a Mr. Spalding, a gentleman well 
known in Germany for his literary acquirements. 
The statement not only had reference to his own 
personal experience, but was drawn up and publish- 
ed by himself. It is as follows : 

" I was this morning engaged with a great num- 
ber of people, who followed each other quickly, and 
to each of whom I was obliged to give my attention. 
I was also under the necessity of writing much ; but 
the subjects, which were various, and of a trivial and 
uninteresting nature, had no connexion the one with 
the other. My attention, therefore, was constantly 
kept on the stretch, and was continually shifting 
from one subject to another. At last it became ne- 
cessary that I should write a receipt for some money 
I had received on account of the poor. I seated 



164 DISORDERED ATTENTION 

myself and wrote the first two words, but in a mo* 
ment found that I was incapable of proceeding, for 
I could not recollect the words which belonged to 
the ideas that were present in my mind. I strained 
my attention as much as possible, and tried to write 
one letter slowly after the other, always having an 
eye to the preceding one, in order to observe wheth- 
er they had the usual relationship to each other ; but 
I remarked, and said to myself at the time, that the 
characters I was writing were not those which I 
wished to write, and yet I could not discover where 
the fault lay. I therefore desisted ; and partly by 
broken words and syllables, and partly by gestures, 
I made the person who waited for the receipt under- 
stand he should leave me. For about half an hour 
there reigned a kind of tumultuary disorder in my 
senses, in which I was incapable of remarking any- 
thing very particular, except that one series of ideas 
forced themselves involuntarily on my mind. The 
trifling nature of these thoughts I was perfectly aware 
of, and was also conscious that I made several ef- 
forts to get rid of them and supply their place by 
better ones, which lay at the bottom of my soul. I 
endeavoured, as much as lay in my power, consid- 
ering the great crowd of confused images which 
presented themselves to my mind, to recall my prin- 
ciples of religion, of conscience, and of future ex- 
pectation ; these I found equally correct and fixed 
as before. 

" There was no deception in my external senses, 
for I saw and knew everything around me ; but I 
could not free myself from the strange ideas which 



DISORDERED ATTENTION. 165 

existed in my head. I endeavoured to speak, in 
order to discover whether I was capable of saying 
anything that was connected ; but, although I made 
the greatest efforts of attention, and proceeded with 
the utmost caution, I perceived that I uniformly 
spoke other words than those I intended. My soul 
was at present as little master of the organs of 
speech as it had been before of my hand in writing. 
Thank God, this state did not continue very long, 
for in about half an hour my head began to grow 
clearer, the strange and tiresome ideas became less 
vivid and turbulent, and I could command my own 
thoughts with less interruption."* 

The mind of the individual, who gives this inter- 
esting account, gradually recovered its regular ac- 
tion. He then recollected the receipt which he had 
begun to write ; and in regard to which he remem- 
bered that he had laboured under some strange ina- 
bility. On examing the receipt, he found, to his 
great astonishment, that, instead of the words fifty 
dollars^ being one half yearns rate, which he ought 
to have written, the words were, fifty dollars through 
the salvation of Bra, He adds further, that he could 
not recollect any perception or business which he 
had to transact, that could, by means of an obscure 
influence, have produced this phenomenon. This 
we acknowledge to be a striking instance ; but we 
do not doubt, from the observations we have been 
able to make on the operations of the human mind, 
that there have, from time to time, been many others 

* The German Psychological Magazine, as quoted in Mac- 
nish's Philosophy of Sleep, oh. xvi. 



166 DISORDERED ATTENTION. 

like it. Cases where the concentrative element, th© 
power of attention, the ability to fasten the mind upon 
its appropriate object, has suddenly and strikingly 
failed, although, perhaps, not permanently. 

§ 93. Additional illustration of this disordered 
Action, 

There is rather a striking instance of the failure 
of the Concentrative or Attentive power, mentioned 
by Dr. George Combe, which came within his per- 
sonal knowledge. He relates, that the gentleman 
who was the subject of it experienced a feeling, as 
if the power of concentrating his mind were about to 
leave him. This naturally caused some anxiety ; 
and he accordingly used vigorous efforts to preserve 
it. " He directed his attention to an object, fre- 
quently a spire at the end of a long street, and reso- 
lutely maintained it immovably fixed there for a con- 
siderable length of time, excluding all other ideas 
from his mind. The consequence was, that, in his 
then weak state, a diseased fixity of mind ensued, in 
which feelings and ideas stood, as it were, bound up 
and immovable ; and, thereafter, a state in which 
every impression and emotion was floating and fickle 
like images in water."* 

§ 94. Of the course to he taken to restore the potver 
of Attention. 

It would be desirable, if possible, to suggest some 
remedies of this state of mind, particularly as it ex- 
ists in its less marked but more frequent forms. 

* Combe's Phrenology, Boston ed., p. 137, 



DISORDERED ATTENTION, 167 

I. — And the first thing to be done is to secure a 
healthy and vigorous state of the body, especially of 
the nervous system. If the bodily system be dis- 
eased, especially if there be a weak, tremulous, and 
uneasy state of the nerves, there will probably be, 
in connexion with this state of things, an uncertain 
and dissatisfied state of the mind. Deficient in en- 
ergy, and yielding to the slightest cause of despond- 
ency, it will find itself incapable of directing itself, 
" with a single eye," to the proper object of its con- 
templations. Not, because there is naturally and 
necessarily any defect in itself, but because its ef- 
forts, even when put forth with no small degree of 
energy, are borne down by the appendant burden of 
a weak and inefficient body. 

II. — In other cases, the state of mind in question 
has been brought about by a wrong course of men- 
tal training. The individual has never been sub- 
jected to anything like severity of discipline ; but 
in study, as in everything else, has pursued his own 
pleasure, promptly leaving every inquiry which in- 
volved a laborious effort, and seeking some object 
of thought or action that was less repugnant. Such 
a course is ultimately fatal to that energy of mind 
which is requisite to a high degree of attention, and 
can be remedied only by a different course. The 
mind must be restored to energy by a course the 
opposite of that which has reduced it to its present 
lassitude, viz., by labour, which always has been, 
and always will be, the necessary condition of men- 
tal as well as of physical ability. 

III. — There are cases where the inordinately in- 



168 DISORDERED ATTENTION. 

attentive state of mind has been caused, not by any 
weakness of the physical system, nor by a defect in 
the process of mental training, but is probably owing 
to something in the constitution of the mind itself. 
If there may be a constitutional weakness of the 
memory or of the reasoning power, may there not 
also be a constitutional weakness of the power of 
attention, or of those elements, whatever they may 
be, which constitute the power of attention? When- 
ever this is the case, it may be difficult wholly to 
eradicate the evil ; but it may undoubtedly be di- 
minished by a suitable course of mental training. 
Perhaps the ground of the imbecility of attention 
may be found in the weakness of the desires, per- 
haps in the feebleness of the will, or in some other 
condition of the mind incidental to the exercise of 
attention. If this be the case, a course should be 
taken appropriate to such a state of things. Efforts 
should be made (such as will naturally suggest them- 
selves) to increase the desires ; in other words, to 
excite an interest in the subjects brought before the 
mind, to impart energy to the action of the will, and 
to discipline the mind in whatever other respects may 
be necessary. 



ON DREAMING. 169 



CHAPTER X. 

ON DREAMING. 

^ 95. General statement in regard to Dreams. 

One of the modifications of Disordered Mental 
Action (not permanent, it is true, but occasional and 
temporary disordered action) exists in the form of 
D/eams. We sometimes say of a man, who is un- 
der partial mental hallucination, that he is a dream- 
er ; or, that he has no more correctness of percep- 
tion and understanding than if he were dreaming. tt 
Hence it is obviously proper to give some attention - 
to these states of mind. Furthermore, as dreams 
are found, for the most part, to be particularly and 
very closely connected with external perceptions 
and conceptions, there seems to be a propriety in 
considering them in this place, viz., under the gen- 
eral head of the External Intellect. 

In undertaking to give the reader some account 
of dreams, it will not be necessary, in the first in- 
stance, to be particular in our statements. It will, 
perhaps, approach sufficiently near to a correct gen- 
eral description to say, that they are our mental 
states and operations while we are asleep. But the 
particular views, which are to be taken in the ex- 
amination of this subject, will not fail to throw light 
on this general statement. — ^We proceed, therefore, 

P 



170 ON DREAMING. 

to give some explanation of them in their more 
common or ordinary appearance. And, in doing 
this, shall find it convenient (as we have ah-eady 
done in some cases, in giving an account of the reg- 
ular or normal mental processes) to repeat essen- 
tially the statements which are to be found in the 
recently published Elements of Mental Philosophy; 
a work, where we have made it an especial object, 
although probably with very imperfect success, to 
give what we consider the correct view of the mind's 
regular and ordinary action. 

§ 96. Connexion of dr earns with our waking 
thoughts. 

In giving an explanation of dreams, our attention 
is first arrested by the circumstance that they have 
an intimate relationship with our waking, thoughts. 
The great body of our waking experiences appear 
in the form of trains of associations ; and these 
trains of associated ideas, in greater or less contin- 
uity, and with greater or less variation, continue 
when we are asleep. — Accordingly, Franklin has 
somewhere made the remark, that the bearings and 
results of political events, which had caused him 
much trouble while awake, were not unfrequently 
unfolded to him in dreaming. — Mr. Coleridge re- 
lates, that, as he was once reading in the Pilgrimage 
of Purchas an account of the palace and garden of 
the Khan Kubla, he fell into a sleep, and in that 
situation composed an entire poem of not less than 
two hundred lines; some of which he afterward 



ON DREAMING. 171 

committed to writing. The poem is entitled Kubia 
Khan, and begins as follows : 

"In Xanadu did Kubla Khan 
A stately pleasure-dome decree ; 
Where Alph, the sacred river, ran 
Through caverns measureless to man 
Down to a sunless sea." 

It is evident, from such statements as these, which 
are confirmed by the experience of almost every 
person, that our dreams are fashioned from the ma- 
terials of the thoughts and feelings which we have 
while awake ; in other words, they will, in a great 
degree, be merely the repetition of our customary 
and prevailing associations. 

§ 97. Dremns are often caused by our sensations. 

But while we are to look for the materials of our 
dreams in thoughts which had previously existed, 
we further find that they are not beyond the influ- 
ence of those slight bodily sensations of which we 
are susceptible even in hours of sleep. These sen- 
sations, slight as they are, are the means of introdu- 
cinoj one set of associations rather than another. — 
Dugald Stewart relates an incident, which may be 
considered an evidence of this, that a person with 
whom he was acquainted had occasion, in conse- 
quence of an indisposition, to apply a bottle of hot 
water to his feet when he went to bed ; and the con- 
sequence was, that he dreamed he was making a 
journey to the top of Mount -3Etna, and that he found 
the heat of the ground almost insupportable. 

A cause of dreams closely allied to the above, is 



172 ON DREAMING. 

the variety of sensations which we experience from 
the stomach, viscera, &c. Persons, for instance, 
who have been for a long time deprived of food, or 
have received it only in small quantities, hardly 
enough to preserve life, will be likely to have dreams 
in some way or other directly relating to their con- 
dition. Baron Trenck relates, that, being almost 
dead with hunger when confined in his dungeon, 
his dreams every night presented to him the well- 
filled and luxurious tables of Berhn, from which, as 
they were presented before him, he imagined he was 
about to relieve his hunger. 

The state of health also has considerable influ- 
ence, not only in producing dreams, but in giving 
them a particular character. The remark has been 
made by medical men, that acute diseases, particu- 
larly fevers, are often preceded and indicated by 
disagreeable and oppressive dreams. 

§ 98. Explanation of the incoherency of dreams. 

There is frequently much of wildness, inconsis- 
tency, and contradiction in our dreams. The mind 
passes very rapidly from one object to another ; 
strange and singular incidents occur. If our dreams 
be truly the repetition of our waking thoughts, it 
may well be inquired. How this wildness and incon- 
sistency happen? 

The explanation of this peculiarity resolves itself 
into two parts. — The first ground or cause of it is, 
that our dreams are not subjected, like our waking 
thoughts, to the control and regulation of surround- 
ing objects. While we are awake, our trains of 



ON DREAMING. 173 

thought are kept uniform and coherent by the influ- ^ 

ence of such objects, which continually remind us 
of our situation, character, and duties, and which 
keep in check any tendency to revery. But in 
sleep the senses are closed ; the soul is, according- 
ly, in a great measure excluded from the material 
world, and is thus deprived of the salutary regulating 
influence from that source. 

In the SECOND place, when we are asleep, our 
associated trains of thought are no longer under the 
control of the will. We do not mean to say that 
the operations of the will are suspended at such 
times, and that volitions have no existence ; but only 
that their influence in a great degree ceases. 

A person, while he is awake, has his thoughts un- 
der such government, and is able, by the direct and 
indirect influence of voHtions, so to regulate them, 
as generally to bring them in the end to some con- 
clusion, which he foresees and wishes to arrive at. 
But in dreaming, as all directing and governing in- 
fluence, both internal and external, is at an end, our 
thoughts and feelings seem to be driven forward, 
much like a ship at sea without a rudder, wherever 
it may happen. 

§ 99. Apparent reality of dreams, {1st cause,) 

When objects are presented to us in dreams, we 
look upon them as real ; and events, and combina- 
tions and series of events, appear the same. We 
feel the same interest, and resort to the same expe- 
dients as in the perplexities and enjoyments of real 
life. When persons are introduced as forming a 

P2 



174 ON DREAMING. 

part in the transactions of our dreams, we see them 
clearly in their Hving attitudes and stature ; we con- 
verse with them, and hear them speak, and behold 
them move, as if actually present. 

One reason of this greater vividness of our dream- 
ing conceptions, and of our firm behef in their real- 
ity, seems to be this. The subjects upon which our 
thoughts are then employed, occupy the mind exclu' 
sively. We can form a clearer conception of an 
object with our eyes shut than we can with them 
open, as any one will be convinced on making the 
experiment ; and the liveliness of the conception 
will increase in proportion as we can suspend the 
exercise of the other senses. In sound sleep, not 
only the sight, but the other senses also, may be said 
to be closed ; and the attention is not continually 
diverted by the multitude of objects which arrest the 
hearing and touch when we are awake. — It is, there- 
fore, a most natural supposition, that our conceptions 
must at such times be extremely vivid and distinct. 

Furthermore, it will be recollected, that very vivid 
conceptions are often attended with a momentary 
belief in the actuality of the things conceived of, 
even when we are awake. But as conceptions ex- 
ist in the mind when we are asleep in a much higher 
degree distinct and vivid, what was in the former 
case a momentary, becomes in the latter a perma- 
nent belief. Hence everything has the appearance 
of reality ; and the mere thoughts of the mind are 
virtually transformed into persons, and varieties of 
situation, and events, which are regarded by us in 



ON DREAMING. 175 

precisely the same light as the persons, and situa- 
tions, and events of our every day's experience. 

§ 100. Apparent reality of dreams. (2d cause,) 

A second circumstance, which goes to account 
for the fact that our dreaming conceptions have the 
appearance of reality, is, that they are not suscepti- 
ble of being controlled, either directly or indirectly, 
by mere volition. — We are so formed as almost in- 
variably to associate reality with whatever objects of 
perception continue to produce in us the same ef- 
fects. A hard or soft body, or any substance of a 
particular colour, or taste, or smell, is always, when 
presented to our senses, followed by certain states 
of mind essentially the same ; and we yield the most 
ready and firm belief in the existence of such ob- 
jects. In a word, we are disposed, from our very 
constitution, to believe in the existence of objects of 
perception, the perceptions of which do not depend 
on the WILL, but which we find to be followed by 
certain states of the mind, whether we choose it or 
not, — But it is to be recollected that our dreaming 
thoughts are, for the most part, mere conceptions ; 
our senses being closed and shut up, and external 
objects not being presented to them. This is true. 
But if we conclude in favour of the real existence of 
objects of perception, because they produce in us 
sensations independently of our vohtions, it is but nat- 
ural to suppose that we shall believe in the reality of 
our conceptions also, whenever they are in like man- 
ner beyond our voluntary control. They are both 
merely states of the mind ; and if belief always at- 



176 ON DREAMING. 

tends our perceptions, wherever we find them to be 
independent of our choice, there is no reason why 
conceptions, which are ideas of absent objects of 
perception, should not be attended with a like belief 
under the same circumstances. — And essentially the 
same circumstances exist in dreaming ; that is, a 
train of conceptions arise in the mind, and we are 
not conscious at such times of being able to exer- 
cise any direction or control whatever over them. 
They exist, whether we will it or not ; and we regard 
them as real. 

§ 101. Of our estimate of time in dreaming. 

Our estimate of time in dreaming differs from 
that when awake. Events, which would take whole 
days or a longer time in the performance, are dream- 
ed in a few moments. So wonderful is this com- 
pression of a multitude of transactions into the very 
shortest period, that, when we are accidentally awa- 
kened by the jarring of a door which is opened into 
the room where we are sleeping, we sometimes 
dream of depredations by thieves, or destruction by 
fire, in the very instant of our awakening. — "A 
friend of mine" (says Dr. Abercrombie) " dreamed 
that he crossed the Atlantic and spent a fortnight in 
America. In embarking on his return, he fell into 
the sea ; and, having awoke with the fright, discover- 
ed that he had not been asleep above ten minutes." 

This striking circumstance in the history of our 
dreams is generally explained by supposing that our 
thoughts, as they successively occupy the mind, are 
more rapid than while we are awake. But their ra- 



ON DREAMING. 177 

pidity may at other times be very great ; so much 
so, that, in a few moments, crowds of ideas pass 
through the mind, which it would take a long time 
to utter, and a far longer time would it take to per- 
form all the transactions which they concern. This 
explanation, therefore, is not satisfactory, for our 
thoughts are oftentimes equally rapid in our waking 
moments. 

The true reason, we apprehend, is to be found in 
those preceding sections, which took under exami- 
nation the apparent reality of dreams. Our concep- 
tions in dreaming are considered by us real ; every 
thought is an action ; every idea is an event ; and 
successive states of mind are successive actions and 
successive events. He who in his sleep has the 
conception of all the particulars of a distant military 
expedition, or of a circumnavigation of the globe, 
seems to himself to have actually experienced all the 
various and multipUed fortunes of the one and the 
other. Hence what appears to be the real time in 
dreams, but is only the apparent time, will not be 
that which is sufficient for the mere thought, but that 
which is necessary for the successive actions. 

§ 102. Dreams sometimes lay the foundation of a 
pei^nanently disordered state of mind. 

It is sufficiently evident that Dreams, as we have 
already had occasion to intimate, must be consider- 
ed as disordered, and not as sane or sound states of 
mind. They do not, however, necessarily imply in- 
sanity of mind in the ordinary sense of the term. As 
fioon as the powers of the body are restored, and the 



178 ON DREAMING. 

state of sleep terminates, the mental action, which 
was subject during the period of dreaming to a tem- 
porary disorder, ceases to exhibit those irregularities 
which just before characterized it. Dreams, never- 
theless, in consequence of the feelings of horror 
which they sometimes occasion, have, in a few in- 
stances, been the cause of a permanently disordered 
mental state. In themselves they involve nothing 
more than a temporary disorder ; but in their results 
they may, by possibility at least, lay the foundation 
of a permanent one. 

Mr. Macnish, in his recent Work on the Philoso- 
phy of Sleep, relates the case of a woman in the 
West Highlands of Scotland, who became deranged 
in consequence of a terrific dream. He states, that 
in her derangement she escaped to the mountains, 
and lived and herded with the wild deer for seven 
years. She became so swift of foot, that the shep- 
herds of those regions, and others by whom she was 
occasionally seen, could never arrest her. At the 
end of her seven year's wanderings a severe storm 
drove the herds of deer and the woman with them 
into the valleys, where she was surrounded and 
caught. She was conveyed to her husband, by 
whom she was kindly received, and in the course 
of three months regained her reason. 

^ 103. JVEental disorder sometimes developes itself 
in connexion with dreams. 

Sometimes persons, under the influence of dreams, 
perform actions indicative of an unsound state of 
mind, although the unsoundness of mind may never 



ON DREAMING. 179 

liave been suspected before. It is the dream which 
first brings to light the hidden trait of insanity. Of 
this the following facts are an instance. 

Some years since, an individual resident in Gardi- 
ner, in the State of Maine, dreamed that he was in- 
structed by the Supreme Being to burn a neighbour- 
ing church, and also to kill a certain woman of his 
acquaintance. His mind was powerfully affected. 
And, not doubting that he had the highest possible 
authority, he succeeded in burning the place of wor- 
ship, and exhibited every disposition to execute, as 
soon as possible, the remaining part of his terrific 
commission. Before he could effect his purpose, 
however, he was seized and prevented. — Neverthe- 
less, he remained firm in his intention to perform, at 
the first favourable opportunity, what he considered 
to be the will of God. As there was now no doubt 
of his insanity, he was imprisoned for life, not merely 
as a punishment for what he had already done, but 
as the only sure means of preventing the atrocities 
which he still intended to perpetrate. To his dying 
day he clung to the belief, that he did right in de- 
stroying the building, and much lamented that he 
was not permitted to perform all that had been pre- 
scribed to him. — As has been intimated, this man 
was essentially insane previous to this time. That 
is to say, he had the elements of Insanity in him, 
although they were first developed and put in opera- 
tion by the dream. 

Pinel mentions a case very similar to the forego- 
ing. The individual was an old monk, whose ex- 
cessive religious feelings had assumed the form of 



180 ON DREAMING. 

enthusiasm. In this state of mind, he dreamed one 
night that he saw the Virgin, and that she gave him 
an express order to put to death a person of his ac- 
quaintance, whom he suspected of infidehty. *^ This 
projected homicide" (says Pinel) " would, no doubt, 
have been executed, had not the maniac, in conse- 
quence of betraying his purpose, been timely and 
effectually secured." 

§ 104. Case of destruction of life arising from a 
dream. 

In Hoffbauer's Treatise on Legal Medicine is a 
case narrated, which may properly be introduced 
here. It is the case of Bernard Schidmaizig. This 
individual, under the influence of some terrific dream, 
as is supposed, awoke suddenly at midnight, and 
beheld, at the moment of awaking, what he conceiv- 
ed to be a frightful phantom standing near him. The 
object before him was his wife, who was probably 
passing across the room at the time. In this state 
of mind, half dreaming and half awake, he mingled 
his own disturbed conceptions with the reality before 
him, and still continued to see, as he thought, some 
phantasmagorial appearance. He cried out, "Who 
goes there?" but received no answer. In the 
greatest affright he seized a hatchet, which he gen- 
erally kept near him, sprung from his bed, and 
assaulted the imaginary spectre. The blow felled 
his wife to the ground, and she died the next day. 

This case, it will readily be perceived, is an im- 
portant one in a legal point of view. Although the 
result was horrible in the extreme, the man could 



SOMNAMBULISM. 181 

not well be considered as guilty of a crime. It is 
true he was not insane, and no valid excuse of his 
conduct could be found in insanity. Nor was he, 
strictly speaking, asleep ; but there was such a com- 
bination of the sleeping and waking states, such a 
mingling of what was actually perceived with what 
was dreamed, combined too with extreme affright, 
that the same reasons which would nullify the crime 
of an insane person would seem to apply here, and 
be sufficient to extract the moral guilt from this. 
The man evidently was not himself. He laboured 
under a delusion, which, though different from in- 
sanity, practically amounted to it.* 



CHAPTER XI. 

SOMNAMBULISM. 

§ 105. General view of Somnambulism. 
With the subject of dreaming, that of Somnam- 
buhsm is naturally and very intimately connected. 
And if the term Dreaming, in some important sense, 
indicates a perplexed and irregular mental action, 
Somnambulism does not less so. Hence the pro- 
priety of giving some account of it in a treatise 
which proposes to give the outlines, if nothing more, 
of disordered mental action. 

* Hoffbauer's Medecine Legale, Des Maladies Mentales du 
Sommeil (French ed., by Chambeyron). 

Q 



182 SOMNAMBULISM. 

In attempting to give a definition, we are not cer- 
tain of being perfectly safe. Perhaps we shall come 
near enough to the fact in the case, in saying, that 
somnambulists are persons who are capable of walk- 
ing and of other voluntary actions while asleep. 
Of such persons many instances are on record ; and 
of some a particular account is given. The in- 
stance in the following section, which in some re- 
spects is a somewhat striking one, will help to illus- 
trate the nature of the subject now before us. 

§ 106. Singular instance of Somnambulism. 

A farmer in one of the counties of Massachu- 
setts, according to the account of the matter which 
was published at the time, had employed himself, for 
some weeks in winter, thrashing his grain. One 
night, as he was about closing his labours, he as- 
cended a ladder to the top of the great beams in the 
barn, where the rye which he was thrashing was de- 
posited, to ascertain what number of bundles re- 
mained unthrashed, which he determined to finish 
the next day. The ensuing night, about two o'clock, 
he was heard by one of the family to arise and go 
out. He repaired to his barn, being sound asleep 
and unconscious of what he was doing, set open his 
barn doors, ascended the great beams of the barn 
where his rye was deposited, threw down a flooring, 
and commenced thrashing it. When he had com- 
pleted it, he raked ofi* the straw, and shoved the rye 
to one side of the floor, and again ascended the lad- 
der with the straw, and deposited it on some rails 
that lay across the great beams. He then threw 



SOMNAMBULISM. 183 

down another flooring of rye, which he thrashed and 
finished as before. Thus he continued his labours 
until he had thrashed five floorings, and on returning 
from throwing down the sixth and last, in passing 
over part of the haymow, he fell off, where the hay 
had been cut down about six feet, on to the lower 
part of it, which awoke hini. He at first imagined 
himself in his neighbour's barn; but, after groping 
about in the dark a long time, ascertained that he 
was in his own, and at length found the ladder, on 
which he descended to the floor, closed his barn 
doors which he found open, and returned to his 
house. On coming to the light, he found himself in 
such a profuse perspiration that his clothes were 
literally wet through. The next morning, on going 
to his bam, he found that he had thrashed, during 
the night, five bushels of rye, had raked the straw 
off in good order, and deposited it on the great 
beams, and carefully shoved the grain to one side of 
the floor, without the least consciousness of what he 
was doing until he fell from the hay. 

§ 107. Of the senses falling to sleep in succession. 

Before attempting to offer anything in explanation 
of cases of somnambulism, we wish to delay a mo- 
ment for the purpose of stating very briefly the man- 
ner in which the senses are supposed successively to 
fall asleep. What sleep is, mentally considered and 
independently of the body, it might be difficult to say. 
But we know this, at least, that in a state of sleep 
the mind, as a general thing, ceases to retain its 
customary power over the muscular movements of 



184 SOMNAMBULISM. 

the system ; and also that all the senses are at such 
times locked up, as it were, and no longer perform 
their usual offices. And furthermore, the effect 
upon the senses takes place in such a way, that it 
seems to be proper to speak of them as separately 
or individually going to sleep and awaking from 
sleep. The additional fact is, that they appear to 
fall asleep at different times and in succession. 

This last fact is one of considerable importance 
in its practical appUcations. But we do not under- 
take here to enter into particulars and proofs. Ref- 
erence must be had for the details and the confirma- 
tory reasonings and facts to Cullen, and particularly 
to Cabanis,* a distinguished French writer on sub- 
jects of this nature. We give merely the conclu- 
sions at which they arrive. 

The sight, as we gather from the writers who 
have been named, ceases, in consequence of the pro- 
tection of the eyehds, to receive impressions first, 
while all the other senses preserve their sensibility 
entire ; and may, therefore, be said to be first in 
falling asleep. The sense of taste, according to 
the above writers, is the next which loses its sus- 
ceptibility of impressions, and then the sense of 
smelling. The hearing is the next in order, and last 
of all comes the sense of touch. — Furthermore, the 
senses are thought to sleep with different degrees of 
profoundness. The senses of taste and smelling 
awake the last ; the sight with more difficulty than 
the hearing, and the touch the easiest of all. Some- 
times a very considerable noise does not awake q 

* Rapports du Physique et du Moral de L'Homme, Mem. x. 



SOMNAMBULISM. 185 

person ; but, if the soles of his feet are tickled in the 
slightest degree, he starts up immediately. 

§ 108. Similar views applicable to the muscles. 

Similar remarks are made by the writers already 
referred to on the muscles. Those which move 
the arms and legs cease to act, when sleep is ap- 
proaching, sooner than those which sustain the head : 
and the latter before those which support the back. 
— And here it is proper to notice an exception to 
the general statement made in the preceding sec- 
tion, that the mind in sleep ceases to retain its power 
over the muscles. Some persons can sleep stand- 
ing, or walking, or riding on horseback ; with such 
we cannot well avoid the supposition, that the vol- 
untary power over the muscles is in some way re- 
tained and exercised in sleep. — These statements 
are particularly important in connexion with the facts 
of somnambulism ; only admit that the susceptibil- 
ity of the senses, and the power of the muscles may 
remain, even in part, while we are asleep, and we 
can account for them. We know that this is not 
the case in a vast majority of instances ; but that it 
does sometimes happen is a point which seems at 
last to be sufficiently well established. 

§ 109. Of the connexion of Somnamhulism with 
dreaming. 

Keeping in mind the views that have been given 
in the preceding sections, we proceed to remark, as 
has already been intimated, that a number of things 
may be satisfactorily said in explanation of somnam- 

Q2 



186 SOMNAMBULISM. 

bulism. The somnambulist, in the first place, is in 
all cases dreaming, and we may suppose, in general, 
that the dream is one which greatly interests him. 
After he has awaked, the action he has passed 
through appears, in his recollection of it, to be mere- 
ly a dre^m, and not a reality. " A young nobleman 
(says Dr. Abercrombie), " living in the citadel of 
Breslau, was observed by his brother, who occupied 
the same room, to rise in his sleep, wrap himself in 
a cloak, and escape by a window to the roof of the 
building. He there tore in pieces a magpie's nest, 
wrapped the young birds in his cloak, returned to his 
apartment, and went to bed. In the morning he 
mentioned the circumstances as having occurred in 
a dream, and could not be persuaded that there had 
been anything more than a dream, till he was shown 
the magpies in his cloak." And this is noticed to 
be commonly the fact. What has been done has 
the appearance of being a dream. And there is no 
doubt that the mind of the somnambulist is in that 
particular state which we denominate dreaming. 

II. — In the second place, those volitions, which 
are a part of his dreams, retain their power over the 
muscles, which is not the fact in the sleep and the 
dreaming of the great body of people. — Conse- 
quently, whatever the somnambulist dreams, is not 
only real in the mind, as in the case of all other 
dreams, but his ability to exercise his muscles en- 
ables him to give it a reality in action. Whether he 
dream of writing a letter, of visiting a neighbour's 
house, of cutting and piling wood, of thrashing his 
grain, or ploughing his fields (acts which have at 



SOMNAMBULISM. 187 

various times been ascribed to the somnambulist), 
his muscles are faithful to his vivid mental concep- 
tions, which we may suppose in all cases closely 
connected with his customary labours and experi- 
ences, and frequently enable him to complete what 
he has undertaken, even when his senses are at the 
same time closed up. 

But the inquiry arises here, how it happens, while 
in most cases both senses and muscles lose their 
power, in these, on the contrary, the muscles are 
active, while the senses alone are asleep ? — In refer- 
ence to this inquiry, it must be acknowledged, that 
it is involved at present in some uncertainty, although 
there is much reason to anticipate that it may here- 
after receive light from further investigations and 
knowledge of the nervous system and functions. 
There is a set of nerves, which are understood to be 
particularly connected with respiration, and which 
appear to have nothing to do with sensation and with 
muscular action. There is another set, which are 
known to possess a direct and important connexion 
with sensation and the muscles. These last are 
separable into distinct filaments, having separate 
functions ; some being connected with sensation 
merely, and others with volition and muscular action. 
In sensation, the impression made by some external 
body exists at first in the external part of the organ 
of sense, and is propagated along one class of fila- 
ments to the brain. In volition and voluntary muscu- 
lar movement, the origin of action, as far as the body 
is concerned, seems to be the reverse, commencing in 
the brain, and being propagated along other and ap- 



188 SOMNAMBULISM. 

propriate nervous filaments to the different parts of 
the system. 

Hence it sometimes happens, that, in diseases of 
the nervous system, the power of sensation is, in a 
great measure, lost, while that of motion fully re- 
mains ; or, on the contrary, the power of motion 
is lost, while that of sensation remains. These 
views help to throw light on the subject of som- 
nambulism. Causes, at present unknown to us, 
may operate, through their appropriate nervous fil- 
aments, to keep the muscles awake, without dis- 
turbing the repose and inactivity of the senses. A 
man may be asleep as to all the powers of exter- 
nal perception, and yet be awake in respect to the 
capabilities of muscular motion. And, aided by the 
trains of association, which make a part of his 
dreams, may be able to walk about and to do many 
things without the aid of the sight and hearing. 

§ 110. Further illustrations of somnambulism. 

III. — Further, we are not to forget here some re- 
marks in the preceding chapter to this effect, viz., 
that the sleep of the senses is sometimes an im- 
perfect or partial one ; and that at such times the 
senses are susceptible of slight external influences. 
Both in somnambulism and in ordinary cases of 
dreaming, the senses are not always entirely locked 
up ; many observations clearly show, that it is pos- 
sible for the mind to be accessible through them, and 
that a new direction may be given in this way to a 
person's dreams without awaking him. Hence 
somnambulists may sometimes have very slight vis- 



SOMNAMBULISM. 189 

ual perceptions ; they may, in some slight measure, 
be guided by sensations of touch; all the senses 
may be affected in a small degree by their appropri- 
ate objects, or this may be the case with some and 
not with others, without effectually disturbing their 
sleep. — These facts will be found to help in ex- 
plaining any peculiar circumstances, which may be 
thought not to come within the reach of the gen- 
eral explanation which has been given. 

§ 111. Reference to the case of Jane Rider, 

lY. — But this is not all. There are some cases 
which are not reached by the statements hitherto 
made. There are not only slight exceptions to the 
general fact, that somnambulists, hke persons in or- 
dinary sleep, are insensible to external impressions, 
but occasionally some of a marked and extraordinary 
character. There are a few cases (the recent in- 
stance of Jane Rider in this country is one) where 
persons, in the condition of somnambulism, have not 
only possessed slight visual power, but perceptions 
of sight increased much above the common degree. 
In the extraordinary narrative of Jane Rider, the au- 
thor informs us, that he took two large wads of cot- 
ton, and placed them directly on the closed eyelids, 
and then bound them on with a black silk handker- 
chief "The cotton filled the cavity under the eye- 
brows, and reached down (o the middle of the cheek ; 
and various experiments were tried to ascertain 
whether she could see. In one of them a watch en- 
closed in a case was handed to her, and she was re- 
quested to tell what o'clock it was by it ; upon which, 
after examining both sides of the watch, she opened 



190 SOMNAMBULISM. 

the case, and then answered the question. She also 
read, without hesitation, the name of a gentleman, 
written in characters so fine that no one else could 
distinguish it at the usual distance from the eye. In 
another paroxysm, the lights were removed from her 
room, and the windows so secured that no object 
was discernible, and two books were presented to 
her, when she immediately told the titles of both, 
though one of them was a book which she had never 
before seen. In other experiments, while the room 
was so darkened that it was impossible, with the or- 
dinary powers of vision, to distinguish the colours of 
the carpet, and her eyes were also bandaged, she 
pointed out the different colours in the hearth-rug, 
took up and read several cards laying on the table, 
threaded a needle, and performed several other 
things, which could not have been done without the 
aid of vision."* — Of extraordinary cases of this 
kind, it would seem that no satisfactory explanation 
(at least no explanation which is unattended with 
difficulties) has as yet been given. 

* As quoted in Dr. Oliver's Physiology, chap. xxx. 



IMPERFECT AND DISORDERED 



MENTAL ACTION 



DIVISION FIRST. 
DISORDERED ACTION OF THE INTELLECT. 

PART XL 

DERANGEMENT OF THE INTERNAL INTELLECT. 



DISORDERED ACTION 

OP THE 

INTERNAL INTELLECT. 

CHAPTER I. 

DISORDERED SUGGESTION. 

^112. Of the Internal in distinction from the Ex- 
ternal Intellect. 

It was remarked, in one of the Introductory 
Chapters to this Work, that the Mind may be con- 
sidered under the three general heads of the Intel- 
lect, the Sensibilities, and the Will. The Intellect, 
so far as it is brought into action, in consequence 
of being immediately in contact with the External 
World, is designated by the epithet External. We 
find it convenient to call it the External Intellect. 
But, so far as the Intellect has an internal action, 
that is to say, an action carried on without any di- 
rect or very close connexion with the external world, 
it is a matter of convenience, besides involving a 
great philosophical truth, to designate it as the In- 
ternal Intellect. In support of this great distinction 

R 



194 DISORDERED SUGGESTION. 

in the Intellectual action, it is not necessary to say 
anything further here, than to make the general re- 
mark, that it is a distinction fully recognised, and 
sustained, at greater or less length, by many of the 
most distinguished mental philosophers. On this 
matter, therefore, it is not necessary to delay. We 
are to regard it, in this discussion at least, as a well 
ascertained and clearly established point of depar- 
ture. 

§ 113* Original suggestion to be regarded as a 
distinct j)oioer of the mind. 

Some of the cases of thought and knowledge (as 
we have had occasion to remark in the Elements of 
Mental Philosophy), which the mind becomes pos- 
sessed of in itself, without the direct aid of the Sen- 
ses, are to be ascribed to Suggestion. This word, 
in its application to the mind, is used merely to ex- 
press a simple but important fact, viz., that the mind, 
by its own activity and vigour, by the originative im- 
pulse of its own spontaneity, gives rise to certain 
thoughts. We have already had occasion, in the 
chapter on the Outlines of Mental Philosophy, to 
refer to some remarks of Dr. Reid, who speaks, in 
his Inquiry into the Human Mind, of certain notions 
(for instance, those of existence, mind, person, 
&c.), as the "judgments of nature, judgments not 
got by comparing ideas, and perceiving agreements 
and disagreements, but immediately inspired by our 
constitution." 

Pursuing this train of thought, he ascribes those 
notions, which cannot be attributed directly to the 



DISORDERED SUGGESTION. 195 

senses on the one hand, nor to the reasoning power 
on the other, to an internal or mental Suggestion, as 
follows : " I beg leave" (he expressly says) " to 
make use of the word Suggestion, because I know 
not one more proper, to express a power of the mind, 
which seems entirely to have escaped the notice of 
philosophers, and to which we owe many of our sim- 
ple notions." 

Mr. Stewart also, in his Philosophical Essays 
and in other parts of his valuable Works, appears 
very clearly to take similar ground. Referring to 
certain mental phenomena, particularly such as 
would naturally come under the general head of In- 
ternal Origin, he speaks of them, not as the objects 
of consciousness, but as merely attendant upon those 
objects, and as suggested by them. 

Suggestion, therefore (or, as we should prefer to 
designate it, Original Suggestion, thus distinguishing 
it from Relative Suggestion or Judgment), is to be 
regarded as a distinct source of ideas. And cer- 
tainly no conceptions of the human mind are more 
fundamental and important than those, the origin of 
which is to be assigned here. Such as the ideas of 

EXISTENCE, PERSONAL IDENTITY, UNITY, PLURALI- 
TY, NUMBER, SUCCESSION, DURATION, TIME, POWER, 

SPACE, and the like. — What remains to be done in 
this chapter, is to show that it is possible for insan- 
ity, in a greater or less degree, to attach to the men- 
tal action, in connexion with the origin of some of 
these fundamental conceptions. 



196 DISORDERED SUGGESTION. 

§114. Insanity in connexion with the conviction of 
personal identity. 

Among other important conceptions, the origirf of 
which may be traced to Original Suggestion, or 
which, in other words, are originated by an ultimate 
and spontaneous movement of the mind, is that of 
our Personal Identity. This is not only one of the 
earliest, but one of the strongest convictions which 
men have ; and is essential, in the highest sense of 
that term, to soundness of mind. But this great 
link of thought, which makes a man one with him* 
self in all the varieties of his past and present ex- 
istence, is sometimes broken. In such cases the 
portion of past existence is let loose from the pres- 
ent ; and the individual, who is subject to this form 
of mental malady, confounds himself with other per- 
sons and other beings, and constantly reasons and 
acts upon this false view. 

Dr. Rush mentions a case to which this statement 
will apply. " There is now" (he says) " a madman 
in the Pennsylvania Hospital, who believes that he 
was once a calf, and who mentions the name of the 
butcher that killed him, and the stall in the Philadel- 
phia market on which his flesh was sold, previously 
to his animating his present body.'' He likewise 
mentions the case of one of the princes of Bourbon, 
who believed himself transformed into a plant ; and 
with such sincerity, that he often went and stood in 
his garden, and insisted upon being watered in com- 
mon with the plants around him.* 

* Diseases of the Mind, p. 80. 



DISORDERED SUGGESTION. 197 

It is stated, on the authority of Pinel, that a cele- 
brated watchmaker of Paris became insane during 
the French Revolution. This man believed that he 
and some others had been beheaded, but that the 
heads were subsequently ordered to be restored to 
the original owners. Some mistake, however, as 
the insane person conceived, was committed in the 
process of restoration, in consequence of which he 
had unfortunately been furnished with the head of 
one of his companions instead of his own. He was 
admitted into the Hospital Bicetre, " where he was 
continually complaining of his misfortune, and la- 
menting the fine teeth and wholesome breath he had 
exchanged for those of very different qualities."* 

Such instances show that the fundamental per- 
ception, which we commonly denominate the feeling 
or consciousness of Personal Identity, and in virtue 
of which we confidently speak of ourselves as the 
same being, amid all the changes incident to our ex- 
istence, may be disordered ; and that, too, to such 
an extent as to cause, as it were, a dislocation of 
our continuity, and to separate our personality into 
remote and unrelated fragments. I am aware that 
this aspect of Insanity, considered as holding a sep- 
arate and distinctive place, is not prominent in the 
writers on that subject. Dr. Rush, however, ex- 
pressly states, that, in certain marked cases which 
he describes, the conviction of Personal Identity 
may for a time be destroyed. And, in confirmation 
of his remark, he refers to Shakspeare, where the 

* Treatise on Insanity, p. 69. 
R2 



198 DISORDERED SUGGESTION. 

poet represents King Lear as uttering the following 
words : 

*' I am mainly ignorant 
What place this is ; and all the skill I have 
Remembers not these garments, nor I know not 
Where I did sleep last night." 

Dr. Combe also explicitly says, " Patients are 
sometimes insane in the feeling of Personal Identi- 
ty." " Such individuals" (he adds) " lose all con- 
sciousness of their past and proper personality, and 
imagine themselves different persons altogether ; 
while, with the exception of this erroneous impres- 
sion, they feel and think correctly." 

^115. Disordered mental action^ in connexion with 
the idea of space. 

The idea of Space, which we next propose for 
consideration, is revealed to us in the Internal intel- 
lect, and by a suggestive rather than a deductive 
act. The idea or conception of space is one of the 
clearest which the mind has. It seems indispensa- 
ble that it should be so, inasmuch as it furnishes the 
basis for all our ideas of the position or place of 
things. Nevertheless, this important and element- 
ary conception may be disordered ; and this disor- 
der may extend to everything that is incidental to, or 
involved in it, viz., to the position or place of things. 
There is at such times an expansion, an ampHfica- 
tion of the great reality developed in the idea of 
space, which is not only strange and unprecedented 
in itself, but which has the effect to enlarge and ex- 
aggerate everything which is subordinate to it, in the 
sense of having a place or locality. 



DISORDERED SUGGESTION. 199 

The Leper of Aost, an interesting little work of 
Count le Maistre, appears to me to contain some 
allusions to this peculiar state of mind. — " I yield" 
(says the leper, whose mind had become affected 
and disordered by the intensity of disease) " to ex- 
traordinary impressions, which I feel in these un- 
happy moments. Sometimes it is as if an irresisti- 
ble power were dragging me to a fathomless abyss. 
Sometimes I see nothing but bleak forms ; when I 
endeavour to examine them, they cross each other 
with the rapidity of lightning, increase in approach^ 
ing, and soon are like mountains, which crush me 
under their weio-ht. At other times I see dark 
clouds arise from the earth around me ; they come 
over me like an inundation, which increases, advan- 
ces, and threatens to ingulf me, ^^ 

It is well known that the mind is powerfully and 
very injuriously affected by the use of opium. De 
Quincey's Confessions of an Opium Eater, contain- 
ing very interesting and striking statements, drawn 
from the author's own unhappy experience, may be 
considered an authentic document on this subject. 
This publication throws some light upon the inquiry 
now directly before us. When he was awake, his 
mind was powerfully affected. But still more so in 
his dreams. Everything seemed expanded im.- 
measurably. In one place, giving an account of 
his dreams, he says, " My imagination was infinite." 
Again he says, more directly to our present purpose, 
* I seemed to descend into chasms and sunless 
abysses, depths below depths, from which it seemed 
hopeless that I could ever reascend. Nor did I, by 



200 DISORDERED SUGGESTION. 

waking, feel that I had reascended. Buildings, 
landscapes, &c., were exhibited in proportions so 
vast as the bodily eye is not fitted to receive. Space 
$welled, and was amplified to an unutterable infinityj*^ 

These statements seem to show the possibility 
that the mind may be injuriously affected in this 
respect as well as in others. 

As the idea of space is, in the order of nature, 
antecedent to that of place, and may be considered 
as the foundation or basis of it, it is possible we 
pay find, in what has now been said, a reason, in 
part at least, that insane persons frequently misap-^ 
prebend the position or place of things, and are at a 
loss where they are. 

§ 116. Disordered mental action in connexion with 

Time, 

The idea of duration (or Time, as we commonly 
express it) is not given us, whatever may be true of 
the measurements of time, by means of the outward 
senses. It is correctly regarded as a communica^ 
tion from the internal intellect, in the exercise of its 
power of original suggestion. The existence of this 
important mental conception depends (not the thing 
itself, but merely the conception or idea of it) upoi> 
the previous fact of a succession in our mental op- 
erations, of which we are conscious. If the succes* 
siori be disordered, the notion of time ^yill be disor** 
dered, If, for instance, in a case of insanity, which 
is sometimes the fact, the mind be fixed upon one 
thought ; if it suffer a sort of paralysis in respect to 
every other movement, and revolve continually in 



DISORDERED SUGGESTION. 201 

the monotonous circle of a single conception, the 
power of original suggestion, acting upon such a 
basis, must, of necessity, give but an imperfect idea 
of the actual duration. 

Essentially this view appears to be taken by Dr. 
Gall. '* It appears" (says this laborious and valuable 
collector of mental facts) " that there is no idea of 
time with those insane persons who remain days 
and weeks fixed in the same place. A madman at 
Vienna had but one fixed idea, namely, that it was 
always the 17th of October. It oflen happens in 
mental alienation, as in other grievous diseases, that 
the idea of time is completely destroyed. When 
these patients recover, they begin to count the time 
from the moment when they regained the distinct 
perception of their existence. After twenty-seven 
years of seclusion and mania, a lady experienced a 
revolution favourable to her moral state. Her de- 
lirium and madness continued during this space of 
time to the extent of tearing her clothes, of remain- 
ing naked, &c. At the moment of the cessation of 
her delirium, she appeared to come out as from a 
profound dream, and asked after two young children 
which she had previous to her alienation, and could 
not conceive that they had been married several 
years previous. ''* 

Other similar cases might be introduced. Dr. 
Rush mentions the case of a clergyman, which 
furnishes an illustration of the doctrine which has 
been laid down. The person referred to was insane 
four years and a half. The peculiarity or type of 
* Gall's Works, Boston ed., vol. v., p. 95. 



202 DISORDERED SUGGESTION. 

his insanity was despair, resulting from the belief 
that he had lost his Maker's favour, and was neces- 
sarily and inevitably exposed to everlasting misery. 
He kept his hands constantly in motion, and con- 
stantly repeated his conviction of his lost condition. 
The single thought of his present and prospective 
misery, without any alleviation, seems to have oc- 
cupied his mind. After his recovery, he asserted, in 
reference to the period of his insanity (what, indeed, 
the principles of the philosophy of the mind would 
naturally lead us to expect), " thai he lost all sense of 
years, months, weeks, days, and nights, and even of 
morning and evening ; that, in this respect, time was 
to him no more."* 

Dr. Haslam relates the case of a man who was 
attacked with insanity at the period of the year when 
people were planting their corn. Having recovered 
at the period when the corn was ripe and was being 
gathered, he seriously asserted that he had seen the 
corn planted only three or four days before, and con- 
sidered it a very uncommon and remarkable circum- 
stance that it should have become ripe so soon. 
The simple fact was, that his insanity was of such a 
nature as directly or indirectly to reach and perplex 
the mental process, by which we have a knowledge 
of time and of its measurements. Time, as a sub- 
ject of distinct conception, had been virtually anni- 
hilated to him, almost as much so as if he had been, 
during the whole period, in sound sleep or deprived 
oflife.t 

* Diseases of the Mind, 2d ed., p. 95. 
t Burrows's Commentaries, p. 677^ 



DISORDERED SUGGESTION. 203 

$ 117. Furthei' illustrations of disordered Time, 
Under this head we may properly introduce an in- 
teresting and instructive statement^ which is to be 
found in the first volume of the American Journal of 
Science. The statement is given in a letter to the 
editor, Professor Silliman, in the following terms : 

" Some years ago, a farmer of fair character, who 
resided in an interior town in New-England, sold 
his farm, with an intention of purchasing another in 
a different town. His mind was naturally of a mel- 
ancholy cast. Shortly after the sale of his farm, he 
was induced to believe that he had sold it for lesig 
than its value. This persuasion brought on dissat- 
isfaction, and eventually a considerable degree of 
melancholy. In this situation, one of his neighbours 
engaged him to enclose a lot of land with a post 
and rail fence, which he was to commence making 
the next day. At the time appointed he went into 
the field, and began, with a beetle and wedges, to 
split the timber out of which the posts and rails 
were to be prepared. On finishing his day's work, 
he put his beetle and wedges into a hollow tree, and 
went home. Two of his sons had been at work 
through the day in a distant part of the same field. 
On his return, he directed them to get up early the 
next morning, to assist him in making the fence. 
In the course of the evening he became delirious, 
and continued in this situation several years ; when 
his mental powers were suddenly restored. The 
first question which lie asked after the return of his 
reason, was, whether his sons had brought in the 



204 DISORDERED SUGGESTION. 

beetle and wedges. He appeared to be wholly un- 
conscious of the time that had elapsed from the 
commencement of his delirium. His sons, appre- 
heasive that any explanations might induce a return 
of his disease, simply replied that they had been un- 
abla to find them. He immediately arose from his 
bed, went into the field where he had been at work 
a number of years before, and found the wedges 
and the rings of the beetle where he had left them, 
the beetle itself having mouldered away. During 
his delirium, his mind had not been occupied with 
those subjects with which it was conversant in 
health." 

The question so promptly put by the individual 
who is the subject of this narrative, in regard to the 
beetle and wedges, seems to indicate clearly that his 
mental disorder extended to that form of mental ac- 
tion which is involved in the origination of our ideas 
of TIME. There was, subjectively or relatively to 
the mind, a virtual extinction of time. It could not 
well be otherwise. The mind, in its actual position, 
was incapable of revealing a distinct and well-reg- 
ulated conception of it. The philosophy in this 
case, and the facts which are narrated, evidently cor- 
respond to each other. 

§ 118. Varieties or peculiarities in disordered ideas 
of Time. 
We may add here, and in connexion with what 
has been said, that disordered time assumes very 
different phases in different persons. Sometimes 
it is annihilated, lost beyond recovery, as in some of 



DISORDERED SUGGESTION. 205 

the instances which have been nientioned. Some- 
times it stops short in its movement ; or, if it moves 
at all, returns at brief intervals upon its own steps, 
and continually revolves around the same point ; as 
in the case of Dr. Gall's madman of Vienna, who 
believed it was always the 17th of October. But in 
other cases, it appears to take a new pair of wings, 
and fly with astonishing rapidity, so that the madman 
seems to live years, perhaps centuries, in an hour. 
This last view receives some confirmation in the 
statements of persons who have been on the point of 
drowning, but have been rescued from that situation. 
These persons inform us, that the operations of their 
minds were exceedingly quickened. Their fami- 
lies, their friends, their past life, with its thousand mi- 
nute incidents, presented themselves before the mind 
with the greatest rapidity ; in appearance almost si- 
multaneously. The consequence was, that time was 
greatly expanded ; aird a few moments became of 
almost interminable length. The author of the Con- 
fessions of an Opium Eater, who has already been 
quoted, refers to this state of mind, particularly as 
it developed itself in his dreams. After saying that 
space was amplified to an unutterable infinity, he 
adds : " This, however, did not disturb me so much 
as the vast expansion of time. I sometimes seemed 
to have lived seventy or a hundred years in one 
night. Nay, sometimes had feelings representative 
of a millennium passed in that time." In another 
place he speaks of himself as " being buried for a 
thousand years in stone coffins, with mummies and 

S 



206 DISORDERED CONSCIOUSNESS. 

sphinxes, in narrow chambers, in the heart of eter- 
nal pyramids." 

We propose to go no further under this head, viz., 
of Original Suggestion, although there are other 
important ideas which, in their origin, may be attrib- 
uted to this source. Indeed, it is not necessary, nor 
even proper, to say everything under every subordi- 
nate division which might be said. The powers of 
the mind are in their exercise so implicated with 
each other, and disorder in one part so frequently 
extends to another part, that such a course would be 
likely to be attended with too many needless repe- 
titions. 



CHAPTER 11. 

DISORDERED CONSCIOUSNESS. 

^119. Of the meaning of the term Consciousness, 
We proceed now to the second great source of 
internal knowledge, viz., Consciousness. — The term 
Consciousness, as we had occasion to remark in one 
of the Introductory chapters, is appropriated to ex- 
press the way or method in which we obtain the 
knowledge of those objects which belong to the 
mind itself, and which do not, and cannot exist, in- 
dependently of some mind. Imagination and rea- 
soning, as was also remarked in the chapter just re- 



DISORDERED CONSCIOUSNESS. 207 

ferred to, are terms expressive of real objects of 
thought ; but evidently, the objects for which they 
stand cannot be supposed to exist, independently of 
some mind which imagines and reasons. Hence 
every instance of Consciousness may be regarded 
as embracing in itself three distinct notions at least, 
viz., the idea of Self or of personal existence ; be- 
sides this, the idea or notion of some quality, state, 
or operation of the mind ; and also the relative per- 
ception of possession, appropriation, or belonging to, 
which announces or substantiates the mental quality, 
whatever it is, as an attribute of the person or self. 

It may be added further, in connexion with this 
topic, that Consciousness, properly speaking, relates 
exclusively to the present time, and takes no cogni- 
zance of the past. We cannot be said, in strictness 
of speech, to be conscious of the feelings which we 
had yesterday, but merely of the recollection of them. 
But we may be conscious of any mental acts or 
feelings which exist now. 

^ 120. Two forms of disordered Consciousness. 

It will be particularly understood, from what has 
been said, that the great fact of Consciousness al- 
ways implies something in the first person ; an Ego ; 
in plain English, a Self or I. The terms self, 
MYSELF, I, and the like, are expressions for the sim- 
ple fact of our personal existence, which is one of 
our earliest conceptions, and is made known by what 
we have denominated Original Suggestion. Con- 
sciousness, in distinction from this, expresses the 
fact, that we naturally and necessarily recognise all 



208 DISORDERED CONSCIOUSNESS. 

the aGt$ or operations of the mental part, of the self 
or I, as belonging to such mental self or I ; in 
other words, as belonging to our own minds. — 
Consequently, in a sound state of Consciousness, 
the EGO or I is one, and one only ; and all mental 
acts and operations are promptly and invariably re- 
ferred to this great centre of personality. And, on 
the other hand, there is an insanity of mind (specifi- 
cally an insanity of Consciousness) when the ego 
becomes divided ; in other words, when a man has 
a different self at different times ; and also in all 
cases when Consciousness is unable to connect an 
individual's mental acts or operations invariably with 
one and the same personal centre. 

In accordance with these views, there are two 
forms, at least, of an unsound state of Conscious- 
ness ; FIRST, Suspended Consciousness, which is 
the more common form, and, second. Divided or 
Intermittent Consciousness. 

§ 121. Illustrations of suspended Consciousness. 

Various instances are recorded of what may be 
called SUSPENDED CONSCIOUSNESS. — The case al- 
ready mentioned in the preceding chapter, of the 
man who placed his beetle and wedges in a hollow 
tree, and became maniacal the night after, is an in- 
stance in point. It is, of course, unnecessary that 
the statement should be repeated. There is an- 
other instance found in the same Work, the Ameri- 
can Journal of Science, vol. i., p. 432. The state- 
ment is given in the following terms : 

'* Mrs. S., an intelligent lady, belonging to a re- 



DISORDERED CONSCIOUSNESS. 209 

spectable family in the State of New- York, some 
years ago undertook a piece of fine needlework. 
She devoted her time to it almost constantly for a 
number of days. Before she had completed it she 
became suddenly delirious. In this state, without 
experiencing any material abatement of her disease, 
she continued for about seven years, when her rea- 
son was suddenly restored. One of the first ques- 
tions which she asked after her reason returned, re- 
lated to her needlework. It is a remarkable fact, 
that during the long continuance of her delirium, she 
said nothing, so far as was recollected, about her 
needlework, nor concerning any such subjects as 
usually occupied her attention when in health." 

The case of an English clergyman, the Rev. Si- 
mon Browne, seems properly to be mentioned here. 
This gentleman entertained the idea that " he had 
fallen under the sensible displeasure of God, who 
had caused his rational soul gradually to perish, and 
left him only an animal life in common with the 
brutes.''* He was a man of exemplary life, and of 
no small ability and learning. His insanity was 
limited to the single conviction that, although he 
possessed a vital principle or sort of animal life, the 
perceptive and reasoning part or mind was totally 
extinct. Accordingly, as every case of conscious- 
ness implies not only a recognition of the mental 
acts, but a reference of those acts to the mind as 
their subject, it would seem that, in his case, con- 
sciousness was disordered and suspended. 

This case, as well as the preceding one in this 

* Conolly, p. 412. 
S2 



210 DISORDERED CONSCIOUSNESS. 

section, might also have been introduced under the 
head of Suggestion, since the facts stated evidently 
involve a disordered state of the suggestive power 
as well as of consciousness. 

,^ 122. Illustration's of divided or intermittent Con^ 
sciousness. 

There are other cases of disordered conscious- 
ness, somewhat different from those which have been 
mentioned, which may be designated as cases of 

DIVIDED or INTERMITTENT CONSCIOUSNESS. That 

is to say, the mind, at two different periods of time^ 
is found to be in two different states. In one state 
its action is marked by certain peculiarities ; it has 
thoughts, reasonings, feelings, remembrances pecu- 
liar to itself at that particular time. In the other 
state it is the subject of thoughts, reasonings, and 
feelings wholly different ; the point of transition from 
one state to a subsequent one is distinct ; and in the 
actually existing state, whatever it is, there is a for- 
getfulness of the other. " I once attended" (says 
Dr. Rush) " the daughter of a British officer, who 
had been educated in the habits of gay life, who was 
married to a Methodist minister. In her paroxysms 
of madness she resumed her gay habits, spoke 
French, and ridiculed the tenets ar^d practices of the 
sect to which she belonged. In the intervals of her 
fits she renounced her gay habits, became zealously 
devoted to the religious principles and ceremonies of 
the Methodists, and forgot everything she did and 
said during the period of her insanity."* 

* Rush's Diseases of the Mind, p. 165. 



I 



DISORDERED CONSCIOUSNESS. 211 

The writer in the American Journal of Science, 
already repeatedly referred to, narrates a case which 
may properly be introduced here. The case is a 
marked and interesting one, as follows : 

" A lady in New-England, of a respectable fam- 
ily, was for a considerable period subject to parox- 
ysms of delirium. These paroxysms came on in- 
stantaneously, and, after continuing an indefinite 
time, went off as suddenly, leaving her mind per- 
fectly rational. It often happened that, when she 
was engaged in rational and interesting conversation, 
she would stop short in the midst of it, become in a 
moment entirely delirious, and commence a conver- 
sation on some other subject, not having the re- 
motest connexion with the previous one, nor would 
she advert to that during her delirium. When she 
became rational again, she would pursue the same 
conversation in which she had been engaged during 
the lucid interval, beginning where she had left off. 
To such a degree was this carried, that she would 
complete an unfinished story or sentence, or even an 
unfinished word. When her next delirious parox- 
ysm came on, she would continue the conversation 
which she had been pursuing in her preceding par- 
oxysm ; so that she appeared as a person might be 
supposed to do who had two souls, each occasion- 
ally dormant and occasionally active, and utterly ig- 
norant of what the other was doing." 

There is a particularly interesting case of divided 
or intermittent consciousness to be found in the 
Medical Repository, in a communication from Dr. 
Mitchell, of the City of New- York, to the Rev. Dr. 
Nott. 



212 DISORDERED CONSCIOUSNESS. 

"When I was employed" (says the writer of 
this communication), " early in December, 1815, 
with several other gentlemen, in doing the duty 
of a visiter to the United States' Military Acade- 
my at West Point, a very extraordinary case of 
Double Consciousness in a woman was related 
to me by one of the professors. Major Elicott, 
who so worthily occupies the mathematical chair 
in that seminary, vouched for the correctness of 
the following narrative, the subject of which is re- 
lated to him by blood, and an inhabitant of one of 
the western counties of Pennsylvania. Miss R. 
possessed, naturally, a very good constitution, and 
arrived at adult age without having it impaired by 
disease. She possessed an excellent capacity, and 
enjoyed fair opportunities to acquire knowledge. 
Besides the domestic arts and social attainments, 
she had improved her mind by reading and conver- 
sation, and was well versed in penmanship. Her 
memory was capacious, and stored with a copious 
stock of ideas. Unexpectedly, and without any 
forewarning, she fell into a profound sleep, which 
continued several hours beyond the ordinary term. 
On waking, she was discovered to have lost every 
trait of acquired knowledge. Her memory was 
tabula rasa ; all vestiges, both of words and things, 
were obhterated and gone. It was found necessary 
for her to learn everything again. She even acqui- 
red, by new efforts, the art of spelling, reading, wri- 
ting, and calculating, and gradually became acquaint- 
ed with the persons and objects around, like a being 
for the first time brought into the world. In these 



I 



DISORDERED CONSCIOUSNESS. 213 

exercises she made considerable proficiency. But, 
after a few months, another fit of somnolency inva- 
ded her. On rousing from it, she found herself re- 
stored to the state she was in before the first parox- 
ysm, but was wholly ignorant of every event and 
occurrence that had befallen her afterward. The 
former condition of her existence she now calls the 
Old State, and the latter the New State ; and she 
is as unconscious of her double character as two 
distinct persons are of their respective natures. For 
example, in her old state, she possesses all her ori- 
ginal knowledge ; in her new state, only what she 
acquired since. If a gentleman or lady be introdu- 
ced to her in the old state, and vice versa (and so of 
all other matters), to know them satisfactorily she 
must learn them in both states. In the old state 
she possesses fine powers of penmanship, while in 
the new she writes a poor, awkward hand, having 
not had time or means to become expert. During 
four years and upward, she has undergone periodi- 
cal transitions from one of these states to the other. 
The alterations are always consequent upon a long 
and sound sleep. Both the lady and her family are 
now capable of conducting the affair without embar- 
rassment. By simply knowing whether she is in 
the old or new state, they regulate the intercourse, 
and govern themselves accordingly." 

It would not be difficult, probably, to multiply 
cases similar to those which have been mentioned. 
They are of great interest in themselves, and they 
seem clearly to establish the existence of that pecu- 
liar form of mental disorder in connexion with which 



214 DISORDERED ACTION OF 

they are introduced. It is unnecessary, after what 
has already been said, and especially in connexion 
with what remains to be said, to intimate how erro- 
neous was that ancient doctrine of insanity, which 
resolved it, in all cases and under all its aspects, into 
one type or form. 



CHAPTER III. 

DISORDERED ACTION OF RELATIVE SUGGESTION OR 
JUDGMENT. 

§ 123. Relative Suggestion or Judgment a distinct 
Power, 

Among other powers or susceptibilities of the 
human mind is that by which we perceive or feel 
the relation of objects to each other in certain re- 
spects. The office of this power is not merely to 
perceive objects in themselves, which may be done 
by means of the senses, or by original suggestion, or 
in some other way, but precisely what has been said, 
viz., to perceive and to make known to us their re- 
lations. Hence the name, which is properly given 
to it, that of RELATIVE SUGGESTION ; although, as 
we have already stated in a previous chapter, it is 
frequently expressed by the less definite term judg- 
ment. We shall employ the two terms, in what 
we have to say at present, as synonymous with each 
other. 



RELATIVE SUGGESTION OR JUDGMENT. 215 

The power of relative suggestion, or the judg- 
ment, if we choose so to term it, is very properly re- 
garded in systems of Mental Philosophy as a con- 
natural and ultimate principle of the mind ; in other 
words, a principle so thoroughly elementary, that it 
cannot be resolved into any other. The human in- 
tellect is so made, so constituted, that, when it per- 
ceives different objects together, or has immediately 
successive conceptions of any absent objects of per- 
ception, their mutual relations (we do not mean to 
say all, but some of them at least) are immediately 
felt by it. 

§ 124. Of the views which have sometimes been 
taken of this power. 

We are aware, however, that the view which has 
now been presented, and which is the prevalent one 
at the present time, has not always been taken. It 
has sometimes been made a question whether man 
really possesses the power under consideration, re- 
garded as a distinct and original power. Some of 
the earlier French philosophers seem to have es- 
poused the negative of this question. It was the 
doctrine of Helvetius, and of the French philosophic 
school generally, which was predominant in his day, 
that all mental acts may be resolved into Sensation. 
" All the operations of the mind" (he expressly 
says) " are reduced to mere sensations. Why then 
admit in man a faculty of judging distinct from the 
faculty of sensation."* He then goes on with a 

♦ Helvetius on Man, Hooper's translation, sec. ii., chs. iii, 
iv., and v. 



216 DISORDERED ACTION OF 

train of reasoning, to show that the comparing of 
judging power and sensation are essentially one. 

This, as seems to be generally conceded at the 
present time, is an erroneous view of the human 
mind ; a doctrine equally at variance with our person- 
al consciousness, and with the facts gathered from 
the observation of others. Nothing can be more 
obvious than the fact, notwithstanding the assertions 
of these writers, that men possess not only the pow- 
ers of sensation and of external perception, but of 
judgment, in the positive and full sense of that term ; 
that is, of perceiving the relations of agreement and 
disagreement, and other relations existing in the ob- 
jects which they perceive. But this is not all. It 
is not enough to say that the power of Relative 
Suggestion or Judgment has an existence merely. 
It is necessary to add, that it is a leading power of 
the mind ; a characteristic and exceedingly important 
element ; one which not only furnishes an explana- 
tion, to a considerable extent, of man's intellectual 
ability, but of those diversities of mental efficiency 
by which one man is distinguished from another. 

^125. Weak or disordered Judgment arising from 
natural obtuseness of JMind. 

Without delaying longer upon the subject of the 
existence and of the nature of this power, we shall 
proceed at once to consider it in connexion with the 
general inquiry of imperfect and disordered mental 
action. And our first general remark is, that an 
imperfect, defective, or disordered judgment may 
exist in various forms. I. — In the first place we 



RELATIVE SUGGESTION OR JUDGMENT. 217 

discover in some persons, owing to the original con- 
stitution of the mind, or to accidental injuries, or oc- 
casionally, perhaps, to some other causes, an obtuse- 
ness or want of quickness in relative perceptions. 
The external perceptive faculties of these persons 
may be sufficiently acute and active ; they may ex- 
hibit a quick reception of everything which is ad- 
dressed to the outward senses ; but, when they are 
required to judge of one thing as compared with an- 
other, and to indicate in what they agree and in what 
they differ, and thus to call into exercise the dis- 
criminating power in distinction from mere percep- 
tion, they discover at once a degree of mental infe- 
riority, which would not have been suspected by 
merely looking at another form of mental action. 
This trait of mind is happily described by Dr. Con- 
olly in the following terms. — " Defect of the Com- 
paring power" [by which he means the judgment, 
as every act of judging involves comparison] " is 
observable in the pursuits and progress of many men 
in all professions. The industry of such men is 
great, but often ill-directed : they do not distinguish 
trifles from things of importance, and are generally 
occupied about matters of little worth. In my own 
profession, we see such minds engaged in the prose- 
cution of minute observations ; all the larger features 
of pathology, all general principles of practice, escape 
them ; but a symptom not heeded or not valued by 
others, or any deviation from common anatomical 
arrangement, or a line in the face, or a pimple on the 
hand, or a streak on the tongue, or a pretended spe- 
cific, fills them with the anticipated delight of a dis- 

T 



218 DISORDERED ACTION OF 

covery. They do not compare one symptom with 
another ; they pronounce diseases to exist which 
are really not present ; they do not contrast the rep- 
utation of a new medicine with that of other medi- 
cines, once brought forward in the same way, and 
then abandoned ; they do not compare effects with 
causes, but suppose they have cured diseases which 
were only imaginary, with specifics of which the 
virtue is equally imaginary ; and thus, but in a state 
of continual satisfaction, they grow old without ex- 
perience. These errors and many others, to which 
something analogous may doubtless be found in ev- 
ery department of study, arise from defective powers 
of comparing one thing with another." 

§ 126. Disordered Judgment as connected with in" 
capacity of Mention. 

II. — ^In other cases the defect in the exercises of 
the power of Judgment does not seem to be owing 
so much to any obtuseness in the power itself, as to 
an inability of fixing the attention, and a consequent 
rapid transition from one object to another. There 
are some men who have a quick perception, who 
bestow more or less notice on almost everything 
which comes in their way, but do not appear to be 
capable of a fixed ness or continuity of thought. They 
are like the winds, always in motion, but always 
veering from one point of the compass to another. 

This state of things may be owing to two causes 
in particular ; first, a want of voluntary energy ; 
SECOND, a disordered action of the principle of asso- 
ciation.— Where there is a want of voluntary power, 



RELATIVE SUGGESTION OR JUDGMENT. 219 

it will be found difficult, in a multitude of cases, to 
keep the mind long enough fixed upon the object of 
inquiry to estimate it properly in all its bearings. I 
am aware that some writers adopt the opinion, that 
the Will has no direct power over trains of thought, 
either in originating them, or in directing and regu- 
lating them when they are already called into exist- 
ence. But this opinion, so far at least as it relates 
to the regulation of trains of thought already present 
to the mind, is undoubtedly an erroneous one. The 
power of the Will is unquestionably great in this 
respect ; but it is no less true, that it is much great- 
er in some persons than in others. In some it is 
very deficient ; and the consequence is an incapa- 
city of continuity of thought, and a rapid transition 
from one thing to another, which is necessarily very 
unfavourable to accurate judgment. 

But that trait of mind which we are now consid- 
ering is more frequently owing to a disordered ac- 
tion, or, at least, a peculiarity in the principle of As- 
sociation. The peculiarity of mind which we now 
have in view is known in common parlance under 
the designation of " light-headedness." And we of- 
ten speak of the persons who exhibit it as " flighty" 
or " hairbrained," in consequence of their thoughts 
flying rapidly from one thing to another. But as it 
will be necessary to recur to this subject under an- 
other head, we will not dwell upon it here. — All we 
have to add is, that whether this unfixedness and 
evanescence of perception be owing to a weakness 
of the Will or to a too rapid action of the Associa- 
ting principle, it is in either case inconsistent, to a 



220 DISORDERED ACTION OF 

great degree, with entire soundness of Judgment. 
And one, at least, of the forms of disordered Judg- 
ment is to be explained by keeping these facts in 
view. 

§ 127. Of disordered Judgment in connexion with 
facility of Belief 

III. — Another form of weak or imperfect Judg- 
ment seems to be closely connected with a disor- 
dered state of the susceptibility of Belief. There 
are some persons whom, in consequence of the fa- 
cihty with which they receive the statements made 
to them, we are accustomed to designate as credu- 
lous persons. And it will hardly be denied, that 
we generally connect the idea of weakness of Judg- 
ment with the existence, whenever it is ascertained 
to be a permanent mental trait, of Credulity. 

Credulous persons (pursuing the subject a little 
more into particulars) take statements too much 
upon trust. It is a characteristic trait, that they re- 
ceive without hesitation the most exaggerated ac- 
counts. Their belief, instead of being graduated to 
the degrees of presumption, probability, and certain- 
ty, in some degree of accordance with the evidence, 
assumes the highest form at once, and receives eve- 
rything that is proposed to it as a thing unquestion- 
able. 

Now let us consider a moment the bearing of this 
state of things on the Judgment. It is evidently not 
so much the office of the Judgment, in its original 
and appropriate exercise, to ascertain facts, as to 
ascertain the relations existing among them, and to 



RELATIVE SUGGESTION OR JUDGMENT. 221 

decide upon their character, as compared one with 
another. Furthermore, it is not the less clear that 
facts, as they come under the cognizance of the 
Judgment, exist in the mind in the shape of beliefs, 
either presumptive, probable, or certain. And if the 
position of the belief be wrong, it does not easily 
appear how the decision of the Judgment, which is 
founded upon such belief, can be right. 

We have here, therefore, another class of persons, 
who exhibit a defective or disordered Judgment ; the 
defect arising not so much from anything in the 
judging power itself, as from its connexion with the 
disordered action of another susceptibility. 

It seems to be this form of disordered judgment, 
more than any other, which is found in that busy, 
amusing, and sometimes beneficial class of men 
who are known as Projectors. These persons are 
not only characterized by adopting some new idea, 
or forming some untried plan, or prosecuting some 
novel invention, which a man of very sound judg- 
ment may sometimes do ; but the difficulty is, that 
the thing, whatever it is, at once assumes a dispro- 
portionate place in th^ estimation of the mind. It 
not only controls the belief inordinately, but may be 
said to occupy the whole heart ; either banishing for 
a tinae all other objects of contemplation, or making 
them entirely subordinate. And there is this further 
difficulty, that the strong passion which these per- 
sons exhibit, whether it exists in the shape of love, 
or of faith, or in some other form, is less permanent 
than strong. It is very desultory; excitable and 
powerful while it lasts, but suddenly changing its 

T2 



222 DISORDERED ACTION OP 

object ; and, both in its location and its transitions, 
in its excessive adhesions at one time and its sudden 
disruptions at another, is the subject of abundant 
ridicule to those sober and discriminating minds, that 
have less faciUty of belief as well as less energy of 
emotion. 

§ 128. Of disordered Judgment in connexion with 
obstinacy of Belief. 

IV. — Another form of disordered Judgment is 
owing to the fact of its being connected with ex- 
treme obstinacy of Belief, and is nearly the opposite 
of that which has just been mentioned. The per- 
sons to whom we now refer attach themselves to a 
particular object or to a particular aspect of an ob- 
ject ; they seize upon a particular opinion, or, per- 
haps, the minute fragment of an opinion ; and they 
hold it with a tenacity which neither life nor death 
can separate. All appeals to their feelings, to their 
sympathies, to their common humanity, would be out 
of place, and abundantly ridiculous. " Leviathan is 
not so tamed." But this is not all. With imper- 
turbable coolness, they turn the scaly hide of their 
obstinacy to the fiery darts of truth, and shake them 
off unharmed. No statements of facts, no sugges- 
tions of venerable wisdom, no deductions of reason- 
ing, and, least of all, the persuasions even of Athe- 
nian eloquence, have the effect to disturb, even for 
a moment, the invincibility of their adhesion. They 
give themselves up to their object, " for better or 
worse ;" not temporarily, but, as it were, through all 
time. 



RELATIVE SUGGESTION OR JUDGMENT. 223 

This is, perhaps, a strong statement ; but it shows 
what we mean. It would be absurd to say that this 
state of things does not imply a disordered action of 
the mind. But undoubtedly there are varieties here 
as elsewhere. 

§129. Of mere unsoundness in distinction from in- 
sanity of Judgment. 

We have thus given some general and imperfect 
idea of the more common forms of defective or dis- 
ordered Judgment ; but we do not wish the reader 
to understand, that the matter, as we have now sta- 
ted it, comes up to the true idea of insanity of the 
Judgment. The cases which have been stated are 
such as occur very frequently ; and, though they 
disqualify the persons to whom they attach for very 
many things, these persons may still, in many re- 
spects, be very valuable men. Their judgment is 
perplexed in its action, and enfeebled, but not ex- 
tinct. It may even be found, in some individuals, 
to possess a high degree of strength, when exercised 
upon any or all matters which do not come within 
the reach of the intellectual malady. 

Insanity of the Judgment, in distinction from mere 
ordinary defect or disorder, implies something more. 
It implies an entire disqualification of correct views, 
either upon all subjects or upon some particular 
subjects. Not necessarily upon all, because we 
sometimes find the insanity directing itself to a par- 
ticular thing, and not extending beyond it. In illus- 
tration of what has now been said, take the case of 
the Projector, the man of new schemes. His de- 



224 DISORDERED ACTION, ETC. 

votedness to the particular object before him is, in 
many cases, essentially harmless and amusing rather 
than otherwise. His time is occupied ; he is abun- 
dantly happy in prosecuting to its anticipated results 
the " grand experiment ;" and when the experiment 
fails ; when the bubble, which had so long delighted 
him, bursts, he has the satisfaction of knowing, what- 
ever may be true of himself, that he has contributed 
to the happiness of others, by exciting to activity the 
pleasant sentiment of the ridiculous. Such cases 
as these are the more frequent and common cases ; 
and they are indicative, beyond all question, of real 
unsoundness of mind ; but common parlance would 
not, as a general thing, speak of these persons as 
" mad people," as " crazy people." They certainly 
are not to be regarded as suitable candidates for 
banishment from society, for guardianship, and for 
hospitals. With all their faults, they are often found 
to have their associates and friends, and are often 
deeply loved in their families. 

Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that they 
approximate, if they are not already on the very bor- 
ders of that frightful condition of mind, which insan- 
ity, in the more common acceptation of the term, is 
understood to indicate. They stand, dizzy-headed, 
on the brink of the precipice. Sometimes the mal- 
ady increases. They engage in plans which every- 
body else knows to be not only doubtful, but even 
hopeless. They are unable to do anything else ; 
they exaggerate the importance of their object ; they 
dissipate their property, ruin their health, and dis- 
tress their families. These people are called crazy, 



DISORDERED ACTION, ETC. 225 

and they are so. They are unable to see the pre- 
cise and full relations of things. They omit to take 
into account a multitude of circumstances, which are 
necessary to such precision and comprehensiveness 
of relative perception. In a single word, the inex- 
pressibly important trait of sound judgment is not 
merely weakened or perplexed (which is the fact in 
all cases of disordered judgment), but is annihilated. 
Insanity, in the strict sense of the term, has super- 
vened ; and there is an evident necessity of ihe sub- 
stitution of the guidance of friends and of the law 
for their own personal and self-responsible control. 



CHAPTER IV. 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF ASSO- 
CIATION. 

^ 130. General remarks on the nature of Association, 

The laws of the mind, the great principles which 
regulate its action, as well as its mere perceptions or 
states, may be disordered ; for instance, the laws of 
Association. The term Association expresses the 
general fact, that there is a regular consecution of 
the mental states. This succession of mental states, 
however, as is well ascertained, is not an accidental 
and irregular one, but has its laws. The leading 
laws of Association, modified by some subordinate 



226 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE 

ones, are Resemblance, Contrast, Contiguity in time 
and place, and Cause and Effect. Such is the spe- 
cific and just operation of these laws in their appli- 
cation to the thoughts and feelings, that a just and 
coherent action, in other words, a movement regu- 
larly successive, and reducible to fixed principles, 
will characterize the operations of the mind in a per- 
fectly sane state. When the mind is disordered in 
the associating principle, the mental action will be 
very different ; characterized by wildness, exceed- 
ingly rapid transitions, and, in general, by great in- 
coherency. Perhaps an instance of this form of in- 
sanity, taken from real life, will best illustrate what 
we mean to say. The following extract was taken 
down from the remarks of an insane young man of 
a good education, who was formerly detained as a 
lunatic in the Pennsylvania Hospital. 

" No man can serve two masters. I am King 
Philip of Macedonia, lawful son of Mary, Queen of 
Scots, born in Philadelphia. I have been happy 
enough ever since I have seen General Washington 
with a silk handkerchief in High-street. Money 
commands sublunary things, and makes the mare 
go; it will buy salt mackerel, made of tenpenny 
nails. Enjoyment is the happiness of virtue. Yes- 
terday cannot be recalled. I can only walk in the 
nighttime, when I can eat pudding enough. I shall 
be eight years old to-morrow. They say R. W. is 
in partnership with J. W. I believe they are about 
as good as people in common ; not better, only on 
certain occasions, when, for instance, a man wants 
to buy chincopins, and to import salt to feed pigs. 



PRINCIPLE OF ASSOCIATION. 227 

Tanned leather was imported first by lawyers. Mo- 
rality with virtue is like vice not corrected. L. B. 
came into your house and stole a coffeepot in the 
twenty-fourth year of his majesty's reign. Plum- 
pudding and Irish potatoes make a very good dinner. 
Nothing in man is comprehensible to it. Born in 
Philadelphia. Our forefathers were better to us 
than our children, because they were chosen for 
their honesty, truth, virtue, and innocence. The 
Queen's broad B. originated from a British forty- 
two pounder, which makes too large a report for 
me. I have no more to say. I am thankful I am 
no worse this season, and that I am sound in mind 
and memory, and could steer a ship to sea, but am 
afraid of the thiller. ****** ******, son of Mary, 
Queen of Scots. Born in Philadelphia. Born in 
Philadelphia. King of Macedonia."* 

This extract will serve to explain what we have 
said in respect to a want of coherency and regularity 
of mental action, where the associating principle is 
disordered. In all cases of perfectly sound mental 
action, there is a chain, a connecting link, binding 
one part of the train of thought to another ; gener- 
ally easily discoverable, but less obvious in some 
cases than others. But in the extract which has 
been given, and in all similar cases of disordered 
mind, it is very different. Nearly each successive 
thought has the appearance of being entirely inde- 
pendent of what went before. 

* Rush's Diseases of the Mind. 



228 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE 

§ 131. Of sluggish and ineffective Association. 

Imperfect and disordered association exists in a 
number of varieties, and assumes various aspects. 
There are some cases where the Associating prin- 
ciple appears to be more sluggish and ineffective in 
its action than would naturally be expected in a per- 
fectly symmetrical mind. The action of the mind 
is amazingly slow ; it seems to labour under a sort 
of paralytic torpidity ; so much so, that it creeps on 
with great difficulty from one topic to another. This 
is sometimes noticed in conversation. We are con- 
versing, for instance, with such a person ; as a nat- 
ural result of the effort of conversation, we become 
in some degree excited ; our minds, in consequence 
of greater associating activity, take a position far 
ahead ; and we look back with a degree of impa- 
tience for the corresponding movements of our slug- 
gish interlocutor. After a while we discover in his 
uplifted eye the gleams of nascent intelligence, and 
a thought, perhaps a very just and appropriate one, 
emerges from the depths of mental inactivity, which 
we imagine, judging from our own different mental 
structure, ought to have been on its journey long 
before. 

The facetious author of Knickerbocker's History 
of New- York, in exaggerating some peculiarities of 
national character, has given an uncommonly favour- 
able view of this mental defect, viz., the ideas are 
so large they cannot be turned over. He is speaking 
of the venerable Wouter Yan Twiller. " He was 
a man shut up within himself like an oyster, and of 



PRINCIPLE OF ASSOCIATION. 229 

such a profoundly reflective turn, that he scarcely 
ever spoke, except in monosyllables, yet did he 
never make up his mind on any doubtful point. 
This was clearly accounted for by his adherents, who 
affirmed, that he always conceived every object on 
so comprehensive a scale, that he had not room in 
his head to turn it over and examine both sides of 
it, so (hat he always remained in doubt, merely in 
consequence of the astonishing magnitude of his 
ideas." 

It is here, in the view which has now been given, 
we find one element of that great phasis of human 
nature, mental dulness or stupidity. We do not 
mean Idiocy, but merely dulness, a want of a quick 
and penetrating apprehension of things. We say that 
we find here one element of this, because the ele- 
ments, or, rather, the sources of dulness, are many, 
and are implicated in various parts of the mental 
structure. A man may be accounted a dull or stu- 
pid person in consequence of a naturally dull or 
blunted power of external perception, or in conse- 
quence of a weakness in the power of relative sug- 
gestion, or in consequence of a great defect in the 
imaginalive power, as well from the circumstance 
of great weakness and tardiness in the action of the 
associating principle. 

§ 132. Of mental defect in consequence of too 
quick and rajpid Association. 

A more striking associative defect than that which 
we have just been commenting on, is one of a di- 
rectly opposite kind, viz., too great rapidity of asso- 

U 



230 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE 

elation. We not unfrequently find persons whose 
thoughts fly from one subject to another with great 
rapidity ; not by choice or an act of the will, but in 
spite of it. A rapid transference of the mind by a 
voluntary act (a trait which is recorded of some dis- 
tinguished men, such as Julius Ccesar and Napoleon 
Bonaparte), is clearly an evidence of mental power ; 
a like rapidity of transition, which is not voluntary, 
is not less clearly an evidence of mental weakness. 
Persons of this description exhibit what may be 
called an incontinence of thought ; there is no con- 
servative power of restraint ; the floodgates of the 
mind are thrown open, and it rushes onward, not to 
some fixed and available consummation, but in ev- 
ery possible direction, and bearing every strange 
thing in its current. 

It is worthy of remark, that the trait of mind un- 
der consideration is commonly attended with great 
volubility of tongue, and also with almost constant 
motion of the body. It is well known that the men- 
tal action, as a general thing, has its external signs. 
And in this case there is an agitation and movement 
of the outward members, and a rapidity of utterance 
corresponding to the unfixed and rapid movement 
within. We have already had occasion to refer to 
the relation existing between this form of disordered 
association and a defective or disordered judgment. 
As the subject of this form of derangement is inca- 
pable of checking and regulating the train of his 
ideas, so as to make them distinct objects of com- 
parison and reflection, it is a matter of course, that 
he constantly forms incorrect judgments of things* 



PRINCIPLE OF ASSOCIATION. 231 

§ 133. Instances illustratwe of the preceding seC" 

lion. 

Almost every one will recollect instances within 
the circle of his own acquaintance, which illustrate 
the mental traits that have now been described. 
And not a few cases have been made matters of 
record by medical and other writers. An English 
clergyman who visited Lavater, the distinguished 
physiognomist, has given an account of that singu- 
lar character, which seems to me accurately to illus- 
trate one of the less marked forms of the mental dis- 
order now before us. — " I was detained" (says he) 
" the whole morning by the strange, wild, eccentric 
Lavater, in various conversations. When once he 
is set a going, there is no such thing as stopping 
him till he runs himself out of breath. He starts 
from subject to subject, flies from book to book, 
from picture to picture ; measures your nose, your 
eye, your mouth, with a pair of compasses ; pours 
forth a torrent of physiognomy upon you ; drags you, 
for a proof of his dogma, to a dozen of closets, and 
unfolds ten thousand drawings ; but will not let you 
open your lips to propose a difficulty ; and crams a 
solution down your throat before you have uttered 
half a syllable of your objection. 

" He is as meager as the picture of famine ; his 
nose and chin almost meet. I read him in my 
turn, and found little difficulty in discovering, amid 
great genius, unaffected piety, unbounded benevo- 
lence, and moderate learning, much caprice and un- 
steadiness, a mind at once aspiring by nature and 



232 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE 

grovelling through necessity; an endless turn to 
speculation and project ; in a word, a clever, flighty, 
good-natured, necessitous nnan."* 

Dr. Conolly also happily illustrates the subject, 
although the case seems to have be^n less marked 
and decisive than the one just mentioned, in his ref- 
erence to a man who was unable to tell a story 
continuously from beginning to end. — " He would 
begin with the best intentions, and proceed a little 
way tolerably well ; but the chairs and tables, and 
all the objects around him, a hat hung upon a peg, 
or an ornament in the chimney-piece, would become 
interwoven with his narrative, and lead him from 
subject to subject with irresistible rapidity." 

§ 134. RemarJcs on Fickleness of Character. 

Some cases of what are called fickleness op 
CHARACTER may be explained in connexion with the 
mental traits which have now been described. — The 
opposite of fickleness of character is permanency ; 
that is to say, a continuity and fixedness of plan and 
pursuit, unless there are sound reasons for a change. 
The fickle man is pleased with new objects ; they 
assume an undue place in his estimation, as com- 
pared with other objects which have previously in- 
terested him ; and he is found frequently changing 
from one thing to another. 

This trait of mind, it is true, may sometimes be 
owing to other causes than that which we are par- 
ticularly considering in this connexion. It is some- 
times, for instance, found connected with great 

* As quoted by Dr. Rush in his Diseases of the Mind* 



PRINCIPLE OP ASSOCIATION. 233 

quickness of sensibility. A person susceptible of 
very vivid ennotions is more likely to be affected by 
present objects than another ; and, in consequence 
of this, may attach an undue value to them, which 
may lead to an uncertain and vacillating course of 
conduct. 

Fickleness of character, a trait which is obviously 
very prejudicial to any person, may also, and, per- 
haps, more frequently, find its basis in a variable and 
incontinent action of the associating principle. It 
will not be necessary to delay, after the illustrations 
which have already been given, and the remarks al- 
ready made in various places, in order to show how 
this may be the case. 

§ 135. Of temporary excitement of the Associating 
Principle, 

Persons of minds that, in their ordinary action, are 
apparently, in all respects, sound and symmetrical, 
are at times subject to singular excitements of the as- 
sociating principle. The cause of this peculiar men- 
tal malady is commonly to be sought for in a dis- 
ordered condition of the physical system. The late 
Professor Fisher, of New-Haven, has left a state- 
ment illustrative of this inordinate mental affection. 
Like that of Nicolai, it is the more valuable in com- 
ing from a scientific man, as the narration is, in con- 
sequence, placed above any suspicion of mistake. 
It was in his case, however, not a permanent, but 
merely a temporary state of the mind, arising un- 
questionably, as is generally the fact in this form of 
disorder, from some physical derangement. — "To 

U2 



234 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE 

whatever subject" (he says) " I happened to direct 
my thoughts, my mind was crowded with ideas upon 
it. I seemed to myself able to wield the most diffi- 
cult subjects with perfect ease, and to have an entire 
command over my own train of thought. I found 
myself wonderfully inventive ; scarce a subject pre- 
sented itself in which I did not seem to myself to 
perceive, as it were by intuition, important improve- 
ments. I slept but a part of the night, my mind be- 
ing intensely occupied with planning, inventing, &c. 
All the writing that I did was done in the utmost 
hurry. Ideas crowded upon me five times as fast 
as I could put down even hints of them, and my 
sole object was to have some memorial by which 
they might be recalled. I was employed the whole 
time in the most intense meditation ; and, at the same 
time, thinking never seemed to be attended with so 
little effort. I did not experience the least confu- 
sion or fatigue of mind. My thoughts flowed with 
a rapidity that was prodigious ; and the faculties of 
association, memory, &c., were wonderfully raised. 
I could read different languages into English, and 
English into Hebrew, with a fluency which I was 
never before or since master of During the whole 
time, though I was in a low state of health, I never 
felt the least pain or. fatigue of body." 

^136. Additional instance of this view of the sub- 
ject. 

A striking instance of quickened association re- 
cently occurred under my immediate notice. A stu- 
dent had, by special efforts, wrought himself into con- 



PRINCIPLE OF ASSOCIATION. 235 

siderable mental excitement on religious subjects ; 
and this unusual rapidity and power of mental ac- 
tion soon transferred itself to scientific subjects. In 
this state of things he was led to direct his attention 
(a very unfortunate direction of the mind under such 
circumstances) to the difficult subjects of Fore- 
knowledge, Free Agency, and Time. In the course 
of a day or two, he was very much absorbed in the 
latter subject in particular. It was now that con- 
ceptions, strange and unheard of before, came into 
his mind. Thinking was no task to him. His 
thoughts flowed with very great rapidity. Among 
other things, he made a grand discovery, or what he 
considered to be such, viz., not only that God is 
truths but the converse of the proposition also, which 
is a very different thing, viz., that t7^uth is God, 
His grand discovery he supposed to be the com- 
mencement of the long-expected millennium ; and, 
as such, it was an era never to be forgotten ; and 
his imagination was full of the glorious events about 
to follow. For a week he slept almost none, and 
ate but very little ; and his nervous system was ev- 
idently very much disordered. Finally, he reduced 
everything, mind and matter, infinite worlds and 
countless intelligences, and all forms of knowledge, 
to this simple equation, to wit, 1 + 1=2. 

The young gentleman read his lucubrations to 
myself and another person, who I suppose is capa- 
ble of understanding any ordinary flights of intellect ; 
but, humbling as it was, we were obliged to confess 
our inability to understand the nature of his wonder- 
ful discoveries. However, he consoled himself with 



236 DISORDERED ACTION, ETC. 

the saying of Scripture, that not many wise men 
after the flesh are called; and continued to pursue 
the subject of his inquiries in his own way. In his 
own language, " his whole soul was absorbed and 
drawn forth with an intensity utterly inconceivable 
by any one who never experienced the like. Ideas 
were rushing into his mind in torrents. He was 
exceedingly inventive. He could not write one idea 
in ten. He could have dictated to ten amanuenses. 
His powers of memory and association were quick- 
ened in a wonderful degree. He could make all 
he ever knew converge, like rays from the burning- 
glass, to one tremendous focus. He had the whole 
Bible at his tongue's end. Every muscle of his soul 
was in exercise, but he felt no fatigue." He began 
to write a book, which he thought would be another 
inspired volume ; and he accordingly divided it into 
chapters and verses. Finally, his mind was carried 
forward with such rapidity, and into such before un- 
known conceptions, that he began to doubt his iden- 
tity. Sometimes he thought that Christ had reap- 
peared on earth in his own person, and at other 
times he questioned whether Paul or Adam had not 
thus appeared. But, however he might doubt of 
this point, he was certain of one thing, that true re- 
ligion was to be propagated by his instrumentality 
through the world. He read, in particular, the 
prophet Daniel and the Revelation, and every sylla- 
ble was as plain as the multiplication table. He 
searched in these books for some prediction con- 
cerning himself; and, though not successful, discov- 
ered, as he thought, all the mysteries of Masonry and 



DISORDERED ACTION OF THE MEMORY. 237 

of the Romish church. The Bible was a new book 
to him. He fastened his eyes on its pages with 
maddening intensity. 

In this state of mind he had determined upon 
leaving college, with the intention of communicating 
his discoveries to the world. But being at last per- 
suaded by some friends that this was improper, and 
that his mind was somewhat out of order, he was 
finally induced to take some medicine, leave books, 
mingle in society, and divert the mind in every pos- 
sible way. In this way a check was given to the 
mental disease ; the mind gradually recovered a 
healthy tone, and all his wonderful discoveries van- 
ished like a dream. 



CHAPTER V. 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE MEMORY. 

§ 137. General nature of the Memory. 

The examination of the Memory, considered as 
the subject of imperfections and irregularities of ac- 
tion, naturally follows that of Association. In its 
general nature, we cannot but suppose that the mem- 
ory, a power so constant in its action and so impor- 
tant in its results, is well understood ; certainly so 
much so as to require but few words to be said upon 
that point. 



238 DISORDERED ACTION 

On another occasion, and having other objects in 
view, we proposed to define the Memory as that pow- 
er or susceptibility of the mind by which those con- 
ceptions are originated which are modified by a per- 
ception of the relation of past time. Accordingly, 
we are to regard it as a complex rather than a sim- 
ple principle ; implying, when called into exercise, 
1. A conception of the object; 2. A perception of 
the relation of priority in time. That is to say, we 
not only have a conception of the remembered object, 
but this conception is attended with the conviction, 
that it underwent the examination of our senses, or 
was in some way perceived by us at some former 
period. 

The intellectual principle which we designate as 
the memory, whatever views may be taken of its 
general nature, is subject to various disorders. The 
other parts of the intellect, such as the powers of 
perception, association, imagination, and reasoning, 
may be sound and regular in their movement, at 
least so far as they are able to act independent of 
the memory ; while the action of the latter power is 
either essentially obliterated, or is the subject of 
strange and unaccountable deviations. 

§ 138. Cases involving a general prostration of the 
JVLemory. 

One class of cases, where we perceive a dis- 
organization of the memory, are those in which 
there is a general prostration of power; in other 
words, a defect or prostration of power, not limited, 
as is sometimes the case, to particular objects, but 



OF THE MEMORY. 239 

extending to all. Such cases sometinnes occur. 
Individuals are found from time to time, in whom 
the power of memory seems to be entirely gone ; 
plucked up, as it were, and erased from the mind ; 
giving scarcely the least sign of vivification. 

This form of defective memory is sometimes nat- 
ural or congenital. Persons may come into the 
w^orld almost entirely destitute of the power of mem- 
ory, just as some other persons come into the world 
destitute, in an equal degree, of the abstractive and 
ratiocinative powers. We do not propose, however, 
to remark upon these cases here. A general pros- 
tration of memory (saying nothing here of those ca- 
ses where it is natural or congenital) may be caused 
in various ways ; perhaps, we may add, in very 
many ways ; some of which we shall proceed to point 
out, without attempting, however, a complete enu- 
meration. 

1. — And, in the first place, it may be caused by 
the indulgence of deep and long-continued sorrow. 
— This source of injury to the memory is somewhat 
frequent. A person, for instance, finds himself the 
subject of various and great disappointments. Grief, 
seated deeply at the heart, continually preys upon 
him ; and one of the early and very common re- 
sults, as already intimated, is a weakness, and ulti- 
mately an entire prostration of the memory. How 
this happens, although there can be no question as 
to the fact, it may not be entirely easy to see. But 
the explanation may, in part, perhaps, be this. The 
mind is so entirely occupied with the particular sub- 
ject of its sorrow, whatever it is, that it feels no in- 



240 DISORDERED ACTION 

terest in anything else, and gives no attention ; and 
the natural consequence of this state of things is, 
to a greater or less extent, a defect of memory. 
It is a great law of the memory, that it must and 
will fail where there is a want of attention, or, what 
is nearly the same thing, a want of interest. 

2. — We not unfrequently see, in the second place, 
an almost entire prostration of the memory caused 
by the advances and influences of extreme old age. 
The explanation in this case seems to be this. In 
the great mass of mankind there is but little devel- 
opement of the Internal Intellect ; the mind almost 
exclusively operates in connexion with what is pre- 
sented to the cognizance of the outward senses ; 
so that their knowledge, whatever may be its amount, 
deals chiefly with the outward and visible, and rests 
substantially upon a basis of materiality. Accord- 
ingly, when their outward senses fail ; when the eye, 
and the ear, and the taste no longer furnish iheir wont- 
ed materials for the mental action, it is no wonder 
that their minds, so far as they have ever been call- 
ed into exercise, should sink back into a state of ut- 
ter sluggishness and decrepitude, and that the mem- 
ory should suffer at the same time with the other 
mental powers. 

3. — The memory sometimes fails, furthermore, 
and fails utterly, in connexion with some violent 
disease. Such is the close connexion between the 
physical and mental system, particularly between the 
brain and the mind, that an aflTection of the former, 
as we have already had occasion to remark, is very 
likely to be attended with an affection of the latter. 



OF THE MEMORY. 241 

Accordingly, it is sometimes the case, that a violent 
fever, a sudden and violent blow on the head, and 
other causes of physical injury and disorder, are fol- 
lowed by an entire loss of the power of recollection. 

§ 139. Of loss of memory in relation to particular 
subjects. 

It is one peculiarity of disordered memory, that it 
sometimes exists exclusively in relation to particular 
subjects. A certain portion or section of the mem- 
ory seems to be lost, while in all its applications be- 
yond these particular limits, whatever they may be, 
it remains unimpaired. 

It does not appear that any explanation of these 
cases has been given, or is likely to be given, which 
will be generally satisfactory. They undoubtedly 
involve the general fact of a connexion between the 
mind and the body, particularly between the mind 
and the brain ; but do not seem to admit of a defi- 
nite and specific explanation, which will not be found 
to be attended with some formidable objections. 
Accordingly, in this state of things, we shall feel at 
liberty merely to give some facts or instances, with- 
out attempting to go further. 

Dr. Beattie mentions the case of a person who, 
in consequence of a violent blow on the head, lost 
his knowledge of the Greek language, but did not 
appear to have lost anything else. It is related of 
a certain Spanish author (Good's Study of Medi- 
cine, vol. iv.), that, being attacked by an acute fever, 
he forgot all the languages he ever knew, and had 
no recollection even of his own writings. It does 

X 



242 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE MEMORY. 

not appear, from anything that is said in connexion 
with this statement, that this person's memory was 
equally impaired on other subjects. Dr. Good also 
mentions the case of a certain Welshman, who left 
his native land in his youth, forgot his native dialect, 
and used the English language for thirty years. 
This man was attacked by the brain fever, and, in 
consequence of it, suddenly recovered the knowl- 
edge of the Welsh language, which he had forgotten, 
and lost the knowledge of the Enghsh, with which 
he had been so long familiar. — Other facts of a 
similar nature might be introduced if it were neces- 
sary. 

§ 140. Impaired memory in connexion with names. 
There have been persons whose impairment of 
memory was hmited exclusively, or nearly so, to 
proper names. This fact is noticed by Mr. Combe, 
who makes the remark, that " numerous cases are 
on record of the power of using words having been 
impaired by disease, when the ability to articulate, 
and the powers of perception and judgment remain- 
ed entire.'* And, in confirmation of this general 
statement, he introduces from the Phrenological 
Journal the case of a Mr. Hood. It is stated, in 
respect to this person, that he suddenly forgot the 
nameo^ every object in nature. " His recollection 
of things seemed to be unimpaired ; but the names, 
by which men and things are known, were entirely 
obliterated from his mind ; or, rather, he had lost 
the faculty by which they are called up at the con- 
trol of the will. He was by no means inattentive. 



DISORDERED ACTION OF THE MEMORY. 243 

however, to what was going on, and he recognised 
friends and acquaintances perhaps as quickly as on 
any former occasion ; but their names, or even his 
own, or his wife's name, or the names of any of his 
domestics, appeared to have no place in his recol- 
lection."* 

The father of the late Dr. Watson, bishop of Lan- 
dafF, was unable, in consequence, as was supposed, 
of an apoplectic attack, to recollect the name of his 
eldest son. He was obliged to designate him, which 
he had very frequent occasion to do, in connexion 
with his pursuits or his place of residence ; calling 
him, for instance, the " lad at college," instead of 
repeating his name. " And yet he was able to re- 
peat, without a blunder, hundreds of lines out of 
classic authors." 

A case, coming under this general head, occurred 
a few years since in the city of Washington. A re- 
spectable and intelligent lady residing there expe- 
rienced a slight attack of apoplexy. It is stated 
that, up to the time of this attack, she possessed 
rather uncommon powers of conversation ; was fluent, 
and had a ready command of five languages. The 
apoplectic attack, although it left her general power 
of language untouched, destroyed entirely her ability, 
with a single exception, of recalling proper names. 
And this power, it seems, she has never, as yet, re- 
covered. She still converses fluently, so far as 
proper names are not concerned. But, whenever a 
name of this kind occurs, she is arrested in her con- 
versation, and cannot proceed till the name is sug- 
* Combe's Phrenology, 3d Am. ed., p. 430. 



244 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE MEMORY. 

gested. Whenever this is done, she instantly rec- 
ognises the person or thing for which the name 
stands, as the one appropriate to her train of thought 
and conversation, and is thus enabled to go on. 

In connexion with these facts, it will not be sur- 
prising when we state that persons sometimes for- 
get their own names. A case of this kind is related 
in the Psychological Magazine. Some years since, 
a German gentleman, who held a high rank in po- 
litical life, had occasion to call at another person's 
house on some business. The servant of the house, 
being unacquainted with him, asked him his name. 
But he was unable to answer ; he had entirely for- 
gotten it ; and was under the disagreeable and rather 
ridiculous necessity of asking a friend who was with 
him what his own name was.* 

^ 141 . Of loss of memory during particular periods 
of time. 
Another striking modification of disordered mem- 
ory is that which exists for a particular period of 
time. — Dr. Beattie relates the case of a clergyman 
who was attacked with apoplexy ; and, on recover- 
ing, was found to have lost the recollection of ex- 
actly four years. Dr. Abercrombie also relates, 
that he once attended a lady in a protracted illness, 
whose impairment of memory assumed this form. 
She lost the recollection of a period of about ten or 
twelve years, but spoke with perfect consistency of 
things as they stood before that time. — Facts of this 

« For some of the above and other similar statements, see 
Good's Medicine, vol. iv., p. 189. i 



DISORDERED ACTION OF THE MEMORY. 245 

kind cannot fail to convince us, that no inconsidera- 
ble degree of mystery, in some respects at least, 
still rests upon the operations and laws of the hu- 
man mind. It is true that various explanations of 
the facts which have been given in this section 
may be attempted ; but they will all be found, on 
examination, to involve more or less of merely hy- 
pothetical views. What further developements the 
well-disciplined inquiries of science will be able to 
make in future time, we are, of course, unable to say. 
Certainly we have no reason for saying that, in the 
existing state of mental knowledge, we know all 
which possibly can be known ; although it is un- 
doubtedly the case, that at present we know only in 
part. 

§ 142. Of other modifications of disordered 
JVlemory. 

The imperfect and disordered action of the mem- 
ory appears in a variety of forms, too numerous to 
render it practicable, in the narrow Hmits to which 
the present work is restricted, fully to describe them. 
We shall leave the subject, therefore, with briefly re- 
ferring to one other modification of disorder, some- 
what diflTerent from any which has hitherto been 
mentioned. It consists in putting one name for 
another, but always employing the words which are 
used in the same sense. An individual who was 
the subject of this form of mental disorder, is men- 
tioned by Dr. Abercrombie ; and some accompany- 
ing explanations are given in the following terms. — 
" He uniformly called his snuflf-box a hogshead, and 

X2 



246 IMPERFECT AND DISORDERED ACTION 

the association which led to this appeared to be ob- 
vious. In the early part of his life he had been in 
Virginia, and connected with the trade in tobacco; 
so that the transition from snuff to tobacco, and from 
tobacco to a hogshead, seemed to be natural. An- 
other gentleman affected in this manner, when he 
wanted coals put upon his fire, always called for pa- 
per, and when he wanted paper called for coals ; 
and these words he always used in the same man- 
ner. In other cases, the patient seems to invent 
names, using words which to a stranger are quite 
unintelligible ; but he always uses them in the same 
sense, and his immediate attendants come to un- 
derstand what he means by them."* 



CHAPTER VI. 

IMPERFECT AND DISORDERED ACTION OF THE REA- 
SONING POWER. 

§ 143. Of the nature of the Reasoning Power. 

It will be noticed, so far as we have gone in the 
examination of the subject of the imperfections and 
disorders of mental action, that we have considered 
the powers of the mind separately. Probably every 
power of the mind, but particularly those of the in- 
tellect in distinction from the sensibilities, may be- 
♦ Abercrombie's Intellectual Powers, Harpers' ed., p. 130. 



OP THE REASONING POWER. 247 

come more or less disordered. It is not safe to re- 
strict the doctrine of insanity, much less of mental 
disorder, in the more general sense of the terms, by 
arbitrary and narrow definitions. The statements 
which have already been given seem sufficiently to 
show the correctness of the general doctrine laid 
down at the commencement of the work, that the 
true limits of disordered mental action are coexten- 
sive with the opposite, viz., with a just, orderly, 
sound, or sane state of the mind. Having success- 
ively considered sensation, external perception, the 
conceptive power, original suggestion, conscious- 
ness, relative suggestion or judgment, association, 
and memory, we propose, as coming next in order 
in the arrangement which we have adopted, to exam- 
ine the subject before us, in its connexion with the 
reasoning power. 

Of the nature of the reasoning power, inasmuch 
as the present work takes for granted some general 
knowledge of the mind's ordinary or regular action, 
it is unnecessary to speak except very briefly. 
When the power in question is in exercise, we term 
such exercise of it reasoning. Accordingly, rea- 
soning may be defined the mental process or opera- 
tion whereby we deduce conclusions from two or 
more propositions premised. A train of reasoning 
may be regarded, therefore, as a ivhole, and, as such, 
it is made up of separate and subordinate parts, 
which are usually denominated propositions. 

The reasoning power, great as it is in its nature 
and its results, has its specific position, and also its 
specific duties or office ; and in both points of view 



248 IMPERFECT AND DISORDERED ACTION 

is Clearly enough distinguished from all other intel- 
lectual powers It is, perhaps, more likely to be con- 
founded with the power of Relative Suggestion or the 
Judgment than any other. Nevertheless, there is a 
distmction between them. Without Relative Sua- 
gestion, which is to be regarded as a distinct source 
of knowledge, there would be no perception of rela- 
tions m their simplest possible forms. And, unas- 
sisted by reasoning, which, as compared with the 
power just named, takes a higher stand and operates 
in a wider field, we could have no knowledge of the 
relations of those things, which cannot be compared 
without the aid of intermediate propositions. 

itself of r.^"'^/"""^']"^ f«<^"'t3^^ ^hich avails 
tself of the intimations and appliances of nearly all 
the other powers, may be subject to imperfection and 
disorder in various ways and degrees, as we shall 
now proceed to explain. 

§ 144. OffaUure of Reasoning from the want of 

ideas. 

wJrp^Ih ""^^ ^^ no reasoning, in the first place, 
where there are no ideas previously laid up in the 
mind Such IS the nature of the reasoning power, 
that It must have its data, its materials on thich to 
act Reasoning deals with propositions, and prop- 
OS. ions involve ideas. He, therefore, 4o is^coS. 

ill!^ "" "* '^'^'' ™"^' "«' ^"""P'^in «> find 
himself no reasoner. 

It is here we find one ground of the failure of 

irr'^f rT-l" '*^'*^"y- ^he idiot is almost 
wholly destitute of ideas; so that, if he happens to 



OF THE REASONING POWER. 249 

possess those powers of comparison and combina- 
tion which are implied in reasoning, still he has no 
materials on which to employ them. In such per- 
sons, therefore, the reasoning power, even if it has 
an existence, is not only not exercised in fact, but 
it is impossible that it should be ; and, consequent- 
ly, it is virtually extinct. Even a few ideas, al- 
though they undoubtedly have their value, will not 
be enough to furnish a ratiocinative basis. The 
reasoning which is raised on such a basis will gen- 
erally be found unsymmetrical, built up in some 
parts and not in others, weak in one place and 
strong in another, and presenting, on the whole, either 
an imperfect or a distorted view of the subject. 
Hence we have, with the failure of ideas, either no 
reasoning or false reasoning, either no action or 
perverted action. 

§ 145. Of mere weakness or imbecility of the Rea- 
soning power. 

In the second place, we are led to remark, that 
there is in some persons a natural weakness or im- 
becility of the reasoning power, in itself consider- 
ed. The difficulty does not consist, as in the case 
just now mentioned, in the want of ideas ; of these 
they perhaps have multitudes : but it consists rather 
in their want of a power to perceive and to esti- 
mate consecutively their relations. They may, per- 
haps, be able to perceive and understand separate 
relations ; for instance, the relation existing between 
two objects or two simple propositions ; but they 
are not able, by connecting object with object, and 



250 IMPERFECT AND DISORDERED ACTION 

proposition with proposition, to deduce remote and 
ultimate relations. The mind does not expand it- 
self sufficiently so as to embrace the whole subject ; 
or it has not energy enough so as to advance safely 
and firmly from step to step ; or, if these be not the 
proper expressions, we still have the general and 
undeniable fact that it comes short, utterly and ab- 
solutely, of the consecutive process which is in- 
volved in every mental effort deserving the name 
of ratiocination. 

Mr. Locke seems to have had this class of per- 
sons in mind, where he remarks in the following 
terms : " There are some men of one, some but of 
two syllogisms, and no more ; and others that can 
advance but one step farther. These cannot al- 
ways discern that side on which the strongest proofs 
he ; cannot constantly follow that which in itself is 
the more probable opinion."— These persons are 
not insane in the ordinary sense of that term, but 
they are accountable only so far as they have abil- 
ity. They have, intellectually, but a feeble light ; 
and, such as it is, they are often obliged to borrow', 
from the lamp of their neighbours, the oil that feeds 
their own. 

§ 146. Of disordered Reasoning in relation to par- 
ticular subjects. 
One of the forms of disordered reasoning, and 
one, too, of very frequent occurrence, is character- 
ized by the circumstance that the disordered or ab- 
normal tendency has relation to particular subjects, 
and IS limited to them. Beyond this limit, whether 



OF THE REASONING POWER. 251 

more or less restricted, the operation of this power 
appears to be entirely unobstructed. It might, per- 
haps, be suggested here, that the disordered action 
does not exist so much in the reasoning power, in 
itself considered, as in that antecedent state of mind, 
whatever it is, which furnishes the premises upon 
which the ratiocinative process is based. That is 
to say, the reasoning process goes well in itself, but 
is upon a wrong track. It arrives at an erroneous 
issue, because it started from a wrong point. 

A man, for instance, believes that he is made of 
glass. He reasons correctly, in deducing the con- 
clusion from premises of this kind, that he must 
move slowly and cautiously. Another person be- 
lieves that he is a plant ; an idea which is said to 
have taken possession of one of the Bourbon prin- 
ces. He reasons correctly when he goes into the 
garden and insists on being watered in common 
with the plants around him. Another, again, be- 
lieves that he is a king ; and he reasons correctly 
in requiring for himself the homage suited to a king, 
and in expressing dissatisfaction on account of its 
being withheld. 

In all such cases, it is very true that the funda- 
mental error is in the premises. Nevertheless, 
when we consider that reasoning must necessarily 
have its preliminaries or basis, and that the true idea 
of reasoning, at least in the higher sense of the term, 
embraces premises as well as conclusion, we shall 
not hesitate to speak of such reasoning as has been 
mentioned, although erroneous in the incipient rath- 



252 IMPERFECT AND DISORDERED ACTION 

er than the deductive stage, as on the whole wrong, 
perverted, or insane. 

§ 147. Instance of the foregoing form of perverted 
Reasoning. 

We have an instance of the form of mental dis- 
order just described, namely, that which is limited 
to a particular subject or class of subjects, in the 
character of Don Quixote. Cervantes, it will be 
recollected, represents the hero of his Work as hav- 
ing his naturally good understanding perverted by 
the perusal of certain foolish, romantic stories, false- 
ly purporting to be a true record of knights and 
deeds of chivalry. These books, containing the 
history of dwarfs, giants, necromancers, and other 
preternatural extravagance, were zealously perused, 
until the head of Don Quixote was effectually turn- 
ed by them. Although he was thus brought into a 
state of real mental derangement, it was limited to 
the extravagances which have been mentioned. We 
are expressly informed, that in all his conversations 
and replies, he gave evident proofs of a most excel- 
lent understanding, and never " lost the stirrups" 
except on the subject of chivalry. On this subject 
he " was crazed." — Accordingly, when the barber 
and curate visited him on a certain occasion, the 
conversation happened to turn on what are termed 
reasons of state, and on modes of administration ; 
and Don Quixote spoke so well on every topic as 
to convince them that he was quite sound, and had 
recovered the right exercise of his judgment. But 
something being unadvisedly said about the Turkish 



OP THE REASONING POWER. 253 

war, the knight at once remarked, with much so- 
lemnity and seriousness, that his majesty had no- 
thing to do but to issue a proclamation, command- 
ing all the knights- errant in Spain to assemble at his 
court on a certain day ; and, although not more than 
half a dozen should come, among these one would be 
found who would alone he sufficient to overthrow the 
whole Turkish power. 

When the subject of conversation turned upon 
war, which had so near a connexion with shields, 
and lances, and all the associations of chivalry, it 
came within the range of his malady, and led to the 
absurd remark, which showed at once the unsound- 
ness of his mind, notwithstanding the sobriety and 
good sense which he had just before exhibited. 

^148. Of disordered Reasoning arising from a dis' 
ordered state of the other powers of the JWind. 

All the powers of the mind have a connexion, 
more or less close, with each other. Hence their 
action may be said, in reference to this connexion, 
to be a conditional one. Consequently, if the con- 
dition fails, the action fails. As an illustration, the 
exercise of the reasoning power implies, as the ne- 
cessary condition of its own existence, the antece- 
dent exercise of memory, of relative suggestion, of 
the external and internal perceptive powers, and also 
of the susceptibility of belief. It is obvious that 
disorder cannot attach to any one of these without 
indirectly affecting any power which, although it 
may be distinct, is, nevertheless, in some sense built 
upon them. Hence the reasoning power is often 

Y 



254 IMPERFECT AND DISORDERED ACTION 

disordered, in consequence of derangement in some 
one of these powers, or in some other part of the 
mind, with which its action is particularly connected. 
We make here this general remark, as one which 
it may be important to keep in mind, without deem- 
ing it necessary to dwell upon it. 

^149. Of readiness of Reasoning in the partially 
insane. 

Those, who have been personally acquainted with 
the intellectual condition of the partially insane, have 
sometimes observed in them great quickness of 
thought in some httle emergencies, and an unusual 
degree of cunning. When, for instance, an attempt 
has been made to seize and confine them, they stead- 
ily and promptly mark the motions of their pursu- 
ers ; they rapidly decipher their intentions from their 
countenance, and cause them no small degree of 
perplexity. In particular, it has been observed in 
some instances that they discover more fluency of 
expression and rapidity of deduction than others of 
a perfectly sound mind, or than themselves could 
have exhibited before their derangement. This sin- 
gular fact is to be briefly explained. 

The unusual quickness of deduction and of ex- 
pression, which has sometimes been noticed in par- 
tially insane persons, may be referred to two causes ; 
first, an uncommon excitation of the attention and 
of all the intellectual powers ; and, secondly, a re- 
moval of those checks which attend the sober and 
the rational in their reasonings. 

Some of the checks which retard the process of 



OP THE REASONING POWER 255 

reasoning in the case of men whose powers are in 
a good state, are these. I. — There is a distrust of 
phraseology, a fear of mistakes, from the ambiguity 
and vagueness of language. — The object of a ra- 
tional man is supposed to be to arrive at truth, and 
not merely to gain a victory. He therefore feels 
anxious not only to employ terms which appear to 
himself proper, but which shall be rightly understood 
by his opponent. But the irrational man, as might 
be expected, does not find himself embarrassed with 
considerations of this nature. II. — A second ob- 
struction to facility and promptness in argumenta- 
tion, in the case of the sober-minded and rational, is 
this : they fear that they may not be in possession 
of all those premises on which the solution will be 
found in the event to depend. — Many disputes are 
carried on without previously forming an acquaint- 
ance with those facts, which are necessarily and 
prominently involved. While disputants of sound 
minds have any suspicion on this point, and know 
not but it will be labour lost, they of course feel 
their interest in the dispute very much diminished. 
III. — The third circumstance to which reference 
was had, is this : the influence of certain feelings of 
propriety and of good sense, which ordinarily govern 
men in the full exercise of their powers. 

The disputant feels himself under obligations to 
profess a deference for his opponent ; it is due to 
the customary forms of society. He is sometimes 
restrained and embarrassed by what he considers 
due to those who are present to hear the argument. 
He is particularly careful to say nothing foolish, ab- 



256 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE 

surd, or uncharitable. — All these things weigh no- 
thing with the insane person. He is not troubled 
about exactness of expression or the observance of 
ceremonies, but strangely rushes, as it were, upon 
the main points of the controversy, regardless of all 
minor considerations.* 



CHAPTER VH. 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE IMAGINATION. 

§ 150. General remarks on the nature of Imagi' 

nation. 

We proceed now to a consideration of the defect- 
ive and disordered exercises of the Imagination. 
The mental process which is involved in any exer- 
cise of the Imagination, is a complex rather than a 
simple operation. Such a process implies, in par- 
ticular, the exercise of the power of Association, in 
furnishing those conceptions which are combined to- 
gether ; also the exercise of the power of Relative 
Suggestion, by means of which the combination is 
effected. Hence we may properly propose as a def- 
inition of Imagination, that it is a complex exercise 
of the mind, by means of which various conceptions 
are combined together so as to form new wholes. 
The conceptions may very properly be regarded as 

* See Stewart's Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. ii., ch. iii. 



IMAGINATION. 257 

the materials from which the new creations are 
made ; but it is not until the existence of those acts 
which are impHed in every process of the Imagina- 
tion, such as Association and Relative Suggestion, 
that they are selected, detained before the mind, and 
ultimately united in various beautiful combinations. 
A dry definition will give but little idea of the 
fruitful and vast results which flow out of the exer- 
cise of this power. Sometimes it is chiefly descrip- 
tive, catching the images of things as they exist in 
nature, subjecting them to the finest analysis, and 
recombining them in forms of exquisite beauty. 
So that nature herself, coming from the hands of the 
infinite and perfect Artist, finds herself rivalled in 
the productions which man's imagination gives rise 
to. Sometimes it assumes the suggestive and cre- 
ative aspect, as in Spenser and Milton, giving ex- 
istence to things and beings which have no parallel 
in earthly shapes ; creating new worlds, peopling 
them with new inhabitants ; adorning and rendering 
them happy with arts, and sights, and harmonies un- 
known before. 

^161. Great Imagination does not necessarily iro' 
ply a disordered or insane action of the JVLind. 

Without delaying further upon the general nature 
of Imagination, we now proceed to some remarks 
more closely connected with the subject properly 
before us. And, in doing this, it may be proper to 
allude to an opinion somewhat prevalent, that great 
power of imagination implies a tendency to disorder- 
ed mental action. In regard to this opinion, it may 



558 DISORDERED ACTION OP THE 

be remarked, that this is not necessarily the case, 
although there is some foundation for this view. It 
is undoubtedly true, that there are some men of fer- 
tile and vigorous imaginations, whose minds are not 
well balanced ; who discover a lack of judgment ; 
and who would not be wisely trusted in many things 
where sound judgment is necessary. Perhaps there 
are many such cases. And it is certain there are 
some, perhaps many, exceptions, especially in men 
of the very highest forms of imagination. 

If we may judge from their writings, which is al- 
most the only means of judging we have, Homer 
and Shakspeare, who, by common consent, are 
placed at the head of poets, could not have been 
deficient in those quahties of mind which constitute 
the man of sound judgment. The admirable poems 
of Virgil discover no such deficiency in him. On 
the contrary, it may be said without hyperbole, that 
almost every line discovers, not only those powers 
of language and that exquisite sensibility which are 
requisite to the higher forms of poetry^ but also a 
judgment sound and well disciplined in the very 
highest degree. Dante and Milton, without men- 
tioning other names, men who were emphatically 
kindred geniuses in the powers of the imagination, 
were also men of such practical tact, men of such 
discrimination and general capabilities for business, 
that they were considered suitable persons to hold 
high stations, and to exercise important influence in 
the political movements of their times. 

Great imagination, therefore, does not necessarily 
imply a tendency to disordered mental action, pro- 



IMAGINATION, 259 

vided there is a suitable division of power; in other 
words, a corresponding energy in the other faculties. 
The imagination, in order to be great in the highest 
sense of the term, must draw nourishment from the 
other powers. Unquestionably, if the poet is of im- 
agination all compact, in the sense of excluding a 
due mixture of the other capabilities, he may properly 
be located, where Shakspeare has placed him, in 
the same category with the lunatic. But such a 
man, although he may be a poet, is not to be con- 
founded with a great poet, any more than Phaeton 
is to be confounded with Apollo. He holds the reins 
of the horses of the sun, but he has not the strength 
to guide them. 

§ 152. Of cases of marked deficiency of Imagina" 

tion. 

There may, however, notwithstanding what has 
been said, be unsoundness of mind arising from ex- 
cess of imagination. And is not the reverse equal- 
ly true ? Are we to speak of that as a sound mind 
where imagination has no place? Can there well 
be a greater mental defect than this ? Certain it is, 
there are some persons in whom the power of im- 
agination appears to be almost totally extinct. They 
are matter-of-fact men, in the literal sense of the 
terms. They seem to have no possible conception 
of anything beyond the limit and boundary of what 
actually is. In vain would Sir Philip Sidney, in his 
beautiful Defence of Poetiy, attempt to convince 
them that the imagination hath profit. They at once 
apply to all the delightful creations of this wonderful 



260 DISORDERED ACTION OP THE 

faculty EzekiePs reed ; they measure the walls, 
and the porches, and the threshold, and the cham- 
bers, that they may thereby estimate the utilities, 
not that they may get a clearer perception of the 
beautiful. Wonderful to them is the idea, that 
there may be truth and beauty, standing imperisha- 
ble and beaming with radiance, and yet without the 
substantial and literal realization of anything which 
profiteth the body. What would such men make of 
Paradise Lost? Would not even the flute of Burns, 
sounding in its simplicity from his native Ayr, prove 
a mystery] Awakening no emotion of the heart, 
giving birth to no conception above this " diurnal 
sphere." 

At the same time, it must be acknowledged, that 
this faculty is more frequently dormant than absent ; 
that it wants cultivation, not existence. In almost 
all minds, not excepting the peasant who humbly 
labours among the sods of the earth, there are some 
feeble twinklings of this inner light. In many cases 
where neither of the powers exists in a remarkable 
degree, the power of imagination is more vigorous 
and active than that of reflection. Often uncul- 
tured men catch by the outward eye a glance of the 
charms of nature, and imagination awakens at the 
happy moment, and adds to the beauty of her tints. 

§ 163. Disorder of the Imagination a^ connected 
with Association and excited Conceptions, 

As imagination, considered as a whole, implies 
the exercise of various subordinate powers, we may 
sometimes more fully understand the nature of the 



IMAGINATION. 261 

disorders to which it is found to be subject by a ref- 
erence to those powers. If, for instance, the power 
of association be in any degree disordered, the ef- 
fects of this disorder will be more or less felt in the 
imagination. The results of the imagination will in 
that case be discontinuous, bizarre, and incoherent. 
If the susceptibility, by which we form conceptions 
of absent objects, be disordered, the results of the 
imagination will probably be characterized by a too 
vivid and unnatural aspect of things. Both features 
seem to be combined in the following case, which 
Dr. Gall has extracted from Fodere's Memoir of 
M. Savary ; " A carpenter forty-seven years old, 
with every appearance of good health, was assailed 
by a crowd of strange and incoherent ideas. He 
often imagined himself fluttering in the air, or traver- 
sing smiling fields, apartments, old chateaus, woods, 
and gardens, which he had seen in his infancy. 
Sometimes he seemed to be walking in public courts, 
places, and oth^r spots that were known to him. 
While at work, the moment he was going to strike 
his axe at a given place, an idea would pass through 
his head, make him lose sight of his object, and he 
would strike somewhere else. He once rose at 
midnight to go to Yersailles, and found himself there 
without being sensible of having made this journey. 
— None of these hallucinations prevent the patient 
from reasoning correctly. He is astonished, and 
laughs at himself for all these fantastic visions, but 
still is unable to withdraw himself from their influ- 
ence." 



262 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE 

§ 164. Disorder of the Imagination as connected 
with the Sensibilities. 
When the imaginative power exists in the same 
mmd m connexion with strong sensibilities, it is 
sometimes the case that its operation is stimulated 
to an excessive and morbid degree. It is well 
known that men of marked imaginative genius, 
combmed with deep sensibility, often become men- 
tally disordered. Not that we are authorized, as a 
general thing, to include these among the more afri- 
kmg forms of insanity. Certain it is, that they gen- 
erally attract but little notice. But such are the ex- 
travagant dreams in which these persons indulge • 
such are the wrong views of the character and ac- 
tions of men which their busy and melancholy im- 
aginations are apt to form, that they cannot be reck- 
oned persons of truly sound minds. These instan- 
ces, which are not rare, it is difficult fully to de- 
scribe ; but their most distinguishing traits will be 
recognised in the following sketch from Madame de 
htaePs Reflections on the Character and Writings 
of Rousseau. 

After remarking that he discovered no sudden 
emotions, but that his feelings grew upon reflection, 
and that he became impassioned in consequence of 
his own meditations, she adds as follows ; « Some- 
times he would part with you with all his former af- 
fection ; but, if an expression had escaped you which 
might bear an unfavourable construction, he would 
recollect It, examine it, exaggerate it, perhaps dwell 
upon It for a month, and conclude by a total breach 



IMAGINATION. 263 

with you. Hence it was that there was scarce a 
possibiUty of undeceiving him ; for the light which 
broke in upon him at once was not sufficient to ef- 
face the wrong impressions which had taken place 
so gradually in his mind. It was extremely diffi- 
cult, too, to continue long on an intimate footing 
with him. A word, a gesture, furnished him with 
matter of profound meditation ; he connected the 
most trifling circumstances like so many mathemat- 
ical propositions, and conceived his conclusions to 
be supported by the evidence of demonstration. 

" I believe (she farther remarks) that imagination 
was the strongest of his faculties, and that it had 
almost absorbed all the rest. He dreamed rather 
than existed, and the events of his life might be said 
more properly to have passed in his mind than with- 
out him : a mode of being, one should have thought, 
that ought to have secured him from distrust, as it 
prevented him from observation ; but the truth was, 
it did not hinder him from attempting to observe ; it 
only rendered his observations erroneous. That his 
soul was tender, no one can doubt after having read 
his works ; but his imagination sometimes interposed 
between his reason and his affections, and destroyed 
their influence : he appeared sometimes void of sen- 
sibility, but it was because he did not perceive ob- 
jects such as they were. Had he seen them with 
our eyes, his heart would have been more affected 
than ours." 

§ 155. Other illustrations of the same subject. 
There is some ground for supposing that state- 



264 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE 

merits, similar to those which have now been made, 
will apply, in a considerable degree, to the case of 
Dean Swift. Frequent attempts have been made 
to analyze the character of Swift, but, in general, 
with doubtful success. That he was, however, a 
person of imagination in a high, though not in the 
highest, sense of the term, cannot well be doubted. 
Of this his writings, and his prose more than his po- 
etry, are a proof. Moreover, notwithstanding the 
asperity and repulsiveness which his character some- 
times assumed, he was, in the elements of his na- 
ture, a man of generous and vivid sensibilities. It 
is true they were not obtruded upon the public eye, 
but were assiduously nourished in solitude ; and, 
gaining strength from this solitary nurture, they had 
the effect to give an impulse to his imagination, by 
means of which the facts of friendship and enmity, 
of life and manners, were presented before him in 
a distorted and exaggerated aspect. 

He had, in particular, a keen perception, arising 
in part from this exciting tendency of the imagina- 
tion, of the follies and vices of men ; but he does 
not appear to have understood so well the nature 
and extent of the sanative principle which the Chris- 
tian religion furnishes : consequently, the world pre- 
sented to him a morbid appearance, " dark, with no 
entrance of light." Disgusted with what he saw 
around him, he retired into the recesses of his own 
bosom. No star of hope, however it should have 
been otherwise, arose there. The image of evil 
continually presented itself before him, which the 
imaginative power, rever relaxing from its solitary 



IMAGINATION. 265 

labours, expanded to gigantic dimensions. He 
brooded over it in silence and sorrow, and died in a 
madhouse. 

Such are the results (and the history of literary 
men gives too many sad instances of them) when 
this power is permitted to operate without the checks 
of a sound judgment. This is the process by which 
generous minds, dwelling too intently upon the evils 
which all flesh is heir to, are often converted into 
misanthropists. They mingle the cup of poison 
with their own hands, and drink it. 

§156. Of inordinate Imagination, the opposite of 
JMisanthropical. 

It is to be noticed, further, that the operation of 
the imagination is sometimes just the reverse of 
what has been mentioned, particularly in those per- 
sons in whom the element of hope is naturally 
strong. The souls of such persons have no har- 
mony with thoughts of evil. If the inflictions of 
present sorrows cannot be avoided, they flatter them- 
selves with coming good, and build airy castles for 
the future. They are like the cottage maiden 
whom some English poet celebrates. 

-" Nor, while she turns the giddy wheel around, 
Revolves the sad vicissitudes of things." 

Pleased with the present and happy in the future, 
they kindle the torch of the imagination at the fires 
of a rejoicing heart. It is not with them, " Who 
shall show us any good 1" but who shall show us 
anything that is not good ? Infinite are the crea- 

Z 



266 DISORDERED ACTION, ETC. 

tions which their busy invention forms, some to be 
realized to-morrow, some to be realized the next 
year ; some located in their native land, and, as it 
were, on the very tomb of their fathers, and others 
shining in some distant and conjectural El Dorado 
of the East or West. Their imagination is all upon 
one track, onward to the regions of light. They 
see no darkness in the clouds ; they hear no rum* 
bling of the tempest. 

How different this state of mind from that which 
has just now been described. But, unfortunately, it 
is equally at variance with the true state of things. 
Such a man is a marvel to his neighbours, who, al- 
though they are not misanthropes, do not see all 
things bright ; but brightness and darkness mingled 
together, with a full proportion of the latter. They 
wonder he is so happy, and yet they call him a fool. 
They shake their heads in their wisdom, and mourn- 
fully predict that he will end his days in a mad- 
house. And so it is. But the distinctive trait of 
his malady does not leave him even there. His 
mind is in ruins ; but it is shrouded in a rainbow. 
He rattles his chains with joy, and makes the walls 
of his prison echo with his songs. 



NATURE AND CAUSES OF IDIOCY. 267 



CHAPTER VIII. 

NATURE AND CAUSES OF IDIOCY. 

§ 157. Idiocy generally implies a defective action 
of the whole JMind, 

We propose to close this part of the general sub- 
ject with some remarks upon Idiocy. A topic 
which naturally has a place in a work that professes 
to treat of defective or imperfect, as well as of dis- 
ordered mental action. In the matter of arrano;e- 
ment, it is of but little consequence whether we in- 
troduce this subject here or in some other place. 
Idiocy does not imply merely an imperfect action of 
the External Intellect, or of the Internal Intellect, or 
of the Natural and Moral Sensibilities, but of the 
whole. Generally speaking, it may be considered 
as covering the whole mental area ; presenting a 
scene of desolateness and vacuity throughout. It 
has, therefore, no specific place in the minor divis- 
ions into which the treatise naturally resolves itself. 
Nevertheless, .as the basis of this unfortunate state of 
mind may, with a good degree of probability, be 
generally located in the intellect, we have conclu- 
ded to introduce the following remarks in reference 
to it in the present connexion, rather than in the 
subsequent part of the work, which has particular re- 
lation to the Sensibilities. Such is the nature of the 



S68 NATURE AND CAUSES OF IDIOCY. 

subject that it will not require an extended discus- 
sion. 

§ 168. Of the degree of Intellectual Power possessed 
in Idiocy, 

It will be proper, in the first place, in entering 
upon this subject, to notice some of the marks or 
characteristics which are commonly found to attach 
to a state of idiocy. And here the first remark is, 
that persons in this condition will always be found 
to have but few ideas of any kind whatever. This 
small number of ideas they are able, except in some 
extreme cases, to compare together, so far as to dis- 
tinguish those in which there are any striking differ- 
ences. Such, however, is the general weakness, 
and, at times, the total incapacity of the power of 
relative suggestion, that the class of General Ab- 
stract ideas, which are of such a nature as always 
to imply the exercise of that power, are not only 
fewer in idiots than those of any other class, but are 
ill-defined and indistinct. The few ideas which they 
actually possess, they are sometimes, but not always, 
able to combine together, and to form from them 
some simple propositions. They have, however, 
the power of deducing inferences from the compari- 
son of a number of consecutive propositions, that is, 
by reasoning only in a very small degree. Their 
great feebleness of reasoning power is to be attrib- 
uted partly to the fewness of the ideas and proposi- 
tions which they possess ; partly to the dulness of 
their susceptibility of perceiving relations, the exer- 
cise of which is always implied in the comparison of 



NATURE AND CAUSES OF IDIOCY. 269 

propositions ; and partly, in some cases, to a great 
weakness of memory. We say in some cases, be- 
cause idiots have occasionally been found, who, 
while they have been deficient in every other men- 
tal power, have still been remarkable for memory. 
There is one characteristic of idiocy which very 
seldom fails ; and that is, an inability to give atten- 
tion. We never, for instance, find an idiot who can 
steadily attend to a long argument, and estimate the 
point and weight of its conclusion ; even if it be of 
such a simple nature that he can understand the 
separate ideas and propositions involved in it. 

§ 159. Of the natural and moral Sensibilities in 
Idiocy. 

Such is the intellectual power, or, rather, want of 
intellectual power, which characterizes the condition 
of this unfortunate class of persons. If we pass 
from the Intellect into the region of the Sensibilities, 
we shall find them estranged, in an almost equal 
degree, from the common measure of human emo- 
tion and passion. In general, they take but a little 
interest in the loves and hatreds, the joys and the 
sorrows of others, even of their near friends. They 
show no disposition to engage in the pursuits which 
fire the hearts and prompt the efforts of all around 
them, but appear to be lost, if one may use the ex- 
pression, in the abyss of their own fatuity. Their 
want of emotion, as well as the defect of thought, is 
indicated by a vacant gaze, and a general absence of 
meaning and expression in the countenance. 

If we pass from the natural to the moral sensibil- 
Z2 



270 NATURE AND CAUSES OF IDIOCY. 

ities, we find it no better. Whatever injury the idiof 
may do, he is not, in general, regarded as accounta- 
ble for it. In a multitude of cases, he is not capa- 
ble of distinguishing right from wrong ; and, conse- 
quently, is not considered a proper subject of moral 
blame or approbation from others. Nor can it well 
be otherwise. Our moral nature is so constituted, 
that it necessarily acts in view of facts, knowledge, 
the deductions of reasoning. We cannot feel a thing 
to be right or wrong, unless we know something of 
the nature of the thing and of its relations. If a 
man has no knowledge, from the nature of the case, 
he will have no conscience ; or, rather, there will be 
no developement, no exercise of the conscience. If 
a man of a sound mind sets fire to an inhabited 
house, he does wrong, and is justly punishable, be- 
cause he fully understands the consequences of such 
an act ; but the idiot, who does the same thing, is 
not treated as a wrong-doer and as punishable, sim- 
ply because to estimate the consequences in such a 
case is beyond his capacity. The idiot, therefore, 
possesses, as a general thing, no conscience, be- 
cause he has no adequate basis for conscience to 
rest upon ; in other words, no adequate powers of 
perception and reasoning. — This is a description of 
common cases of idiocy ; but there are gradations 
in this, as well as in all other mental weaknesses 
and disorders. 

§ 160. Of certain marked or peculiar aspects of 
Idiocy. 

There is one peculiarity of idiocy which it seems 



NATURE AND CAUSES OF IDIOCY. 271 

proper to notice here. It is sometimes the case that 
there is something left ; some form of mental power, 
which exists as an exception to the general character 
of the mind. Some persons, for instance, who are 
justly considered as idiots, nevertheless show con- 
siderable power in matching rhymes. This power 
alone seems to be left to them ; and, by means of it, 
they are enabled to furnish some degree of amuse- 
ment to themselves and others. Others, again, will 
exhibit some degree of mechanical genius ; enough, 
in the general prostration of their powers, to attract 
the notice of strangers, while it gives employment to 
themselves ; but it is always exercised on a small 
scale, and is remarkable only from the fact of its ex- 
isting in connexion with idiocy. 

There have also been instances of idiots, as we 
have already had occasion to intimate, who have 
shown considerable power of memory. They ac- 
curately repeat what they have seen and heard, al- 
though they cannot apply to their knowledge, which 
generally consists of a mere series of external and 
unimportant facts, the ordinary powers of judgment. 
Some are said to be interested with diversities of 
colours, and to show a talent for the copying of 
paintings. Sometimes they appear to understand 
the nature of musical sounds ; and continually re- 
peat some simple and melancholy air. These things 
relieve, although they do not essentially alter, the 
character of their fatuity. There is just enough left 
imperfecdy and sadly to indicate what the mind 
might have been if a mysterious Providence had oth- 
wise ordained* 



272 NATURE AND CAUSES OP IDIOCY. 

§ 161. Of the origin and causes of Idiocy. 
Idiotism is sometimes congenital or natural ; that 
IS the causes of it exist from the commencement of 
In many of these cases, there is a greater or 
less bodily malformation ; the scull is of a size less 
than common, and there is a disproportion between 
the face and the head, the former being larger in 
proportion than the latter. The bones of the head 
are asserted by Dr. Rush to be preternaturally thick • 
and the consequence of this is a diminution of the 

internal capacity of the cranium « What appears 

most striking" (says Pinel, in giving an account of 
an Idiot m the asylum Bicetre) «is the extremely 
disproportionate extent of the face compared with 
the diminutive size of the cranium. No traits of 
animation are visible in his physiognomy. Every 
line indicates the most absolute stupidity. Between 
the height of the head and that of the whole stature, 
there is a very great disproportion. The cranium 
is greatly depressed, both at the crown and at the 
temples. His looks are heavy, and his mouth wide 
open. The whole extent of his knowledge is con- 
faned to three or four confused ideas, and that of his 
speech to as many inarticulate sounds."* 

From this instance, which is one of the lowest 
torms of idiocy, and from others where there was a 
similar conformation of the head, Pinel seems to be 
inclined to the opinion that a malconformation of 
the head in particular is the cause of idiotism when 
It exists from infancy. 

* Pinel's Treatise on Insanity (Davis's Translation), sect. iii. 



NATURE AND CAUSES OF IDIOCY. 273 

The absence or weakness of intellectual power, 
which is termed idiocy, is often found to exist from 
other causes. Men of great mental ability have 
sometimes sunk into the state of idiotism, in conse- 
quence of too great and long-continued application of 
the mind, a tasking of its powers beyond their great- 
est strength. Sometimes, on the contrary, the same 
results seem to have followed from too little applica- 
tion, especially when combined with a disrelish for 
social intercourse, which might have checked, and 
probably have prevented, an entire prostration. It 
is obviously one of the great laws of the mind, that 
the progress or advancement of its powers is con- 
nected with a suitable degree of exercise. If, 
therefore, a person withdraws into inane and idle 
solitude ; if he pertinaciously withholds himself from 
the communion and conflicts of society, and thus 
loses the opportunity both of acquiring a fund of new 
ideas and of renovating his former stores of knowl- 
edge, he will be likely to find his mind collapsing 
into a state of weakness and ignorance, approaching, 
in the end, the condition of idiocy. 

§ 162. Idiocy to be ascribed sometimes to the effects 
of Jlge. 

Idiocy appears, in some cases, to be induced by 
mere old age. The senses at that period of hfe be- 
come dull ; the ideas received from them are less 
lively than formerly ; the memory fails, and with it 
the power of reasoning ; and there is sometimes 
combined with these unfavourable circumstances a 
want of interest in persons and events, a coldness 



274 NATURE AND CAUSES OF IDIOCY. 

and sluggishness of feeling, which perhaps cannot 
be considered altogether surprising at that period of 
life, but which is obviously unpropitious to the pres- 
ervation of mental energy. In referring to old age, 
however, in this connexion, it is proper to modify 
this general statement by one or two remarks. 
When idiocy is superinduced by the influences of old 
age, this result is found for the most part to take 
place in those persons only in whom the External 
intellect alone has been cultivated. They have been 
so situated, being deprived in early life of instruc- 
tion, and always deprived of the use of books, that 
their minds have been exercised exclusively in con- 
nexion with the senses. They know but very httle 
more than what has been directly addressed to the 
touch, sight, and taste. The inward fountains of 
thought, original suggestion, consciousness, judg- 
ment, reasoning, are in a great degree sealed up. 
Consequently, when in extreme old age the outward 
senses are unable to perform their office, it is una- 
voidable, that the mind should sink back into a state 
of feebleness, exhibiting all the ordinary characteris- 
tics of idiocy. 

Further ; this state of the mind may be caused by 
various * diseases, such as violent fevers, which at 
times suddenly disturb the mental powers, produce 
a temporary delirium, and then leave the faculties of 
the mind in a permanently torpid and inefficient con- 
dition. It may originate also in the abuse of ardent 
spirits, from great grief, from violent blows on the 
head, from sudden and great terror, &c. The idi- 
ocy, which is natural, and exists from infancy, has 



NATURE AND CAUSES OF IDIOCY. 275 

sometimes been distinguished from that which is 
brought on by the above-mentioned and other causes 
in after hfe ; but the mental condition being in both 
cases essentially the same, they may properly be 
considered together in one view. 

§ 163. Illustrations of the causes of Idiocy, 
Great and sudden terror was mentioned as one 
of the causes of idiocy. Very great and sudden 
excitements of any of the passions may produce the 
same effect. We know of no illustrations of this 
statement more striking than the following, from the 
interesting work of Pinel on Insanity. — " The feel- 
ings of individuals, endowed with acute sensibility, 
may experience so violent a shock, that all the func- 
tions of the mind are in danger of being suspended 
in their exercises or totally abolished. Sudden joy 
and excessive fear are equally capable of producing 
this inexplicable phenomenon. An engineer pro- 
posed to the committee of public safety, in the sec- 
ond year of the [French] repubUc, a project for a 
new invented cannon, of which the effects would be 
tremendous. A day was fixed for the experiment 
at Meudon ; and Robespierre wrote to the inventor 
so flattering a letter, that, upon perusing it, he was 
transfixed motionless to the spot. He was shortly, 
afterward sent to Bicetre in a state of complete idi- 
otism. 

" About the same time, two young conscripts, who 
had recently joined the army, were called into ac- 
tion. In the heat of the engagement one of them 
was killed by a musket-ball at the side of his broth* 



276 NATURE AND CAUSES OF IDIOCY. 

er. The surviver, petrified with horror, was struck 
motionless at the sight. Some days afterward he 
was sent, in a state of complete idiotism, to his fa- 
ther's house. His arrival produced a similar im- 
pression upon a third son of the same family. The 
news of the death of one of the brothers, and the de- 
rangement of the other, threw this third victim into 
such a state of consternation and stupor as might 
have defied the powers of ancient or modern poetry 
to give an adequate representation of it. My sym- 
pathetic feelings have been frequently arrested by 
the sad wreck of humanity, presented in the appear- 
ance of these degraded beings ; but it was a scene 
truly heart-rending to see the wretched father come 
to weep over these miserable remains of his once 
enviable family." 

§ 164. Of restoration from a state of Idiocy* 

Idiocy, so far as we have been able to learn, is 
considered incurable ; at least a restoration from it 
is more difficult and less probable than from the 
more common forms of defective mental action. 
This is especially true when it is natural and con- 
genital ; which is understood, as a general thing, to 
imply an imperfect or deformed structure of the cer- 
ebral organ. And, when it is otherwise, it cannot 
be denied that the encouragement to effort is small. 
One thing, however, ought to be done. The idiot 
should be instructed to the extent of his capacity, 
whether more or less. Who knows but a faithful 
training within the narrow limits of his mental capa- 
bility may arouse some dormant energy, may disen- 



NATURE AND CAUSES OF IDIOCY. 277 

tangle and adjust some disordered intellectual action, 
may open to his astonished apprehension some new 
fountain of thought, and thus produce a complete in- 
ternal revolution. Such a result, as facts might be 
adduced to show, is not altogether hopeless ; al- 
though undoubtedly the preparatory efforts are such 
as to require a high degree of faith and patience. 

§ 165. Of the beneficial results connected with 
Idiocy. 

And here it might be inquired with some proprie- 
ty, what end Providence could have had in view in 
permitting the existence of these unfortunate beings, 
except it be to try the faith and patience, to quicken 
the sensibilities, and to discipline the virtues of those 
by whom they are surrounded. If there were no 
vice and no suffering in the world, how could any of 
us know that we possess a nature which would turn 
with horror from crime, or would melt with pity at 
misfortune ? 

There is an interesting poem of Wordsworth, en- 
titled the Cumberlatid Beggar. The whole business 
of the poor old man is to go from cottage to cottage, 
on his daily errands of want. In the decrepitude of 
age, he advances so slow that " the cottage curs, ere 
he have passed the door, will turn away weary of 
barking at him." But Wordsworth contends, in the 
spirit of a philosopher as well as of a poet, that the 
old man, though wholly dependant upon others, is 
not without some benefit to mankind. He not only 
serves to remind the villagers, as he wanders in his 
poverty among them, of the past offices of kindness 

Aa 



278 NATURE AND CAUSES OF IDIOCY. 

which they have shown him, and again to awakefi, 
as he presents anew his decrepit form, the spirit of 
benevolence ; but he helps to quicken in their hearts 
the recollection of their own comparatively favoured 
situation, and to keep more vividly alive the decay- 
ing sentiments of religious gratitude. This is the 
important office which Providence assigns him ; and 
who will say that the idiot, a being still more de- 
graded, still more capable of appealing to our sym- 
pathies, does less ! He stands a perpetual monitor, 
appointed in the wisdom of an inscrutable Superin- 
tendence, to teach us that man, in his natural ele- 
ments, is what he is, not by his own volition, but by 
the gift of God ; and to remind us individually of 
what we iiave more than others, and of what we are 
bound in pity and in duty to do for those who have 
less. 

" And while in that vast sohtude, to which 
The tide of things has led him, he appears 
To breathe and live but for himself alone, 
Unblamed, uninjured, let him bear about 
The good, which the benignant law of Heaven 
Has hung around him ; and, while life is his. 
Still let him prompt the unletter'd villagers 
To tender offices and pensive thoughts." 



IMPERFECT AND DISORDERED 



MENTAL ACTION 



DIVISION SECOND. 



DISORDERED ACTION OF THE SENSIBILITIES. 



DERANGEMENT 

OF THE 

SENSIBILITIES. 

CHAPTER I. 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE APPETITES. 

§ 166. Classification and method of inquiry. 
We now enter upon a distinct and very important 
department of the mental nature, viz., the Sensibili- 
ties. — The SensibiUties, like the Intellect, are sus- 
ceptible of some subordinate divisions ; the most 
important of which is the leading and most general 
one of the Natural and the Moral Sensibilities. Of 
these two we propose to consider, first, the Natural 
Sensibilities. Of the elementary or simple feelings, 
which come under this general head, the leading di- 
vision is into Emotions and Desires. As we ad- 
vance from the Intellect to the Natural or Pathe- 
matic Sensibilities, we find ourselves in the region 
of the natural Emotions. These are followed by 
Desires. 

The Desires, for the most part in combination 
Aa2 



282 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE APPETITES. 

with Emotions, assume a number of distinct and im- 
portant modifications or forms, viz., the Appetites, 
Propensities, and Affections, We propose, under 
this general head of the Natural Sensibilities, to 
prosecute the subject of alienated or depraved men- 
tal action, in connexion with these principles in par- 
ticular. — It is true that the emotions and desires, 
in their simple or elementary state, are susceptible 
of an inordinate or depraved action ; but they do not 
appear to furnish, in that form, a sufficient basis for 
a prolonged, definite, and scientific discussion. It 
is in their combination with each other ; it is in the 
shape of appetitive, propensive, and affective princi- 
ples, which, in general, are the result of such com- 
bination, that they stand out prominently to the eye, 
and give a definite aspect to the character. We 
shall begin, therefore, with the Appetites, which will 
be followed in the order in which they have been 
named by remarks on the Propensities, and, finally, 
by a consideration of the Aflfections, including un- 
der that term the two leading divisions of the Benev- 
olent and Malevolent Affections. 

§ 167. Of the distinction between mere disorder and 
Insanity of the Sensibilities.' 

It may be proper to keep in mind here, that a dis- 
tinction may be drawn satisfactorily between mere 
disorder or irregularity of the sensibilities, and in- 
sanity of the sensibilities. Insanity indicates not 
merely disorder, but disorder existing in a high de- 
gree. When, for instance, the disordered or irreg- 
ular state *of mind, which at first existed only in a 



DISORDERED ACTION OF THE APPETITES. 283 

slight degree, continually increases, so as at last to 
pass a certain boundary, which is more easily con- 
ceived of than described, it becomes Insanity or 
Alienation. That is to say, the merely irregular 
action becomes an insane or aliented action, when it 
becomes so great, so pervading, and so deeply root- 
ed in the mind that the individual has no power of 
riestoration in himself. So that it would seem to 
follow, in view of this remark, that there may be a 
disordered state of the mind which is insanity ; and, 
under other circumstances, a disordered state of the 
mind which is not insanity, or, rather, which is less 
than insanity. But, in either case, this condition of 
mind is not to be regarded, nor is it, in point of fact, 
a sound mental state. Although we may not be 
able to say, specifically, in a given case, that the 
disorder has reached the point of insanity, yet it is 
certain that the mind in this disordered state, wheth- 
er jthe disorder be greater or less, is presented to our 
view in a new and important aspect. 

^ 168. Of the disordered and alienated action of the 
Appetites. 

In accordance with the plan of discussion propo- 
sed in the first section of this chapter, we proceed 
to remark, in the first place, that there may be a 
disordered and alienated action of the Appetites. — 
It is well known, that the appetites grow stronger 
and stronger by repeated indulgence. While the 
process of increased appetitive tendency is going on, 
there still remains, in the majority of cases, enough 
of remonstrance in the conscience, and of restrictive 



284 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE APPETITES. 

and aggressive energy in the will, to ward off that 
state of thraldom which is rapidly approaching. But 
in some melancholy cases it is otherwise ; the line 
of demarcation, which separates the possibility and 
the impossibility of a restoration, is passed ; and 
from that time onward there is nothing but inter- 
minable sinking. Such cases as these may un- 
doubtedly be regarded as coming within the limits 
of some of the multiplied forms of mental alienation. 
-The most frequent instances of mental alienation, 
originating in a disordered and excessive energy of 
the appetites, are to be found in that numerous class 
of persons who habitually indulge in the use of in- 
toxicating drugs, particularly ardent spirits. When 
the person who indulges in the use of intoxicating 
liquors has so increased the energy of this pernicious 
appetite as really to bring himself within the limits 
of mental alienation, there is no hope of a return by 
means of any effort which he himself is capable .of 
making. He may have a clear perception of the 
misery of his situation ; the desire of esteem may 
still arouse within him the recollection of what he 
once was and of what he still ought to be ; the con- 
science may still speak out in remonstrance, though 
probably with a diminished voice ; the will may con- 
tinue to put forth some ineffectual struggles ; but it 
is found to be all in vain. If left to himself, and 
not put under that constraint which is proper to per- 
sons in actual insanity, it may be regarded as a 
matter of moral certainty that he will plunge deep- 
er and deeper in the degrading vice of which he is 



DISORDERED ACTION OF THE APPETITES. 285 

the subject, so long as the remaining powers of life 
shall support him in the process. 

§ 169. Facts illustrative of the preceding statements* 
The individuals who are in this situation seem 
themselves to have a consciousness of their danger. 
They see clearly that in their own strength there is 
no hope. Some years since there was a pamphlet 
published in England, entitled the Confessions of a 
Drunkard. The statements made in it are asserted, 
on good authority, to be authentic. And what does 
the writer say ? "Of my condition there is no hope 
that it should ever change ; the waters have gone 
over me ; but out of the black depths, could I be 
heard, I would cry out to all those who have but set 
a foot in the perilous flood. Could the youth, to 
whom the flavour of his first wine is delicious as the 
opening scenes of life, or the entering upon some 
newly-discovered paradise, look into my desolation, 
and be made to understand what a dreary thing it is 
when a man shall feel himself going down a preci- 
pice with open eyes and a passive will ; to see his 
destruction, and have no power to stop it, and yet to 
feel it all the way emanating from himself; to per- 
ceive all goodness emptied out of him, and yet not 
be able to forget a time when it was otherwise ; to 
bear about the piteous spectacle of his own self 
ruins : could he see my fevered eye, feverish with 
the last night's drinking, and feverishly looking for 
this night's repetition of the folly ; could he feel the 
body of the death out of which I cry hourly, with 
feebler and feebler outcry, to be delivered, it" were 



286 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE APPETITES. 

enough to make him dash the sparkling beverage to 
the earth in all the pride of its mantling tempta- 
tion."* 

In repeated instances persons, whose desire for 
intoxicating articles has become inordinately strong, 
have gone to keepers of penitentiaries and other 
prisons, and earnestly entreated for admission, on 
the ground that nothing short of strict seclusion 
within their massy walls would secure them against 
the ruinous indulgence of their appetite. — " The use 
of strong drink" (says Dr. Rush, Diseases of the 
Mind, chap, x.) "is at first the effect of free agency. 
From habit it takes place from necessity. That this 
is the case, I infer from persons who are inordinate- 
ly devoted to the use of ardent spirits being irre- 
claimable, by all the considerations which domestic 
obligations, friendship, reputation, property, and 
sometimes even by those which religion and the 
love of life can suggest to them. An instance of 
insensibility to the last, in an habitual drunkard, oc- 
curred some years ago in Philadelphia. When 
strongly urged by one of his friends to leave off 
drinking, he said, ' Were a keg of rum in one cor- 
ner of a room, and were a cannon constantly dis- 
charging balls between me and it, I could not re- 
frain from passing before that cannon, in order to 
get at the rum.' " 

^ 170. Further notices on the disorder of the 
Appetites, 

Before leaving this subject we wish to recur a 

* London Quarterly Review, vol. xvii,, p. 120. 



DISORDERED ACTION OF THE APPETITES. 287 

moment to some remarks of Mr. Stewart in regard 
to the Appetites. He says they may be distinguish- 
ed by the three following things : (1.) They take 
their rise from the body, and are common to men 
with the brutes. (2.) They are not constant, but 
occasional. (3.) They are accompanied with an 
uneasy sensation, which is strong or weak, in pro- 
portion to the strength or weakness of the Appetite. 

He then goes on to state that our Appetites are 
three in number, viz., hunger, thirst, and the 
APPETITE OF SEX. — What has been said will suffi- 
ciently illustrate, in consequence of the close analo- 
gy between them, the disordered action of the first 
two, although the statements given had particular 
relation to the irregularities of the Appetite of thirst. 

The Appetite of Sex, also, is susceptible of an 
unrestrained and inordinate action, not only indica- 
ting insanity in the specific principle or Appetite it- 
self, but resulting in a disorganization and insanity 
of other parts of the mind. On this subject, as this 
Treatise is designed for general reading, we do not 
propose to dwell. It will be enough to say, that 
very melancholy instances of the operations and ef- 
fects of this disordered Appetite are found in many 
writers on Insanity, to which we hope the reader 
will excuse us for referring him. — (See, among 
other Works, Rush on the Diseases of the Mind, 
ch. xviii.) 



288 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 



CHAPTER II. 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE PROPENSITIES, 
(l.) PROPENSITY OF SELF-PRESERVATION. 

§ 171. General remarhs on the Propensities. 

As we proceed in the examination of the Natural 
or Pathematic SensibiUties, we meet with certain 
modifications or forms of Desire which, as they are 
different from the Appetites, require a distinct con- 
sideration. These distinct principles, which are 
known as the propensive principles or Propensities, 
differ from the Appetites, first, in the circumstance 
that they are much less dependant for their existence 
and exercise upon the condition of the body ; and, 
SECONDLY, because, in that comparative estimation 
which is naturally attached to the different active 
principles of our nature, they confessedly hold a 
higher rank. At the same time they evidently, in 
the graduation of our regard, fall below the Affec- 
tions, besides being distinguished from them in other 
respects. And hence they may be regarded as 
holding a sort of intermediate place between the 
Appetites on the one hand, and the Affections on 
the other. 

Among the leading or more important of the Pro- 
pensities may be enumerated the principle of Self- 



(l) propensity of self-preservation. 289 

preservation, or the desire of continued existence ; 
Curiosity, or the desire of knowledge ; Sociality, or 
the desire of society ; Self-love, or the desire of 
happiness ; the desire of Esteem ; Imitativeness, or 
the propensity to imitate ; and some others. All 
these, it will be noticed, are modifications of De- 
sire ; and yet there is reason to believe that a pleas- 
ant emotion, in view of the object towards which 
the desire is directed, is the preparatory condition or 
basis of the existence of the desire. And not only 
this, it is possible at least that the emotion may con- 
tinue subsequently (as is the fact in the Affections) 
to exist in connexion with the desires ; constituting, 
in this manner, the ground of their continuance, as 
well as the ground or condition of their origin. But 
these are points which may properly and safely be 
left to mental philosophers. 

What we have to say here is, that the various 
Propensities which have been mentioned (and what- 
ever others may properly come under the denomina- 
tion of Propensities) are susceptible of irregularity, 
from the lowest degree of disorder to the higher 
form of Insanity. 

^ 172. Disordered action of the principle of Self 
preservation. 

In the prosecution of this part of our subject, we 
begin, as it is one which would naturally present it- 
self first for our consideration, with the propensive 
principle of Self-preservation, or what may be des- 
ignated, in other terms, as the natural desire of a 
continuance of existence. This principle, like the 

B B 



290 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

others of the same class, although not generally in 
SO marked a degree, will sometimes manifest itself 
under such circumstances, and in such a manner, as 
obviously to show that its action is not a natural, 
regular, or healthy action. Persons under the in- 
fluence of the disordered action of the principle 
which is connected with the preservation of life 
multiply, as they would be naturally disposed to do, 
images of danger and terror which have no exist- 
ence, nor likeness of existence, except in their own 
disordered minds. They not only see perils which 
are invisible to others, but are led to take a multi- 
tude of precautions which, in the estimation of those 
around them, are altogether unnecessary, and even 
ridiculous. 

Pinel, under the head of Melancholy, mentions 
a case which may be considered as illustrating this 
subject : " A distinguished miUtary officer" (he says), 
" after fifty years of active service in the cavalry, was 
attacked with disease. It commenced by his expe- 
riencing vivid emotions from the slightest causes ; 
if, for example, he heard any disease spoken of, he 
immediately believed himself to be attacked by it ; 
if any one was mentioned as deranged in intellect, 
he imagined himself insane, and retired into his 
chamber full of melancholy thoughts and inquietude. 
Everything became for him a subject of fear and 
alarm. If he entered into a house, he was afraid 
that the floor would fall and precipitate him amid 
its ruins. He could not pass a bridge without ter- 
ror, unless impelled by the sentiment of honour for 
the purpose of fighting."* 

* Pinal, as quoted in Combers Phrenology, Boston ed., p. 241. 



(l.) PROPENSITY OF SELF-PRESERVATION. 291 

§ 173. Other disordered forms of the SelfpreserV' 
alive 'principle. 

The Propensity of Self-preservation, or desire of 
the continuance of existence, is generally, and, as 
we suppose, very correctly, considered an original or 
implanted principle of the human mind. As such 
it unquestionably has its distinctive nature, adapted 
to the precise object for which it was implanted. 
We must suppose, therefore, that it has a regular or 
normal action, as well as an irregular or abnormal 
one. And it is deviation from the regular action 
which constitutes irregularity of action. This ir- 
regularity, therefore, may show itself either in the 
form of excess of action, or of defect of action, or, 
what amounts to nearly the same thing, by too great 
energy or too great weakness of action. The in- 
stance which has been given from Pinel shows a 
disorder or irregularity of the action of this principle 
in excess. There are other cases, which seem not 
less clearly to show, that the form or shape of the 
disorder may sometimes be that of inordinate weak- 
ness or defect. We shall proceed here to introduce 
one or two cases of this kind. 

We find the following statement in the Commen- 
taries on Insanity of Dr. Burrows (p. 440) : " Har- 
riet Cooper, of Haden Hill, Rowley Regis, aged ten 
years and two months, upon being reproved for a 
trifling indiscretion, went up stairs, after exhibiting 
symptoms of grief by crying and sobbing, and hung 
herself in a pair of cotton braces from the rail of a 
tent-bed. A girl named Green, eleven years old, 



292 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

drowned herself in the New River, from the fear of 
correction for a trivial fault." 

" A French journal" (says Dr. Ray, in his valua- 
ble Treatise on Medical Jurisprudence, p. 375) " has 
lately reported the case of a boy twelve years old, 
who hung himself by fastening his handkerchief to 
a nail in the wall, and passing a loop of it around 
his neck, for no other reason than because he had 
been shut up in his room, and allowed only dry 
bread, as a punishment for breaking his father's 
watch. The same journal gives another case of a 
suicide committed by a boy eleven years old, for 
being reproved by his father ; and several more of 
a similar description are also recorded."* 

The records of such cases, melancholy as they 
are, might undoubtedly be very much multiplied. 
We have ourselves known a lad, about fourteen 
years old, on the occasion, as was supposed, of 
some trifling disquietude or offence similar to those 
which have just been mentioned, go out of the shop 
where he worked, and, in the light and pleasantness 
of a summer's day, put an end to his life by hang- 
ing himself from a tree in a neighbouring garden. 

§ 174. Explanation of the above-mentioned cases. 

Attempts have been made to trace the origin of 
all such cases exclusively to some form of disease 
existing in the physical system ; to a disease, for in- 
stance, of the thoracic or abdominal viscera, or 
somewhere else ; but, so far as we have been able 
to perceive, not with entire satisfaction. In many 

* Medico-Chirurgical Review, No. 8, vol. xxvii., p. 212, 



(l.) PROPENSITY OF SELF-PRESERVATION. 293 

cases, undoubtedly, the cause of mental disorder is 
to be sought in the previously disordered condition 
of the body, particularly the nervous system ; but 
it does not appear that this is always the fact. Not 
unfrequently, in cases of suicide, there is no per- 
ceptible change, no morbid developement in the 
body, which can furnish an explanation of that pe- 
culiar, and, for the most part, insane state of mind 
which leads to self-destruction. This is acknowl- 
edged, if we may rely upon the statements of Dr. 
Burrows in the case, by a number of distinguished 
physicians. " The same" (says Burrows, Comm., 
p. 416) "is observed in all cases of Insanity where 
the patient dies from any accident soon after he has 
become insane. The maniacal action [by which he 
means the disorder existing mentally] has not had 
time to take deep root, and no visible change in the 
intellectual organ [the brain] is therefore detected. 
This is additional testimony, which leads to the nat- 
ural inference, that, when morbid changes are dis- 
covered in the brain, they are generally the conse- 
quences, and not the causes of menial derangement,^^ 
What view, then, shall be taken of the cases 
which have just now been mentioned, and others 
like them ? If physical disease, so far as we can 
judge, will not account for all of them, what further 
can be said? The simple fact seems to be, that 
frequently, in the instance of such persons, the prin- 
ciple of self-preservation, which in almost all cases 
binds men so strongly to the present Hfe, either does 
not exist at all, or exists in very much diminished 
strength. If a man may be born destitute, in a great 

Bb2 



294 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

degree, of some of the appetites or affections, or des- 
titute of all powers of reasoning, as in the case of 
idiots, why may he not also come into the world with 
the propensity of self-preservation inordinately weak, 
so much so as scarcely to have any influence over 
his actions ? 

§ 175. Further remarks on this subject. 

This view is confirmed not only by the considera- 
tion that, in many cases of suicide, medical philoso- 
phers themselves being the judges, there is no pre- 
tence at all of there being any disease or lesion of the 
physical organs ; but also by the fact, although this 
circumstance might not of itself alone be a decisive 
one, that the tendency to suicide appears frequently 
to be hereditary. — " I have had several members of 
one family under my care" (says Dr. Burrows), 
" where this propensity declared itself through three 
generations. In the first, the grandfather hung him- 
self ; he lei^t four sons. One hung himself; an- 
other cut his throat ; and a third drowned himself 
in a most extraordinary manner, after being some 
months insane ; the fourth died a natural death, 
which, from his eccentricity and unequal mind, was 
scarcely to be expected. Two of these sons had 
large families. One child of the third son died in- 
sane ; two others drowned themselves ; another is 
now insane, and has made the most determinate at- 
tempts on his life. — Several of the progeny of this 
family, being the fourth generation, who are now ar- 
rived at puberty, bear strong marks of the same 
fatal propensity." 



(l.) PROPENSITY OF SELF-PRESERVATION. 296 

Mental traits and peculiarities are propagated 
(such is the great law of Providence) with nearly as 
much certainty, in other words, with nearly as defi- 
nite reference to the principles of propagative succes- 
sion, as those of the body. If the parents exhibit a 
mental defect or disorder, the children will be very 
likely to do the same. If the parents are suicides, 
and if the suicidal tendency, as is frequently the fact, 
has its basis in undue weakness or estrangement of 
the self- preservative principle, we should not be sur- 
prised to find the same tendency developing itself in 
some of their descendants. 

The supposition, then, which we make, in refer- 
ence to such cases of suicide as have been detailed, 
and many others like them, is, that the Propensity of 
Self-preservation is, naturally and by the inheritance 
of birth, disordered by defect ; in other words, inor- 
dinately weak, so much so as to fail in fulfilling the 
ordinary purposes of life. Consequently, when 
some disappointment arises, when some slight pun- 
ishment is inflicted, when some current of public 
opinion sets against the individual, the dissatisfaction 
and melancholy which naturally follow are frequently 
found to be too great for the opposing and conserva- 
tive principle of self-preservation, which, in their case, 
is unfortunately almost destitute of power. The 
strong chain which ordinarily binds men to the pres- 
ent scene, is, in their case, so exceedingly weak, that, 
one after another, they escape out of life on the very 
slightest occasions, and leave those behind them to 
weep and wonder at the strangeness of the event. 
It is like what we sometimes witness in a time of 



296 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

storms and inundations, when those things which 
are but weakly moored in their position are swept 
away, and only those which are strongly fastened 
remain. 



CHAPTER III. 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE PROPENSITIES, 
(ll.) PROPENSITY TO ACCiUIRE OR ACQUISITIVENESS. 

^ 176. The propensity to acquire an original or 
implanted one. 

So far as we have been able to observe, it seems 
to be at last very generally conceded by writers on 
the Human Mind, however much they may differ on 
other points, that there is implanted within us an 
original disposition or propensity to acquire. Nor 
could we reasonably expect that it should be other- 
wise. It is difficult to conceive of a being, sustain- 
ing in the moral world the high rank which man 
does, and yet constituted on the principle of an en- 
tire exclusion of the Possessory desire. How can a 
rational being, in the undisturbed exercise of his 
powers, do otherwise than desire his own existence 
and happiness; and, consequently, those things, 
whatever they may be, which are essential to his ex- 
istence and happiness. Accordingly, an inspired 
apostle directs the Corinthians not only to " covet to 



(ll.) PROPENSITY OF ACQUISITIVENESS. 297 

prophesy," but, in general terms, " to covet earnestly 
the best gifts." 1 Cor., xii., 31 ; xiv., 39. 

On this topic, however, we need not delay. We 
take it for granted (and do not suppose, after the in- 
quiries that have been made on the subject, that it 
will be considered a matter of dispute) that the prin- 
ciple in question is a connatural or implanted one. 
Like all the other propensive principles (and the 
same view will apply to the appetites and the affec- 
tions), the Acquisitive or Possessory principle has a 
twofold action, viz., instinctive and voluntary. 
And in both of these forms, as we shall now proceed 
to show, it is susceptible of an abnormal or disor- 
dered movement. 

§ 177. Instances of the first kind or form of disoV' 
dered action of the Possessory Principle. 

The instances of disordered action of the principle 
of Acquisitiveness, which naturally present them- 
selves to our notice first, are what may be termed 
Congenital or Constitutional ; and are evidently the 
irregular or disordered manifestations of the Instinc- 
tive, rather than of the Voluntary modification of this 
propensity. In the case of the persons to whorh we 
now have reference, the disposition to get possession 
of whatever can be regarded as property, whether of 
greater or less value, shows itself, not only in great 
strength, but at a very early period of life. And at 
no period of life does it appear to be a matter over 
which they have a full voluntary control. 

There are a considerable number of cases of this 
kind to be found in the writings of Gall and Spur- 



298 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

zheim ; and there are some notices of similar cases 
in a few other writers. — Fodere {Medicine Legale, 
t. i., p. 237) relates the case of a female servant 
in his own family, " who could not help stealing se- 
cretly from himself and others articles even of tri- 
fling value ; though she was intelligent, modest, and 
religious, and was all the while conscious of and ad- 
mitted the turpitude of her actions. He placed her 
in an hospital, considering her insane, and, after ap- 
parent restoration and a long trial, he again took her 
into his services. Gradually, in spite of herself, the 
instinct again mastered her ; and in the midst of an 
incessant struggle between her vicious propensity on 
the one hand and a conscientious horror of her con- 
dition on the other, she was suddenly attacked with 
mania, and died in one of its paroxysms."* 

Dr. Rush, in his Medical Inquiries, mentions a 
woman who was entirely exemplary in her conduct, 
except in one particular. " She could not refrain 
from stealing. What made this vice the more re- 
markable was, that she was in easy circumstances, 
and not addicted to extravagance in anything. Such 
was the propensity to this vice, that, when she could 
lay her hands on nothing more valuable, she would 
often, at the table of a friend, fill her pockets secretly 
with bread. She both confessed and lamented her 
crime." 

* This case is given as it is found in Dr. Ray*s Medical Ju« 
risprudence, p. 190. 



(ll.) PROPENSITY OF ACQUISITIVENESS. 299 

§ 178. Imtances illustrative of the subject from Dr* 

Gall 

Some of the facts which are given by Dr. Gall 
are as follows. — " Victor Amadeus L, king of Sar- 
dinia, was in the constant habit of stealing trifles. 
Saurin, pastor of Geneva, though possessing the 
strongest principles of reason and religion, frequently 
yielded to the propensity to steal. Another individ- 
ual was, from early youth, a victim to this inclination. 
He entered the military service, on purpose that he 
might be restrained by the severity of the discipline ; 
but, having continued his practices, he was on the 
point of being condemned to be hanged. Ever 
seeking to combat his ruling passion, he studied the- 
ology and became a Capuchin. But this propensity 
followed him even to the cloister. Here, however, 
as he found only trifles to tempt him, he indulged 
himself in his strange fancy with less scruple. He 
seized scissors, candlesticks, snuffers, cups, goblets, 
and conveyed them to his cell. An agent of the 
government at Vienna had the singular mania for 
stealing nothing but kitchen utensils. He hired 
two rooms as a place of deposite ; he did not sell, 
and made no use of them. The wife of the famous 
physician Gaubius had such a propensity to pilfer, 
that, when she made a purchase, she always sought 
to take something. The Countess M., at Wessel, 
and P., at Frankfort, had also this propensity. 
Madame de W. had been educated with peculiar 
care. Her wit and talents secured her a distin- 
guished place in society. But neither her education 



300 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

nor her fortune saved her from the most decided pro- 
pensity to theft. Lavater speaks of a physician, 
who never left the room of his patient without rob- 
bing them of something, and who never thought of 
the matter afterward. In the evening his wife used 
to examine his pockets ; she there found keys, scis- 
sors, thimbles, knives, spoons, buckles, cases, and 
sent them to their respective owners."* 

§ 179. Second form of the alienated action of the 
Possessory principle. 

There is another, a second form of the irregular 
and aUenated action of the Acquisitive Propensity, 
which differs from the first-mentioned modification 
in the important circumstance of its depending more 
upon the Will of the person himself than upon any 
constitutional or connatural trait. Cases of this 
kind, therefore, are voluntary; that is to say, are 
brought about by a course of action, the responsibil- 
ity of which rests upon the individual himself. 

Nor is there anything inconsistent with reason, 
any philosophical anomaly in this view. It is well 
known that all the principles of the mind rapidly' in- 
crease in energy and facility of movement by mere 
repetition. Not only this ; but the process may be 
carried so far as to give altogether an undue degree 
of strength to some one principle as compared with 
another. In other words, a right or healthy action 
of the mind may in this way be gradually converted 
into an inordinate, uncontrollable, or unhealthy ac- 
tion. Such as we see it not unfrequently in game- 
*Xrairs Works, vol. iv., Am. ed., p. 132. 



(ll.) PROPENSITY OF ACQUISITIVENESS. 301 

sters, mercantile men, and in other classes of persons, 
whose minds are continually exercised upon the sole 
object of increasing their possessions. 

Among the class of confirmed misers we shall be 
likely, from time to time, to find instances and illus- 
trations of this view of the subject. There are in- 
dividuals in this denomination of persons, who have 
so increased the energy of the Possessory principle 
(Acquisitiveness, as it is sometimes conveniently 
termed) by a long, voluntary course of repetition, 
that its action is obviously no longer under the con- 
trol of the Will, bui has passed over, not merely into 
the region of temporary disorder, but of positive and 
permanent insanity. Such, probably, must have been 
the situation of a certain individual mentioned by 
Valerius Maximus, who took advantage of a famine 
to sell a mouse for two hundred pence, and then, 
famished himself with the money in his pocket. — It 
is difficult to tell, however, although a person may 
unquestionably become insane in his avarice, wheth- 
er this is actually the case in any given instance, or 
whether, notwithstanding its intensity, it falls in 
some degree short of actual alienation. 

^ 180. Reference to the singular case of Sir Harvey 

Elwes. 

The reader will be able, probably, by consulting 
the resources of his own recollection, to understand 
the applications of this subject. Nevertheless, we 
take the liberty to delay a moment upon the well- 
known and somewhat singular case of Sir Harvey 
Elwes, of Stoke, in the county of Suffolk, England. 

Co 



302 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

Sir Harvey Elwes inherited from a miserly mother, 
and an uncle of the same parsimonious disposition, 
the large property of £350,000. This singular in- 
dividual, as is sometimes the case with misers, is 
said to have punctually discharged his obligations 
towards others, and in some instances even to have 
conducted with liberality ; but, in whatever concern- 
ed himself, his parsimony, notwithstanding his great 
riches, was extreme and unalterable. When trav- 
elling he accustomed himself to great abstinence, 
that he might lessen the charges of his maintenance ; 
and for the same reason he supported his horse with 
the few blades of grass which he could gather by the 
sides of hedges and in the open commons. Like 
his predecessor. Sir Harvey, from whom he seems 
to have derived his title, and who was hardly less 
miserly than his nephew, he wore the clothes of 
those who had gone before him ; and when his best 
coat was beyond the ability of any further service, 
he refused to replace it at his own expense, but ac- 
cepted one from a neighbour. He was so saving of 
fuel, that he took advantage of the industry of the 
crows in pulling down their nests ; and if any friend 
accidentally living with him were absent, he would 
carefully put out his fire and walk to a neighbour's 
house, in order that the same chimney might give 
out warmth to both. Although he never committed 
any of his transactions to writing, he could not have 
been ignorant of his immense wealth ; but this did 
not prevent his being exceedingly apprehensive that 
he should at last die with want. " Sometimes hi- 
ding his gold in small parcels in different parts of 



(ll.) PROPENSITY OF ACQUISITIVENESS. 303 

his house, he would anxiously visit the spot to as- 
certain whether each remained as he had left it: 
arising from bed, he would hasten to his bureau to 
examine if its contents were in safety. In later hfe, 
no other sentiment occupied his mind : at midnight 
he has been heard as if struggling with assailants, 
and crying out in agitation, * I will keep my money, 
I will ; nobody shall rob me of my property !' though 
no one was near to disturb him in its possession. 
At length this remarkable person died in the year 
1789, aged nearly eighty, and worth nearly a mill- 
ion."* 

^181. Reference to the case of Jeremiah Hallet, 

The case of Jeremiah Hallet, who recently died 
at Yarmouth, in Massachusetts, at the age of sixty- 
four, is very similar in a number of respects to the 
foregoing. If the statements which were circulated 
at the time of his death in the public newspapers are 
correct (and we see no reason to doubt them), he 
was certainly a very eccentric character. — It is re- 
lated of him that his mind was constantly engrossed 
by two subjects, viz., getting money, and the math- 
ematics. The first was the business, the other the 
amusement of his life. He was a miser in every 
sense of the word ; living alone for the last ten years 
of his life, and denying himself all the luxuries, and 
many of what are regarded the necessaries of life. 
He lived upon the coarsest fare ; and would sit in his 
room in cool weather without a fire, when his wood 

* Origin and Progress of the Passions (Anonymous), toI. i., 
p. 310. 



304 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

was rotting in piles ; and a shingle served him for 
the double purpose of a fireshovei and bellows. It 
is a confirmatory evidence of the disordered state 
of his mind, that he committed suicide, probably for 
some reason connected vi^ith the excited and insane 
position of the acquisitive principle. After his death, 
on examining his rooms, it was found that the whole 
value of his furniture and bedding would not exceed 
three dollars, and every room was covered with filth 
and dirt. 

And yet this man was profoundly skilled in the 
science of numbers, and could boast of greater pro- 
ficiency in the higher branches of mathematics than 
any man in the part of the country in which he lived. 



CHAPTER IV. 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE PROPENSITIES, 
(ill.) AMBITION, OR THE DESIRE OF POWER. 

^182. The desire of Power an original or implanU 
ed principle. 

Another of the Original Propensities, if we may 
reason from the facts which are almost constantly 
presented to our notice, is the Desire of Power. — It 
is true, that power is not a thing which is directly 
addressed to or cognizable by the outward senses. 



(hi.) the desire op power. 305 

We do not see Power as we see any extended ob- 
ject ; nor do we touch it ; nor is it, properly speak- 
ing, an object of the taste or of the smell. But, as 
it is itself an attribute of mind rather than of mat- 
ter, so it is revealed to us as an object of percep- 
tion and knowledge, by the Internal rather than the 
External Intellect. Nevertheless, although it is not 
a thing which is cognizable by the outward senses, 
it is as much a reality, as much an object of emo- 
tion and desire, as if that were the case. This being 
the case, we may with entire propriety speak of the 
Desire of Power ; for, wherever there is a thing, a 
reality, an object, that object may, in possibility at 
least, be desired ; but, on the other hand, where 
there is no object before the mind, it is not possible 
for desire to exist. 

In connexion with these explanatory remarks we 
repeat, what has already been stated, that the desire 
of power is natural to the human mind ; in other 
words, it is an original or implanted principle. Such 
is the doctrine of Dugald Stewart ; and it is a view 
of the subject which at the present time is very gen- 
erally assented to. 

§ 183. This propension^ like others, susceptible of 
derangement. 

We will not stop to enter into proofs of the view 
which has now been presented, for that is not our 
appropriate business at present; but taking it for 
granted that such an original principle exists in the 
human mind, we proceed to say that this important 
propensity, like the other propensive principles, is 

C c2 



306 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

susceptible of a disordered and insane action.-— 
And why should it not be so ? Men place Power 
before them in its various forms of authority, hon- 
our, high office, titled dignity, and the like, as a 
specific and brilliant object of contemplation and 
pursuit. This great object, whatever the particular 
shape in which it presents itself, they behold con- 
stantly with an excited heart and a constrained eye, 
till the corresponding Desire, strengthened by con- 
stant repetition, becomes the predominant feeling. 
If the desire increases beyond a certain point, as it 
is very likely to do under such circumstances, the 
excess of its action cannot fail to interfere with the 
appropriate action of other parts of the mind ; and 
the result is in all cases a state of disorder, often 
existing in the specific form of insanity. 

The leading characteristic of a sane and well-or- 
dered mind, as is well understood, is a harmony of 
all its parts. But such harmony does not exist, and 
no approximation to harmony, when any one princi- 
ple becomes so strong, so overbearingly dominant, 
as to suppress and trample on all the rest. The prin- 
ciple under consideration may, by a gradual increase 
and exercise, become so powerful (and who can say 
that this was not the fact even in the case of such 
men as Julius Caesar, Napoleon, and others of that 
class ?) as to bring the Will itself, which is the great 
regulating principle of the mind, into subjection. 
And such complete subjection, too, that persons in 
this situation can no more be accounted persons of 
truly free and sane minds than the drunkard can, 
mentioned by Dr. Rush, whose appetite was such, 



(ni.) THE DESIRE OF POWER. 307 

that cannon balls discharged between him and his 
liquor could not prevent his rushing after it. 

^184. Results of a disappointed love of Power. 

And this is not all ; nor the only point of view in 
which the subject is to be contemplated. If the 
aspiring and ambitious tendency, when it has in- 
creased in strength to a high degree, is suddenly and 
greatly disappointed, as it is very likely to be, the 
reaction upon the whole mind may be such as to 
cause disorder in all its functions, and leave it a 
wide mass of ruins. 

The history of those who are confined in Insane 
Hospitals furnishes a strong presumption that such 
results are not unfrequent. Although the mind is 
deranged, the predominant feeling which led to the 
derangement seems still to remain. One individ- 
ual challenges for himself the honours of a chancel- 
lor, another of a king ; one is a member of Parlia- 
ment, another is the lord-mayor of London ; one, 
under the name of the Duke of Wellington or Bo- 
naparte, claims to be the commander of mighty ar- 
mies, another announces himself with the tone and 
attitude of a prophet of the Most High. Pinel in- 
forms us that there were at one time no less than 
three maniacs in one of the French Insane Hospi- 
tals, each of whom assumed to be Louis XIV. On 
one occasion these individuals were found disputing 
with each other, with a great degree of energy, their 
respective rights to the throne. The dispute was 
terminated by the sagacity of the superintendent, 
who, approaching one of them, gave him, with a se- 



308 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

rious look, to understand that he ought not to dis- 
pute on the subject with the others, since they were 
obviously mad. '• Is it not well known" (said the 
superintendent) " that you alone ought to be ac- 
knowledged as Louis XIV. ?" The insane person, 
flattered with this homage, cast upon his compan- 
ions a look of the most marked disdain, and imme- 
diately retired. 

§ 185. Mditional illustrations of this subject. 

Dr. Gall has given an account of an individual, 
in whom undoubtedly the passions of self-esteem 
and pride were somewhat marked, but who seems 
equally well, and perhaps in a higher degree, to fur- 
nish an illustration of the inordinate exercise of the 
principle before us. He speaks of this individual 
as a person who, in childhood, could never get fa- 
mihar with his companions, nor in adult age with 
his equals. During a long-continued illness, re- 
sulting from a blow on his head, he exhibited his 
predominant traits in a still higher degree ; so much 
so, that if he could not be considered insane in the 
ordinary sense of the term, he certainly could not 
be considered a person of a perfectly sound mind. 
Among other things indicative of his peculiar state 
of mind, it is remarked of him, that " he treated his 
superiors like subordinates, and wrote them letters 
in a laconic imperative style, ordering them to yield 
this or that favour or distinction."* 

Mr. Locke also, in his Letters on Toleration, 
gives some notice of an individual of an ambitious 

* Gall's Works, Boston ed., vol. iv., p. 178. 



(hi.) the desire of power. 309 

temperament, whose mind was so long and earnestly 
fixed on some high object that he became insane. 

§ 186. Of this form of Insanity in connexion with 
particular periods of society. 

During the tremendous events of the first French 
Revolution, and for some subsequent years, when, 
in consequence of the great disorganization of civil 
and political principles and precedents, the way was 
open to the indulgence and the attainment of splen- 
did hopes, the desire of Power (the ambitious prin- 
ciple, as we may, perhaps, conveniently term it) was 
called into frequent and energetic exercise : so much 
so as to authorize the assertion, by well-informed 
persons, that the cases of insanity occurring during 
that period took their character in a very marked 
degree from this state of things. Superior to va- 
rious other influences which sometimes disorder the 
human mind, they nevertheless went mad with Am- 
bition. Accordingly, if a person entered the lunatic 
establishments of that country during the period in 
question, he found, in the language of Dr. Conolly, 
a great proportion of the male patients believing 
"themselves to be persons of great importance, 
mayors, prefects, directors of France, generals, mar- 
shals, kings, or emperors, possessing vast territories, 
or extensive influence, or wealth which nothing can 
exhaust." 

I Some, it seems, took a higher bound than this, 
and, like Alexander, who, in the intoxication of suc- 
cess, claimed to be descended from Jupiter Ammon, 
were not satisfied with anything short of the ac- 



310 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

knowledgment of their divine lineage. One of the 
patients confined at Charenton defended his claim 
to a divine origin in a letter addressed to one of his 
attendants. Considering the source from which it 
comes, and the light which it throws upon insane 
mental action, it will repay an insertion in this place. 
The letter is as follows : 

" Sir, — I cannot conceal from you my extreme 
astonishment on learning that the cause of my de- 
tention at Charenton is a suspicion of madness, on 
account of my declaring myself to be the son of 
Jupiter. Very well ! You may convince yourself 
of it by accompanying me to Olympus. Do you 
think that, if I were a man of ordinary birth, I 
should possess all those scientific attainments which 
adorn my mind and my heart with all the flowers 
of the sublimest eloquence ? Do you think I could 
have related, with such vehement, impetuous, war- 
like audacity, the high transactions of all the repub- 
lics of Greece and Rome 1 And could I have re- 
stored to the Iliad its previous colouring, as it sprung 
from the genius of Kanki, who lived many millions 
of ages before the deluge of Ogyges ? 

" A second hour sufficed me to make an epopee, 
embracing the universal history of Greece and 
Rome, and of this great and generous France ; the 
same space of time to execute a painting of im- 
mense and prodigious dimensions. I think I have 
sufficiently vindicated my birth, and sufficiently es- 
tablished that Jupiter is my father, and the divine 
Juno my tender mother. I therefore beg, sir, that 
you will have the goodness to intercede for me, to 



i 



(iV.) PROPENSITY TO IMITATION. 311 

restore me to my family and to my divine parents. 
I shall cherish a divine gratitude for this favour ; a 
gratitude eternal as the life of the gods."* 



CHAPTER V. 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

(iV.) IMITATIVENESS, OR THE PROPENSITY TO IMI- 
TATION. 

§ 187. Evidence ofdhe existence of this principle. 

We next proceed to the consideration of Imita- 
tiveness, or the Propensity to Imitation. The proof 
that there is in man a principle of Imitation, which 
impels him to do as others do, is so abundant as 
probably to leave no reasonable doubt upon the can- 
did mind. We find evidence of it, not only in chil- 
dren, whose principal business it seems to be to re- 
peat whatever they see others do, but also in men, 
who exhibit, as a general thing, a strong tendency to 
do as their fathers have done before them. This is 
an important principle of our nature ; much more so 
than, at first sight, would seem to be the case. If we 
examine it in its various influences and relations, it 
will be found one of the great supports of society ; 
and if not directly, yet indirectly, a source of knowl- 
edge, happiness, and power. 

♦ ConoUy's Inquiry, Lond. ed., p. 367. 



312 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

This important principle, like all the other pro- 
pensities, is liable to occasional disorders. In some 
individuals it is found to exhibit, as compared with 
its ordinary operation and character, a decidedly 
irregular or diseased action. — Cabanis makes men- 
tion of an individual, in whom this tendency existed 
in a very high degree ; so much so, that, when he 
was hindered from yielding to its impulses, " he ex- 
perienced insupportable suffering." — Pinel, as he is 
quoted by Dr. Gall, speaks of an idiot woman, 
" who had an irresistible propensity to imitate all 
that she saw done in her presence. She repeats, 
instinctively, all she hears, and imitates the gestures 
and actions of others with the greatest fidelity, and 
without troubling herself with any regard to pro- 
priety."* 

^ 188. Explanations in relation to sympathetic Im- 
itation. 

There is a peculiar form of disordered Imitation, 
generally known in philosophical writers under the 
denomination of sympathetic imitation, which is 
particularly worthy of attention. Of this we shall 
now proceed to give some account. 

It is implied, in the first place, in all cases of Sym- 
pathetic Imitation, that there is more than one per- 
son concerned in them ; and it exists in general, in 
the highest degree, when the number of persons is 
considerable. Some one or more of these individ- 
uals is strongly agitated by some internal emotion, 
desire, or passion ; and this inward agitation is ex- 

* GalFs Works, Am. ed., vol. i., p. 320. 



(iV.) PROPENSITY TO IMITATION. 313 

pressed by the countenance, gestures, or other ex- 
ternal signs. 

In the second place, there is a communication of 
such agitation of the mind to others ; they experi- 
ence, as is generally the case when we witness the 
external signs of strong feeling, similar emotions, 
desires, and passions. And these new exercises of 
soul are expressed on the part of the sympathetic 
person by similar outward signs. — In a single word, 
when we are under the influence of this form of im- 
itation, we both act and feel as others. There is 
an imitation of the feelings as well as of action, a 
sympathy of the mind as well as of the body. 

§ 189. Fa^niliar instances of Sympathetic Imitation. 

Abundance of instances (many of them frequent 
and familiar) show the existence of sympathetic 
IMITATION ; in other words, that there is in human 
feelings, and in the signs of those feelings, a power 
of contagious communication, by which they often 
spread themselves rapidly from one to another. 

"In general, it may be remarked" (says Mr. Stew- 
art), " that whenever we see, in the countenance of 
another individual, any sudden change of features ; 
more especially such a change as is expressive of 
any particular passion or emotion, our own counte- 
nance has a tendency to assimilate itself to his. 
Every man is sensible of this when he looks at a 
person under the influence of laughter or in a deep 
melancholy. Something, too, of the same kind 
takes place in that spasm of the muscles of the jaw 
which we experience in yawning ; an action which 

Dd 



314 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

is well known to be frequently excited by the conta- 
gious power of example. Even when we conceive^ 
in solitude, the external expression of any passion, 
the effect of the conception is visible in our own ap- 
pearance. This is a fact of which every person 
must be conscious, who attends, in his own case, to 
the result of the experiment ; and it is a circum- 
stance which has been often remarked with respect 
to historical painters, when in the act of transferring 
to the canvass the glowing pictures of a creative im- 
agination."* 

To these statements, illustrative of sympathetic 
imitation, may be added the fact that, if there are 
a number of children together, and one of them sud- 
denly gives way to tears and sobs, it is generally 
the case that all the rest are more or less affected in 
the same manner. Another case, illustrative of the 
same natural principle, is that of a mob, when they 
gaze at a dancer on the slack-rope. They seem not 
only to be filled with the same anxiety which we 
may suppose to exist in the rope-dancer himself, but 
they naturally writhe, and twist, and balance their 
own bodies as they see him do. It has also been 
frequently remarked, that, when we see a stroke 
aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of 
another person, we naturally shrink, and slightly 
draw back our own leg or arm, with a sort of pro- a 
phetic or anticipative imitation of the person on 
whom the blow is about to be inflicted. Hysterical 
paroxysms are said to have been sometimes produ- 
ced at witnessing the exhibition of the pathetic parts 

* Stewart's Elements, voL iii., chap. ii. 



(IV.) PROPENSITY TO IMITATION. 315 

of a drama. And even the convulsions of epilepsy 
have been excited by the mere sight of a person af- 
flicted with them. 

§ 190. Of Sympathetic Imitation in large multi" 
tudes. 

It has been often noticed, that the power of sym- 
pathetic imitation has been rendered intense, nearly 
in proportion to the numbers assembled together. — 
In a large army, if the voice of triumph and joy be 
raised in a single column, it immediately extends 
through the whole. On the other hand, if a single 
column be struck with panic, and exhibit external 
signs of terror by flight or otherwise, the whole army 
is likely to become rapidly infected. The tremen- 
dous power of the mobs, which are often collected 
in large cities, may be explained in part on the same 
principle. The dark cloud that is standing upon 
the brow of one, is soon seen to gather in dark- 
ness on the brow of his neighbour ; and thus to prop- 
agate itself rapidly in every 'direction, till one univer- 
sal gloom of vengeance settles broadly and blackly 
upon the moving sea of the multitude. 

Similar results are sometimes witnessed in large 
deliberative assemblies. The art of the orator in- 
troduces a common feeling, which glows simultane- 
ously in their bosoms. Soon some one, either sus- 
tained by weaker nerves or under the influence of 
stronger internal impulses, gives signs of bodily ag- 
itation. Those who sit nearest will probably next 
imbibe the contagion, which spreads and increases 
until the whole assembly is in a tumult. The 



316 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

spread of this sympathetic communication will be 
particularly rapid if the first instances of emotion 
and action are of a decided and strong character. — 
The statements which have been made are matters 
of common observation, and can hardly be supposed 
to have escaped the notice of any. But there are 
various other facts on record of a less common char- 
acter, although involving essentially the same prin- 
ciples ; some of which we shall now proceed to men- 
tion. 

§191. Of the Animal Magnetism of M. Mesner 
in connexion with this subject. 

About the year 1784, M. Mesner, of Vienna, 
professed to perform various and important cures 
by what he called animal magnetism. As this new 
mode of healing was introduced into France, and 
much interest was felt on the subject, Louis the 
Sixteenth appointed a number of persons to exam- 
ine into it ; among whom were Lavoisier, Bailly, 
and Dr. Franklin, at that time American minister 
at Paris. On inquiry, it appeared that it was com- 
mon in the process to assemble a considerable num- 
ber of patients together. The patients were placed 
round a circular box or bucket of oak, the lid of 
which was pierced with a number of holes, through 
which there issued moveable and curved branches 
of iron. These branches were to be applied by 
the patient to the diseased part. The commission- 
ers, who were witnesses to these proceedings, found 
that no effect was produced at first. The patients 
usually sat an hour, and sometimes two, before the 
crisis came on ; being connected with each other 



(IV.) PROPENSITY TO IMITATION. 317 

meanwhile by means of a cord passed round their 
bodies. At length some one, wearied and nervous, 
and with feelings evidently much excited, was 
thrown into extraordinary convulsions ; and in a 
short time the whole body of patients became sim- 
ilarly affected, in a greater or less degree. But the 
commissioners themselves, after having witnessed 
these singular results, consented to become the sub- 
jects of these experiments in their own persons. 
But they testify that no effect was produced upon 
them. They also aver, when the process was gone 
through on persons alone, the same effects were not 
produced as when a number were together, provided 
the attempt were made for the first time. In the 
following extract they seem to attribute the results 
partly to imagination and partly to sympathy ; that 
is to say, to Sympathetic Imitation. 

" The magnetism, then" (the commissioners re- 
mark), " or, rather, the operations of the imagination, 
are equally discoverable at the theatre, in the camp, 
and in all numerous assemblies, as at the bucket ; 
acting, indeed, by different means, but producing 
similar effects. The bucket is surrounded with a 
crowd of patients ; the sensations are continually 
communicated and recommunicated ; the nerves are 
at last worn out with this exercise, and the woman 
of most sensibility in the company gives the signal. 
In the mean time, the men who are witnesses of 
these emotions partake of them in proportion to 
their nervous sensibility ; and those with whom this 
sensibility is greatest and most easily excited, be- 
come themselves the subjects of a crisis. 

D d2 



318 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

" This irritable disposition, partly natural and 
partly acquired, becomes in each sex habitual. 
The sensations having been felt once or oftener, 
nothing is now necessary but to recall the memory 
of them, and to exalt the imagination to the same 
degree in order to operate the same effects. The 
public process is no longer necessary. You have 
only to conduct the finger and the rod of iron be- 
fore the countenance, and to repeat the accustomed 
ceremonies. In many cases the experiment suc- 
ceeds, even w^hen the patient is blindfolded, and, 
without any actual exhibitions of the signs, is made 
to believe that they are repeated as formerly. The 
ideas are re-excited ; the sensations are reproduced ; 
while the imagination, employing its accustomed in- 
struments, and resuming its former routes, gives 
birth to the same phenomena."* 

§ 192. Instances of Sympathetic Imitation at the 
poorhouse of Haerlem, 

Multitudes of other facts, equally well attested, 
show the sympathetic connexion between mind and 
mind, and the sympathy between the mind and the 
nervous and muscular system. Few are more in- 
teresting and decisive than what is stated to have 
occurred at Haerlem under the inspection of Boer- 
have. — "In the house of charity at Haerlem" (says 
the account), " a girl, under the impression of terror, 
fell into a convulsive disease, which returned in reg- 
ular paroxysms. One of the by-standers, intent 

* Rapports des Commissaires charges par le Roi,de TExa- 
men du Magnetisme Animal (as quoted by Stewart) 



(iV.) PROPENSITY TO IMITATION. 319 

upon assisting her, was seized with a similar fit, which 
also recurred at intervals ; and, on the day follow- 
ing, another was attacked ; then a third, and a 
fourth ; in short, almost the whole of the children, 
both girls and boys, were afflicted with these con- 
vulsions. No sooner was one seized, than the sight 
brought on the paroxysm in almost all the rest at 
the same time. Under these distressing circum- 
stances, the physicians exhibited all the powerful 
antepileptic medicines with which their art furnished 
them, but in vain. They then applied to Boerhave, 
who, compassionating the wretched condition of the 
poor children, repaired to Haerlem ; and, while he 
was inquiring into the matter, one of them was seiz- 
ed with a fit, and immediately he saw several others 
attacked with a species of epileptic convulsion. It 
presently occurred to this sagacious physician, that, 
as the best medicines had been skilfully administer- 
ed, and as the propagation of the disease from one 
to another appeared to depend on imagination [the 
sympathy of imagination], by preventing this im- 
pression upon the mind the disease might be cured ; 
and his suggestion was successfully adopted. Hav. 
ing previously apprized the magistrates of his views, 
he ordered, in the presence of all the children, that 
several portable furnaces should be placed in difler- 
ent parts of the chamber, containing burning coals, 
and that irons, bent to a certain form, should be 
placed in the furnaces ; and then he gave these far- 
ther commands : that all medicines would be totally 
useless, and the only remedy with which he was 
acquainted was, that the first who should be seized 



320 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

with a fit, whether boy or girl, must be burned in the 
arm to the very bone by a red-hot iron. He spoke 
this with uncommon dignity and gravity ; and the 
children, terrified at the thoughts of this cruel rem- 
edy, when they perceived any tendency to the re- 
currence of the paroxysm, immediately exerted all 
their strength of mind, and called up the horrid idea 
of the burning; and were thus enabled, by the 
stronger mental impression, to resist the influence 
of the morbid propensity." 

§ 193. Other instances of this species of imitation. 

It would not be difficult to multiply cases similar 
to those which have been mentioned. A few years 
since, there was a man in Chelmsford, Massachu- 
setts, who had a family of six children, one of whom 
became affected with the chorea or St. Vitus's 
dance. The others, in the indulgence of that 
thoughtless gayety which is natural to children, 
amused themselves with imitating his odd gestures, 
until, after a time, they were irresistibly affected in 
the same way. At this state of things, which seems 
to be susceptible of an explanation in no other way 
than on the principles of sympathetic imitation, the 
family, as may naturally be supposed, were in great 
affliction. The father, a man of some sagacity as 
well as singularity of humour, brought into the house 
a block and axe, and solemnly threatened to take off 
the head of the first child who should hereafter exhibit 
any involuntary bodily movements, except the child 
originally diseased. By this measure, which pro- 
ceeded on the same view of the human mind as the 



(IV.) PROPENSITY TO IMITATION. 321 

experiment of Boerhave just mentioned, a new train 
of feeling was excited, and the spell was broken.* 

It may be added, that not only those in the same 
family and in the same building have been seized, 
but the contagion has sometimes spread from one to 
another (by the mere influence of sympathetic imi- 
tation, as we suppose), over whole towns, and even 
large districts of country. This was the case in a 
part of the island of Anglesey in 1796 ; and still 
later in this country, in some parts of Tennessee. 
When the disease appeared in Tennessee, which 
was essentially of the nature of the chorea, al- 
though it had its origin in connexion with religious 
excitement, it is the statement of a writer who seems 
to have had good opportunities of information (Felix 
Robertson, of Tennessee, author of an Essay on 
Chorea Sancti Viti), " that it spread with rapidity, 
through the medium of the principle of imitation. 
Thus it was not uncommon for an affected person 
to communicate it to a greater part of a crowd, who, 
from curiosity or other motives, had collected around 
him."t 

§ 194. Additional and striking facts on this subject. 

This subject, which, after what has been said, we 
shall certainly be justified in considering a very im- 
portant one, might be pursued to much greater 
length. We shall dismiss it, however, with a very 
few facts and remarks more. 

A few years since a female in France, Henriette 

* Powers's Essay on the Influence of the Imagination, p. 32. 
t See Edinburgh Med. and Surg. Journal, vol. iii., p. 446. 



322 DISORDER OP THE PROPENSITIES. 

Cornier, under the influence, probably, of an insane 
impulse, put to death a young child, of which she 
had always appeared to be fond. She made no at- 
tempt to escape or defend herself after having com- 
mitted the deed, but calmly, and even with indiffer- 
ence, awaited her arrest. The conduct of this un- 
fortunate woman, and the trial which took place, oc- 
cupied much of public attention, and caused a gen- 
eral and deep sensation. — At a sitting of the French 
Academy of Medicine, which took place soon after^ 
M. Esquirol made the statement, which cannot well 
be explained except in connexion with the principle 
under consideration, that six cases had occurred of 
persons having been seized with the propensity to 
destroy their children since the trial of Henrietta 
Cornier for a similar crime. 

At the same meeting of the Academy, M. Costel 
made a statement, in connexion with the same sub- 
ject, which is still more to our present purpose. He 
stated that a soldier at the Hotel des Invahdes hung 
himself on a certain post. In a very short time af- 
terward twelve other invalid soldiers hung themselves 
in the same place. And the suicidal epidemic was 
stopped only by removing the post. 

It is stated that thirteen hundred people destroyed 
themselves at Versailles in the year 1793 ; a fact 
which finds its explanation partly in the atrocities of 
that remarkable period, and partly in the strong ten- 
dencies of the principle under examination. In the 
year 1806, sixty persons destroyed themselves in 
the city of Rouen in the months of June and July ; 
an event striking as it was melancholy, and which 



(IV.) PROPENSITY TO IMITATION. 323 

cannot well be explained, except in connexion with 
the same principle. In 1813, in the little village of 
St. Pierre Monjau, in the Valais, one w^oman hung 
herself; and it is stated that many others followed 
her example. So that it required the interposition 
of the civil authorities to prevent the spreading of 
this suicidal contagion. 

Says Dr. Burrows, in connexion with these and 
other similar statements, " There is also a favourite 
method, or a fashion in the choice of death some- 
times prevailing. When a person of note has rush- 
ed on a voluntary death, the majority of succeeding 
suicides will be marked by the selection of a similar 
instrument or mode of immolation, whether it be a 
halter, a pistol, a razor, or by drowning, or by as- 
phyxia from the fumes of carbon, which is now 
common in France."* 

§ 195. Application of these views to the Witchcraft 
Delusion in New- England. 
The doctrines of this chapter furnish, in part at 
least, an explanation of the witchcraft delusion which 
prevailed in New-England about the year 1690. In 
the first place, it is to be recollected that the exist- 
ence of witches and wizards, possessing a powerful 
but invisible agency, was a part of the popular creed, 
and was generally and fully believed. It is further 
to be recollected, that the people were, as a general 
thing, very ignorant at that time, a state of mind ex- 
ceedingly favourable to any superstition or delusion 
of that sort ; and also that their minds were kept in 
* Commentaries on Insanity, p. 438. 



324 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES, 

a state of constant and high excitation, not only in 
consequence of living scattered abroad and remote 
from each other, but by residing, in many cases, in 
the midst of dense and dark forests. 

Under these circumstances, certain individuals, 
under the influence of some form of nervous dis- 
ease, as we have already suggested and explained 
in a former chapter, became affected with pains in 
certain parts of the body, resembling the pain occa- 
sioned by the pricking of pins, or by sudden and 
heavy blows ; and in some cases became subject to 
certain involuntary motions of the body, similar to 
those of the chorea or St. Yitus's dance. Of 
course, in accordance with the common belief, those 
mysterious personages, popularly denominated witch- 
es, were at their work ; and the whole country was 
at once thrown into a ferment. It is not easy to 
conceive a more favourable basis than this for the 
operations of the powerful principle of Sympathetic 
Imitation. The few cases of nervous and muscu- 
lar disease which existed at first, were rapidly prop- 
agated and multiplied on every side ; and, as the 
popular belief ascribed them to the agency of Satan, 
manifested in the subordinate agency of witchcraft, 
the infatuation soon arose to the highest point. The 
accusations of innocent individuals as exercising the 
art of witchery, and the scenes of blood which fol- 
lowed, were the natural consequence. — Similar 
views will probably apply to the witchcraft delu- 
sions which, to the ruin of thousands of individuals, 
havp prevailed in other periods and countries. 



(iV.) PROPENSITY TO IMITATION. 325 

§ 196. Practical results connected with the forego^ 
ing views. 

As sympathetic imitation, if it be correctly con- 
sidered as a modification of the more ordinary form 
of Imitativeness, is to be regarded as, in its basis at 
least, an original part of our mental constitution, we 
may well suppose it has its beneficial ends. But it 
is evident, from the facts which have been given, 
that it may also be attended, and, under certain cir- 
cumstances, is very likely to be attended, with results 
of a different kind. Hence the direction has some- 
times been given by physicians, that a free inter- 
course with persons subject to convulsive attacks 
ought not to be unnecessarily indulged in, especially 
by such as are inclined to nervous afl^ections. And 
this precautionary rule might be extended to other 
cases : for instance, of madness. " It is a ques- 
tion" (says Mr. Stewart, in the chapter already re- 
ferred to) " worthy of more attention than has yet 
been bestowed upon it by physicians, whether cer- 
tain kinds of insanity have not a contagious tenden- 
cy, somewhat analogous to that which has just been 
remarked. That the incoherent ravings and frantic 
gestures of a madman have a singularly painful ef- 
fect in unsettling and deranging the thoughts of 
others, I have more than once experienced in my- 
self; nor have I ever looked upon this most afflict- 
ing of all spectacles without a strong impression of 
the danger to which I should be exposed if I were 
to witness it daily. In consequence of this impres- 
sion, I have always read, with peculiar admiration, 

E E 



326 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

the scene in the tragedy of Lear, which forms the 
transition from the old king's beautiful and pathetic 
reflections on the storm, to the violent madness in 
which, without any change whatever in his external 
circumstances, he is immediately after represented. 
In order to make this transition more gradual, the 
poet introduces Edgar, who, with a view of conceal- 
ing himself from Lear, assumes the dress and be- 
haviour of a madman. At every sentence he ut- 
ters, the mind of the king, ' ivhose wits' (as we are 
told in the preceding scene) were ' beginning to 
turn,'* becomes more and more deranged, till at 
length every vestige of reason vanishes completely." 

^ 197. Application of these views to Legislative and 
other 'Assemblies. 

We have already had occasion to intimate that 
the effects of sympathetic imitation have been stri- 
kingly experienced in public assemblies; and we 
may here add, when those effects have been strong- 
ly marked, they have seldom been beneficial. In 
all political deliberative assemblies, it is a reason- 
able suggestion that all violent external signs of ap- 
probation and disapprobation should be, in a great 
degree, suppressed. There is generally enough in 
the subjects which are discussed to excite tho 
members, without the additional excitement (to use 
a phrase of Buffbn) of " body speaking to body.^^ 
It is said of the famous Athenian tribunal of the 
Areopagus, that they held their deliberations in the 
night, in order that their attention might not be di- 
verted by external objects. And, mthout expressing 



(iV.) PROPENSITY TO IMITATION. 327 

an opinion on this practice, it is certainly not unwise 
to guard against the terrible influences under con- 
sideration ; otherwise truth, honour, and justice will 
often be sacrificed to feeling. Every public delib- 
erative assembly has probably furnished facts illus- 
trative of the propriety of this caution. 

Similar remarks will apply to religious assemblies, 
and perhaps with still more force, as religious sub- 
jects are more important, and, in general, more ex- 
citing than any other. If, in such an assembly, the 
feelings of a few individuals become so strong as to 
show themselves very decidedly in the countenance 
and the movements of the body, and particularly by 
sobs and loud outcries, it will not be surprising if 
this state of things should quickly spread itself 
through the whole body. In this way it is proba- 
ble that serious evils have sometimes been experien- 
ced, and that true and false religious feelings have 
been confounded. It is true that people may some- 
times be led, by the mere power of sympathy, to 
attend to religious things ; and so far, if there are 
no collateral evils, the result may be regarded as 
favourable ; but, at the same time, it should be kept 
in recollection, that the feelings, which are really 
propagated from one to another by mere sympathy, 
are not in themselves religious feelings in any prop- 
er sense of the terms, though they are often con- 
founded with them. 



328 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 



CHAPTER VI. 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE PROPENSITIES, 
(v.) THE DESIRE OF ESTEEM. 

^ 198. The desire of Esteem susceptible of a disor- 
dered action. 

There may be a disordered action of the desire of 
Esteem. This principle is not only an original one, 
but, as a general thing, it possesses, as compared 
with some of the other propensities, a greater and 
more available amount of strength. It is a regard 
for the opinion of others (a sense of character, as we 
sometimes term it), which, in the absence or the too 
great weakness of higher principles, serves to re- 
strict the conduct of multitudes within the bounds of 
decency and order. This principle is good and im- 
portant in its place and under due regulation ; but 
it is exceedingly apt to become irregular, unrestrain- 
ed, and inordinate in its exercise. This view throws 
light upon the character of many individuals. It is 
here, probably, that we may discover the leading de- 
fect in the character of Alcibiades, a name of dis- 
tinguished celebrity in the history of Athens. His 
ruling passion seems to have been not so much the 
love of POWER as the love of applause. In other 
words, his great desire was, as has been well re- 



(v.) THE DESIRE OF ESTEEM. 329 

marked of him, " to make a noise, and to furnish 
matter of conversation to the Athenians." 

Pope, in the first of his Moral Essays, illustrates 
this subject, in his usual powerful manner, in what 
he says of the Duke of Wharton ; the key to whose 
character he finds in the excessive desire of human 
applause. 

" Search then the ruling passion. There alone 
The wild are constant and the cunning known ; 
This clew, once found, unravels all the rest, 
The prospect clears, and Wharton stands confess'd. 
Wharton, the scorn and wonder of our days, 
Whose ruling passion was the lust of praise. 
Born with whate'er could win it from the wise, 
Women and fools must like him, or he dies." 

^199. Further explanatory remarks on this subject. 

The inordinate exercise of this propensity, as is 
correctly intimated by Mr. Stewart, tends to disor- 
ganize the mind. It cannot well be otherwise. 
The man who is under the influence of such an ex- 
cessive appetite for the world's smiles and flatteries, 
has no fixed rule of conduct ; but the action of his 
mind, his opinions, desires, hopes, and outward con- 
duct, are constantly fluctuating with the changing 
tide of popular sentiment. It is nearly impossible 
that the pillars of the mind should remain firm, and 
without more or less undermining and dislocation, 
under the operations of such a system of uncertainty 
and vicissitude. Hence the disorganization which 
Mr. Stewart speaks of; not merely in the power 
primarily affected, but also in other parts of the 
mind. 

Nor is this all. — When persons who are under 
E E 2 



330 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

tSie influence of this excessive desire are disap- 
pointed in the possession of that approbation and ap- 
plause which are its natural food, they are apt to be- 
come melancholy, misanthropic, and unhappy in a 
very high degree. In fact, numerous cases of ac- 
tual Insanity, using the term in distinction from the 
more ordinary forms of irregularity and disorder, 
may probably be traced to this source. Various 
statements of writers on the subject of Mental 
Alienation evidently support this view. 

^ 200. Incidents illnstrative of this form of Alien- 
ation, 

Pinel mentions a young man who, under the in- 
fluence of an overweening vanity, which is one of the 
excessive or disordered exercises of the implanted 
Desiro of Esteem, rosolved at all hazards to be- 
come distinguished ; at least, like Alcibiades, so far 
as to be talked about. He studied natural philoso- 
phy, chymistry, and the fine arts. He travelled in 
unknown regions, which his ample fortune enabled 
him to do; and published his discoveries with su- 
perb plates, and in a style of great elegance. He 
kept arti&ts with him to aid him in his plans. In 
imitation of other celebrated names, he stimulated 
his faculties, already over- excited, by the fiee use of 
strong coffee and ardent spirits. He endeavoured 
to do without sleep, hurrying from place to place 
night and day. And finally, as might be expected, 
i)ecame furiously insane. 

An instance very recently occurred in Paris, which 
I3iay be regarded, on the whole, as rather a striking 



(v.) THE DESIRE OF ESTEEM. 331 

illustration of the shape which mental disorder as- 
sumes when originating in the propensity which we 
are examining. A journeyman printer, in a joke, 
threw something at one of his companions, which 
broke the glass of his spectacles, and slightly wound- 
ed him. The feehngs of the sufferer were so se- 
verely excited by what he considered a premeditated 
insult, that he insisted upon having his injured hon- 
our healed by a mortal duel. The thoughtless of- 
fender protested his innocence of any intended out- 
rage. The infatuated man, nevertheless, continued 
to urge his hostile appeal till he found it totally in 
vain. Conceiving himself thus degraded for ever, 
he shut himself up in his room, in the Rue de Foin, 
and there at length did, as he madly supposed, jus- 
tice to himself by cutting his throat. His father is 
said to have put an end to his life in a similar fit of 
monomania. 

^201. Other instances still further illmtrative of 

the subject. 

And where Insanity or the highest form of disor- 
der does not supervene, there are sometimes conse- 
quences scarcely less unfavourable. It is well 
known, that within a few years a number of gifted 
individuals have been hurried to an early grave, in 
consequence of being held up to public contempt 
and ridicule in anonymous Reviews. The principle 
which led them to seek the sympathy and the fa- 
vourable opinion of others was too exquisitely sus- 
ceptible to be treated with that severity and roughness 
of manners which it experienced. 



332 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

The case of Henry Kirk White, too keenly alive 
to the frowns and favours of popular sentiment, not- 
withstanding his great and unquestionable excellen- 
ces, will illustrate what we mean. Keats, also, the 
gifted author of Endymion, may probably be re- 
garded as another victim of the severity of criticism, 
operating upon a mind too eagerly desirous of popu- 
lar approbation, and too susceptible to the influences 
of popular aversion and reproof. 

The circumstance that the inordinate exercise of 
the Desire of Esteem is sometimes connected with 
distinguished vigour of intellect and purity of moral 
sentiment, does not necessarily secure the disap- 
pointed and calumniated individual who is the sub- 
ject of it against great anguish of mind ; so great in 
some instances as not only to destroy happiness, but 
life itself. 



CHAPTER Vn. 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE PROPENSITIES. 
(VI.) SOCIALITY, OR THE DESIRE OF SOCIETY. 

§ 202. Origin of the propensive principle of Social- 
ity. 

There are yet other propensive principles which 
may properly be considered under this general head. 
Nothing is more obvious than that men naturally 



(VI.) THE DESIRE OF SOCIETY. 333 

(not moved to it primarily by the influences of edu- 
cation, or considerations of interest, or anything of 
that kind, but of themselves and naturally) have a 
desire of the company or society of their fellow- 
men ; a tendency of the mind expressed by the term 

SOCIALITY or SOCIABILITY. 

We are aware that some writers take a different 
view, and endeavour to resolve this principle, as 
well as some others, into the principle of self-love. 
But when we consider the evident importance of 
this principle to man in his present situation ; when 
we take into account its early appearance, and its 
immense strength in childhood as well as in later 
years, together with various other circumstances 
which would be properly adduced in a full inquiry 
into this topic, we cannot hesitate to speak of the 
social principle as an original or implanted one. 
This propensity, implanted within us for the most 
useful purposes, may exist with such a degree of 
weakness on the one hand, or with such a degree 
of intensity on the other, as justly to entitle its ac- 
tion in either of these forms to be called a disorder- 
ed, and even, in some cases, an alienated or insane 
one. 

§ 203. True idea of Alienation^ or Insanity of the 
Sensibilities. 

And here it may be proper to revert briefly once 
more to the precise idea which we attach to the 
term Alienation, considered as expressive of a state 
or condition of the Sensibilities. There may be an 
imperfection of mental action ; there may be a dis- 



334 DISORDER OP THE PROPENSITIES. 

order of mental action, which is not, nevertheless, 
an absolute alienation or insanity of mental action. 
The term alienation, and the same may be said of 
the term insanity, properly applies to those forms of 
mental action (we speak now particularly of the sen- 
sibilities) which are so much disordered as to set at 
defiance any efforts of the Will to control them ; in 
a word, they are involuntary. So that, in accord- 
ance with this statement, there may be either a dis- 
ordered state of the principle of sociality or of any 
other principle (that is to say, one which is irregu- 
lar, but still is susceptible of correction under the 
efforts of the will) ; or there may be, when this dis- 
order is found to exist beyond certain limits, an 
alienated, an insane state. But although this dis- 
tinction ought to be clearly understood, it is not ne- 
cessary, in the remarks which for the most part we 
have occasion to make, that we should always keep 
it distinctly in view. 

^ 204. The irregular action of the Social principle 
exists in two forms. 

But to return to our subject. An irregular ac- 
tion of the social principle, whether it be truly alien- 
ated or exist in some lighter form of disorder, may 
show itself in two aspects, which are entirely diverse 
from each other, viz., either in a morbid aversion to 
society, or in a desire of society inordinately intense. 

Persons to whom the first statement will apply 
are generally, and for the most part justly, designa- 
ted as misanthropes. There are some cases, it is 
true, where the character of being misanthropic 



(VI.) THE DESIRE OF SOCIETY. 335 

does not, in strictness of speech, appear to be ap* 
plicable. Individuals may be found, although it is 
not often the case, in whom the social principle is 
naturally so very weak that they shun all intercourse 
with their fellow-men, and yet without hating them. 
They live apart, but not in opposition. They have 
no enmity to their fellow-men, although they do not 
seek their company. 

The more frequent and decided cases are those 
which have their origin, not in nature, but in circum- 
stances. Under the influence of some sudden re- 
vulsion of the mind, of some great disappointment, 
of some ill-treatment on the part of near relatives 
and supposed friends, or of some other powerful 
cause, the natural tie of brotherhood, which binds 
man to his fellow-man, is snapped asunder, and the 
unhappy individual flees to the rock and the desert, 
never more to return. Such instances (the Timon 
of Athens of Shakspeare, the Black Dwarf of Wal- 
ter Scott, and numerous others) are frequently found, 
not only on the recorded annals of human nature, 
but in almost every one's personal experience. 

The views which have now been presented ap- 
pear to be rather remarkably illustrated in the case 
of Henry Welby, who died in London in 1639, in 
the eighty- fourth year of his age. This individual 
was a man of good education and of some wealth ; 
charitable to others, and happy in the esteem and 
love of his friends. When he was about forty years 
of age, his brother, a man without affection or prin- 
ciple, attempted to shoot him with a pistol double 
charged with bullets. 



336 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

The attempt was unsuccessful ; but the result 
upon his own mind was such as to fill him with 
horror and disgust of the human race. He resolv- 
ed, from that time, to seclude himself from society. 
He ever afterward lived alone, avoiding, as far as 
possible, the sight of every human being, and spend- 
ing his time in reading, meditation, and prayer. And 
although he seems to have had but one child, an 
amiable daughter, who was happily married, he could 
never, after having been affected with this disorder- 
ed mental bias, be persuaded to see her or any of 
her family. 

§ 205. Further remarks on the disordered action of 
the Social propensity. 

There is another class of cases, which in their 
character appear to be directly the reverse of those 
which have just been mentioned. — Individuals, when 
they are cut off* from society, particularly the society 
of their friends, are sometimes the subjects of a 
misery inexpressibly intense. In these persons the 
social principle is, perhaps, too strong. It is, at 
least, subjected to too severe a trial. Deprived of 
its natural food, it disorganizes, in the intensity of 
its grief, the whole mind. 

Such was the case, perhaps, with the unfortunate 
Foscari, whose sad story is so well known. Hav- 
ing been banished from Venice, he took measures 
to return again, to see once more his beloved pa- 
rents and family, at the evident hazard of his life. 
On being again banished from his country, he died 
in a short time of pure anguish of heart. 



(Vl.) THE DESIRE OF SOCIETY. 337 

In this place, and as illustrating the connexion 
which the social principle has in various ways with 
soundness of mind, we may briefly refer to certain 
psychological and disciplinary experiments which 
have been made in this country.— In the year 1821, 
the Legislature of New- York directed the Superin- 
tendent of the Auburn State Prison to select a num- 
ber of the most hardened criminals, and to lock them 
up in solitary cells, to be kept there day and night, 
without any interruption of their solitude, and with- 
out labour. This order, which was regarded, and 
was designed to be regarded, in the light of an ex- 
periment, was carried into effect in September of 
that year, by confining eighty criminals in the man- 
ner prescribed. On this experiment, Messrs. Beau- 
mont and Toqueville, who were recently commis- 
sioned by the French government to examine and 
to report on the American system of Prison Disci- 
pline, make the following remarks : " This trial, from 
which so happy a result had been anticipated, was 
fatal to the greater part of the convicts ; in order to 
reform them, they had been subjected to complete 
isolation ; but this absolute solitude, if nothing in- 
terrupt it, is beyond the strength of man ; it destroys 
the criminal without intermission and without pity ; 
it does not reform, it kills. — The unfortunates on 
whom this experiment was made fell into a state of 
depression so manifest, that their keepers were struck 
with it ; their lives seemed in danger if they remain- 
ed longer in this situation ; five of them had already 
succumbed during a single year ; their moral state 
was not less alarming ; one of them had become 

Ff 



338 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

insane ; another, in a fit of despair, had embraced 
the opportunity, when the keeper brought him some- 
thing, to precipitate himself from his cell, running 
the almost certain chance of a mortal fall. — Upon 
these and similar effects the system was finally 
judged. The Governor of the State of New- York 
pardoned twenty-six of those in solitary confinement. 
The others, to whom this favour was not extended, 
were allowed to leave the cells during the day, and 
to work in the common workshops of the prison." 

§ 206. Of the disease founded on the Social prO' 
pensiiy termed JVostalgia. 

There is an exceedingly painful disease, founded, 
in a great degree, upon the disordered action of the 
social principle, which is termed by physicians Nos- 
talgia, but which is more commonly known under 
the familiar designation of home-sickness. This 
disease, which is sometimes fatal, is said to have 
frequently prevailed among the Swiss when absent 
from their native country. The beautiful sky which 
shone over them in their absence from their native 
land, the works of art, the allurements of the high- 
est forms of civilization, could not erase from their 
hearts the image of their rugged mountains and their 
stormy heavens. They had society enough around 
them, it is true ; but it was not the society which 
their hearts sought for, or in which, in existing cir- 
cumstances, they could participate. They bowed 
their heads under the influence of a hidden and irre- 
pressible sorrow ; and in many cases not merely 
pined away, but died in the deep anguish of their 
separation. 



(VI.) THE DESIRE OF SOCIETY. 339 

In the year 1733, a Russian army, under the 
command of General Praxin, advanced to the banks 
of the Rhine. At this remote distance from their 
native country, this severe mental disease began to 
prevail among the Russians ; so much so, that five 
or six soldiers every day became unfit for duty ; a 
state of things which threatened to affect the exist- 
ence of the army. The progress of this home-sick- 
ness was terminated by a severe order from the 
commander (designed probably, and which had the 
effect to produce a strong counteracting state of 
mind), that every one affected with the sickness 
should be buried alive.* 

§ 207. Disordered action of the principle of Vera-' 

city. 

We close these remarks on the ahenated action 
of the Propensities, although we do not profess to 
have fully exhausted the subject, by a brief refer- 
ence to another important principle, that which is the 
natural basis of the utterance of the truth. 

The principle of Veracity, or the tendency of 
mind which leads men to utter the truth, appears to 
be an original or implanted one. This principle, 
either through habit or by natural defect, sometimes 
exhibits itself in strangely perverted forms. — In ac- 
cordance with this view, Dr. Rush speaks of a lying 
disease. 

" It differs" (he says) " from exculpating, fraud- 
ulent, and malicious lying, in being influenced by 
none of the motives of any of them. Persons thus 

* Rush on the Diseases of the Mind, 2d ed., p. 113. 



340 DISORDER OF THE PROPENSITIES. 

diseased cannot speak the truth on any subject, nor 
tell the same story twice in the same way, nor He- 
scribe anything as it has appeared to other people. 
Their falsehoods are seldom calculated to injure 
anybody but themselves, being for the most part of 
a hyperbolical or boasting nature, but now and then 
they are of a mischievous nature, and injurious to 
the characters and property of others. That it is a 
corporeal disease [that is to say, in some way con- 
nected with a diseased state of the body], I infer 
from its sometimes appearing in mad people, who 
are remarkable for veracity in the healthy siates of 
their minds, several instances of which I have known 
in the Pennsylvania Hospital. Persons affected 
with this disease are often amiable in their tempers 
and manners, and sometimes benevolent and chari- 
table in their dispositions."* 

Enough, perhaps, has been said on this part of our 
subject, although the topic is not exhausted, to give 
at least a general idea of it. The same train of 
thought, and with scarcely any modification, will ap- 
ply to all the original appetites and propensities, 
whatever they may be, which have not been noticed. 
They are all implanted by the Creator of the mind ; 
they are all good in their place, and under proper 
regulation ; they are all not only morally evil when 
they are not properly controlled and restrained, but 
are liable to be attended with more or less of men- 
tal disorder, from the slightest shades of disorgani- 
zation to the deep and terrible miseries of permanent 
insanity. 

* Rush on the Diseases of the Mind, 2d ed., p. 265. 



DISORDERED ACTION, ETC. 341 



CHAPTER VIIL 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE AFFECTIONS. 

§ 208. Of the states of mind denominated Presenti- 
ments. 

We proceed now to remark, that there may be a 
disordered action of the Affections or Passions, as 
well as of the lower principles of the Sensitive na- 
ture ; and this remark is designed to apply to both 
classes of the Affections, the benevolent and those 
of an opposite kind. We do not propose, however, 
in this chapter to confine ourselves very strictly to 
the Affections, properly so called, but shall intro- 
duce some collateral or connected subjects, which 
may be regarded as too interesting to be omitted, 
and, at the same time, as too unimportant to require 
a distinct place. They may be expected, moreover, 
to throw indirectly some light upon the leading topic 
of the chapter. We begin with the subject of pre- 
sentiments. 

Many individuals have had, at certain times, strong 
and distinct impressions in relation to something fu- 
ture ; so much so that not the least doubt has re- 
mained in their own minds of its being something 
out of the cohimon course of nature. It is related, 
for instance, of the nonconformist writer, Isaac Am- 
brose, whose religious works formerly had some ce- 

F r 2 



342 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE 

lebrity, that he had such a striking internal intima- 
tion of his approaching death, that he went round to 
all his friends to bid them farewell. When the day 
arrived which his presentiments indicated as the day 
of his dissolution, he shut himself up in his room 
and died. Mozart, the great musical composer, 
had a strong presentiment that the celebrated Re- 
quiem which bears his name would be his last work. 
Nothing could remove this impression from his mind. 
He expressly said, " It is certain I am writing this 
requiem for myself; it will serve for my funeral ser- 
vice." The foreboding was realized. It is stated 
of Pendergrast, an officer in the Duke of Marlbo- 
rough's army, that he had a strong foreboding that 
he would be killed on a certain day. He mention- 
ed his conviction to others, and even made a writ- 
ten memorandum in relation to it.* Henry the 
Fourth, of France, for some weeks previous to his 
being assassinated by Ravaillac, had a distinct pre- 
sentiment, which he mentioned to Sully and other 
men of his time, that some great calamity was about 
to befall him. 

Some cases of Presentiments can undoubtedly be 
explained on natural principles. Some accidental 
circumstance, a mere word, the vagaries of a dream, 
any trifling event which happens in the popular be- 
lief of the time and country to be regarded as a sin- 
ister omen, may have been enough, in some cases, 
to lay the foundation for them ; and the subsequent 
fulfilment may have been purely accidental. Nor 
is it necessary, so far as we are able to perceive, 

♦ BoswelPs Life of Johnson, vol. ii., p. 48. 



AFFECTIONS. 343 

to suppose that in any cases whatever there is any 
supernatural or miraculous interposition. But, if 
this is not the case, it is difficult to account for the 
deep conviction which sometimes fastens upon the 
mind, a conviction upon which arguments and per- 
suasions are found to make no impression, except 
upon the ground that the action of the Sensibilities 
is in some degree disordered. But of the specific 
nature of that disorder, the trait or circumstance 
which distinguishes it from other forms of disorder- 
ed mental action, it is difficult to give any account. 

^209. Of sudden and strong impulses of Mind. 
There is another disordered condition of mind, 
different from that which has just been mentioned, 
and yet, in some respects, closely allied to it. Some 
persons, whose soundness of mind, on all ordinary 
occasions, is beyond question, find in themselves at 
certain times a sudden and strange propensity to do 
things which, if done, would clearly prove them, to 
some extent at least, deranged. As an illustration, 
a person of a perfectly sane mind, according to the 
common estimate of insanity, once acknowledged, 
that, whenever he passed a particular bridge, he felt 
a slight inclination to throw himself over, accompa- 
nied with some dread that his inclination might hurry 
him away. Such slight alienated impulses are prob- 
ably more frequent than is commonly supposed. 
And they exist in every variety of degree, sometimes 
scarcely attracting notice, at others bearing the broad 
and fatal stamp of dangerous insanity. 

Dr. Gall mentions the case of a woman in Ger- 



344 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE 

many, who, having on a certain occasion witnessed 
a building on fire, was ever afterward, at intervals, 
subject to strong impulses prompting her to fire 
buildings. Under the influence of these impulses, 
she set fire to twelve buildings in the borough where 
she lived. Having been arrested on the thirteenth 
attempt, she was tried, condemned, and executed. 
" She could give no other reason, nor show any 
other motive for firing so many houses, than this im- 
pulse, which drove her to it Notwithstanding the 
fear, the terror, and the repentance she felt in every 
instance after committing the crime, she went and 
did it afresh."* Would not sound philosophy, to say 
nothing of the requisitions of religion, have assigned 
such a person to an insane hospital rather than to the 
block of the executioner ? 

The same writer, who has collected numerous 
valuable facts in relation to the operations of the 
human mind, mentions the case of a German sol- 
dier, who was subject every month to a violent con- 
vulsive attack. " He was sensible" (he proceeds 
to remark) " of their approach ; and as he felt, by 
degrees, a violent propensity to kill, in proportion as 
the paroxysm was on the point of commencing, he 
was earnest in his entreaties to be loaded with chains. 
At the end of some days the paroxysm and the fa- 
tal propensity diminished, and he himself fixed the 
period at which they might without danger set him 
at liberty. At Haina, we saw a man who, at cer- 
tain periods, felt an irresistible desire to injure oth- 
ers. He knew this unhappy propensity, and had 

♦ Gall's Works, vol. iv., Am. ed., p. 105. 



AFFECTIONS. 345 

himself kept in chains till he perceived that it was 
safe to hberate him. An individual of melancholic 
temperament was present at the execution of a crim- 
inal. The sight caused him such violent emotion, 
that he at once felt himself seized with an irresisti- 
ble desire to kill, while, at the same time, he enter- 
tained the utmost horror at the commission of the 
crime. He depicted his deplorable state, weeping 
bitterly, and in extreme perplexity. He beat his 
head, wrung his hands, remonstrated with himself, 
begged his friends to save themselves, and thanked 
them for the resistance they made to him."* 

§ 210. Insanity of the Affections or Passions. 

From the instances which have been given, it will 
be seen that sudden and strong impulses, indicating 
a disordered state of the mind, may exist in refer- 
ence to very different things, and also in very vari- 
ous degrees. The cases last mentioned were of 
such an aggravated nature, that they may properly 
be regarded as instances (and perhaps the same 
view will apply to some other cases of a less mark- 
ed character) of actual alienation or insanity. And, 
as such, they may be correctly described as instan- 
ces of the insanity of the Affections or Passions. 

The insanity of the passions is a state of mind 
somewhat peculiar, even as compared with other 
forms of insanity. The powers of perception, in 
cases of insanity of the passions, are often in full 
and just exercise. The mind may possess, in a 
very considerable degree, its usual ability in compa- 

* Gall's Works, vol. i., Am. ed., p. 329. 



346 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE 

ring ideas and in deducing conclusions. The seat 
of the difficulty is not to be sought for in what are 
usually designated as the intellectual powers, in dis- 
tinction from the sensitive nature, but in the passions 
alone. The victim of this mental disease does not 
stop to reason, reflect, and compare ; but is borne 
forward to his purpose with a blind, and often an ir- 
resistible impulse. 

Pinel mentions a mechanic in the asylum Bice- 
TRE who was subject to this form of insanity. It 
was, as is frequently the case, intermittent. He 
knew when the paroxysms of passion were coming 
on, and even gave warnings to tho^e who were ex- 
posed to its effects to make their escape. His pow- 
ers of correctly judging remained unshaken, not 
only at other times, but even in the commission of 
the most violent and outrageous acts. He saw 
clearly their impropriety, but was unable to restrain 
himself; and, after the cessation of the paroxysms, 
was often filled with the deepest grief. 

^211, Of the mental disease termed HypocJion^ 
driasis. 

The seat of the well-known mental disease term- 
ed Hypochondriasis is to be sought for in a disor- 
dered state of the Sensibilities. It is, in fact, no- 
thing more or less than a state of deep depression, 
gloom, or melancholy. This is the fact; and we 
never apply the term hypochondriasis to a state of 
the mind where such gloom or melancholy does not 
exist ; but it is nevertheless true, that the occasion 
or basis of the fact may sometimes be found in a 



AFFECTIONS. 347 

disordered condition of some other part of the mind. 
One or two concise statements will illustrate what 
we mean. 

One of the slighter forms of hypochondriasis can, 
perhaps, be traced to inordinate workings of the 
Imagination. The mind of the sufferer is fixed 
upon some unpromising and gloomy subject ; prob- 
ably one which has particular relation either to his 
present or future prospects. He gives it an undue 
place in his thoughts, dwelling upon it continually. 
His imagination hovers over it, throwing a deeper 
shade on what is already dark. Thus the mind be- 
comes disordered ; it is broken off from its ordinary 
and rightful mode of action, and is no longer what 
it was, nor what nature designed it should be. 

§ 212. Of other forms of Hypochondriasis. 

There is another and still more striking form of 
hypochondriasis, which is connected in its origin 
with an alienation of the power of belief. As in all 
other cases of hypochondriasis, the subject of it suf- 
fers much mental distress. He is beset with the 
most gloomy and distressing apprehensions, occa- 
sioned, not by exaggerated and erroneous notions in 
general, but by some fixed and inevitable false be- 
lief — One imagines that he has no soul ; another, 
that his body is gradually but rapidly perishing ; and 
a third, that he is converted into some other animal, 
or that he has been transformed into a plant. We 
are told in the Memoirs of Count Maurepas, a fact 
which we have already had occasion to refer to, that 
this last idea once took possession of the mind of 



348 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE 

one of the princes of Bourbon. So deeply was he 
infected with this notion, that he often went into his 
garden, and insisted on being watered in common 
with the plants around him. Some have imagined 
themselves to be transformed into glass, and others 
have fallen into the still stranger folly of imagining 
themselves dead. — ^What has been said confirms 
our remark, that although hypochondriasis is, in it- 
self considered, seated in the sensibiUties, yet its 
origin may sometimes be found in a disordered state 
of some other part of the mind. 

It is also sometimes the case that this disease 
originates in a violation of some form of sensitive 
action. It is not only, as its appropriate, posuion, 
seated in the sensibilities, but it sometimes has its 
origin there. We have already mentioned the case 
of a certain Englishman, a man of generous and 
excellent character, whose life was once attempted 
by his brother with a pistol. On wresting the pistol 
from his brother's hand and examining it, he found 
it to be double charged with bullets. This transac- 
tion, as might be expected in the case of a person 
of just and generous sentiments, filled him with such 
horror, and with such disgust for the character of the 
man, that he secluded himself ever after from human 
society. He never allowed the visits even of his 
own children. It is certainly easy to see, that un- 
der such circumstances the sensibilities may receive 
such a shock as to leave the subject of it in a state 
of permanent dissatisfaction and gloom. In other 
words, he may in this way, and for such reasons, 
become a confirmed hypochondriac. 



* AFFECTIONS. 349 

§ 213. Of intermissions of Hypochondriasis, and 
of its remedies. 

The mental disease of hypochondriasis is always 
understood to imply the existence of a feeling of 
gloom and depression ; but this depressed feeling 
does not exist in all cases in the same degree. In 
all instances it is a source of no small unhappiness, 
but in some the wretchedness is extreme. The 
greatest bodily pains are light in the comparison. 
It is worthy of remark, however, that the mental 
distress of hypochondriasis is in some persons char- 
acterized by occasional intermissions. An acci- 
dental remark, some sudden combination of ideas, 
a pleasant day, and various other causes, are found 
to dissipate the gloom of the mind. At such times 
there is not unfrequently a high flow of the spirits, 
corresponding to the previous extreme depression. — 
As this disease, even when mitigated by occasional 
intermissions, is prodigal in evil results, it becomes 
proper to allude to certain remedies which have 
sometimes been resorted to. 

I. — The first step towards remedying the evil is 
to infuse health and vigour into the bodily action, 
especially that of the nervous system. The nerves, 
it will be recollected, are the great medium of sen- 
sation, inasmuch as they constitute, under different 
modifications, the external senses. Now the senses 
are prom.inent sources of belief and knowledge. 
Consequently, when the nervous system (including, 
of course, the senses) is in a disordered state, it is 
not surprising that persons should have wrong sen- 

Gg 



350 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE 

sations and external perceptions, and, therefore, a 
wrong belief. If a man's nerves are in such a state 
that he feels precisely as he supposes a man made 
of glass would feel, it is no great wonder, when we 
consider the constitution of the mind, that he should 
actually believe himself to be composed of that sub- 
stance. But one of the forms of the disease in 
question is essentially foimded on an erroneous but 
fixed belief of this kind. Hence, in restoring the 
bodily system to a right action, we shall correct the 
wrong belief, if it be founded in the senses ; and, in 
removing this, we may anticipate the removal of that 
deep-sealed gloom which is characteristic of hypo- 
chondriasis, 

^214. Further remarks on the remedies of Hypo* 
chondriasis. 

II. — As all the old associations of the hypochon- 
driac have been more or less visited and tinctured 
by his peculiar malady, efforts should be made to 
break them up and remove them from the mind, by 
changes in the objects with which he is most con- 
versant, by introducing him into new society, or by 
travelling. By these means his thoughts are likely 
to be diverted, not only from the particular subject 
which has chiefly interested him, but a new impulse 
is given to the whole mind, which promises to inter- 
rupt and banish that fatal fixedness and inertness 
which had previously encumbered and prostrated \i. 

III. — Whenever the malady appears to be found- 
ed on considerations of a moral nature, the hypo- 
chondriasis may sometimes be removed, or, at least, 



AFFECTIONS. 351 

alleviated, by the suggestion of counteracting moral 
motives. If, for instance, the despondency of mind 
has arisen from some supposed injury, it is desira- 
ble to suggest all well-founded considerations which 
may tend to lessen the sufferer's estimate of the 
amount of the injury received. When the injury is 
very great and apparent, suggestions on the nature 
and duty of forgiveness may not be without effect. 
— But, whatever course may be taken, it is desirable 
that the attention of the sufferer should be directed 
as little as possible to his disease, by any direct re- 
marks upon it. It was a remark of Dr. Johnson, 
whose sad experience enabled him to judge, that 
conversation upon melancholy feeds it. According- 
ly, he advised Boswell, who, as well as himself, was 
subject to melancholy of mind, " Never to speak of 
it to his friends, or in company." 

§ 215. Disordered action of the passion of Fear. 

The passion of fear, inasmuch as there are va- 
rious objects around us which are or may be dan- 
gerous, is obviously implanted in us for wise purpo- 
ses. But it not unfrequently exhibits an irregular or 
disordered action. This disordered state of the af- 
fection may discover itself, when considered either 
in reference to the occasion on which it exists, or in 
reference to the degree in which it exists. In some 
cases, for instance, it is connected with objects 
which, in the view of reason and common sense, 
ought not to excite it. Some persons are afraid to 
be alone in the dark ; it is exceedingly distressing 
to them. Others are afraid (so much so, perhaps, 



352 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE 

as to be thrown into convulsions by their presence) 
of a mouse, or a squirrel, or an insect. It will be 
necessary to refer to, and to give some explanation 
of cases of this kind, under the head of Casual As- 
sociations. 

Sometimes the disordered action of the passion of 
fear is not so restricted and shut up, as it were, to a 
particular thing ; but takes a wider range, attaching 
itself to all objects which can possibly excite the idea 
of danger, even in the slightest degree. Pinel, who, 
more than any other writer, is the great source of 
facts on this part of our subject, mentions an indi- 
vidual who was so subject to fears that he could 
scarcely get a few moment's repose, "not lying 
down till four or five o'clock in the morning. He 
passed the night in a state of constant fear ; ima- 
gined he heard a voice speaking in a low tone ; 
carefully shut his door ; a moment after, feared that 
he had not closed it tight, and continually returned, 
and continually discovered his mistake. Another 
idea took possession of his mind ; he would rise 
from his bed to examine his papers ; he would sep- 
arate them one after another ; collect them again ; 
believe that he had forgotten something ; and be 
afraid of the very dust on the furniture. He would 
evince the greatest instability in his thoughts and in- 
tentions ; would wish and not wish ; constantly tor- 
mented by suspicion and gloom ; he even feared to 
breathe the external air, and always kept himself 
within doors." 



AFFECTIONS. 353 

§216. Other illustrations of the disordered action 
of this passion. 

Again, fear may exist with such an intensity as 
essentially to affect the very structure of the mind, 
and even cause insanity in the higher sense of the 
term. Probably the power of this passion is not 
well understood. Certain it is, that terrible results 
have often followed from the attempts of persons, 
particularly of children, to excite it in others, even 
in sport. Many instances are on record of individ- 
uals vv'ho have been permanently and most seriously 
injured, either in mind or body, or both, by a sudden 
fright. It is somewhere stated in the writings of 
Pinel, that he received into the hospital of which he 
had charge three insane persons within a very short 
time, whose insanity was caused in this way. 

Sometimes, especially when connected with per- 
manent causes, it gradually expands and strength- 
ens itself, till it is changed into despair. The dis- 
tinctive trait of Despair, in distinction from all other 
modifications of fear, is, that it excludes entirely the 
feeling of hope, which exists in connexion with fear 
in other cases. Despair may exist, therefore, in a 
greater or less degree, and with a greater or less 
amount of mental anguish, in accordance with the 
nature of the thing, whatever it is, which occasions 
it. When great present or future interests are at 
stake, and the mind, in relation to those interests, is 
in a state of despair, the wretchedness which is ex- 
perienced is necessarily extreme. 

Gg2 



354 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE 

§ 217. Perversions of the Benevolent Affection. 

The general division of the Affections, as is well 
understood, is into the Benevolent and Malevolent. 
There are some singular perversions of the benevo- 
lent affections, as well as those of an opposite kind, 
which are worthy of notice here. — It is not unfre- 
quently the case, that persons in a state of mental 
aUenation are entirely indifferent to, and sometimes 
they even hate those whom, at other times, they love 
most sincerely and deeply. It is, perhaps, difficult 
to explain this, although it is practically important to 
know the fact. 

Dr. Rush, in speaking of a singular apathy or 
torpor of the passions, which is sometimes found to 
exist, says ; " I was once consulted by a citizen of 
Philadelphia, who was remarkable for his strong af- 
fection for his wife and children when his mind was 
in a sound state, who was occasionally afflicted with 
this apathy ; and, when under its influence, lost his 
affection for them all so entirely, that he sai4^ he 
could see them butchered before his eyes without 
feeling any distress, or even inclination to rise from 
his chair to protect them." 

II. — There are other cases where there seems to 
be not merely an extinction of the benevolent affec- 
tion, but its positive conversion into hatred. The 
same philosophic physician mentions the case of a 
young lady, who was confined as a lunatic in the 
Pennsylvania Hospital in the year 1802. One of 
the characteristics of her insanity was hatred for her 
father. She was gradually restored ; and, for sev- 



AFFECTIONS. 355 

eral weeks before she was discharged from the hos- 
pital, discovered all the marks of a sound mind, ex- 
cepting the continuance of this unnatural feeling of 
hatred. On a certain day she acknowledged with 
pleasure a return of her fihal attachment and affec- 
tion, and soon after was discharged as cured.* 

§ 218. Other cases of perverted Benevolent AffeC' 

tions. 

III. — There are other cases where insanity is the 
indirect result of the mere intensity of the benevolent 
affections. In cases of this kind, the affections are 
so strong, so intense, that they are unable to with- 
stand the shock of sudden and great opposition and 
disappointments. — " A peasant woman" (says Dr. 
Gall) " became insane three times ; the first, at the 
death of her brother ; the second, at the death of her 
father; and the third, at that of her mother. After 
she had recovered the third time she came to consult 
me. As she was very religious, she complained to 
me of her unfortunate disposition to be afflicted, at 
the loss of persons who were dear to her, more than 
religion permits ; an evident proof that she had yield- 
ed to grief, although she had combated it by motives 
which were within her reach." Pinel also mentions 
the case of a young man, who became a violent ma- 
niac a short time after losing a father and mother 
whom he tenderly loved. It is true that in these 
cases the proximate cause of the insanity is sorrow 
or grief; but the remote cause, and that without 
which the unfortunate result would not have existed, 
* Rush on the Diseases of the Mind, p. 255, 345. 



2oQ DISORDERED ACTION OF THE 

is an unrestrained and excessive position of the be- 
nevolent affections. 

it may be proper to add here, that sudden and 
•strong feelings of joy have, in repeated instances, 
caused a permanent mental disorganization, and 
«ven death itself. — " The son of the famous Leib- 
nitz died from this cause, upon his opening an old 
chest, and unexpectedly finding in it a large quantity 
of gold. Joy from the successful issue of political 
schemes or wishes has often produced the same ef- 
fect. Pope Leo the Tenth died of joy, in conse- 
quence of hearing of a great calamity that had be- 
fallen the French nation. Several persons died 
from the same cause, Mr. Hume tells us, upon wit- 
nessinof the restoration of Charles the Second to the 

CD 

British throne ; and it is well known that the door- 
keeper of Congress died of an apoplexy, from joy, 
upon hearing the news of the capture of Lord Corn- 
wallis and his army during the American revolution- 
ary war."* 



CHAPTER IX. 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE MORAL SENSIBILITIES. 

§ 219. Nature of voluntary Moral Derangement. 
The moral, as well as the natural or pathematic 
Sensibihties, the Conscience as well as the Heart, 

• Rush on the Diseases of the Mind, p. 339. 



MORAL SENSIBILITIES. 357 

may be the subject of a greater or less degree of 
disorder and alienation. There are probably two 
leading forms, at least, of moral derangement, viz., 
VOLUNTARY, and NATURAL Or CONGENITAL. — In re- 
gard to voluntary moral derangement we remark, as 
an interesting and practically important fact, that 
man may virtually destroy his conscience. There 
is sound philosophy in the well-known passage of 
Juvenal, " nemo repente fuit turpissimus." 
The truth implied in this passage is unquestionably 
applicable to all persons, with the exception of those 
few cases where the moral derangement is natural 
or congenital. A man is not, in the first instance, 
tiirpissimus or a villain, because his conscience 
makes resistance, and will not let him be so. But 
if the energies of the will are exercised in opposition 
to the conscience ; if, on a systematic plan, and by 
a permanent effort, the remonstrances of conscience 
are unheeded, and its action repressed, its energies 
"will be found to diminish, and its very existence will 
be put at hazard. There is no doubt that in this 
way the conscience may be so far seared as to be 
virtually annihilated. Multitudes have prepared 
themselves for the greatest wickedness, and have 
become, in fact, morally insane, by their own volun- 
tary doing. There is a passage in Beaumont, in 
his " King and no King," which strikingly indicates 
the progress of the mind in such cases. 

" There is a method in man's wickedness ; 
It grows up by degrees. I am not come 
So high as kilUng of myself; there are 
A hundred thousand sins 'twixt it and me, 
Which I must do. / shall come to "t at last^ 



358 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE 

We say in such cases the conscience is virtually 
annihilated. And by this remark we mean that it is 
inert, inefficient, dormant, paralyzed. We do not 
mean that it is dead. The conscience never dies. 
Its apparent death is impregnated with the elements 
of a real and terrible resurrection. It seems to 
gather vivification and strength in the period of its 
inactivity ; and at the appointed time of its reappear- 
ance inflicts a stern and fearful retribution, not only 
for the crimes which are committed against others, 
but for the iniquity which has been perpetrated 
against itself. 

§ 220. Of Accountability in connexion with this 
form of Disordered Conscience. 

If the moral sensibility, under the system of re- 
pression which has been mentioned, refuses to act, 
the question arises whether, at such a time, a person 
is morally accountable for his conduct. As his con- 
science does not condemn him in what he does, is 
the transaction, whatever its nature, a criminal one ? 
There can be but one answer to this question. If 
the individual is not condemned by his conscience, 
it is the result of his own evil course. We may il- 
lustrate the subject by a case which is unhappily too 
frequent. A man who commits a crime in a state 
of drunkenness may plead that he was not, at the 
time, aware of the guilt of his conduct. And this 
may be true. But he was guilty for placing him- 
self in a situation where he knew he would be likely 
to injure others, or in some other way commit un- 
lawful acts. His crime, instead of being diminish- 



MORAL SENSIBILITIES. 359 

ed, is, in fact, increased. It is twofold. He is guilty 
of drunkenness, and he is guilty of everything evil, 
which he knew, or might have known, would result 
from his drunkenness. 

In like manner, a man is not at liberty to plead 
that he was not, in the commission of his crimes, 
condemned by conscience, if it be the fact that he 
has, by a previous process, voluntarily perverted or 
hardened the conscience. On the contrary, it would 
be fair to say, as in the case of drunkenness, that 
he has increased his guilt ; for he has added to the 
guilt of the thing done the antecedent and still great- 
er crime of aiming a blow at the mind, of striking at 
the very life of the soul. Practically he is not self- 
condemned, for the mere reason that he has para- 
lyzed the principle by which the sentence of self- 
condemnation is pronounced. But, in the eye of 
immutable justice, there is not only no diminution 
of his guilt, but it is inexpressibly enhanced by the 
attempts to murder, if we may so express it, the 
principle which, more than anything else, constitutes 
the dignity and glory of man's nature. 

§221. Of natural or congenital JMoral Derange-- 

ment. 

The other form of moral derangement is natu- 
ral or CONGENITAL. We do not know that we are 
authorized to say that men are by nature, in any 
case whatever, absolutely destitute of a conscience ; 
nor, on the other hand, have we positive grounds for 
asserting that this is not the case. There is no 
more inconsistency or impossibility in a man's com- 



360 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE 

ing into the world destitute of a conscience, than 
there is in his being born without the powers of 
memory, comparison, and reasoning, which we find 
to be the case in some idiots. But certain it is, 
that there are some men who appear to have natu- 
rally a very enfeebled conscience ; a conscience 
which but very imperfectly fulfils its office ; and 
who, in this respect at least, appear to be constitu- 
ted very differently from the great body of their fel- 
low-men. They exhibit an imbecility, or, if the 
expression may be allowed, an idiocy of conscience, 
which unquestionably diminishes, in a very consid- 
erable degree, their moral accountability. A num- 
ber of those writers who have examined the subject 
of Insanity have taken this view, and have given in- 
stances in support of it. 

" In the course of my life" (says Dr. Rush), " I 
have been consulted in three cases of the total per- 
version of the moral faculties. One of them was in 
a young man, the second in a young woman, both of 
Virginia ; and the third was in the daughter of a citi- 
zen of Philadelphia. The last was addicted to ev- 
ery kind of mischief. Her wickedness had no in- 
tervals while she was awake, except when she was 
kept busy in some steady and difficult employment." 
He refers also to instances in other writers. 

§ 222. Further illustrations of congenital JVforal 
Derangement, 

Dr. Haslam, in his Observations on Madness, 
has given two decided cases of moral derangement. 
One of these was a lad about ten years of age. 



MORAL SENSIBILITIES. 361 

Some of the traits which he exhibited were as fol- 
lows. He early showed an impatience and irrita- 
bility of temper, and became so mischievous and 
uncontrollable that it was necessary to appoint a 
person to watch over him. He gave answers only 
to such questions as pleased him, and acted in op- 
position to every direction. " On the first interview 
I had with him" (says Dr. Haslam), " he contrived, 
after two or three minutes' acquaintance, to break a 
window and tear the frill of my shirt. He was an 
Unrelenting foe to all china, glass, and crockery 
ware. Whenever they came within his reach, he 
shivered them instandy. In walking the street, the 
keeper was compelled to take the wall, as he uni- 
formly broke the windows if he could get near them ; 
and this operation he performed so dexterously, and 
with such safety to himself, that he never cut his 
fingers. To tear lace and destroy the finer textured 
of female ornament seemed to gratify him exceed- 
ingly, and he seldom walked out without finding an 
occasion of indulging this propensity. He never 
became attached to any inferior animal, a benevo- 
lence so common to the generality of children. To' 
these creatures his conduct was that of the brute ; 
be oppressed the feeble, and avoided the society of 
those more powerful than himself. Considerable 
practice had taught him that he was the cat's mas- 
ter; and, whenever this luckless animal approached 
himj he plucked out its whiskers with wonderful ra* 
pidity ; to use his own language, ' / must have her 
beard offJ* After this operation he commonly 
threw the creature on the fire or through the win- 

Hh 



362 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE 

dow. If a little dog came near him, he kicked if ; 
if a large one, he would not notice it. When he 
was spoken to, he usually said, ' I do not choose to 
answer.' When he perceived any one who appear- 
ed to observe him attentively, he always said, ' Now 
I will look unpleasant.' The usual games of chil- 
dren afforded him no amusement ; whenever boys 
were at play he never joined them ; indeed, the 
most singular part of his character was, that he ap- 
peared incapable of forming a friendship with any 
one ; he felt no considerations for sex, and would 
as readily kick or bite a girl as a boy. Of any 
kindness shown him he was equally insensible ; he 
would receive an orange as a present, and afterward 
throw it in the face of the donor." 

This unfortunate lad seems sometimes to have 
been sensible of his melancholy condition. When, 
on a certain occasion, he was conducted through an 
insane hospital, and a mischievous maniac was 
pointed out to him who was more strictly confined 
than the rest, he said to his attendant, " This would 
be the right place for me." He often expressed a 
wish to die, and gave as a reason " that God had 
not made him like other children." 

§ 223. Facts in relation to an individual in the 
Lunatic Asylum in Dublin. 

There was recently an individual in the Richmond 
Lunatic Asylum in Dublin, in whom the moral sense 
seems to have been naturally paralyzed, or, perhaps, 
extinct. Some account is given of him by Dr. 
Crawford, the physician of that asylum, in a letter 



MORAL SENSIBILITIES. 363 

to Mr. George Combe. — " It is one of those cases" 
(says Dr. Crawford) "where there is great difficulty 
in drawing the hne between extreme moral depravi- 
ty and insanity ; and in deciding at what point an 
individual should cease to be considered as a re- 
sponsible moral agent, and amenable to the laws. 
The governors and medical gentlemen of the asy- 
lum have often had doubts whether they were justi- 
fied in keeping E. S. as a lunatic, thinking him a 
more fit subject for a Bridewell. He appears, how- 
ever, so totally callous with regard to every moral 
principle and feeling ; so thoroughly unconscious of 
ever having done anything wrong ; so completely 
destitute of all sense of shame or remorse when re- 
proved for his vices or crimes ; and has proved him- 
self so utterly incorrigible throughout life, that it is 
almost certain that any jury before whom he might 
be brought would satisfy their doubts by returning 
him insane, which in such a case is the most humane 
line to pursue. 

" He was dismissed several times from the asy- 
lum, and sent there the last time for attempting to 
poison his father. And it seems fit he should be 
kept there for life as a moral lunatic. But there 
has never been the least symptom of diseased action 
of the brain, which is the general concomitant of 
what is usually called insanity." 

§ 224. Of Moral Accountability in cases of natural 
or conoenital JMoral Derans:ement, 

The question recurs here, also, whether persons 
who are the subjects of a natural or congenital mor- 



364 DISORDERED ACTION, ETC. 

al derangement are morally accountable, and in what 
degree. If there is naturally an entire extinction of 
the moral sense, as in some cases of idiocy there is 
an entire extinction of the reasoning power, which, 
although it may not frequently happen, is at least a 
gupposable case, there is no moral accountability. 
A person in that situation can have no distinct per- 
ception of what right and wrong are ; nor can he be 
conscious of doing either right or wrong in any giv- 
jen case ; and, consequently, being without either 
merit or demerit, in the moral sense of the terms, 
he is not the proper subject of reward and punish- 
ment, He is to be treated on the principles that 
are applicable to idiots and insane persons generally. 
In other cases, where the mental disorder is not 
so great, but there are some lingering rays of moral 
light, some feeble capability of moral vision, the per- 
son is to be judged, if it is possible to ascertain what 
it is, according to what is given him. If he has but 
one moral talent, it is not to be presumed that the 
same amount of moral responsibility rests upon him 
as upon another who possesses ten. The doctrine 
which requires men, considered as subjects of re- 
ward and punishment, to be treated alike, without 
regard to those original diversities of structure which 
may exist in all the departments of the mind, not 
only tends to confound right and wrong, but is ab- 
horrent to the dictates of benevolence. Many indi- 
viduals, through a misunderstanding of this important 
subject, have suffered under the hands of the execu- 
tioner, who, on principles of religion and strict jus- 
tice, should have been encircled only in the arms of 
compassion, long-suffering, and charity. 



CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS, ETC. 365 



CHAPTER X. 

CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS IN CONNEXION WITH THE 
SENSIBILITIES. 

^ 225. Frequencij of Casual Associations, and some 
instances of them. 

We propose to conclude this part of our subject 
by giving some instances of Casual Associations. 
Such associations, deeply affecting the whole char- 
acter, are not unfrequent. By a thousand circum- 
stances, and in thousands of instances, the feelings 
are wrenched from their natural position, and shoot 
forth and show themselves in misplaced and dispro- 
portionate forms. Casual associations, in the shape 
of antipathies, fears, aversions, prepossessions, re^ 
morse, &c., are found seated in many a mind, which 
is otherwise unembarrassed and unexceptionable in 
its action ; they have established their empire there 
on immoveable foundations, and are incorporated 
with the whole mental nature. 

If it were otherwise, how could a man, who would 
willingly face a thousand men in batde, tremble at a 
mouse, a squirrel, a thunder-shower, at the trivial 
circumstance of placing the left slipper on the right 
foot, or any other very trifling thing ! And yet such 
instances are without number. — It may be consid- 
ered singular enough, but so it is, that some men 

Hh2 



366 CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS IN 

cannot endure the sight of a fish, eel, or lobster ; 
another person is disgusted at the sight of cheese, 
honey, eggs, milk, or apples ; another is exceeding- 
ly distressed, and even convulsed, at the sight of e\, 
toad or a cat, a grasshopper or a beetle. 

§ 226. Of Association in connexion with the 
Appetites. 

In proceeding to give some illustrations of this 
interesting subject, which has hitherto received but 
little attention, we begin with the Appetites, which 
^re subject to strong Associative influences, as will 
appear by some statements. 

I. — Almost every article which is capable of being 
masticated and digested is made, in one country or 
janother, an article of food. It is the case, at the 
same time, that there are many articles used as foocj 
in one country which are not used as food in an- 
other. This difference in the manner of living is to 
be ascribed, in many cases, to some early and fixed 
association. In some countries the people eat rats, 
pfiice, frogs, lizards, horseflesh, dogs, locusts, cater- 
pillars, &c.* In other countries, iri our own foF 
instance, the associations adverse to the use of such 
kinds of food are so strong that it is next to irnpos? 
sible to overcome them. 

II. — There are appetitive associations of a differ- 
ent kind. It is well known, for instance, that the 
appetite for drink may be inflamed by a mere name, 
or the sight of a particular building or place, or the 

* Lander's Niger, vol. i., Am. ed., p. 170, 179. — Lives of Cel- 
ebrated Travellers, vol. i.. Am. ed., p. 102, 215. 



CONNEXION WITH THE SENSIBILITIES. 367 

return of a certain hour of the day. This unques- 
tionably is the result of a casual association. And 
the association may have become so strong, that the 
appetite is rendered wholly irrepressible whenever 
such objects recur. — This is particularly true when 
the liquor itself, the rum, gin, wine, or brandy, is 
placed directly before the thorough-going drunkard. 
The appetite in a moment becomes so strong as to 
convulse the whole souU He is agitated and rent 
with a sort of madness ; and rushes upon the object 
before him, much as the furious lion seizes and 
rends his keeper when he has accidentally seen and 
tasted his blood. 

§ 227, Of Casual Associations in connexion tvith 
the Propensities, 

As we pass on from the Appetites to the consid- 
eration of that part of our Sentient nature which, in 
distinction from the appetites on the one hand and 
the affections on the other, is known as the Propen- 
sities, we find some instances of the power of asso- 
ciation, both in strengthening and in annulling them, 
— Among other Propensities, which have a distinct 
and natural origin, is the desire of society ; but it is 
undoubtedly the case,, that peculiar circumstances 
may operate either to increase this desire or to an- 
nul it altogether. All cases of decided and perma- 
nent Misanthropy, for instance, are the work, with 
perhaps a few exceptions of congenital alienation, 
not of nature, but of circumstances. If a man of 
kind and benevolent feelings is exceedingly ill-treat- 
ed by one whom he has oflen favoured, it is possi- 



368 CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS IN 

ble, at least, that it will result in a fixed aversion to 
that person, which nothing can afterward overcome. 
If a deep and permanent injury were inflicted, not 
merely by a friend, but a brother, the effect on the 
mind might be so great as not only to break up the 
original principle of sociability, but implant a deci- 
ded and unchangeable hostility to the whole human 
race. Such treatment would be so contrary from 
what the injured person had a right to expect, that 
the mind would be thrown entirely out of its original 
position, and with such force as to be unable to re- 
cover it. 

§ 228. Other instances of Casual Association in 
connexion ivith the Propensities, 

The desire of power, in the remarks which were 
formerly made upon that subject, was regarded as 
an original propensity. This principle may become 
disordered in its action by becoming inordinately in- 
tense, and also in connexion with some casual as- 
sociation. Mr. Locke, in his Letters on Tolera- 
tion, mentions the case of an individual (the case 
already instanced under the head of inordinate de- 
sire of power) whose mind was so long and intently 
fixed upon some high object, that he became par* 
tially insane. He was, for the most part, rational at 
other times, but whenever the object he had so earr 
nestly pursued was mentioned, it brought into exer- 
cise so many intense associations that he immedi- 
ately became deranged. 

4^1though we might find it difficult to illustrate this 
subject from the ordinary forms of the propensity to 



CONNEXION WITH THE SENSIBILITIES. 369 

Imitation, the power of casual associations may dis- 
tinctly be shown in sympathetic imitation. If a per- 
son's feelings be, from any cause, so strongly exci- 
ted as to show themselves in involuntary bodily ac- 
tion, subsequently the mere sight of the person, 
place, or instrument that was prominently concerned 
in the original excitement of the mind, will general- 
ly be attended with a recurrence of the sympathetic 
bodily action. After such results have followed a 
number of times, the association will become so 
strong, that it will be very difficult, if not impossible, 
for the sympathetic person to repress the outward 
bodily signs, in all cases, coming within the reach of 
the association. 

§ 229. Inordinate fear from Casual Associations. 

The same views may undoubtedly be carried into 
the higher department of the Affections or Passions. 
It is sufficiently evident, for instance, that the pas- 
sion of FEAR is an attribute of man's nature ; and, 
in ordinary cases, it is susceptible of being subject- 
ed to the control of reason and the sentiments of 
duty. But this is not always the case. Casual 
associations are sometimes formed which no effort 
of reason and no calls of duty can rend asunder. — 
We will endeavour to illustrate this subject by some 
familiar instances. 

Some persons have been exceedingly frightened 
by thunder and lightning at early periods of life. 
The fright may have been occasioned either direct- 
ly, or by the actual terrific power and nearness of 
the explosion, or by merely seeing an exhibition of 



370 CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS IN 

great fear in parents or others more advanced in 
years. And from that hour to the end of Hfe they 
have never been able, with all possible care and anx- 
iety, to free themselves from the most distressing 
fear on such occasions. 

Casual associations, occasioned by some unfor- 
tunate circumstances in early life, have been the 
source of very great and irrepressible fears in re- 
spect to death. The fear of death is natural ; and, 
perhaps we may say, is instinctive ; bui it does not 
ordinarily exist in such intensity as essentially to in- 
terrupt one's happiness. And yet, from time to time, 
we find unhappy exceptions to this statement. Miss 
Hamilton, in her Letters on Education, gives an in- 
teresting account of a lady who suffered exceeding- 
ly from such fears. She was a person of an origi- 
nal and inventive genius, of a sound judgment, and 
her powers of mind had received a careful cultiva- 
tion. But all this availed nothing against the im- 
pressions which had been wrought into her mind 
from infancy. The first view which she had of 
death in infancy was accompanied with peculiar cir- 
cumstances of terror ; and the dreadful impression 
which was then made was heightened by the injudi- 
cious language of the nursery. Ever afterward, the 
mere mention or idea of death was attended with 
great suffering ; so much so, that it was necessary, 
by means of every possible precaution, to keep her 
in ignorance of her actual danger when she was 
sick ; nor was it permitted, at any time, to mention 
instances of death in her presence. So that the 
estimable writer of this statement asserts, that sha 



CONNEXION WITH THE SENSIBILITIES. 371 

often suffered more from the apprehension than she 
could have suffered from the most agonizing torture 
that ever attended the hour of dissolution.* 

§ 230. Casual Associations in respect to persons. 

That the Affections may be more or less disor- 
dered by means of casual associations, is further 
evident from what we notice in the intercourse of 
individuals with each other. Men sometimes form 
such an aversion to others, or associate with them 
such sentiments of dread, that the connexion of the 
persons and the feelings becomes permanent and 
unconquerable. — it has sometimes been the case, 
that a man of distinguished talents has been defeat- 
ed and prostrated by another, in an argument, per- 
haps, on some public occasion ; and although he 
harbours no resentment against his opponent, and 
has no sense of inferiority, yet he never afterward 
meets him in company without experiencing a very 
sensible degree of uneasiness and suffering. 

Persons have sometimes been ill-treated by oth- 
ers ; and this occasionally forms the basis of an in- 
vincible association, either of aversion or of dread. 
The poet Cowper, in early life, suffered in this way. 
A boy of a cruel temper, his superior in age, made 
him the object of long-continued ill-treatment and 
persecution. "This boy" (he remarks) "had im- 
pressed such a dread of his figure upon my mind, 
that I well remember being afraid to lift my eyes 
upon him higher than his knees ; and that I knew 
him by his shoebuckles better than by cmy other 
part of his dress." 

* Elementary Principles of Education, Letter III. 



372 CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS IN 

An individual was once perfectly cured of mad- 
ness by a very harsh and offensive operation. Du- 
ring all his Hfe after, he acknowledged, with the most 
sincere gratitude^ that he could not have received a 
greater benefit ; and still he was utterly unable to 
bear the sight of the operator, it suggested so strong- 
ly the dreadful suffering which he underwent.* 

Some men have an exceeding and unaccountable 
aversion to the mere features and countenance of an- 
other, and cannot bear to be looked upon by them^ 
A statement is somewhere given of a person of a 
noble family, who was not able to bear that an old 
woman should look upon him. Certain persons, in 
a season of merriment, which is not always wisely 
directed towards these humbling infirmities of our 
nature^ succeeded in suddenly and unexpectedly in- 
troducing him into the presence of one such, but the 
shock to his feelings was so great as to terminate in 
his death. 

^231. Casual Association in connexion ivith objects 
and places. 

The mental operations, in consequence of strong 
casual associations, may be perplexed in their action 
in connexion with particular places and objects* 
" Some persons" (says Dr. Conolly, in reference to 
this subject) " are mad and unmanageable at home, 
and sane abroad. We read in Aretaeus of a car- 
penter who was very rational in his workshop, but 
who could not turn his steps towards the Forum 
without beginning to groan, to shrug his shoulders^ 

* Locke's Essay, book ii., ch. xxxii. 



CONNEXION WITH THE SENSIBILITIES. 373 

and to bemoan himself. Dr. Rush relates an in- 
stance of a preacher in America, who was mad 
among his parishioners except in the pulpit, where 
he conducted himself with great ability ; and he also 
speaks of a judge who was very lunatic in mixed 
society, but sagacious on the bench." 

" I have known patients" (says the same writer 
in another place) " in whom there was a tendency 
to mania, complain of the difficulty they found in 
guarding against dislike, not only of particular indi- 
viduals, but of particular parts of a room, or of the 
house, or of particular articles of furniture or dress ; 
those momentary feelings of uneasiness or antipathy 
to which all are subject, becoming in them aggrava- 
ted or prolonged."* In connexion with the facts 
just stated, he mentions the case of an individual 
who could not bear the sight of white stockings ; 
and of a certain Russian general who entertained a 
singular antipathy to mirrors ; so much so, that the 
Empress Catharine always took care to give him 
audience in a room without any. 

§ 232. Of Casual Association in connexion with 
'particular days. 

The same marked tendencies of mind may some- 
times be discovered in connexion with particular 
days or other periods of time. Pinel mentions a 
lady who fancied that Friday was a day of ill omen 
and ill luck. " She at length carried this notion so 
far, that she would not leave her room on that day. 
If the month began on a Friday, it rendered her ex- 

♦ ConoUy on Insanity, London ed., p. 98, 218. 
Il 



374 CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS IN 

tremely fearful and miserable for several days. By 
degrees, Thursday, being the eve of Friday, excited 
similar alarms. If ever she heard either of those 
days named in company, she immediately turned 
pale, and was confused in her manner and conver- 
sation, as if she had been visited by some fatal mis- 
fortune."* 

Statements, much to the same effect, have been 
made of an individual no less distinguished than 
Lord Byron. From some circumstance or other, 
he became deeply impressed with the belief that 
Friday was destined to be, in relation to himself, an 
unlucky or ill-omened day. This was not a mere 
transitory feeling, which was under the control of his 
philosophy, but was deeply seated and operative. 
And, with his characteristic frankness, he did not 
hesitate to declare, or, rather, he took no pains to 
conceal, that his mind was actually under the des- 
potism of this strange influence. | 

We will subjoin here, as bearing some affinity to 
the cases which might properly be arranged under 
this head, an instance mentioned in the Encyclopae- 
dia Americana, by the author of the article on Mem- 
ory. The statement is as follows : " How strange 
are the associations of ideas which often take place 
in spite of us. Every one must have experienced 
such. The writer recollects a melancholy instance 
in the case of an insane boy in an hospital, whose 
derangement was referred to an irreverent associa- 
tion with the name of God, which occurred to him 

* Treatise on Insanity, p. 140. 

t Moore's Life of Byron, vol. ii., p. 458. 



CONNEXION WITH THE SENSIBILITIES. 375 

while singing a hymn in church, and of which he 
could not divest himself, the painfulness of the im- 
pression making it occur to him more forcibly every 
time he sung in church, till his reason became un- 
settled." 

§ 233. Antipathies to Animals. 

Nothing but the fact of the existence and great 
power of casual associations can explain the circum- 
stance, that individuals have, from time to time, dis- 
covered a very great antipathy to certain animals. 
Tasso, according to his biographers, would fall into 
convulsions at the sight of a carp. Henry the 
Third, of England, could not be persuaded to sit in 
the room with a cat. Admiral Coligni, a name 
justly renowned in the history of France, was so 
afraid of a mouse, that he could not be induced to 
admit one to his presence unless he had his sword 
in his hand. 

No man ever gave more decided proofs of cour- 
age than the celebrated Marquis de la Roche Jac- 
queline ; but it is a singular fact (although no ac- 
count is given of the origin of this strange associa- 
tion), that he could not look in the face of a squirrel 
without trembling and turning pale. He himself 
ridiculed his weakness in this respect ; but, with all 
his efforts, he could not prevent the physical effects 
which have been referred to, whenever he was in the 
presence of that harmless animal. 

But we have an incident nearer home, which ap- 
pears the less surprising, because we know the ori- 
gin of it. The late Governor Sullivan, of Massa- 



376 CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS IN 

chusetts, when a boy, fell asleep under a tree, and 
was awakened by a serpent crawling over him. He 
arose in great terror, ran towards the house, and fell 
down in a convulsive fit. Afterward, through life, 
he retained such aversion for everything of the ser- 
pent kind, that he could not see one, or even the 
picture of one, without falling into convulsions. 

Peter the Great, of Russia, who certainly was not 
wanting in expansion and force of mind, was subject 
to a strong and invincible aversion of this kind. His 
biographer, without giving any explanation of it, 
merely mentions the facts as follows. — "Nothing 
was so much the object of the Czar's antipathy as a 
black insect of the scarabeus or beetle kind, which 
breeds in houses that are not kept clean, and espe- 
cially in places where meal and other provisions are 
deposited. In the country the walls and ceilings of 
the peasant's houses are covered with them, partic- 
ularly in Russia, where they abound more than in 
any other part of the world. They are there called 
taracan ; but our naturalists give them the name of 
dermeste, or dissecting scarabeus. 

« Although the Russian monarch was far from 
being subject to childish fears or womanish fancies, 
one of these insects sufficed to drive him out of an 
apartment, nay, even out of the house. In his fre- 
quent journeys in his own dominions, he never went 
into a house without having his apartment carefully 
swept by one of his own servants, and being assured 
that there were no taracans to fear. One day he 
paid a visit to an officer, who stood pretty high in 
his esteem, at his country house, which was built of 



CONNEXION WITH THE SENSIBILITIES. 377 

wood, at a little distance from Moscow. The Czar 
expressed his satisfaction with what was offered him, 
and with the order he observed in the house. The 
company sat down to table, and dinner was already- 
begun, when he asked his landlord if there were 
taracans in his house. 

" ' Not many,' replied the officer, without reflect- 
ing; 'and, the better to get rid of them, I have 
pinned a living one to the wall.' At the same time 
he pointed to the place where the insect was pinned, 
and still continued to palpitate. Unfortunately, it 
was just beside the Czar, in whom the unexpected 
sight of this object of his aversion produced so much 
emotion, that he rose instantly from table, gave the 
officer a violent blow, and left his house with all his 
attendants."* 

* StaBlhim's Original Anecdotes of Peter the Great. 
Ii2 



IMPERFECT AND DISORDERED 



MENTAL ACTION 



DIVISION THIRD, 



DISORDERED ACTION OF THE WILL. 



DISORDERED ACTION 

OF THR 

WILL. 



CHAPTER I. 

NATURE OF THE WILL. 

^ 234. On the relation of the Will to the other parts 
of the M.ind, 

It cannot fail to have been noticed, that our in- 
quiries hitherto have proceeded upon the important 
principle, which is now generally acknowledged to 
be a correct one, of a threefold division of the mind, 
viz., the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will. 
Having considered the subject before us, very brief- 
ly, it is true, in connexion with the two first-mention- 
ed departments, we proceed now to the only re- 
maining topic, viz., the Disordered Action of the Will. 

The Will is a department of the Mind, evidently 
standing by itself; having its distinct nature and at- 
tributes, as well as its appropriate laws. The purely 
intellectual acts have something peculiar and char- 
acteristic, which shuts them out, as it were, from the 



382 NATURE OF THE WILL. 

region of the Sensibilities. The Sensitive action, 
as well as the Intellectual, has its specific nature ; 
something by which it is known and distinguished 
from other forms of mental movement. The Will 
also stands apart, having its appropriate sphere and 
its allotted duties ; holding, as it were, the place of 
keystone to the arch, and exercising a sort of super- 
visory and authoritative power over the other depart- 
ments of the mind. 

The philosophy of the Will, considered in its reg- 
ular or normal action, is a subject of great impor- 
tance and interest ; nor will it be found wholly want- 
ing in interest when considered in reference to those 
irregularities of action of which it is sometimes the 
subject. 

§ 235. Of the attribute of Power as existing in the 

Will 

The subject of the disordered action and insanity 
of the Will will be found, in its basis or origin, to 
have relation, in nearly all cases, to the attribute of 
Power. — It will be noticed, that we take it for grant- 
ed that there is such a thing as power. In other 
words, that power, notwithstanding the fact of its not 
being directly cognizable by the outward senses (as 
it is not), is something positive and real ; something 
which can be estimated to some extent, and which 
can be made a subject of examination, reasoning, 
and opinion. Accordingly, every man is supposed 
to know what power is, although it may be very true 
that it is not a direct object of the sight or hearing, 
or any of the outward senses. 



NATtJRE OF THE WILL. 383 

And not only this. It is a fact also, for which 
we have the testimony of our consciences, that, al- 
though it does not exist in the form of a separate 
faculty analogous to perception or memory, it exists, 
nevertheless, as an attribute of the whole mind, and 
is diffused, in a greater or less degree, through all 
, its faculties. In other words, we have an original 
feeling or conviction, originating in the facts of our 
consciousness, that in every exercise or operation of 
the mind there is, and must be, power. 

And this is not all. Power is not only, in gen- 
eral terms, predicable of the mind as a whole, but 
it is particularly and emphatically so of the depart- 
ment of the Will. If the other mental acts clearly 
indicate to us the existence of an innate energy, cer- 
tainly we should not expect to find less of energy, 
less of power, existing as the basis of acts of the 
will. When a person wills to go to a certain place, 
or wills to do a certain thing, it requires no train of 
reasoning to convince him that power is the basis of 
the volition, and, consequently, that power truly ex- 
ists as an attribute of the voluntary or volitive nature. 

§ 236. Of the degree of Power existing in the Will. 

We are not to suppose that the power which ex- 
ists in the Will is unHmited in degree. The degree 
of power is different in different minds ; but in all 
cases it may be regarded as a fixed and definite 
thing ; capable of a certain amount of action, or of 
sustaining a certain degree of pressure, but utterly 
inefficient beyond that amount or degree. 

The Will, therefore, may, under certain circum- 



384 NATURE OF THE WILL. 

stances, be overburdened and oppressediin its action. 
We may expect too much from it ; and it may not 
answer to our requisitions, merely because it is un- 
able to. It may be thrown into a wrong position by 
the excited state and the inordinate action of other 
parts of the mind. It may be undermined by a 
crazy belief, or trammelled by an invincible associ- 
ation. For these and for other reasons, it may fail 
(and, in point of fact, this is not unfrequently the 
case) to discharge successfully its appropriate offices. 

§ 237. Of Positive in distinction from Relative 
disorder of the WilL 

Accordingly, a disordered or ahenated condition 
of the Will is as frequently relative as positive. 
That is to say (and this is an important considera- 
tion, which it may be well to keep in mind), it fails 
to fulfil the duties which pertain to it as a voluntary 
power, as frequently, and probably more so, in con- 
sequence of the disordered action of other parts of 
the mind, as in consequence of any absolute defect 
inherent in itself. Nevertheless, there are some 
cases where it is evident that the defective volun- 
tary action is to be ascribed, not so much to any 
perplexities and hinderances which lay out of the will, 
as to something which nature herself may be said to 
have wrought into it. 



IMBECILITY OF THE WILL. 



385 



CHAPTER 11. 

IMBECILITY OF THE WILL. 

§ 238. Of natural weakness or imbecility of the Will 
One of the forms in which a disordered will de- 
velopes itself is that of Imbecility or inordinate 
Weakness.— We not unfrequently see persons who 
develope this trait of mind ; men who are easily m- 
timidated, vacillating, who affirm when they should 
deny, and deny when they should affirm ; who, m 
common parlance, and almost in strict truth, "have 
no will of their own." 

Their minds are essentially in the cendition ot a 
paralytic Umb, Ihat may be acted upon, but without 
giving any signs of vitality in itself. Sometimes 
these persons possess a considerable share of natu- 
ral intellectual vigour; but it is almost of no avail, 
since their voluntary energy is not sufficient to bring 
it into permanent action. They sometimes form 
plans, but generally exhaust themselves in the m- 
cipient efforts, and the execution is a non sequitur ! 
They would be wholly useless in society, were it not 
that they can be acted on by others, and thus be 
kept in a sort of automatic movement by means of 
other person's wills substituted in the place of their 

own. 

Kk 



386 IMBECILITY OF THE WILL. 

§ 239. Consideration of the foregoing statements! iri 
connexion with Power. 

The statements which have just been made illus- 
trate a leading remark in the preceding chapter to 
this effect, that the subject of disordered action ex- 
isting in the Will w'ill be found, in nearly all cases, 
to have a relation to the attribute of Power. A nor- 
mal or right Will may, of course, be expected to 
have power enough to secure the great objects for 
which the Will obviously exists, viz., the exercise of 
a supervisory control, and the enforcement of that 
control upon the other parts of the mind, as well as 
upon the body. This is the true idea of a perfectly 
regular or sane state of the Will. Consequently, 
every deviation from this state, when, for instance, 
there is not power enough to secure these great ob- 
jects, and the man is governed by the impulses of 
association and feeling rather than by the great reg- 
ulator, necessarily implies, to some extent, an im^ 
perfect or disordered state. 

And this is precisely the case which was consid- 
ered in the preceding section. The Will fails of its 
object, and, therefore, is not such as it should ht. 
It does not exhibit the great requisite and character- 
istic of its own nature, viz., the element of authori^- 
tative control, and, therefore, cannot escape the im- 
putation, according to the degree in which the defect 
exists, either of disorder short of insanity, or of pos- 
itive alienation. 

Of this form of disordered Will some illustrations 
might properly be given in this place, additional to 



IMBECILITY OF THE WILL. 387 

^e facts and instances given in the chapters on Ab- 
siraction and Attention, which will help to commu- 
nicate some idea of it. 

§ 240. Illustration of natural imhecility of the Will. 
Pinel states, that he had frequent opportunities of 
seeing a person, whose conduct, as it seems to us, 
rather strikingly illustrates this form of mental disor- 
der-After stating that his ideas appeared to be in- 
sulated, and to rise one after the other without con- 
nexion he goes on to remark as follows : His 
Sons, his ideas, his broken sentences his confu- 
ted and momentary glimpses of mental affection, ap- 
peared to present a perfect image of chaos. He 
came up to^me, looked at me, and overwhelmed me 
with a torrent of words, without order or connexion. 
U a moment he turned to another Person, whom, in 
his turn, he deafened with his unmeaning babble or 
threatened with an evanescent look of anger. But, 
Z incapable of determined and continued excite- 
ment of the feelings, as of a just connexion of ideas, 
his emotions were the effects of a """""^nt^. f^'; 
vescence, which was immediately succeeded by a 

^""^he went into a room, he quickly displaced or 
overturned the furniture, without manjfestmg any di- 
rect intention. Scarcely could one look off before 
he would be at a considerable distance, exercismg 
his versatile mobility in some other way. He was 
quiet only when food was presented to h.m. He 
Jested, even at nights, but for a few moments. 
. PineVs Treatise on Insanity, Davis's Translation, p. 163. 



388 IMBECILITY OF THE WILL. 

It is very evident that the power of Will existed 
in this person in a very limited degree. Indeed, it 
is not easy to perceive how his conduct could be 
very much different, if the faculty of the Will had 
been entirely erased from his mind, and he had been 
left without any controlling principle at all. 

§ 241. Further remarks on imbecility of Will. 

There are some important applications which 
may be made of the view that has now been taken. 
There are some men, for instance, who, under the 
influence of some more or less slightly excited pas- 
sion, commit crimes which we should certainly sup- 
pose they would not do if they had the least power 
of self-restraint. They go forward much as do some 
children, in whom the volitive power is but little de- 
veloped, and whose constantly varying acts seem to 
originate exclusively in mere sensitive, passionate 
impulses. In other words, their conduct is very 
much such as we should suppose it would be if the 
outward action were based directly upon the sensi- 
bilities, without the suspensive and regulative faculty 
of the Will intervening. They feel, they have an 
impulse, and they go and do accordingly, without 
any interrogatory being put or any restraint being 
exercised by the higher regulating power. In all 
such cases, where we do not see occasion for great 
excitement of the passions, and where, in point of 
fact, although there is some, there is yet no very 
great excitement, it seems impossible to explain the 
facts that present themselves, except on the ground 
of inordinate weakness of the WilL 



IMBECILITY OF THE WILL. 389 

I am inclined to the opinion, that in many cases 
of murder, if we could analyze perfectly the mental 
structure of those who commit this crime, we should 
find these individuals differing from a multitude of 
other persons less in the positive malignity of the 
passions than in a great weakness of the will, which 
renders them unable to control their passions. It 
is probable that, in most cases, this is not the only 
ground of difference, as there may, for instance, be 
combined with the weakness of the will an inordi- 
nate feebleness of the moral power ; but it is one, 
and a very important one. The persons in ques- 
tion are the subjects of excited feeling and passion 
in a greater or less degree ; sometimes in rather a 
small degree. They have, however, something, and 
evidently 7nust have something, to move them on in 
the course which they take ; but they would proba- 
bly do otherwise than they do, in fact, and would 
frequently repress their emotions and passions, which 
have put them on a wrong direction, if they were not 
greatly deficient in the superintending and control- 
ling principles of the mind. 

These remarks will perhaps apply to the case of 
an individual by the name of Prescott, who was re- 
cently executed in New-Hampshire for the crime of 
murder. The case is given at some length, and 
with appropriate remarks, in the work of Dr. Ray 
on Medical Jurisprudence. 

§ 242. Of alienation of the Will teiined Incon- 

STANTIA. 

Imbecility of the will is sometimes connected with 
Kk2 



390 IMBECILITY OF THE WILL. 

an irregular action of the power of Association ;• and 
it seems to be the pecuUar modification of mental 
disorder which the mind then assumes, which is 
known in medical writers under the name of incon- 
STANTiA. The instances which illustrate this form 
of mental disorder might many times be arranged, 
according to the view which is taken of them, either 
as instances of alienated will or alienated associa- 
tion. The persons who are subject to this form of 
perplexed and disordered mental action are desig- 
nated by various epithets, such as fickle, flighty, 
light-headed, hair-brained. The thoughts of these 
persons, as we have already described them under 
the head of Association, fly from one subject to an- 
other with great rapidity ; their bodies are almost 
always in motion, and their volubility of speech is 
excessive. 

M. Pinel mentions an instance (a gentleman who 
had been educated in the prejudices of the ancient 
noblesse of France) which illustrates this singular 
condition of mind. " He constantly busfled about 
the house, talking incessantly, shouting, and throw- 
ing himself into great passions for the most trifling 
causes. He teased his domestics by the most friv- 
olous orders, and his neighbours by his fooleries 
and extravagances, of which he retained not the 
least recollection for a single moment. He talked 
with the greatest volatility of the court, of his peri- 
wig, of his horses, of his gardens, without waiting 
for an answer, or giving time to follow his incohe- 
rent jargon." 



IMBECILITY OF THE WILL. 391 

§ 243. Of superinduced weakness of Will, or that 
which is occasioned by wrong mental training. 

We are not always to infer, however, from the 
mere fact of the existence of a weakness of the 
Will, that it is in all cases natural, and, conse- 
quently, something for which the individual is not 
accountable. — The Will admits of its appropriate 
exercise, and its nature requires such exercise. 
And, if it is denied what its nature thus requires ; if 
it is never placed in difficult positions, and never 
permitted to exert itself, the necessary result is, that 
it will lose in a considerable degree, and sometimes 
almost entirely, the amount of power, whether more 
or less, which it naturally had. 

There are sometimes whole classes of people, in 
whom, not so much by nature as by circumstances, 
the faculty of the Will, which ought ever to show it- 
self as a decisive and leading principle, appears in- 
ert and feeble. — Dr. Rush intimates that slaves are 
very apt to exhibit this trait of mind ; not, however, 
in consequence of natural imbecility so much as a 
feebleness and uncertainty of purpose, gradually su- 
perinduced by being constantly under the direction 
of others, and not being called upon to exercise their 
own wills. 

It may be added also, that these views may es- 
sentially aid, in some cases at least, in the explana- 
tion of that weakness and uncertainty of purpose 
which we not unfrequently notice in old people, and 
which forms an important element in that complex 
trait of character which we denominate the childish- 



392 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE WILL IN 

ness of old age. Their wills grow weak from the 
want of exercise ; and their passions, showing them- 
selves in the forms of peevishness and fickle ill-hu- 
mour, grow strong for the opposite reason. 



CHAPTER III. 

piSORPEREJ) ACTION OF THE WILL IN CONNEXION 
WITH OTHER POWERS. 

!^ 244. The action of the Will may be perplexed 
through the n^edium of the other faculties. 

Sometimes the perplexed and disordered action 
of the Will is relative rather than positive. It stands 
well in itself. It bears the stamp and gives the ev-^ 
idence of entire soundness, when considered apart 
from the other powers. Nevertheless, in conse- 
quence of its connexion with other parts of the mind, 
its action may be interrupted and perplexed, and 
sometimes in the very highest degree. We do not, 
however, mean to say that it is perplexed and hin- 
dered in its action in all respects, which is not the 
fact ; but only when it comes within reach of the in- 
fluence of this connexion. 

§ 245. Disordered Action of the jV[ind in connexion 
with Casual Associations, 

As m illustration of this matter, we may very 



CONNEXION WITH OTHER POWERS. 393 

properly refer to some of those striking facts which 
were introduced in the chapter on Casual Associa- 
tions. Peter the Great, for instance, in whom en- 
ergy of the will was unquestionably a very conspic- 
uous characteristic, was utterly unable to bear the 
sight of a certain insect. La Roche Jacqueline, an- 
other individual mentioned in the chapter just refer- 
red to, was brave and chivalric in the very highest 
degree. Few names among the numberless re- 
nowned men of France stand higher on the heroic 
and patriotic list than his. And yet it appears, from 
the accounts which are given of him, that he always 
lost all courage, and was entirely unmanned m the 
presence of a harmless squirrel. In these, and a 
multitude of other cases like them, we have instan- 
ces of men who possessed, in general, great energy 
and decision, but who displayed in certain very triv- 
ial conjunctures the greatest imbecility. 

In all cases of this kind, we may probably regard 
the origin, the seat of the disorder, as existing in the 
associating principle. This principle calls up, from 
time to time, certain very unpleasant feelings, which, 
in the history of the individual, are found to be con- 
nected with certain objects. And it does it with 
great force and distinctness ; so much so as to set 
the regulating power of the will entirely at defiance. 
Consequently, the individual, apparently without any 
adequate cause, is thrown into great agitation ; his 
fears, or, perhaps, some other passion, are greatly 
excited ; his will is, as it were, taken captive ; and 
his conduct at once assumes an aspect which can- 



394 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE WILL IN 

not be explained in accordance with the ordinary 
results of a sound mind. 

We assert, therefore, that the action of the will 
in these cases is a disordered one, although the 
cause of the disorder lays out of itself, because it 
does not act, and is not able to act, in accordance 
with the original tendencies and constitution of its 
own nature. It is not what it should be, and what 
a truly sound and unperplexed will always is, viz., 
capable of regulating the feelings and actions, so far 
as is suitable and proper, or, in other words, so far 
as is required by a true view of the nature and rela- 
tions of things. 

§ 246. MditiQual illustration of the preceding view, 
Perliaps we have, in the personal history of Dr. 
Johnson, an instance of alienation of will, based on a 
disordered casual association. — " He had another 
particularity" (says his biographer), ^' of which none 
of his friends ever ventured to ask him an explana-? 
tion. It appeared to me some superstitious habit, 
which he had contracted early, and from which he 
had never called upon his reason to disentangle him. 
This was his anxious care to go out or in at a door 
or passage by a certain number of steps from a 
certain point, or, at least, so that as either his right 
or left foot (I am not certain which) should con- 
stantly make the first movement when he came 
close to the door or passage. Thus I conjecture : 
for I have, upon innumerable occasions, observed 
him suddenly stop, and then seem to count his steps 
with a deep earnestness ; and, when he had neglect- 



CONNEXION WITH OTHER POWERS. 395 

hd or gone wrong in this sort of magical movement, 
I have seen him go back again, put himself into a 
proper posture to begin the ceremony, and, having 
gone through it, break from his abstraction, walk 
briskly on, and join his company."— With such clear- 
ness of perception, with such vast powers of under- 
standing as Dr. Johnson possessed, we cannot sup- 
pose that he would ever have submitted to the utter 
folly of such a practice, if his will had not entirely 
lost its power in that particular, in consequence of 
some early association, which had fastened itself in 
the mind too deeply for eradication. 

§ 247. Of alienation of the Will as connected with 
a disordered state or alienation of Belief 

There are yet other cases of a disordered action 
of the Will, resulting from its connexion with other 
parts of the mind. There is a close connexion, for 
instance, between the faculty of the Will and that 
state of the mind which is termed Belief. And this 
connexion appears, among other things,' in this way. 
It will be found, on examination^ that the strength of 
the will's acts or volitions will become diminished 
more and more in conformity with the diminution of 
belief; and that, by the original constitution of the 
mind itself, there is not even a possibility of putting 
forth the mental exercise of volition when there is 
no belief that the thing to which it relates is in our 
power. Hence it follows as a general truth, that a 
disordered or alienated state of belief will be follow- 
ed by a corresponding alienation of the will. 

Accordingly, if a man, in the condition of insani- 



396 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE WILL IN 

ty of belief, truly looks upon himself as made of 
glass, it is just as difficult for him to will to move 
himself about rapidly, and to throw himself suddenly 
and violently in contact with solid and hard bodies, 
as it is for a man in a sane mind to loill to thrust his 
hand or foot into the fire or boiling water, which, 
with many persons, would be found to be an utter 
impossibility. His will is in such cases enslaved 
(not in the more common and orditiary form of en- 
thralment, which is fully consistent with moral ac- 
countability), but to the degree of imanily. 

We will suppose, as a further illustration of this 
view, that a man in the state of insanity of belief has 
a firm and unalterable conviction, as much so as of 
his own existence, that he has, by amputation or in 
some way, lost an arm or a leg ; and it will be found, 
just so long as he remains the subject of this alien- 
ation of belief, impossible for him to put forth a sin- 
gle volition having a relation to the action of those 
parts of the body. To that extent the power of will- 
ing is entirely lost. If his physician, or any one else, 
should require him to put forth such volition, it would 
appear to him (and necessarily so, from the consti- 
tution of the mind itself) not only impossible, but as 
supremely ridiculous as for a man of sound mind to 
will to walk upon the ocean or to fly in the air. 

^ 248. Alienation of the Will in connexion with 
Melancholy, 

Furthermore, the will is sometimes alienated (that 
is to say, is in that state which is usually indicated 
by the term insanity) in cases where there is a 



CONNEXION WITH OTHER POWERS. 397 

deeply-rooted and permanent melancholy. The 
mind of the person is fixed upon some gloomy sub- 
ject; it remains the object of contemplation day 
after day and hour after hour ; a thick, impenetra- 
ble cloud seems to invest every prospect, whether 
present or future. It seems to the spectator that 
there is nothing wanting but a mere act of the will, 
a resolution, a mere decision, in order to bring the 
person out of this state of gloomy inactivity, and 
carry him once more into the discharge of the duties 
of life. And this is true, if the will could be made 
to act. But the gloom spreads itself from the un- 
derstanding to the heart, and from the heart to the 
region of the voluntary power ; and the will, invest- 
ed on every side by the darkness of this dense and 
impenetrable atmosphere, remains closed up and 
fixed, as if imbedded in a mass of ice. When the 
gloom is deepened to a certain degree, although the 
power of the will is not entirely gone, it is impossi- 
ble for it to put forth any effective action. 

The English poet Collins is an instance of this 
unhappy state of mind. " He languished some 
years" (says his biographer) " under that depression 
of mind which enchains the faculties without de- 
stroying them, and leaves reason the knowledge of 
right without the power of pursuing it. These 
clouds, which he perceived gathering upon his intel- 
lects, he endeavoured to disperse by travel, and pass- 
ed into France ; but found himself constrained to yield 
to his malady, and returned. He was for some time 
confined in a house of lunatics."* Well might this 

* Johnson's Lives of the English Poets, art. Collins. 

Ll 



398 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE WILL IN 

genuine poet have adopted the language, afterward 
SO feelingly applied to himself by his biographer, 

" Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased ? 
* Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow ?" 

In all cases of this kind, whatever may be the 
cause of them, the will has obviously lost its power ; 
it has ceased, and apparently without the possibility 
of doing otherwise, to exercise that authority over 
the other powers of the mind to which it is, by its 
nature, entitled. 

§ 249. Of Accountability in connexion with Aliena- 
tion or Insanity of the Will, 

It will be seen, from what has been said, that the 
particular form or aspect of disorder and insanity of 
the will is very various ; sometimes consisting of the 
entire or almost entire abstraction of its own power ; 
sometimes in an immovable fixedness, either occa- 
sioned by its own imbecility or the undue prepon- 
derance of some other principle ; sometimes in an 
action, powerful enough, perhaps, but urged on, and 
wholly shut up in one direction, and not in posses- 
sion of an adequate degree of liberty ; sometimes 
in a fickleness approaching to entire contingency, 
occasioned by the suspension or violation of those 
general laws by which the action of the will is ordi- 
narily restrained and regulated. — In all cases of ac- 
tual insanity, under whatever aspect or form it may 
appear, the person who is the subject of it is free 
from moral accountability, to the degree or extent 
in which the insanity exists ; for it has now become 
a settled principle on the subject of mental aliena- 



CONNEXION WITH OTHER POWERS. 399 

tion, and one which is perfectly well understood, that 
not unfrequently the insanity extends to a particular 
power or a particular subject, and that beyond that 
particular power or subject the ordinary degree of 
perception and action remains. 

But the question here presents itself to us, How 
can we ascertain the existence of insanity? By 
what rule can it be discovered or known to exist in 
a particular case ? How can the line of demarcation 
be detected between that pressure of the will known 
as mere temporary enthralment, which exists in such 
a limited degree as to be consistent with moral ac- 
countability, and actual insanity of the will, which 
wholly destroys it ? — On this subject we do not feel 
called upon to lay down any general rule ; nor, if 
we were, should we be able to do it. The Supreme 
Being alone can tell, with entire certainty, when the 
limit is passed beyond which moral accountability 
ceases to exist. Men can do nothing more than 
approximate to such certainty of decision, determin- 
ing, according to the best of their judgment, on the 
circumstances of individual cases. 



THE END. 



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